G.R. No. L-49162. July 28, 1987
JANICE MARIE JAO, REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHER AND GUARDIAN AD LITEM, ARLENE S. SALGADO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND PERICO V. JAO, RESPONDENTS.
PADILLA, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision* of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. no. 51078-R, dated 29 August 1978, which dismissed
petitioner’s action for recognition and support against private respondent, and
from the respondent Court’s resolution, dated 11 October 1978, denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of said decision.
On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor,
represented by her mother and guardian-ad–litem
Arlene Salgado, filed a case for recognition and support with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court against private respondent Perico V. Jao. The
latter denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which
was in due course conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) upon
order of the trial court. The result of
the blood grouping test, held 21 January 1969, indicated that Janice could not
have been the possible offspring of Perico V. Jao and Arlene S. Salgado.[1]
The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally
conclusive but upon plaintiff’s (herein petitioner’s) second motion for
reconsideration, it ordered a trial on the merits, after which, Janice was
declared the child of Jao, thus entitling her to his monthly support.
Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court’s
failure to appreciate the result of the blood grouping tests. As there was no showing whatsoever that there
was any irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests, Jao argued that
the result of the tests should have been conclusive and indisputable evidence
of his non-paternity.
The Court of Appeals upheld Jao’s contentions and reversed the
trial court’s decision. In its decision,
the Court of Appeals held:
“From the evidence of the contending parties, it appears
undisputed that JAO was introduced to ARLENE at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club, by Melvin Yabut. After this meeting, JAO dated and courted
ARLENE. Not long thereafter, they had
their first sexual intercourse and subsequently, they lived together as husband
and wife. xxx
It further appears undisputed that in April 1968, JAO accompanied
ARLENE to the Marian General Hospital for medical check-up and her confinement
was with JAO’s consent. JAO paid the rentals
where they lived, the salaries of the maids,
and other household expenses. xxx
The record discloses that ARLENE gave birth to JANICE on August 16,
1968, after completing 36 weeks of pregnancy, which indicates that ARLENE must
have conceived JANICE on or about the first week of December, 1967. Thus, one issue to be resolved in this appeal
is whether on or about that time, JAO and ARLENE had sexual intercourse and
were already living with one another as husband and wife.
In this connection, ARLENE contends that she first met JAO sometime
in the third or fourth week of November, 1967 at the Saddle and Sirloin,
Bayside Club; that after several dates, she had carnal knowledge with him at
her house at 30 Long-beach, Merville, Paranaque, Rizal in the evening of
November 30, 1967, and that he started to live with her at her dwelling after
December 16, 1967, the date they finished their cruise to Mindoro Island.
On the other hand, JAO, albeit admitting that he met ARLENE at the
Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club, however, maintains that this was on December 14, 1967 because the
day following, he and his guests:
ARLENE, Melvin Yabut, Didi Crescini and Charlie Litonjua went to
Mindoro by boat. He dated ARLENE four
times in January, 1968. He remembered he
had carnal knowledge of her for the first time on January 18, 1968, because
that was a week after his birthday and it was only in May, 1968 that he started
cohabiting with her at the Excelsior Apartments on Roxas Boulevard.
These conflicting versions of the parties emphasize, in resolving
the paternity of JANICE, the role of the blood grouping tests conducted by the
NBI and which resulted in the negative finding that in a union with ARLENE,
JAO could not be the father of JANICE.
We cannot sustain the conclusion of the trial court that the NBI is
not in a position to determine with mathematical precision the issue of
parentage by blood grouping test, considering the rulings of this Court xxx
where the blood grouping tests of the
NBI were admitted; especially where, in the latter case, it was Dr. Lorenzo
Sunico who conducted the test and it appears that in the present case, the same
Dr. Sunico approved the findings and report.
xxx In Co Tao vs. Court of Appeals, 101 Phil 188, the Supreme Court had given weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping
test. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that
the competency of the NBI to conduct blood grouping tests has been recognized
as early as the 1950’s.
The views of the Court on blood grouping tests may be stated as
follows:
“Paternity — Science
has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother,
the child, and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that
the man is not the father of the child.
But group blood testing cannot show that a man is the father of a
particular child, but at least can show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many states, and courts in
others, have recognized the value and the limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have recognized the
conclusive presumption of non-paternity where the results of the test, made in
the prescribed manner, show the
impossibility of the alleged paternity.
This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of the Court may
scientifically be completely accurate, and intolerable results avoided, such
as have occurred where the finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony
conflicting with the results of the test.
“The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove
the fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged father
or any one of many others with the same blood type may have been the father of
the child. But the Uniform Act
recognizes that the tests may have some probative value to establish paternity
where the blood type and the combination in the child is shown to be rare, in
which case the judge is given discretion to let it in” (I Jones on
Evidence, 5th Ed., pp. 193-194).
“In one specific biological trait, viz, blood groups,
scientific opinion is now in accord in accepting the fact that there is a
causative relation between the trait of
the progenitor and the trait of the progeny.
In other words, the blood composition of a child may be some evidence as
to the child’s paternity. But thus far
this trait (in the present state of scientific discovery as generally accepted)
can be used only negatively i.e. to evidence that a particular man F is
not the father of a particular child C.” (I Wigmore on Evidence 3rd Ed.,
pp. 610-611).
In a last ditch effort to bar the admissibility and competency of
the blood test, JANICE claims that probative value was given to blood tests
only in cases where they tended to establish paternity; and that there has
been no case where the blood test was invoked to establish non-paternity,
thereby implying that blood tests have probative value only when the result is a possible affirmative and not when in
the negative. This contention is fallacious and must be rejected. To sustain her contention, in effect, would
be recognizing only the possible affirmative finding but not the blood
grouping test itself for if the result were negative, the test is regarded worthless. Indeed, this is illogical. xxx As an admitted test, it is
admissible in subsequent similar proceedings whether the result be in the
negative or in the affirmative.
xxx”
The Court of Appeals also found other facts that ran contrary to
petitioner’s contention that Jao’s actions before and after JANICE was born
were tantamount to recognition. Said
the respondent appellate court:
“On the contrary, after JANICE was
born, JAO did not recognize her as his own.
In fact, he filed a petition that his name as father of JANICE in the
latter’s certificate of live birth be deleted, evidencing his repudiation,
rather than recognition. The mere acts
of JAO in cohabiting with ARLENE, the attention given to her during her
pregnancy and the financial assistance extended to her cannot overcome the
result of the blood grouping test. These
acts of JAO cannot be evaluated as recognizing the unborn JANICE as his own as
the possession of such status cannot be founded on conjectures and
presumptions, especially so that, We have earlier said, JAO refused to
acknowledge JANICE after the latter’s birth.
JAO cannot be compelled to recognize JANICE based on paragraph
2 of Article 283 in relation to Article 289 of the New Civil Code which
provides: “When the child is in
continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct
acts of the latter.”
Nor can there be compulsory recognition under paragraphs 3 or 4 of
said article which states:
“(3) When the child was
conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in
his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.”
As aptly appreciated by the court below,
JANICE could have been conceived from November 20, 1967 to December 4,
1967. Indeed, ARLENE claims that her
first sexual intercourse with JAO was on November 30, 1967 while the latter
avers it was one week after January 18, 1968.
However, to satisfy paragraph 3 as above-quoted, JANICE must have been
conceived when ARLENE and JAO started to cohabit with one another. Since ARLENE herself testified that their
cohabitation started only after December 16, 1967, then it cannot be gainsaid
that JANICE was not conceived during this cohabitation. Hence, no recognition will lie. Necessarily, recognition cannot be had under
paragraph 4 as JANICE has no other evidence or proof of her alleged paternity.
Apart from these, there is the claim of JAO that, at the critical time
of conception, ARLENE had carnal knowledge with two other men: “Oying” Fernandez and Melvin Yabut,
which was not even rebutted; and considering that it was Melvin Yabut, who
introduced ARLENE to JAO at the Bayside Club.
Moreover, the testimony of ARLENE is not wholly reliable. When the trial court said that “the
Court is further convinced of plaintiff’s cause by ARLENE’s manner of testifying
in a most straight-forward and candid manner”, the fact that ARLENE was
admittedly a movie actress may have been overlooked so that not even the trial
court could detect, by her acts, whether she was lying or not.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and a new
one entered dismissing plaintiff-appellee’s complaint. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.”
The petitioner now brings before this Court the issue of
admissibility and conclusiveness of the result of blood grouping tests to prove
non-paternity.
In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other
evidence, to affirm paternity was dealt with in Co Tao v. Court of
Appeals,[2]
an action for declaration of filiation, support and damages. In said case, the NBI expert’s report of the
blood tests stated that “from their blood groups and types, the defendant
Co Tao is a possible father of the child.” From this statement, the
defendant contended that the child must have been the child of another
man. The Court noted: “For obvious reasons, the NBI expert
cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of the child; he can
only give his opinion that he is a ‘possible father’. This possibility, coupled with the other
facts and circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely
establish that appellant Co Tao is the father of the child Manuel.”[3]
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood
grouping tests to disprove paternity, rulings have been much more
definite in their conclusions. For the
past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has
already become an important legal procedure.
There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping
tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity
– that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of
the mother and alleged father does not
conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood
type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother
and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the child cannot
possibly be that of the alleged father.[4]
In jurisdictions like the
United States, the admissibility of blood test results to prove non-paternity
has already been passed upon in several cases.
In Gilpin v. Gilpin[5] the positive results of blood tests
excluding paternity, in a case in which it was shown that proper safeguards
were drawn around the testing procedures, were recognized as final on the
question of paternity. In Cuneo v.
Cuneo[6] evidence of non-paternity consisting of the
result of blood grouping tests was admitted despite a finding that the alleged
father had cohabited with the mother within the period of gestation. The Court said that the competent medical
testimony was overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff, and to reject such
testimony would be tantamount to rejecting scientific fact. Courts, it was stated, should apply the
results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented,
since to reject said result was to deny progress.[7] This ruling was also echoed in Clark v.
Rysedorph[8], a filiation proceeding where an
uncontradicted blood grouping test evidence, excluding paternity, was held
conclusive.[9] Legislation expressly recognizing the use of
blood tests is also in force in several states.[10] Tolentino,[11] affirms this rule on blood tests as proof of
non-paternity, thus –
“Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood
in man which can be transmitted through heredity. Although the presence of the same type of
blood in two persons does not indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet
the fact that they are of different types will indicate the impossibility of
one being the child of the other. Thus,
when the supposed father and the alleged child are not in the same blood group,
they cannot be father and child by consanguinity. The Courts of Europe today regard a blood
test exclusion as an unanswerable and indisputable proof of
non-paternity.”[12]
Moreover,
“The cohabitation between the mother and the supposed father
cannot be a ground for compulsory recognition if such cohabitation could not
have produced the conception of the child.
This would be the case, for instance, if the cohabitation took place
outside of the period of conception of the child. Likewise, if it can be proved by blood tests
that the child and the supposed father belong to different blood groups, the
cohabitation by itself cannot be a ground for recognition.”[13]
Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood
grouping tests in the instant case by impugning the qualifications of the NBI
personnel who performed the tests and the conduct of the tests themselves. Her allegations, in this regard, appear to
be without merit. The NBI’s forensic
chemist who conducted the tests is also a serologist, and has had extensive
practice in this area for several years.
The blood tests were conducted six (6) times using two (2) scientifically recognized blood grouping systems, the MN
Test and the ABO System,[14] under witness and supervision.[15]
Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to
have been a proper subject for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two
years after the first blood test, she, represented by her mother, declined to
undergo the same blood test to prove or disprove their allegations, even as Jao
was willing to undergo such a test again.[16]
Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of
Appeals and holds that the result of the blood grouping tests involved in the
case at bar, are admissible and conclusive on the non-paternity of respondent
Jao vis-a?vis petitioner Janice.
No evidence has been presented showing any defect in the testing
methods employed or failure to provide adequate safeguards for the proper
conduct of the tests. The result of such
tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately reflecting a scientific fact.
In view of the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, as
heretofore quoted, which are binding on this Court, we do not find it necessary
to further pass upon the issue
of recognition raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby
denied. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
* Penned by Justice Corazon
Juliano-Agrava with the concurrence of Justices Crisolito Pascual and Rafael
C. Climaco
[1]
Biology Report No. B-69-14; Rollo at 42
[2]
101 Phil 188 (1957)
[3]
Id at 193
[4]
Guyton, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY 88 (6th ed., 1981); Solis, LEGAL
MEDICINE 435 (1964).
[5]
197 Misc. 319, 94 NYS2d 706 (1950)
[6]
198 Misc. 240, 96 NYS2d 899 (1950)
[7]
Id at 906
[8]
118 NYS2d 103 (1952)
[9]
Id at 106
[10]
UNIF. Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity 9 U.L.A. ’55 P.P. 12
(1956). Sec. 4 of the Act states: “Effect of Test Results” –
If the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the
evidenced based upon the tests, are that the alleged father is not the father
of the child, the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly. If the experts disagree in their findings or
conclusions, the question shall be submitted upon all the evidence. If the experts conclude that the blood tests
show the possibility of the alleged father’s paternity, admission of this
evidence is within the discretion of the court, depending upon the infrequency
of the blood type.”
[11]
I COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE, 1983 ed.
[12]
Id at 546
[13]
Id at 606
[14]
Wiener, III ADVANCES IN BLOOD GROUPING 267 (1970)
[15]
T.s.n., 9 Dec. 1970, pp. 56-59; 63-64; 75-80
[16]
Manifestation dated 15 February 1971; Record on Appeal, p. 110