SEVERO M. LORENZO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ESTHER BANEZ, AND CHARITY BALDONADO, RESPONDENTS.

On January 19, 1980, petitioner Lorenzo filed Special Proceedings
No. 57 in the Municipal Court of Cauayan, Isabela, for the adoption of Charity
Baldonado by one Benjamin S. Baldonado who was then a pensioner of the Social
Security System of the United States Government. On February 27, 1980, Benjamin S. Baldonado died. Subsequently, on March 5, 1980, the decision
was rendered approving the adoption of Charity. In view of said decision, Charity applied for insurance benefits
as heir of Benjamin with the Social Security System of United States of
America. The claim was, however,
denied. Petitioner prepared for Charity
a motion for reconsideration but was signed by her guardian, the private
respondent Esther Banez. This motion
was denied. Private respondent Banez
filed a second motion for reconsideration with petitioner signing as her
counsel on July 15, 1981. This time,
private respondent won. Sometime in
May, 1983, private respondent informed petitioner of the approval of Charity’s
claim which amounted to US$182.00 (P3,891.06 converted to pesos under the
current rate) monthly and a three–year lump sum-monthly pension in
arrears. Private respondent Esther
Banez gave petitioner P1,000.00 as his professional fee. On June 25, 1983 petitioner sent a letter to
private respondent Banez demanding payment of P33,250 as attorney’s fees, plus
a monthly share of P500.00 from the pension of Charity. Private respondents rejected the
demand. Thereupon, petitioner filed a
complaint for payment of attorney’s fees.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private
respondents. On appeal to the
respondent Court of Appeals, it affirmed the lower court’s judgment. Hence, this petition.

The only issue in this case is whether or not P1,000 is a
reasonable amount of compensation to which petitioner is entitled for the legal
services he had rendered to the private respondents.

Noteworthy are the following facts: (1) petitioner was paid his fees in the Special Proceedings case
which ended with the adoption of the minor thereby terminating the client and
lawyer relationship; (2) petitioner was paid for his preparation of the first
motion for reconsideration with regard to the denial of the claims for
insurance benefit which was signed by Charity’s guardian, private respondent
Banez; and (3) this particular motion was not signed by petitioner as counsel
for the private respondents.

Petitioner is now asking his fees for his assistance in preparing
the second motion for reconsideration.

The petition has no merit.

The relevant provision of law is Section 24 of Rule 138, to wit:

“Sec. 24. Compensation
of attorneys agreements as to fees. – An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing
of the attorney. No court shall be
bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper
compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its
own professional knowledge. A written
contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found
by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.”

Under the aforecited Rule, it is clear that a lawyer has the
right to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client. However, the same provides for a limitation
in the fixing of said attorney’s fees, that is, it must be just and reasonable. And in determining the reasonableness of
attorney’s fees, several factors or circumstances must be taken into account,
namely: the amount and character of the services rendered; the nature and
importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered;
the responsibility imposed; the amount of money or the value of the property
affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; the skill and
experience called for in the performance of the services; the professional
character and social standing of the attorney; the results secured, among
others.

We see no reversible error on the part of respondent Court in
affirming the lower court’s judgment. Said respondent Court:

“Turning to the present controversy, it is at once apparent
that the legal work done by herein plaintiff-appellant, Atty. Severo M.
Lorenzo, in preparing the second motion for reconsideration, a two-page letter
addressed to the Social Security Administration of the United States of
America, dated July 18, 1981 (Exh. “E-1”), was quite simple in nature. It did not require much time, effort or
skill. Certainly, it does not serve to
justify a hefty claim to half of the pension due to the defendant minor, or to
P32, 260.00 plus P500.00 monthly, to be precise, as attorney’s fees. The records further disclose that
plaintiff-appellant never attended any hearing in connection with the
aforementioned motion for reconsideration in regard to the insurance benefits
due Charity Baldonado. Then, too, a
close perusal of the said motion for reconsideration would reveal that the
arguments therein raised by him were merely a reiteration of the points touched
upon by the defendants-appellants in their first motion for
reconsideration.” (p. 21, Rollo)

We share likewise the observation made by the trial court in
applying Section 1 of Republic Act 145 which actually militates against
petitioner’s claim. Said law provides:

“Any person assisting a claimant in the preparation,
presentation and prosecution of his claim for benefits under the laws of the
United States administered by the United States Veterans Administration who
shall directly or indirectly, solicit, contract for, charge or receive, or who
shall attempt to solicit contract for, charge or receive any fee or
compensation exceeding twenty pesos, in any claim, or who shall collect his fee
before the claim is actually paid to a beneficiary or claimant shall be guilty
of an offense and upon conviction thereof shall for every offense be fined not
exceeding one thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding five years, or both,
in the discretion of the court.”

As aptly put by the trial court:

“While the defendants’ claim was filed with the Social
Security Administration of the United States of America, the evidence
overwhelmingly shows that said claim is being administered by the United States
Veterans Administration. The communica­tions
sent by the defendants (Exhs. ‘1’, ‘E-1’ and ‘C’), as well as those received
from the United States Government (Exhs. ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘5’, ‘7’, and ‘D’), show
that the claim of Charity Baldonado was being administered by the United States
Veterans Administration. The fact that
communications, although pertaining to the Social Security Administration, were
coursed through the United States Veterans Administration, merely supports the
view that this particular claim of the defendant is being administered by said
department. Since under the aforequoted
law, the plaintiff is only authorized to exact a fee of P20.00, the plaintiff,
therefore, has no cause of action against the defendants for the latter have
paid him more than what the law requires.” (pp. 22-23, Rollo)

The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer
is employed without a price agreed upon for his services. In which case, he would be entitled to
receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has earned. (Robinol vs. Montemayor, Adm. Case No. 2180,
April 10, 1989). Under the
circumstances and on the basis of quantum meruit, the P1,000 paid
to appellant is reasonable compensation for his legal work, there being no
agreement on the amount of the fee.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed judgment is hereby
AFFIRMED with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., on leave.

*
Penned by Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo and concurred in by Justices Jose C.
Campos, Jr. and Ricardo J. Francisco.