G.R. No. L-9695. September 10, 1956

Upon  petition of  the United States  Veterans Administration, appellant Philippine National Bank was, on June 5, 1953, appointed by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Sp. Pr. No-19635) guardian of the estate of the minor Petronila Baga, born May 30, 1938, which estate consists of monetary benefits in the total sum of P4,281.57 awarded to said minor by the United  States Veterans  Administration.   After appellant had qualified for the trust, the court fixed the sum of P25 as the minor’s monthly allowance.

Four months  thereafter, or  on September 22, 1954,  the minor Petronila Baga filed a  petition  in the  court  below alleging  that on February 5, 1953, she contracted marriage with  one Pacifico Garcia;  that she was  emancipated  by such marriage under the New Civil Code; that her emancipation  had the  effect  of terminating her guardianship and enabled her to administer her own property  under Article 399 of the Code; that it would be more beneficial to her interests if she would be  allowed to withdraw  the remainder of her estate (in the amount of P3,567.49) which she proposed to  use wisely and invest profitably in lucrative and sound business; that her estate was not earning anything and was being, periodically depleted by her monthly allowance, so that when she reached the age of majority, it would have no practical utility  to her for purposes of making a profitable investment; that her monthly allowance of P25 became negligible since  her  marriage because of the high cost of living; and prayed for a  declaration of emancipation by marriage, the discharge of her guardian, and the delivery to her of her estate.

Both the  Administrator of Veterans Affairs and the guardian Philippine National  Bank  opposed the petition on  the ground  that the guardianship  proceedings of the minor Petronila Baga are governed, not by the general provisions on guardianship of the New Civil Code, but by the provisions  of  Republic Act No. 390; but the lower court held that Article 399 of the New Code is not repugnant  to  but complementary with  Republic  Act No. 390, and ordered the termination of  the minor’s guardianship and the release ,of her estate by the guardian.  Motion of the guardian Philippine National Bank to set aside judgment having been  denied, it appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to us upon petition of the minor Petronila Baga, concurred in by the appellant Philippine National Bank, on the ground that the appeal involves only questions of law.

The sole issue is whether the lower Court correctly-held that Article 399 of the New Civil Code modified or supplemented section  23 of the Veterans Guardianship Act. Under said article of the New Code, a minor emancipated by  marriage is qualified  “to administer  his property as though he were of age”, although he can not  borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of  his parents or guardian, nor can  he sue or be sued without their assistance.   Republic Act No.  390  (Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act), on the other hand, provides only one ground for the termination of the guardianship over the  estate of a minor beneficiary of the Veterans Administration, namely, the attainment of the age of majority (section 23).

The legislative  Intent  behind  Republic  Act  No.  390 (passed  on the same date as the New Civil Code)  clearly excludes any  application of the general provisions of the Code, especially its Article 399,  to the termination  and discharge of guardianship over  minors  entitled to benefits from the U. S. Veterans Administration.

The intention of Congress in passing Republic Act No. 390 is stated in the explanatory note to the original House Bill  (No. 2383) as follows: 

“The Uniform Veterans  Guardianship Act was adopted by the National  Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State  Laws at the meeting in Seattle, Washington, in 1928 and approved by the American Bar  Association.  Since its adoption  the Act has  been passed either in whole or in  part by  all but three of the States, and Puerto Rico.

Experience in these jurisdictions  has demonstrated that  under this uniform law, the courts are materially aided in their judicial control of the estates of  incompetents and minors who, as a class, are entitled to the maximum protection of the Government and the courts.

The chief attorney, through his legal  staff, acts as an  effective aide to the courts in these matters.   Under this Act, the award and payment of benefits due to minors and incompetent beneficiaries from the Veterans Administration is materially  expedited; the  funds so paid  are  effectively safeguarded against  faulty  or improvident disbursements, and actual embezzlements are usually thwarted.

The passage of the Uniform Veterans Guardianship  Act would provide precisely the  same legal base and  effect in the Philippines , for guardianship supervision and for the furnishing of direct legal assistance to minors and  incompetents in their guardianship affairs as now obtains in the many jurisdictions where this or a similar Act has been passed, and enforced, in which the vast program of benefits to veterans  and their dependants  is being administered by the Veterans Administration.”   

(Congressional Record, H. R., Vol. IV, No. 1).

It  is  readily  seen  that Congress  intended  primarily that  the terms  of  Republic Act 390 should be uniform with the American Veterans Guardianship Act.  It is to be assumed that the provisions of  section 23 (providing that the guardianship of the minor beneficiary should terminate only by his majority) were likewise motivated by the same desire for uniformity, since the same  grounds for discharge appear in section 16 of the American Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act (9 U.L.A. p. 738).  To Inject, therefore, the emancipation  provisions of  the new  Civil Code into the  cases  provided for by section 23 of Republic Act 390  would result  in its discordance  with the model legislation, and violate the legislative intent.

A second  reason against the opinion of the court below is that Republic  Act  390, being  a  special  law limited in its  operation to money benefits  from Veteran’s  Acts, must control as against the provisions of  the new  Civil Code,  which is a general statute.   It is  a  well  settled principle  that,  because repeals  by  implication are not favored, a special law  must  be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general law, in  the absence of special circumstances  forcing a contrary conclusion’ (Lichauco & Co. vs. Apostol, 44 Phil.  138, 146; Motor Alcohol Corp. vs. Mapa, 64,Phil. 715; 723-724; Leyte Asphalt Co. vs. Block, 52 Phil. 429; Visayan Electric Co. vs. David, 49 Off. Gaz. 1385).  In the particular case now before us, the circumstances are against the supersession of the special law, especially in  view of the provisions of section 23 of Republic Act No. 390, providing  that  it should  apply ”notwithstanding  any other provisions of law relating to judicial restoration and discharge of  guardians”.

We  conclude  that Article 399 of the Civil Code of the Philippines  on  the effects of emancipation by  marriage does not terminate a minor’s guardianship constituted under Republic Act No. 390.

The resolution of the lower Court  dated December 28, 1954 is reversed and set aside.  Without  costs.

Paras,  C. J., Padilla, Montenmyor,  Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, and  Felix, JJ., concur.