ADOLFO OLAES AND LINDA M. CRUZ, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. JUDGE ALICIA L. SANTOS (IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF OLO…

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, the petitioners challenge the admission by the
respondent judge of evidence seized by virtue of an allegedly invalid search
warrant and of an extrajudicial confession
taken from them without according them the right to assistance of counsel.^[1]
They seek to restrain further proceedings in the criminal case against them for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act (which we have suspended)^[2]
and ask that they be acquitted with the
setting aside of the questioned orders.

The Solicitor General, in his Comment, suggests that the petition should be dismissed as it is not
alleged there­in that the respondent judge has committed grave abuse of
discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.  He adds that if any reversible error has been
committed, it may be corrected not in this petition but in an ordinary appeal,
which may not even be necessary if the petitioners are exonerated.^[3]

The petitioners, in their Reply, do not meet these arguments
head-on, thus impliedly admitting the formal defect in their petition, but
submit that technicalities should yield to substantial questions in the
interest of justice and to avoid unnecessary or protracted litigation.  Their contention is that since there are
important consti­tutional issues involved, these questions should be decided in
this petition instead of having them debated and resolved first in the lower
court in accordance with the usual procedure, to the prejudice of the speedy
disposition of their case.^[4]

We are not usually persuaded by this kind of argu­ment, since
procedural rules are intended precisely to insure an orderly administration of
justice.  Rights are best established in
accordance with the procedure laid down by the adjective law, which is as
binding on the parties as the
substantive law since they are supposed to comple­ment each other.  The Solicitor General is obviously correct in faulting the petition and in
contending that, besides being defective, it is not the proper remedy at this
time.  There is no disputing this stand.

Worthy of note in this
connection is the separate opinion of the present Chief Justice in Joseph v.
Villaluz,^[5] where he declared that:

“… the Court adheres to the settled rule that it will not
overrule in a special civil action the trial court’s interlocutory order denying
a motion to dismiss for failure or insufficiency of the prosecution’s evi­dence
since it cannot review in such special civil action the prosecution’s evidence
and decide here and now in advance that it has or has not established beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioners-accused.  The orderly procedure prescribed by the Rules
of Court is for the accused to present their evidence after which the trial
court will on the basis of the evidence presented before it by both the
prosecution and the defense render its judgment of conviction or acquittal. 
If the verdict be one of acquittal, the case ends there.  If it be a verdict of conviction, then appeal
is the proper remedy – and such appeal in order to have a review of the trial
court’s findings of fact lies within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals.”

We reiterate the rule
here.

Even so, the Court has
decided, without detracting from the validity of the above-cited observations,
to deviate from the established procedure on this matter and to categorically
resolve the issues presented in the case before us.  The challenged orders are, indeed,
interlocutory.  Nevertheless, a
restatement of the principles governing such issues will, it is expected,
simplify the proceedings in the court below and speed up the disposition of the
criminal case against the petitioners.

The petitioners claim that the search warrant issued by the
respondent judge is unconstitutional because it does not indicate the specific
offense they are supposed to have committed. 
There is, therefore,
according to them, no valid finding of probable cause as a justification for
the issuance of the said warrant in conformity with the Bill of Rights.  In support of this argument, they cite
Stonehill v. Diokno,^[6]
where Chief Justice Concepcion struck down the search warrants issued therein
for being based on the general allegation that the petitioners had committed
violations of “Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code.” He declared:

“In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications.  The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed were abstract.  As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal law.”

We have examined the search warrant issued in the instant case
and find it does not come under the strictures of the Stonehill doctrine.  In the case cited, there was a bare reference
to the laws in general, without any specifi­cation of the particular sections thereof
that were alleged to have been violated out of the hundreds of prohibitions
contained in such codifications.  There
is no similar ambiguity in the instant case.

While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states
that it is in connection with “Violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Acts of 1972,” it is clearly recited in the text
thereof that “there is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias
‘Debie’ and alias ‘Baby’ of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo
City, has in their possession and control and custody of marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt
narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above.”^[7]
Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed,
there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been
committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause.  The search warrant also satisfies the
requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be
made of the “place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.”

The petitioners also fault the admission of the extrajudicial
confessions which they had given without the assistance or advice of counsel
and cite Section 20 of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution providing
that “any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.”

In the separate sworn statements taken from Adolfo Olaes and
Linda Cruz on September 24, 1982,^[8] it appears that both petitioners
were, before being examined, specifically informed of their right to the
assistance of counsel, which would be provided them by the investigating office
at their request.  Asked if they
understood, they said “Opo” and affixed their signatures opposite
their answer.  This was followed by a
statement entitled “Pagpapatunay” or Verification in which they said inter alia that they did not need the assistance of counsel
(“Hindi ko na kailangan ang tulong ng isang manananggol.”) which they
also signed.  It was only after these
prelimi­nary precautions had been taken that the interrogation began and was
recorded in the sworn statement later introduced against them at their trial.

There is no claim that any force, violence, intimidation or threat or any means
vitiating the free will was employed against them.  Their only objection to the extra­judicial
confessions is that they were obtained without the assistance of counsel.  They do not aver in their petition that they
were not apprised of their right to counsel or that they were denied the
assistance of counsel when they asked for it, or, indeed, that they had asked
for it.

Even so, their investigation did not conform to the requirements
laid down in People v. Galit,^[9] where we declared:

“At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be
shown the warrant of arrest, if any.  He shall
be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement he might make could be used against him.  The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means – by telephone if possible – or by letter or messenger.  It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished.  No custodial investigation shall be conducted
unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon
petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf.  The right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel.  Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.”

These requirements were made even stricter under Article III,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, providing as follows:

“Sec. 12.  (1) Any person under inves­tigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice.  If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.  These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.”

“(3) Any
confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.”

Applying the above rules, we reach the conclusion that the
extrajudicial confessions should be declared inadmissible as evidence against
the herein petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly granted.  The extrajudicial confessions are excluded
but the articles seized under the challenged search warrant may be admitted in
evidence.  Our temporary restraining
order of May 25, 1987, is
lifted.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras, and
Gancayco, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 9-11.

^[2]
Ibid., p. 47.

^[3]
Id., p. 64.

^[4]
Petitioner’s Reply, pp. 4-5.

^[5]
89 SCRA 324.

^[6]
20 SCRA 383.

^[7]
Annex “A”, Rollo, p.
15.

^[8]
Annex “B” and
“B-1”, Rollo, pp. 16-17.

^[9]
135 SCRA 465.