AGUSTIN SALGADO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (FOURTEENTH DIVISION) AND HON. ANTONIO SOLANO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC-QUEZON CITY (BRANCH 86) …

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 15493 entitled, “Agustin Salgado v. Hon. Antonio P. Solano, et al.,” which affirmed the Order
dated December 22, 1987 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (Branch 86) sustaining its previous order dated November 18, 1987
directing the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the civil liability of
herein petitioner in Criminal Case No. 0-33798.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of serious physical
injuries in Criminal Case No. 0-33798 entitled, “People of the Philippines
v. Agustin Salgado,” before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 86). 
After trial, judgment was rendered on October 16, 1986 finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged.  The dispositive portion of the decision, states:

“WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused AGUSTIN P. SALGADO,
JR., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious physical injuries,
defined and penalized under paragraph 3 Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code,
and appreciating in his favor the following mitigating circumstances:

1)   voluntary surrender; and

2)   No
intention to commit so grave a wrong

hereby sentence (sic) said accused to
suffer imprisonment for a period of four (4) months and twenty (20) days, with
the accessories provided for by law, and to indemnify the
victim, Francisco Lukban,
Jr., in the sum of P126,633.50 as actual or compensatory
damages, and the sum of
P50,000.00 as damages for the incapacity
of Francisco Lukban to pursue
and engage in his poultry business.

“SO ORDERED.” (p. 19, Rollo)

On October 17, 1986,
petitioner filed an application for probation with the trial court.  The application was granted in an Order dated
April 15, 1987.  The order contained, among others, the
following condition:

“x x x.

“4.  Indemnify the victim FRANCISCO LUKBAN, JR., in
a monthly installment of P2,000.00 (TWO THOUSAND
PESOS) every month during the entire period of his probation.” (P. 15, Rollo)

For the months of May, June, July, August, September and October,
1987, petitioner complied with the above condition by paying in checks the said
sum of P2,000.00 monthly, through the City Probation
Officer, Perla Diaz Alonzo.  Private respondent Francisco Lukban, Jr. voluntarily accepted the checks and
subsequently encashed them (p. 19, Rollo).

On September 19, 1987,
private respondent Francisco Lukban, Jr. filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution for the enforcement of the civil
liability adjudged in his favor in the criminal case.  The motion was opposed by the petitioner.

On November 18, 1987,
the trial court issued an order granting
the motion for issuance of a writ of execution. 
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was denied
on December 22, 1987.  After the denial of his motion for
reconsideration, the petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for
review of the trial court’s order granting the motion for issuance of a writ of
execution.  We referred the petition to
the Court of Appeals in a resolution dated April 13, 1988 (p. 18, Rollo).

On March 16, 1989,
respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the order of the
trial court granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.  A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner
but respondent Court of Appeals denied the motion in a resolution dated August 3, 1989 (pp. 9-10, Rollo).

The petitioner went to this Court via a petition for review which
was filed on September 26, 1989
and raised the following
assignment of errors:

“ASSIGNMENT
OF ERRORS

“1.   THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE ORDER DATED APRIL 15, 1987
HAS NOT MODIFIED THE DECISION OF OCTOBER
16, 1986 AS FAR AS THE CIVIL ASPECT IS CONCERNED.

“2.   THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CONDITION IN THE PROBATION ORDER MODIFYING OR ALTERING THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF
THE OFFENDER IS UNAUTHORIZED AND NOT SANCTIONED BY LAW.” (p. 10, Rollo)

In its decision affirming the order of the trial court granting
private respondent’s motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, respondent
Court of Appeals advanced three (3) reasons: 
1) that the decision dated October 16, 1986 had become final and executory and the judge who rendered the decision cannot
lawfully alter or modify it; 2) that it is clear that the probation law
provides only for the suspension of sentence imposed on the accused; that it
has absolutely no bearing on his civil liability and that none of the conditions listed under Section 10 of the
Probation Law relates to civil liability; and 3) that private respondent is not
estopped because he had nothing to do with the filing
and the granting of the probation.

There is no question that the decision of October 16, 1986 in Criminal Case No. Q-33798
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious
physical injuries had become final and executory
because the filing by respondent of an application for probation is deemed a
waiver of his right to appeal (See Section 4 of P.D. 968.  Likewise, the judgment finding petitioner
liable to private respondent for P126,633.50 as actual
damages and P50,000.00 as consequential damages had also become final because
no appeal was taken therefrom.  Hence, it is beyond the power of the trial
court to alter or modify.  In the case of
Samson v. Hon. Montejo, L-18605, October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 419, 422-423 cited by
respondent appellate court, it was held:

“x x x,
once a decision becomes final, even the court which rendered it cannot lawfully
alter or modify the same (Rili, et al. v. Chunaco, et al., G.R. No. L-6630, Feb. 29, 1956), especially, considering the fact
that, as in the instant case, the alteration or modification is material and
substantial (Ablaza v. Sycip,
et al., L-12125, Nov. 23, 1960).  In the
case of Behn, Meyer & Co., v. J. Mcmicking, et al., 11 Phil. 276, (cited by respondents), it
was held that ‘where a final judgment of an executory
character had been rendered in a suit the mission of the
court is limited to the execution
and enforcement of the said final
judgment in all of its
parts and in accordance
with its express orders.’ The judgment in question is clear,
and with the amended writ of execution, the liability of petitioner is greatly
augmented, without the benefit of proper proceeding.  (underscoring ours)

We do not believe, however, that the order dated April 15, 1987 granting the
application for probation and imposing some conditions therein altered or
modified the decision dated October
16, 1986.  The April 15, 1987
Order of the trial court granting the application for probation and providing as
one of the conditions therein that petitioner indemnify private respondent P2,000.00 monthly during the period of probation did not
increase or decrease the civil liability
adjudged against petitioner but merely provided for the manner of
payment by the accused of his civil
liability during the period of probation.

It is the submission of private respondent that in the case of Budlong v. Apalisok, No. 60151, June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 935, We
already ruled that “(T)he ‘conviction and sentence’ clause of the
statutory definition clearly signifies that probation affects only
the criminal aspect of the case.“

The pronouncement in Apalisok that “probation affects only the
criminal aspect of the case” should not be given a literal meaning.  Interpreting the phrase within the context of
that case, it means that although the execution of sentence is suspended by the
grant of probation, it does not
follow that the civil liability of the offender, if any, is extinguished.  This can
be inferred from a reading of the
text of the Apalisok case where the issue that
was involved therein was whether a grant of probation carries with it the
extinction of the civil liability of the offender.  The reason
for ruling that the grant of probation does not extinguish the civil liability
of the offender is clear,” (T)he extinction or survival of civil liability are
governed by Chapter III, Title V, Book I of
the Revised Penal Code where under Article 113 thereof provides
that:  ‘x x x,
the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability
resulting  from the crime committed by
him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of
deprivation of liberty or other rights,
or has
not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence, or any other
reason.’” In the instant case, the issue is not the survival or extinction of the civil liability
of a probationer but, whether or not the trial court may impose as a condition
of probation the manner in which a probationer may settle his civil liability
against the offended party during the period of probation.

Respondent appellate court ruled that Section 10 of the Probation
Law enumerates thirteen (13) conditions of probation not one of which relates
to the civil liability of the offender (p. 22, Rollo).

Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976)
provides:

“Sec. 4.  Grant of Probation.
– Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court may, after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence
and upon his application, suspend the execution of said sentence and place
the defendant on probation for such period
and upon such terms and conditions as
it may deem best.

In the case of Florentino L. Baclayon v. Hon. Pacito G. Mutia, et al., G.R. No. 59298, April 30, 1984, 129 SCRA
148, We ruled that the conditions listed under Section 10 of the Probation Law
are not exclusive.  Courts are allowed to
impose practically any term it chooses, the only limitation being that it does
not jeopardize the constitutional rights of the accused.  Courts may impose conditions with the end
that these conditions would help the probationer develop into a law-abiding
individual.  Thus,

“The conditions which trial courts may impose on a probationer
may be classified into general or mandatory and special or discretionary.  The mandatory conditions, enumerated in
Section 10 of the Probation Law, require that probationer should a) present
himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his supervision at
such place as may be specified in the order within 72 hours from receipt of
said order, and b) report to the probation officer at least once a month at
such time and place as specified by said officer.  Special or discretionary conditions are those
additional conditions, listed in the same Section 10 of the Probation Law,
which the courts may additionally impose on the probationer towards his correction
and rehabilitation outside of prison.  The
enumeration, however, is not inclusive.  Probation statutes are liberal in character and enable courts to designate practically
any term it chooses as long as the probationer’s constitutional rights
are not jeopardized. 
There are innumerable conditions which may be relevant to the
rehabilitation of the probationer when viewed in their specific individual
context.  It should, however,
be borne in mind that the special
or discretionary conditions of probation should
be realistic, purposive and geared to
help the probationer develop
into a law-abiding and self-respecting individual.  Conditions should be interpreted
with flexibility in their application, and
each case should be judged on its own merits – on the basis
of the problems, needs and capacity of
the probationer.  x x x.”

The primary consideration in granting probation is the
reformation of the probationer.  That is
why, under the law, a post sentence investigation, which is mandatory, has to
be conducted before a person can be granted probation to help the court in
determining whether the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as
well as the defendant will be served by the granting of the probation (Alvin
Lee Koenig, Post Sentence Investigation, Its Importance and Utility, IBP
Journal, Special Issue on Probation, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp. 381-387).  In the case of People v. Lippner,
219 Cal. 395, 26 p. 2d, 457, 458
(1933), among those which has to be ascertained is the financial condition and
capacity of the offender to meet his obligations:

“x x x
there can be no real reformation of a wrong-doer unless there is at least a willingness on his part
to right the wrong committed, and the effect of such an act upon the individual
is of inestimable value, and to a large extent, determines whether there has
been any real reformation.  To be
clearly consonant with such a purpose, the post sentence investigation must
include a financial examination of the
offender’s capability in order to work
out a system of payment which can
effectively accomplish reimbursement without interfering
with the defendant’s family and other financial responsibilities, according to
U.S. Model Penal Code of the American
Law Institute.  x x x.  (Sec. 301.1 Comments (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1954; Also 2 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s Survey of Release
Procedures 38 (1939) cited in The Period and Conditions of Probation by Sergio
F. Go, IBP Journal Special Issue on Probation, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp.
406-420).” (underscoring ours)

The trial court is given the discretion to impose conditions in
the order granting probation “as it may deem best.” As already
stated, it is not only limited to those listed under Section 10 of the
Probation Law.  Thus, under Section 26,
paragraph (d) of the Rules on
Probation Methods and Procedures, among the conditions which may be imposed in
the order granting probation is:

“Sec. 26.  Other conditions of
Probation.  The Probation Order
may also require the probationer in appropriate cases, to:

“x x x

“(d) comply with a program
of payment of civil liability to the victim or his heirs x x
x.”

However, this is not
to say that the manner by which the probationer should satisfy the payment of
his civil liability in a criminal case during the probation period may be
demanded at will by him.  It is necessary
that the condition which provides for a program of payment of his civil
liability will address the offender’s needs and capacity.  Such need may be ascertained from the findings
and recommendations in the post-sentence investigation report submitted by the
Probation Officer after investigation of the financial capacity of the offender
and that such condition is to the end that the interest of the state and the
reformation of the probationer is best served.

In the instant case, in the absence of any showing to the
contrary, it is presumed that when the trial court issued the order of April
15, 1987, the condition that the petitioner has to pay private respondent P2,000.00 a month for the satisfaction of the civil liability
adjudged against him was recommended by the probation officer who prepared the
post-sentence investigation and that such condition is, in the judgment of the
trial court, “deemed best” under the circumstances.

Counting from April 15,
1987, the date of issuance of the order granting probation which
under the law is also the date of its effectivity (Sec.
11, P.D. 968), the probation period must have lapsed by now.  Hence,
the order for petitioner to indemnify the private respondent in the amount of P2,000.00 monthly during the period
of probation must have also lapsed.  If such
were the case, there would therefore, be no more obstacle for the
private respondent to enforce the execution
of the balance of the civil liability of the petitioner.  However, the records are bereft of
allegations to this effect.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED.  The decision dated March 16, 1989 of
respondent Court of Appeals
affirming the order of the trial court granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution as well as the
resolution dated August 3, 1989 of the
same court are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Gancayco, and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., see separate opinion.