AMANCIO SESE, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CRISTETA R. BAGANO, AND BERTOLDO R. BAGANO, RESPONDENTS.

 In this petition for review,
by way of appeal by certiorari, under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as supplemented by, and in conjunction with,
Republic Act No. 5440, the petitioner, Amancio Sese, impugns the Decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on September 29, 1983 and its Resolution promulgated on December
19, 1983, denying his Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed. The
questioned decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (formerly Intermediate
Appellate Court), penned by Justice Porfirio V. Sison, Chairman of the 4th Civil Cases Division,^[1]
set aside and reversed the decision of the trial court.^[2]
The dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court states:

XXX   XXX     XXX

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds:

(1)     Dismissing this case
with costs against the plaintiffs;

(2)     Declaring the
defendant the true owner of the land in question; and

(3)     Ordering the
plaintiffs, jointly and severally to pay to the defendant attorney’s fees the
sum of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos and litigation expenses in the sum of One
Thousand (P1000.00) Pesos.^[3]

XXX   XXX     XXX

On the other hand, the respondent appellate court decided the
appeal of the plaintiffs-appellants-spouses, Cristeta
C. Bagano and Bertoldo R. Bagano, thus:

XXX   XXX     XXX

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby,
set aside and reversed and another one is rendered declaring
plaintiffs-appellants the owners of the land described in par. 4 of their
complaint and consequently ordering defendant-appellee
to vacate the same and surrender possession thereof to the
plaintiffs-appellants.

Plaintiffs-appellants’ claim for actual, nominal, moral and
exemplary damages is denied for lack of sufficient evidence. They are, however,
entitled to the sum of P2,000.00 as counsel fees and other expenses of litigation.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.^[4]

The Resolution of the appellate court, also penned by Justice Porfirio V. Sison. curtly denied Sese’s motion for reconsideration saying: “A second
review of the records does not yield any cause or reason for a finding
favorable to the defendant-appellant.”^[5]

We, however, find otherwise.

There is, indeed, merit to the petitioner’s contention that the
Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) erred:

I.        In holding that the
land in question was fully identified by the private respondents herein;

II.       In holding that the
private respondents have successfully proven their title to the land in
question;

III.      In not holding that
the petitioner herein is the true and absolute owner of the land he bought from
his predecessor-in-interest;

IV.      In not affirming the
decision of the trial court.

The first assignment of error involves the question of the
identity of the land while the second and third focus on the issue ofownership. The resolution of the issue of ownership is
dependent upon the determination of the identity of the land. We thus
endeavored to resolve first the latter.

In their complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of a
3-hectare agricultural land filed against herein petitioner, Amancio Sese, the private
respondents claim that the land now subject of this controversy is part of a
23.04-hectare agricultural land which they acquired partly by inheritance and
partly by purchase. In further proof of their right over the land, the private
respondents also assert that their predecessors-in-interest acquired the
property from the heirs of the late Marciano Brioso in 1950. According to the private respondents, the
23.04-hectare agricultural land is bounded as follows:

North             –           Mabugna River;

East              –           Andres Tugao,
Andres Ramires, and Julian Licup;

South            –           –           Sagawsawan River;

West             –           Mateo S. Pecson.

On the other hand, the land subject of this controversy being
part of the bigger land is bounded thus:

North             –           Cristeta C.
Bagano and V. Gigante;

East              –           Cristeta C.
Bagano

South            –           –           Cristeta C. Bagano; and

West             –           –           Cristeta C. Bagano

Inside the land claimed by the private respondents, however, are
several persons who are in actual possession. One of the witnesses for the
petitioner, Silverio Altarejos,
is actually in physical possession of the northern portion of the land while Victorio Gigante has title over
his land situated in the western portion. These findings of the trial court
which we find no reason to dispute demonstrate that the questioned land has the
following boundaries:

North             –           Silverio Altarejos

East              –           Sagawsawan River

South            –           –           Fernando
Eclipse

–           (now Thelma Ramos)

West             –           Victoriano Gigante

The private respondents’ claim that the land in question was
previously located at Pinamalatican but later became
part of Bo. Umabay Exterior by virtue of some
adjustments made after the war is not substantiated by the evidence on record.
On the contrary, the evidences submitted by the private respondents themselves,
which include the tax declaration and the deed of sale executed by the heirs of
Higinio Quiero and the
sketch showing the boundaries and extent of the entire property of respondent
in relation to its adjoining areas, indicate that respondents’ land is actually
situated in Bo. Pinamalatican and not in Bo. Umabay Exterior.

These evidences were ignored by the respondent court which chose
to give credence to the spouses Bagano’s claim as set
forth above.

As a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and
conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal, provided, they are borne out by
the record or are based on substantive evidence. However, this rule admits of
certain exceptions.^[6]
In this case, we are compelled in order to render substantial justice, to
review the findings of fact by the Court of Appeals for the following reasons:

1.     said
findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based;

2.     the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court;

3.     the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts.

The trial court also found that while the subject land is
actually bordering the Sagawsawan
River which is a natural landmark
on the south of the petitioner’s property, the sketch Exhibit “E”
submitted by the respondents themselves shows that the land in question is
located some distance from the bank of the Sagawsawan River.
This evidence was likewise ignored by the respondent court.

Note must also be taken of the fact that the respondents made
mention of two different tax declarations allegedly covering the same parcel of
land. Under par. 2 of their complaint, the respondents indicated that Tax
Declaration No. 4537 covers their entire 23.04-hectare property. They, however,
offered as exhibit Tax Declaration No. 4621 which, they likewise allege, covers
the same parcel of land. This indeed, is an indication that the private
respondents are unsure of the property they are claiming.

All these give rise to a grave doubt as to the precise identity
of the parcel of land which the private respondents claim to be their property
but which according to the evidence on the record, Sese
bought from Jose Arado and which he (Sese) actually occupies.

It is true that the identity of the land has been
“admitted” by the parties in the pre-trial of the case as shown in an
order^[7] dated July 9, 1974, as follows:

In view of the fact that the parties failed to arrive at an
amicable settlement and the identity of the land admitted by them, with the
issue only of ownership to be resolved by this court, let this case be stricken
from the pre-trial calendar. Set this case for trial on September 2, 1974 at 8:00
o’clock in the morning.

SO ORDERED.

and which the respondent court utilized as a basis in disposing
perfunctorily the issue of identity.

The rule may be that admissions made by the parties during a
pre-trial conference and incorporated in the pre-trial order are binding but
this rule is not without exceptions. If, in order to prevent manifest
injustice, the admissions made by the parties during the pre-trial were
disregarded by the lower court, as in this case, we will not hold otherwise.
For indeed, it would be contrary to the objective of the law if we were
constrained to rule that the land subject of this controversy were the same
land being occupied by the petitioner if the evidence negates such claim. To so
hold would unduly prejudice the substantial rights of the petitioner who stands
to lose his property if only because of mere technicality, inaccuracy of
language, or plain carelessness.

Thus in order to maintain an action to recover ownership of real
property, the person who claims that he has a better right to the property must
prove not only his ownership of the same, but first, he must satisfactorily
prove the identity thereof.^[8]
In this case, failing to fix the identity of the real property they claim, the
respondents action must fail. And this, in fact, was what the trial court has
decided. And for such failure, the issue of ownership need no longer be passed
upon by us. Nonetheless, we are convinced by the findings of the trial court
that the respondents, likewise, have not satisfactorily proven their title to
the property, and we quote:

XXX   XXX     XXX

It is admitted by the plaintiffs that the defendant is in actual
possession of the land. For that reason, the defendant has in his favor the
presumption of ownership arising out of his actual occupancy (Santos
& Espinosa vs. Estejada, 26 Phil. 398). It is
true the plaintiffs have presented document (sic) exhibits to support their
claim of ownership but these documentary evidence show that the land of the
plaintiffs is located in Pinamalatican, Mobo, Masbate, and not in Umabay Exterior, Mobo, Masbate which barrios are far from each other.

It is also admitted by the
plain­tiffs that they did not have actual possession of the land in question
for they are residing in Cebu City. According to them
their tenant is Silverio Altarejos
but the latter denied this claim. As a matter of fact, the plaintiffs admitted
that there is pending case in Branch I of this Court between them and Silverio Altarejos, also for
recovery of ownership.

On the other hand, the
witnesses for the defendant stated categorically that the land has been
cultivated, possessed and owned since before World War II by Fructuso Arado, father of Jose Arado. When Fructoso Arado died, his son Jose Arado
succeeded his possession until it was sold to the herein defendant on September
6, 1966 as evidenced by Exhibit “2”. Jose Arado’s
evidence, of possession of the land sold is Exhibit “3”. Since
September 6, 1966, the defendant has been in possession of the land, enjoying
it peacefully and free from interference by whomsoever.

The fact also remain (sic)
that no attempt was ever made by the plaintiffs to have the tax declaration of Arado cancelled if it were true that the property subject
of said tax declaration belongs to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff, Cristeta Bagano, is a practicing
lawyer and yet the Court is intrigued why it took her almost seven years before
she brought this case to Court. If she believed that she has a meritorious
case, why did she sleep for almost seven years before vindicating her right in
Court? As a lawyer, the Court expected her to be more vigilant in her rights
and the Court believes that she would not have wasted that long period of time
if she had a meritorious and valid claim against the herein defendant.^[9]

XXX   XXX     XXX

WHEREFORE, (1) the
judgment of the Court of Appeals dated September 29, 1983 and its Resolution
dated December 19, 1983 are set aside; (2) the judgment of the trial court
dated January 18, 1980 is hereby
REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

^[1]
With Justices Abdulwahid A. Bidin,
Marcelino R. Veloso, and Desiderio P. Jurado.

^[2]
Regional Trial Court, Fifth Judicial Region, Branch XLVI, formerly Court of
First Instance of Masbate, Tenth Judicial District,
Branch III, Judge Irineo V. Mendoza.

^[3]
Record on Appeal, 34; Rollo,
32.

^[4]
Decision, intermediate Appellate Court, Annex “A” Petition; Rollo,. 28.

^[5]
Resolution, Annex “B”, Petition;
Rollo, 30.

^[6]
Moran Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 133
SCRA 88; Manero v.
Court of Appeals, 102 SCRA 817; Carolina Industries v. CMS Brokerage, 97 SCRA 734; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan,
142 SCRA 593.

^[7]
Record on Appeal, p. 16.

^[8]
Sanchez Mellado v.
Municipality of Tacloban, 9:92; Lubrico
v. Arbo,
12:391; Belen v. Belen, 13:202; Salacup v. Rambac, 17:21; Dela Cruz v. Nino, 18:284; Santos v. Estejada,
26:398; Del Valle v. Mercado, 34:963;
Marcelo v. Maniquis,
35:134 Misamis Lumber Co. Inc. v. Director of Lands, 57:881.

^[9] Record on Appeal, pp. 33-34.