PETRA VDA. DE CARCALLAS, WIDOW AND HER CHILDREN (WHO WILL BE MENTIONED IN THE PETITION PROPER), PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. JUDGE VALERIANO YANCHA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH I,…

An action for recovery of a parcel of land was filed with the
respondent court by the private respondent against petitioners
herein.  After the pre-trial conference,
trial on the merits ensued.  On the day
set for the reception of evidence of the defendants (now petitioners), the
latter and their counsel failed to appear. 
On the same day, that is, 23
February 1977, the trial court issued an order considering the case
submitted for decision^[1].  On the following day, however, defendants
through counsel filed a motion for reconsideration^[2].  This was denied by the respondent court in an
order dated 14 March 1977.  A second motion for reconsideration was filed^[3],
which was likewise denied by the trial court on 18 March 1977.

On 29 March 1977,
the trial court promulgated a decision against the defendants^[4]
who acknowledged receipt of the decision on 1 April 1977.  A
motion (petition) for relief from judgment was filed on 22 April 1977^[5].  The court denied the same on the ground that
it lacked an affidavit of merit.  On 17 May 1977, petitioners filed an
alternative motion (a) for reconsideration of the order denying motion
(petition) for relief or (b) for reproduction and refiling
of original motion (petition) for relief, refiled
this time with the affidavit of merit^[6].  This was again denied in an order dated 1 June 1977^[7],
copy of which was received by petitioners on 7 June 1977.  On 28 July 1977, upon motion of private
respondent, the court a quo issued an order of execution.

Petitioners have come to this Court on a petition for certiorari,
raising the following assignment of errors:

1.   The court a quo committed error
in declaring the case submitted for decision for failure of the defendants
(petitioners herein) and their counsel to appear on the scheduled date of
trial;

2.   The court a quo committed error
in rendering a decision not based on the issue agreed upon by all parties at
the pre trial hearing; and

3.   The court a quo committed error
in denying the second motion for reconsideration and thereafter ordering the
execution of the judgment, when in fact the original motion (petition) for
relief from judgment, with an affidavit of merit and proof of service thereof,
was refiled within the reglementary
period provided by the Rules.

There is merit in this petition.

1.   To begin with, we find no error committed by
the respondent court in issuing the order considering the case submitted for
decision for failure of the petitioners (as defendants) and their counsel to
appear at the scheduled date of trial. 
However, it should be noted that a motion for reconsideration was filed
by petitioners without delay and, upon its denial, a
second motion for reconsideration was again filed.

In the first motion for reconsideration, counsel for petitioners
gave a reasonable explanation for his nonappearance in court on the scheduled
date of trial.  He explained that, on the
day of the trial, he had a slight attack of ashtma and
had to rest for some fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes, that when he arrived
in court at around 9:00 a.m., the
respondent court had already given the order considering the case submitted for
decision.  The court, however, denied the
motion for reconsideration, even after finding the nonappearance of defendants’
counsel justified, because “there is no justification whatsoever for the
absence and nonappearance of the defendants themselves”^[8].

In the second motion for reconsideration, counsel for petitioners
alleged that one of the defendants was with him at the time he arrived late (on
the scheduled date of trial).  In the
same second motion for reconsideration, counsel made a notation that said
motion will be submitted to the court for consideration, at which time, further
explanation will be given.  However, on
the day set for the hearing of said second motion, counsel for petitioners
again failed to appear, for which reason, the respondent court denied said
second motion for reconsideration.

In the motion (petition) for relief from judgment, petitioners’
counsel apologized to the court for his nonappearance at the hearing of the
second motion for reconsideration, alleging that, on the same day, he was in
Branch II of the Court and that the arguments and deliberations of a case in
said other branch dragged for more than one hour and that, by the time he
arrived in the sala of respondent court, he was
informed that the court had already called the case and had declared the second
motion for reconsideration submitted for resolution.

We find the non-appearance of counsel for petitioners at the
scheduled date of trial as not intended to delay the disposition of the
case.  It was the happening of an event
beyond his control – the asthma attack – that forced his absence from court at
the start of such scheduled trial.  But
counsel for petitioners exerted efforts to correct any wrong impression caused
by his absence at the scheduled hearing, by filing a motion for reconsideration
without delay.  The respondent court
should not have applied the rules too strictly. 
The interest of justice would have been better served if petitioners had
been given their day in court.

Petitioners should also not be made to suffer because of minor
lapses in the diligent attendance of their counsel, for they are entitled to be
protected in the vindication of their rights. 
It is to be noted that one of the defendants was with their counsel when
the latter arrived late on the scheduled date of trial on account of an asthma
attack.

2.  At the pre-trial of the
case in the court a quo, the following facts were agreed upon by
both parties, as proven:

“1)    That the two parcels, namely, that which is
claimed by the plaintiffs and that which is claimed by the defendants,
originally belonged to one, Tiburcio Pangan (now deceased) who was the legitimate father of Juan
Pangan;

“2)    That said two parcels of land were sold by
said Tiburcio to Emigdio Carcallas (now deceased husband of defendant Petra Vda. de Carcallas)
on August 26, 1952 under a
public instrument duly registered with the Register of Deeds for Bohol on August 2, 1967; and

“3)    That the parcel claimed by the plaintiffs
was purchased by said plaintiffs from Juan Pangan,
legitimate son of said Tiburcio Pangan,
under a public instrument on July 17, 1967 and duly registered with the same
Office of the Register of Deeds for Bohol on June 4,
1967; and that same parcel was donated to said Juan by his father Tiburcio in consideration of Juan’s marriage sometime in or
before 1951″^[9].

Consequently, as the respondent court itself said, “if such
donation is not preponderantly proven by evidence, therefore, the claim of the
plaintiffs must necessarily fail, considering that they admit that the
aforesaid two parcels of land originally belonged to Tiburcio
Pangan and then the latter sold the same to the
defendants on August 26, 1952, so that the subsequent sale of that portion of
the land by Juan Pangan to them (plaintiffs) must necesarily be inofficious.  On the other hand, if it can be proven by
them (plaintiffs) by means of indubitable documents or evidence that said
parcels were donated to them (actually, Juan Pangan)
under donation propter nuptias
in or about 1951, then their (plaintiffs’s) claim
must succeed”^[10].

Thus, the parties agreed to simplify the issue for resolution, as
–

“WHETHER OR NOT THE SAID PORTION SOLD BY JUAN PANGAN TO THE
PLAINTIFFS ON JULY 17, 1967 WAS PREVIOUSLY A SUBJECT MATTER OF A VALID DONATION
PROPTER NUPTIAS BY TIBURCIO PANGAN IN FAVOR OF HIS LEGITIMATE SON
JUAN PANGAN, IN CONSIDERATION OF THE LATTER’S MARRIAGE SOMETIME IN OR BEFORE
1951″^[11].

In the now assailed decision, the respondent court declared the
plaintiff as the owner of the land in question. 
In arriving at this conclusion, the court said:

“The land in question was originally owned by Juan Pangan who sold the same to plaintiff Esteban Tojong as evidenced by Exhibit A, a written deed of sale of
said land notarized by notary public Juanito Ricafort.  This
document was registered with the corresponding register of deeds.  After the execution of said deed of sale,
vendee, Estaban Tojong
procured that its tax declaration which was then in the name of vendor Juan Pangan be transferred in the name of the plaintiff-vendee,
as per Exhibit C, Land Tax Declaration No. R-21792 in the
name of Esteban Tojong and Aurea
L. Tojong. 
From and after the transfer of the tax declarations of said land in the
name of the plaintiffs, the latter have been paying the taxes thereon as
evidenced by Exhibit D payment of taxes for 1973; Exhibits D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4,
D-5 and D-6, receipts of taxes for the years 1972, 1971, 1970, 1969, 1968,
1967, 1966 and 1965, respectively.

“During the Martial Law regime pursuant to the revision of
land declarations, the tax declaration of said land was further revised as
evidenced by Exhibit C-2, true copy of Tax Declaration No. D-10465 in the name
of spouses plaintiffs Esteban Tojong
and Aurea L. Tojong.

“Before the land in question was sold to the plaintiffs by its
original owner, Juan Pangan, the latter mortgaged
said land to the Philippine National Bank to secure a loan he obtained from
said bank sometime in November 1966 as evidenced by Exhibit C, promissory note
of Juan Pangan in favor of the Philippine National
Bank.  After they purchased said land,
plaintiffs had this mortgage released. 
Plaintiffs took actual possession of said land from Juan Pangan in 1967 and while plaintiffs were in possession of
said land defendants, by means of force and without justification therefore
entered upon said land and occupied the same to the exclusion of and damage to
the plaintiffs.  So that the plaintiffs
in this pray that judgment be rendered declaring them
owner in fee simple of the land in question.

“It having been established by the evidence on record that the
land in question was originally owned by Juan Pangan
who had been in continuous, peaceful possession of the same as an owner for
more than ten years and that Juan Pangan sold the
same to the herein plaintiffs for a valid and sufficient consideration, the
Court believes and so holds that said land is owned by the plaintiffs in fee
simple x x x“^[12].

As can be gleaned from the aforequoted
decision, the respondent court did not rule on the sole issue in the case as
agreed upon by all the parties during the pre-trial conference.  Instead, the court assumed the prior
ownership of Juan Pangan over the disputed land.  And yet, under Section 4, Rule 20 of the
Rules of Court, admissions during the pre-trial conference bind all the parties
and the court, unless modified upon request before trial to prevent manifest
injustice.

3.  Section 3, Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. 
Time for filing petition; contents and verification.  – A petition provided for in either of the
preceding sections of this rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days
after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order, or other proceeding to be
set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was
entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits
showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and
the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or
defense, as the case may be.

There is no question that the petitioners’ motion (petition) for
relief from judgment was filed on time. 
To recapitulate, upon receipt on 1
April 1977 of the adverse decision dated 29 March 1977, petitioners filed on 22 April 1977 a verified motion
(petition) for relief from judgment.  This
was denied by the court because the said motion (petition) lacked an affidavit
of merit as required by the Rules. 
However, on 17 May 1977, and still within
the sixty (60) day period from the time petitioners received the adverse
decision and within six (6) months from the date of entry of said adverse
decision of 29 March 1977,
petitioners re-filed the motion (petition) for relief from judgment together
with an affidavit of merit.  In denying
the motion (petition) of petitioners, dated 17 May 1977, the lower court clearly committed a
reversible error.

Considering that the petition for relief was filed within the
prescribed period and that the herein petitioners appear to have a meritorious
and plausible defense, the respondent judge should have ordered the reopening
of the case for the reception of defendants’ evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The orders of the respondent Judge issued on 23 February 1977, 14 March 1977, 18 March 1977 and 1 June 1977 as well as the decision rendered on 29 March 1977, are hereby annulled and set aside.  The respondent judge, or his successor, is
directed to reopen the case for the reception of the evidence for the
petitioners (as defendants in the court a quo) and thereafter to
render a decision in accordance with the evidence and the law.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera,
Paras, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Original B, Rollo p. 24

^[2]
Original C, Rollo p. 25

^[3]
Original E, Rollo p. 28

^[4]
Original G, Rollo p. 31

^[5]
Original H, Rollo p. 35

^[6] Original
J, Rollo p. 42

^[7]
Original K, Rollo p. 45

^[8]
Original D, Rollo p. 27

^[9]
Original A, Rollo p. 22

^[10] Id.

^[11] Id.

^[12]
Decision, pp. 2-4