PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FELICIANO RUALO Y BELLEN, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 22 which found Feliciano Rualo y Bellen guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act as amended
and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and costs.

The factual findings of the trial court are recited in its
decision as follows:

“From the evidence presented during the trial, the Court finds
that in the evening of November 14, 1983, Lt. Francisco M. Fausto, Chief of the
Investigation Division of the Drugs Enforcement Section, Western Police
District, Manila acting upon previous information given by an informer and by
police officers who subsequently conducted a surveil­lance to the effect that a
certain person called Bong was engaged in the illegal sale of marijuana in the
area of Lepanto and Galicia Streets in Sampaloc, Manila, organized a group of
five policemen led by Sgt. Armando Inabangan to entrap and apprehend the
suspect.  Arriving at the appointed
place, the informer approached the accused, together with Patrolman Wilfredo S.
Ortega who disguised himself and posed as a buyer in need of marijuana for a
party late that evening.  A sale was
arranged for Patrolman Ortega to buy P20.00 worth of the drug.  He gave the accused two ten-peso bills which
were previously marked with the initials of Patrolman Jose Bataller, one of the
men in the apprehending team.  The other
policemen posted themselves in strategic places along Lepanto in readiness for
the entrapment.  After receiving the
marked money, the accused left in the direction of Sulucan St. in Sampaloc
where he lived.  Presently he returned
and gave Ortega 2 plastic tea bags containing
dried leaves.  Thereupon, the
police­men closed in and Sgt. Inabangan arrested the accused and retrieved the
two marked bills from the latter’s pocket. 
The leaves were immediately submitted to the NBI and upon laboratory
analysis by a forensic expert were found to be marijuana.  The accused was forthwith charged under the
present indict­ment.” (Rollo, pp. 4-5).

The facts from the
viewpoint of the accused appellant are:

“The accused testified that on November 14, 1982, he
accompanied his visitors, Gener de Guzman and Antonia Cunanan, to get a
ride.  On his way home, while walking
along Lepanto Street, a policeman approached him and invited him to the police
headquarters.  When he asked the reason
why he was being invited to the police headquarters, the policeman replied that
he (policeman) will explain it at the headquarters.  At the head­quarters, he was forced to point
to the police a person by the name of Al. 
When he refused, as he does not know the person, he was detained in
jail.  Inquiring the reason why he was
being detained, the policeman told him that his refusal to point to that
certain person named Al means that he was in cahoots with the latter. 
During the custodial investigation, the accused was not informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel.  Neither was the contents of the Booking Sheet
and Arrest Report (Exh. “B” for the Prosecution) interpreted to
him.  The reason why he signed said
document was that he was threatened. 
When he denied the source of the two ten (10) pesos bills, he was
brought back to the jail (TSN, pp. 2 to 7, October 18, 1984).

“Gener de Guzman second witness for the defense testified that
he and Antonia Cunanan were at the house of the accused on November 14, 1983
and that the latter accompanied them on their way home.  He further stated that he has no knowledge or
information that accused is a drug addict (TSN, pp. 3 to 6, October 30, 1984).

“Antonia Cunanan third witness for the defense testified that
she was at the house of the accused together with Mr. de Guzman in the evening
of November 14, 1983.  She knows the
accused for quite sometime and that the former is not engaged in selling
marijuana (TSN, pp. 7 to 8, October 30, 1984).” (Appellant’s brief, pp.
4-5.  Rollo, p. 19).

The accused-appellant
raised a sole assignment of error, namely:

I

“THE COURT A QUO
ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 1).

A review of the records
of this case and a careful consideration of the arguments raised by the
accused-appellant in his brief indicate no reason why we should not accord the
usual respect given to factual findings of trial courts.  As repeatedly stressed in the majority of
appeals in criminal cases, an appellate court gives great weight to the factual
findings of trial courts and accords them respect if not finality unless the
accused-appellant is able to show that the trial court overlooked or
disregarded matters of substance which, if considered, would very likely change
the results.  (People v. Egas, 137 SCRA
188; People v. Amoncio, 122 SCRA 686; People v. Rosario, 134 SCRA 496;
People v. Centeno, 130 SCRA 198; People v. Silfavan, G.R. No. 71510, June 30,
1987; and People v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 74953, June 30, 1987.)

The only defense put up by the accused-appellant is that he was
framed-up.

The prosecution evidence is both substantial and convincing.  Lt. Francisco Fausto of the Drugs Enforcement
Section, Western Police District, Manila organized a group of five policemen to
stop drug trafficking at the corner of Lepanto and Galicia Streets in Sampaloc.  The buy-bust operation resulted in the
apprehension of Feliciano Rualo.  He
accepted two ten peso bills from the poseur-buyer, went to his source of drugs,
returned with the marijuana, and was forthwith arrested.

Rualo’s contention that he was innocently walking home along
Lepanto Street when arrested for refusing to act as an informant is hollow and
obviously self-serving.  Stronger proof
is needed to overcome the findings of the trial court that the prosecution
witnesses were telling the truth.

The trial court stated:

“The Court is not impressed by the defendant’s testimony to
the effect that he was at the time walking along Lepanto Street accompanying
two visiting friends when he was arrested, and that he was framed up because of
his refusal to cooperate and point out a certain “Al” to the
police.  This is quite an improbable
motive for officers of the law to incriminate him with this serious
offense.  Admittedly, the accused had no
previous misunderstanding or grudge with any of the police­men composing the
apprehending team.  In fact, its leader
Sgt. Armando Inabangan was a previous acquaintance being a resident of the same
area where accused lived.  Also, it
turned out from the testimonies of his two supposed companion friends whom
accused called to testify to support his theory, that the latter learned of the
accused’s arrest only on the following morning, which means that they were not
with the accused at the time of his apprehension and would not know of the
cause of said arrest.” (Rollo, p. 5).

The other argument of the accused-appellant in his brief refers
to an alleged violation of his constitutional right to remain silent and to
counsel.

The argument is irrelevant and frivolous.  Mr. Rualo did not give any confession or
extra-judicial statement.  His conviction
is based purely on the evidence adduced during trial.  When an arrested person signs a booking sheet
and arrest report at a police station, he does not admit the commission of an
offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance.  The booking sheet is merely a statement of the accused’s being
booked and of the data which accompanies the fact of an arrest.  It is a police report and may be useful in
charges of arbitrary detention against the police themselves but it is not an
extra-judicial statement and cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction.

The trial court was aware of
the gravity of the penalty in cases involving prohibited drugs.  It states:

“It is well to state, in passing, that the law – Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended – imposes a heavy penalty for the offense charged in this
case.  It is therefore difficult to under­stand,
unless it be because of innate depravity, why persons like the accused herein
would bargain their freedom for a measly sum of P20.00, and in their pernicious
trade cause so much physical, mental and moral pain not only to the immediate
victims of their greed, but also, more especially, to the family of said
victims.” (Rollo, p. 5).

The penalty imposed by law is based on legislative policy.  Its harshness calls for extra careful
attention to the evaluation of evidence either incriminating or exculpating an
accused.  We see no reason from the
records to show that the trial court did not give such solicitous attention.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.