THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BR. XII, HON. FERNANDO A. CRUZ, PRESI­DING JUDGE; AND PABLO, ANGELITA, JUAN, BARCELISA, ISRAEL, REBECCA …

This is a Petition for
Review (Appeal by Certiorari) filed by the Director of Lands from the
Orders dated January 4, 1969 and July 14, 1969 of respondent Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XII Caloocan City, in Land Re­gistration Case
No. C-72, L.R.C. Record No. N-30167. 
Said order of January 4, 1969 denied the Petition for Review filed by
the Director of Lands and the order of February 3, 1969 denied the
motion for reconsideration.

Briefly, the facts of the
case are as follows:

On February 22, 1966,
respondents Pablo, Angelita, Juan Barcelisa, Israel, Rebecca and Pedro Jr., all
surnamed Casaje, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Land Regis­tration Case No. C-72, L.R.C. Record No. N-30167, for the confirmation
and registration of their title to a parcel of land situated in Barrio San
Roque, Municipality of Navo­tas, Province of Rizal, more particularly described
on plan PSU-214300 with an area of 986
square meters.  They alleged that they are the owners in fee
simple and in possession of the aforementioned land and that their possession
together with their predecessors-in-interest has been from time im­memorial and
for a period of more than thirty (30) years, public, continuous, adverse to the
whole world, and in the concept of absolute owners thereof.

The Director of Lands, thru the Solicitor General, filed an
Opposition dated July 18, 1966 stating
that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess
sufficient title to the parcel of land sought to be regis­tered, the same not
having been acquired by them by com­position title from the Spanish government
or by possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894;
that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-­in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land
in question for at least 30
years immediately preceding the filing of the
application and that the same is a portion of the public domain belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines.

Notice of the initial hearing scheduled on September 8, 1966 was furnished the Director of
Lands.  The corresponding publication was
made in the official Gazette and the required posting of Sheriff’s notice was
duly complied with.

At the said scheduled initial hearing, however, the Director of
Lands did not appear.  Instead, counsel
for the applicants presented to the court, the second and third in­dorsements
of the District Land Officer dated August 7, 1966, manifesting that
the Bureau of Lands is no longer interested in opposing the application for
registration, because after due investigation the land was found to be of
private owner­ship as certified to by the land investigator Mr. Jose Sison, C/O
District Land Officer III-1.  The third
indorsement, dated August 7, 1966
and signed by Mr. Arturo Pascual, re­commended that in view of the above
findings as per inves­tigation conducted by a representative of the Bureau of
Lands, no opposition be filed.  A copy of
the said 2nd Indorsement is hereinbelow reproduced as follows –

SUBJECT:

Land. Reg. Case No.
C-72

L.R.C. Rec. No.
N-30167

Pablo Casaje, et al.

San Roque, Navotas,

Rizal

2nd Indorsement

August 1,
1966

Respectfully returned to the Director of Lands thru the District
Land Officer, DLO III-1, Bureau of Lands, Manila, sub­mitting hereunder the
findings and report of the undersigned on the above-noted Registration Case, to
wit:

That the parcel of land sought to be registered is a residential
lot located in San Roque, Navotas, Rizal which was originally owned and
possessed by Leonardo Casaje, de­ceased and father of the herein registration
applicants;

That the land subject of this registra­tion was declared for
taxation purposes under Tax Dec. No. 8800 in the names of the appli­cants and
the taxes were paid for and the latest is covered by O.R. No. D-1865945 dated
May 31, 1966 with an assessed value of P990.00;

That during the ocular investigation of the premises of the land
subject of this regis­tration, it has been ascertained that a camarin and a
residential house are found thereon.  The
3-meter legal easement has been set aside and unoccupied for embankment of the
Navotas, River;

That it has been ascertained further that the subject of this registration
case is abut­ting Lot 12 of Psu-64860 of Leonardo Casaje which is a titled or
private property;

That the land has been found that the same is not covered by any
public land appli­cations or patent neither it is within any public or quasi public
improvements;

That the undersigned has finally ascer­tained that the applicants
are Filipino citizens and no person, corporation, or asso­ciation is either
directly or indirectly interested in the land sought to be regis­tered; and

That the applicants thru their predecessors-in-interest and in
concept of owners have been in actual, open, adverse, public and continuous
occupation ad possession for more than thirty (30) years which is believed to
be not later than July 4, 1926.

In view of the foregoing, and in as much as the applicants have
satisfactorily met all the conditions essential to entitle them to a Judicial
legalization of their imperfect claims over the land applied for under the
provisions of Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 1942, it is recommended that no
opposition be interposed on the instant Regis­tration Case as far as our Office
is concern.

(SGD.)
JOSE SISON

Land Investigator

Also on September 8, 1966,
respondent Court, for failure of the Oppositors to appear despite due
notice, entered an order of general default against the whole world, with the
exception of the provincial government of Rizal and the municipal government of
Navotas, thereby authorizing the applicants to present their evidence before the Deputy
Clerk of Court, who was commissioned to receive the same.

On September 13, 1966, respondent court rendered a decision declaring the
applicants, the true and absolute owners of the land in question, and ordering
the registration thereof in their names but reserving for public easement a
3.00 meter strip of the land along the Navotas River.

On August 26, 1967, the private oppositors Roberto Lusterio, et al.,
filed a Petition for Review from the order of general default and from
the judgment alleging fraud and evident bad faith.  The petition was denied by respondent court for failure on the part of
private oppositors to prove their allegations of fraud and evident bad faith
allegedly employed by the applicants.  No
appeal was inter­posed by the private oppositors from the said order.

On his part, the Director
of Lands filed on October 11,
1967, a Petition for review,
pursuant to Sec. 38 of Act No. 496, alleging fraud in
obtaining the decree of registration and that the one (1) year period has not
elapsed from the issuance of the decree (the decress was issued on June 5, 1967).

The applicants (the
Casajes) filed an opposition con­tending among other things, that the said
petition for review “represents the interest of Eusebia Cruz, Roberto Lusterio
and Evangelina Laquindanum who were the original oppositors represented by
private counsel Atty. Artemio L. Agcaoili”; that since the decree of
registration was issued on June 5, 1967 and since the corresponding
certificate of title has already been issued by the Register of Deeds, said
petition for review is a mere harassment, and that the land in dispute, as may
be seen from the investigation report and indorsement of the District Land
Officer, is the private property of Leonardo Casaje; and that the afore­mentioned
Eusebia Cruz, Roberto Lusterio and Evangelina Laquindanum were merely their
tenants.

The petition for review
was set for hearing on Decem­ber 19, 1968.  On January 4, 1969, respondent court
issued its Order denying the petition for lack of evidence to support the same.  From this order, after its
motion for reconsi­deration had been denied, herein petitioner
interposed this petition.

The primodial question to be resolved in the case at bar is
whether or not respondent court erred in denying petitioner’s petition for
review filed pursuant to Sec. 38 of Act 496, (Land Registration Act) which
provides:

“Section 38.  Decree of
registration, and remedies after entry of decree.

If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse
claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for
registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered.  Every decree of registration shall bind the
land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the
following section.  It shall be con­clusive
upon and against all persons, in­cluding the Insular Government and all the
branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice of
citation, or included in the general description ‘To all whom it may concern’.  Such decree shall not be opened by reason of
the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor
by any procedding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject,
however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the
competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after
entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.  x x x
.”

The essential elements for the allowance of the re­opening or
review of a decree are:  (a) that the
petitioner has a real and dominical right; (b) that he has been deprived
thereof; (c) through fraud; (d) that the peti­tion is filed within one year
from the issuance of the decree; and (e) that the property has not as yet been
transferred to an innocent purchaser.

However, for fraud to
justify the review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral and the
facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was
rendered.  The following ruling spells
out the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud:

“Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from
intrinsic fraud, connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing
litigant “outside the trial of a
case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby
said defeated party, is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of
the case.” But in­trinsic fraud takes the form of “acts of a party in
a litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or
perjured testimony, which did not affect the present action of the case, but
did prevent a fair and just determination of the case.” (Libudan vs. Gil 45 SCRA 17)

In
other words, extrinsic fraud is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction
of the Court.

In its Petition for
Review filed before the respondent court, petitioner alleged that the Casajes
committed fraud in obtaining said decree of registration in the following manner:

(a)  
By falsely alleging and misre­presenting that
they have been in peaceful, open, adverse and continuous possession of the land
described in paragraph 1 hereof for more than 30 years, the truth being that said land had been in the actual
and exclusive possession of Eusebia Cruz, Roberto Lusterio and Evangeline
Laquin­danum who are not and have never been in such possession as tenants or
representatives of the registration applicants;

(b)   By
falsely representing that the land was formed by alluvia and is thus an
accretion to their private property, the truth being that the entire land has
always been part of the public domain, formed as it was by the intervention of
human hands; and

(c)   By
misrepresenting that no other person, including the state, has any in­terest
whatsoever in the land in question.  (pp.
47–48, Rollo)

Clearly, the foregoing allegations, even if proved, do not constitute extrinsic fraud as would warrant
a re-opening of the decree.

The person(s) contemplated under Section 38 of Act 496, to be
entitled to a review of a decree of registra­tion, are those who were
fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original
registration case.  Such is not the
situation of the petitioner here.  It was
not denied a day in court by fraud, which the law provides as the sole ground
for reopening of the decree of registra­tion. 
In fact, it opposed the application but failed to substantiate its
opposition because it did not appear at the hearing of the registration case
despite proper notice.  In Solomon et
al., vs. Bocauto et al., 71 Phil. 363,
365, cited in Crisolo vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 435, 441, a peti­tion
for review of a decree of registration was properly denied for “both petitioners
had notice of the original registration proceedings; but failed to put up any
claim and to show title in
themselves.” Significantly, petitioner failed to explain why it
failed to appear at the hearing.  Mere
allegation of fraud is not enough.  Specific,
intentio­nal acts to deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some
manner injure him must be alleged and proved. 
There must be actual or positive fraud as distinguished from
constructive fraud to entitle one to the reopening of a decree of registration.  And it must be extrinsic and not
intrinsic fraud (Greg Alba vs. de la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, 57).  This is
necessary to maintain the stability of judicial decisions and save the precious time of the courts
from being wasted by unnecessary proceedings. 
Moreover, the fact that the District Land Officer of the Bureau of Lands
conducted the corresponding inspection and investigation of the land in
question with its findings and report sub­mitted in court, renders the present
appeal interposed by the Director of Lands about valid basis.  It cannot just simply deny the report of its
own investigator.  Besides, there is
always that presumption of regularity in the per­formance of official function.

WHEREFORE, this petition is DENIED for lack of merit.  The order of respondent judge denying the
petition for re­view and/or to reopen the decree of registration in Land
Registration Case No. C-72, L.R.C. Record No. N-30167 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz, and
Gancayco, JJ., concur.