THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VICENTE ANDAYA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The defendant-appellant, Vicente Andaya, was charged with the murder
of Teresita Cervantes in an information which reads:

That on or about March 3, 1980, in the morning thereof, at Barangay
Kinamaligan, Municipality of Masbate, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within
the jurisdiction of this court, the said accused with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloneously attack, assault and hack several
times one Teresita Cervantes, hitting the latter on the head, thereby
inflicting wounds which directly caused her instantaneous death.

Contrary to law.

Andaya
pleaded “NOT GUILTY” but the court a quo after trial
rendered judgment finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and imposed the death penalty. 
Hence, this automatic review.  The
dispositive portion of the decision is as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds accused Vicente
Andaya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by
treachery and aggravated by the circumstance of an uninhabited place, without
any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, therefore, hereby sentences him
to the supreme penalty of death; to indemnify the heirs of the late Teresita
Cervantes the amount of P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, and to pay the
costs of the suit.

In view of the nature of the penalty imposed by the Court, the
record of this case is hereby ordered forwarded to the Supreme Court of the
Philippines, Manila for automatic review.

SO ORDERED.

The case for the prosecution rests on the positive identification
of the defendant-appellant by witnesses Edna Ternal and Francisco Masamoc.  The latter testified to having seen the crime
actually committed.  The defense relies
on alibi.

The decision appealed from, takes into account the conflicting
versions of the prosecution and of the defense as to what happened on the
morning of March 3, 1980.  It clearly
indicates the facts and law on which the decision is based, thus:

*          *         *

A perusal of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and that
of the defense show that accused’s alibi is feeble and flimsy.  Prosecution witness, Francisco Masamoc
positively identified accused Vicente Andaya as the assailant of the deceased
Teresita Cervantes.  He saw Vicente
Andaya armed with bolo, chasing the victim and upon overtaking her, he hacked
the victim.  As a result of the hacking, she
died.  Thereafter, Vicente Andaya ran to
the creek.  Francisco Masamoc immediately
reported the incident to the parents of the victim.  Significantly, this testimony of Francisco
Masamoc was the subject of a perfect corroboration by a young barrio girl, Edna Ternal who
in her testimony said that while she was going down the trail of barrio
Kinamaligan, Masbate, Masbate, she saw accused Vicente Andaya and Teresita
Cervantes going the hill of Kinamaligan. 
Teresita Cervantes was ahead, followed by the accused who was then
carrying a bolo
tucked on his waist.  Edna Ternal
testified that accused Vicente Andaya was behind Teresita Cervantes while they
were going down the trail.  In this
connection, Dr. Emilio Quemi declared that the incised wound of the victim,
about four inches long at the posterior base of the neck could have been
inflicted while the assailant was behind the victim.  The evidence on record is bereft of any known
motive why these witnesses should falsely testify against the accused or of any
special interest in accused’s
conviction, thus, their testimonies deserve weight and credence.

Accused Vicente Andaya pleaded the defense of alibi.  He maintains that in the early morning of March
3, 1980, he was in the house of his parents-in-law at barrio Kinamaligan,
Masbate, Masbate.  And from said house he
went to his place of work in the coconut plantation of Carlito Saut also
located in the same barrio, arriving thereat about 8:00 A.M. on said date.  At about past 8:00 A.M. he started gathering
coconuts until 11:00 A.M.  Cecilio
Labastida corroborated accused’s claim that at about 7:00 A.M. on March 3,
1980, he was in the house of his father-in-law, Crispulo Labastida.  Cecilio stayed there for almost two (2) hours
where he also saw Edna Ternal in the same house.  He declared however that Vicente Andaya went
uphill of barrio Kinamaligan at around past 7:00 A.M. on the same day.  Jose Saut likewise attempted to corroborate
Vicente Andaya’s alibi.  He testified
that in the early morning of March 3, 1980, he went to the house of his nephew,
Carlito Saut in the hill of barrio Kinamaligan, Masbate, Masbate to borrow
money.  On his way, he met Vicente
Andaya.  So they went together in going
to the house of Carlito Saut and arrived thereto about past 8:00 A.M.  After resting for a while, Vicente Andaya started gathering coconuts from past
8:00 A.M. up to 11:00 A.M.

It is significant to note
that Cecilio Labastida is not an impartial witness as he is Vicente Andaya’s brother?in-law, therefore his
testimony is tainted with bias.  At any
rate, he admitted that at around 7:00 A.M. on March 3, 1980, Vicente Andaya
actually left the house of his father-in-law and went up the hill of barrio Kinamaligan,
Masbate, Masbate, the place where the victim was killed.  Similarly, Jose Saut could not be a
disinterested witness because he is the uncle of Carlito Saut, the owner of the
coconut plantation where Vicente Andaya was
gathering coconuts.  But, even granting
that the alibi presented by the accused and his witnesses is to be admitted,
the fact remains that the place where Teresita Cervantes was killed and the
place where accused was allegedly gathering coconuts on March 3, 1980 is only
around 500 meters away, therefore, it was not physically impossible for the
accused to have been at the place where the crime was committed, either before
or after the time he was in the place of his work in the plantation of Carlito
Saut.  In this connection, it has been
held that “to establish an alibi, a
defendant must not only show that he was present at some other place
about the time of the alleged crime, but also that he was at such other place
for so long a time that it was impossible for him to have been at the place
where the crime was committed, either before or after the time he was at such
other place.  (People v. Palomas, 49
Phil. 501; People v. Angeles, 92 SCRA 432; People v. Alcantara, 33 SCRA 812) In
another case the Supreme Court refused to believe appellants’ defense of alibi
as the plantation where he was allegedly working on the day in question was
only about six hundred yards away from the scene of the crime, and it was not
impossible for them to leave their place of work.  (People v. Niem, et al., L-8634, 75 Phil.
668; People v. Gamboa, et al. L-8634, October 18, 1954) But apart from the
foregoing weakness which inheres in the alibi invoked by the accused, his
inability to exculpate from the fact that the prosecution eyewitness, Francisco
Masamoc positively and categorically identified Vicente Andaya as the
perpetrator of the crime and Edna Ternal substantially corroborated his version
of the incident.  The positive
identification of the accused as the
author of the crime by said witnesses is beyond doubt, hence the alibi of
Vicente Andaya cannot stand against it. 
The unchallenged rule in this jurisdiction is that the defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification by
prosecution witnesses pointing to the accused as particeps criminis.” (People v. Dela Cruz,
97 SCRA 385)

In the instant case, the crime was correctly characterized by the
prosecutor as murder.  Accused Vicente
Andaya made a deliberate and
sudden attack with his bolo on the unarmed victim, Teresita Cervantes after she
was chased and overtaken by said accused. 
Dr. Emilio Quemi who examined the deceased, said that the incised wound
of the victim, about four inches long at the posterior base of the neck could
have been inflicted while the assailant was behind the victim, thus, corroborating
the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Francisco Masamoc and Edna Ternal
that the accused herein was behind the victim during the incident.  Accused resorted to a mode of assault which insured the consumation (sic) of the killing without any risk to himself
arising from any defense which the victim could have made.  Hence, alevosia qualifies the killing as
murder.  But the evidence on record also
shows that the victim was killed on top of the hill of barrio Kinamaligan,
Masbate, Masbate, an uninhabited place which is far from human habitation, the
nearest house being about 1/2 kilometer away
and the place of the killing was obviously sought and chosen by the
accused to avoid detection and preclude interference with the commission of the
murder or giving assistance to the victim. 
Thereby, uninhabited place aggravates the penalty.  And there being no mitigating circumstance
present, the death penalty must be imposed to the accused.  The accused in this case victimized a young barrio girl living at the top
of the hill of barrio Kinamaligan, Masbate, Masbate.  Clearly, the accused is a criminal with anti-social proclivities against which
society has the need, if not the right, to defend itself.  The imposition of the supreme penalty to him
is not only justified by the facts of the case, but is required as a measure of social defense.  To spare his life is to endanger the lives of
many more other innocent persons.  For
him justice cannot be tempered with mercy; the law must be applied to its full
force and to its full extent.

*          *         *

As counsel for the
defendant-appellant the Citizens
Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) assigns the following errors:

I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ON
THE TESTIMONY OF FRANCISCO MASAMOC AS THE ALLEGED EYE-WITNESS TO THE CRIME
INSPITE (sic) OF HIS CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON MERE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.  [Rollo, p. 29].

This Court finds no merit in the appeal.

The defense challenges
the credibility of the witness Francisco Masamoc pointing out discrepancies in his statements in the
affidavit executed before the police authorities and those made on the
witness stand.  In the affidavit the
witness did not say anything about having seen the defendant-appellant hack the
victim while he testified at the trial to having seen the act done.  However, the witness explaining his omission,
on cross-examination stated that the affidavit was prepared by a policeman at
the municipal building who asked and typed the questions together with the
answers.

In previous cases this Court has ruled on the issues of
contradictions made by witnesses for the prosecution in statements in their
affidavits and on the witness stand. 
[People v. Tan, 89 Phil. 337 (1951), People v. Pacala, L-26647, August
15, 1974, 58 SCRA 370].

In People v. Tan [at p. 341], the Court dealt with the issue,
thus:

. . . As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
contradictions, if any, may be explained by the fact that an “affidavit *
* * will not always disclose the whole facts, and will oftentimes and without
design incorrectly describe, without the deponent detecting it, some of the
occurrences, narrated * * * ” (2 Moore on Facts, 1098) and “being
taken ex parte, is almost always incomplete and
often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and sometimes from the
want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be
unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the
correction of the first suggestions of his memory, and for his accurate
recollection of all that belongs to the subject . . .”

Another discrepancy in the testimony of the principal witness
Masamoc pointed out by the defense refers to Masamoc’s purpose in going to the
poblacion on the morning of March 3, 1980. 
This is minor, is satisfactorily explained and does not affect the
credibility of the witness.

The defense assigns as error the conviction of the
defendant-appellant on “mere circumstantial evidences.”

The prosecution presented Francisco Masamoc as eyewitness to the
dastardly act of the defendant-appellant. 
Masamoc testified that he saw Vicente Andaya armed with a bolo chasing
the victim, and that upon overtaking her, Andaya hacked the victim.  The court a quo
who heard the testimony of Masamoc and observed him during the trial gave full
credence to his account of what happened. 
Masamoc’s act of immediately reporting what he saw to the parents of the
victim supports the veracity of his account of the event.  Furthermore, the schoolgirl Edna Ternal’s
testimony that she met the victim closely followed by the accused-appellant
carrying a bolo tucked on his waist, as they were going down the trail, corroborates
Masamoc’s testimony.  Further
corroboration was made in findings of the medical doctor that the most fatal
wounds of the victim were located on the mandible and at the back of the neck,
which could have been caused by a sharp edged instrument wielded by the
assailant positioned behind the victim.

The court a quo committed no error in rejecting
alibi as a defense against the
positive identification of the defendant-appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime.  As the trial court noted the
witnesses presented for the defense were not impartial witnesses and even if
they were, the place where the defendant-appellant was supposed to be at the
time the murder was committed was only about 500 meters away from the scene of
the crime.

However, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General, that
although the offense was committed in an uninhabited place, the record does not
show that the defendant-appellant actually sought the solitude of the place to
better attain his purpose.  For this
reason this aggravating circumstance should not be considered against the
defendant-appellant [People v. Luneta, et al., 79 Phil. 815 (1948), People v.
Deguia, et al., 88 Phil. 520 (1951), U.S. v. Vitug, 17 Phil. 1 (1910)].  With neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, the proper penalty, therefore, would be reclusion perpetua not death. 
Even without this factor, under the 1987 Constitution [Art. III, Sec.
19(1)] the modification of the penalty imposed by the trial court would in any
event have to be modified to reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding the
defendant-appellant guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt is hereby MODIFIED to reduce the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua, and to increase the amount of
indemnity to be paid the heirs
of Teresita Cervantes to P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.