G.R. No. 75380. July 31, 1987
VICTORIA M. TOLENTINO, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BF LIFEMAN INSURANCE CORP. AND/OR ENRIQUE M. ZALAMEA, JR., PRESIDENT, RESPONDENTS.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside
1) the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC for
short) promulgated on April 16, 1986 which modified the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and 2) its resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
private respondents with the Arbitration Branch of public respondent NLRC
docketed as NLRC/NCR Case No. 10-3838-84 which rendered a judgment, its
dispositive portion reading as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
“a. declaring
complainant as suspended from work for the period of October 15 to 26, 1984;
and
“b. ordering respondent to reinstate complainant
to her position, without loss of seniority, with back wages from October 27,
1984 up to the date of actual reinstatement.” (pp. 32-33, Rollo)
On appeal to the NLRC by respondent company, a decision was
rendered modifying the decision of the Labor Arbiter; the decretal portion of
the NLRC decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the
Decision appealed from is modified by deleting the award of reinstatement and
its consequences and instead, ordering respondent to pay complainant six (6)
months back wages plus separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month salary
for every year of service, a fraction of at least six months being considered
as one whole year.” (Rollo, p. 64)
Hence this appeal, petitioner relying on the following
arguments:
I
“PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES” INVOKED
IN NLRC DECISION WITHOUT FACTUAL BASIS AND, IN ANY EVENT, NOT RELEVANT TO ISSUE
OF REINSTATEMENT.
II
MODIFICATION OF ARBITER’S AWARD TO LIMITED
BACKWAGES UNJUSTIFIED AND WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS.
III
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE SACRIFICED TO
TECHNICALITY.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner was the Audit Supervisor in respondent-company with a
monthly pay of P2,015.00 until she received an Inter Office Memo, signed by the
Personnel Manager and in the following tenor:
“We regret to inform you that after a thorough investigation
of the case filed against you regarding the incident of September 5, 1984, we
have to terminate your employment effective Monday, October 15, 1984.”
(Rollo, p. 25)
It appears that the incident referred to in the memo was a
slapping incident wherein petitioner was admittedly the aggressor of the
Manager in the Accounting Services Department, a certain Mrs. Teofista
Villadelgado, allegedly because she (petitioner) could no longer “repress
her feeling of being unjustly aggrieved by the baseless and vindictive merit
ratings which the latter official gave the complainant and the subsequent false
rationalizations she forwarded to justify her actions, which adversely affected
her official record and position in the company and that she was forced to do
so to relieve her of some of the pain she has been suffering.”
Petitioner on October 15, 1984, sought reconsideration of the
decision of management to terminate her services. Management in denying the request of
petitioner filed a report of termination dated October 16, 1984 on the further
ground of “grave misconduct and falsification of documents.”
In rendering favorable judgment for petitioner-complainant the
Labor Arbiter found that there was an absence of a valid cause for dismissal,
declaring as follows:
“We are, therefore, inclined to agree with complainant’s
contention, thus?
‘There is no question that the complainant’s offense during that
September 5, 1984 incident was her first.
It is not denied that Mrs. Villadelgado suffered no physical
injury. Had the matter been clear that
the incident was not attended by any qualifying factor or circumstance that
would warrant the imposition of the applicable penalty in its maximum range. This would have been different if complainant
continued attacking the victim in such vicious and violent manner which
necessarily resulted in physical injuries.
Even in the extreme case the maximum penalty which may be imposed for
the first offense is ‘suspension of 12 days’.
‘Respondent should have considered, on the other hand the prejudice
that complainant suffered due to Mrs. Villadelgado’s initial inaction and
later her unjust and unfounded appraisal in the subject merit rating. Any derogatory rating adversely affects even
the pay increase of the employee not to mention her company standing. The members of the Personnel Committee should
have exercised fairness and understanding.”
“Concerning the falsification charge, the same is certainly
not a ground cited by management in its October 10, 1984 memorandum terminating
the services of complainant. We are
inclined to agree, therefore, that the inclusion of this charge is a mere
afterthought, apparently hatched up after realizing that the slapping incident
might not suffice as a valid ground for complainant’s dismissal.
“The Rules Implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 further
amending the Labor Code, Rule XIV thereof, provide:
SEC. 6 Decision to Dismiss.
The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision
to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.” (underscoring
supplied)
Moreover, the alleged falsification was done not ‘to obtain the
release of the loan proceeds’, as alleged, to show intent to gain, it appearing
that said releases effected May 11, 17 and 30 took place prior to the
commission of the act in question.” (p. 32, Rollo)
On appeal by private respondent, the NLRC, found no reversible
error of the Labor Arbiter and modified the ruling by declaring that:
“Be that as it may, however, We strongly feel that,
considering the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case, the award of
reinstatement is no longer feasible.
Firstly, unlike in the prior fighting incident where the protagonists
belonged to different departments and were of practically the same rank, the
persons involved in the 5 September 1984 incident belonged to the same
department where one was the superior of the other. To order therefore the reinstatement of
complainant to her former position will certainly not serve the interest of
industrial peace in the company.
Secondly, respondents have found as a fact that complainant Tolentino
falsified the signature of her co-maker in two promissory notes forming part of
her chattel mortgage loans with the company.
While this evidentiary aspect was not considered in the resolution of
the case, and rightly so, the fact remains that insofar as the management of
the company are concerned, Tolentino as already breached their trust and
confidence in her. This is another point
that assails the propriety of reinstating Tolentino.
“It is therefore Our considered opinion and so hold, that it
would be more reasonable and proper that instead of reinstatement, complainant
Tolentino be awarded a limited back-wages plus separation pay.”
In other words public respondent NLRC found that petitioner was
dismissed without sufficient cause but nonetheless denied her reinstatement to
her former position. Hence this appeal
by petitioner.
Petitioner’s contentions deserve credence.
The records of the case reveal that it is not true as found by
the public respondent NLRC that petitioner and Ms. Villadelgado belonged to the
same department during the period material to this case. While petitioner, since March 16, 1984 and
until her illegal dismissal on October 15, 1984, was admittedly a supervisor in
the Auditing Department, Ms. Teofista Villadelgado, on the other hand, was the
Department Head of the Agents Account Control Department. However prior to March 16, 1984, Ms. Villadelgado
was the petitioner’s superior officer in the Accounting Services
Department. During the relevant periods,
petitioner’s superior was Mr. Eladio T. Bolos, Assistant Vice-President and
their Auditing Department was under the Office of the President. Mrs. Villadelgado was in another department,
the Agents Control Department (as Manager thereof) which was under the Sales
Division. It is clear therefore that the
ruling of respondent NLRC against reinstatement is anchored on a false premise
and contrary to the evidence on record.
There is also no showing that the position previously held by
the petitioner no longer exists or that should the petitioner be reinstated to
her former position, industrial unrest in the company would result. To follow respondent NLRC’s reasoning, every
fight or quarrel between employees which is punishable by suspension and not
dismissal, will prevent the reinstatement of an otherwise unjustly dismissed
employee upon the pretext or excuse of an industrial unrest.
Reinstatement of the petitioner is mandated by law. Thus Art. 280 of the Labor Code provides as
follows:
“Art. 280. Security
of tenure. In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except
for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to
his backwages computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his reinstatement.” (Labor Code,
emphasis given).
And to implement the foregoing rule, the Minister Labor and
Employment promulgated the following rules:
“Sec. 4. Reinstatement
to former position.- (a) an employee who is separated from work without
just cause shall be reinstated to his former position, unless such position no
longer exists at the time of his reinstatement, in which case he shall be given
a substantially equivalent position in the same establishment without loss of
seniority rights.
(b) In case the establishment where the employee
is to be reinstated has closed or ceased operations or where his former
position no longer exists at the time of reinstatement for reasons not
attibutable to the fault of the employer, the employee shall be entitled to
separation pay equivalent at least to one month salary or to one month salary
for every year of service, whichever is higher, a fraction of at least six
months being considered as one whole year.”
(Rule 1, Book IV, Rules to Implement the Labor Code).
Security of tenure is a right of paramount value as recognized
and guaranteed under our new constitution.
“The State shall afford full protection to labor, x x x and promote
full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers
to x x x security of tenure x x x” (Sec. 3, Art. XIII on Social Justice
and Human Rights, 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.) Such
constitutional right should not be denied on mere speculation of any similar
unclear and nebulous basis.
Be it noted that the Office of the Solicitor General, recommends
in its comment, for the setting aside of the assailed NLRC decision and for the
reinstatement of petitioner with full backwages not exceeding 3 years, except
for the period of her suspension from October 15 to 26, 1984 & with other
employment benefits. If reinstatement to
her former position is no longer possible, she should be reinstated to a
substantially equivalent position (Sec. 4, Rule 1, Book IV, Implementing Rules;
Labor Code).
Likewise We cannot sustain respondent NLRC in denying
reinstatement to petitioner because of the alleged falsification of
“signature of her co-maker in two promissory notes forming part of her
chattel mortgage loans with the company”, thereby creating a breach of
trust and confidence of her employer and thereby rendering reinstatement
unwarranted. Yet respondent NLRC admits
that this evidentiary aspect of falsification was not considered in the resolution
of the case. How then could the breach
of trust and confidence of the company in petitioner arise? Furthermore, petitioner was not dismissed due
to this falsification charge but because of the September 5, 1984 slapping
incident as mentioned in the letter of dismissal. She should have been charged with the alleged
falsification, given the opportunity to defend herself, and dismissed only
after being proved guilty.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent BF Lifeman Insurance Corp. is
hereby ordered to REINSTATE petitioner to her former position without loss of
seniority and with full back wages from October 27, 1984 until the date of her
actual reinstatement (but not exceeding three years).
SO ORDERED.
Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.