CRISANTA F. SENO, CAROLA SENO SANTOS, MANUEL SENO, JR., DIANA SENO CONDER, EMILY SENO AND WALTER SENO, PLAINTIFFS, VS. MARCOS MANGUBAT AND SPOUSES FRANCISCO LUZAME AND VERGITA P…

This is an appeal that was certified to this Court by the Court
of Appeals^[1]
from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, dated September 29, 1972 in Civil Case No.
12205 dismissing the action for reformation of instrument and annulment of
subsequent sale.^[2]

This case stemmed from a complaint filed by plaintiffs on August
29, 1969 seeking 1) the reformation of a Deed of Sale executed in favor of
defendant Marcos Mangubat and, 2) the annulment of a subsequent sale to
defendant spouses Francisco Luzame and Vergita Penaflor of a parcel of land in
Barrio Dongalo, Paranaque, Rizal covered by OCT No. 1197 of the Land Registry
of Rizal.

The material allegations of the complaint so far as they affect
the present appeal are to the following effect: 
that plaintiff Crisanta Seno, a widow, approached defendant Marcos
Mangubat sometime in 1961 to negotiate with him a mortgage over the subject
parcel of land so she can pay off a previous indebtedness; that she and herein
defendant agreed on a mortgage for the sum of P15,000.00 with interest of 2% a
month payable every month and that as long as the interest is being paid, the
mortgage over the property will not be foreclosed; that on the assurance of
defendant Marcos Mangubat, a practicing lawyer, that he will respect their true
agreement on the mortgage, plaintiff Crisanta F. Seno agreed to the execution
of a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property for a consideration of
P5,000.00 in favor of defendant Marcos Mangubat and certain Andres Evangelista
and Bienvenido Mangubat on July 17, 1961;^[3]
that defendant Marcos Mangubat was able to obtain a title in his name and the
other alleged vendees Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat; that on
January 8, 1962 Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale transferring their share in the subject property to defendant
Marcos Mangubat; that defendant Marcos Mangubat was able to obtain a title over
the subject property in his name by virtue of this latter sale; that plaintiff
Crisanta F. Seno continued paying defendant Marcos Mangubat the usurious 2%
interest per month; that sometime in 1963, when plaintiff Crisanta F. Seno
failed to pay the monthly interest of 2%, she was sued for ejectment by
defendant Marcos Mangubat alleging non-payment of rentals; that sometime in the
later week of January 1969, plaintiff Crisanta F. Seno learned that defendant
Marcos Mangubat sold the subject property in favor of spouses Francisco Luzame
and Vergita Penaflor for the sum of P10,000.00 on January 14, 1969;^[4]
that defendant spouses Francisco Luzame and Vergita Penaflor bought the
property in bad faith since they had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding
the transaction between plaintiff and defendant Marcos Mangubat; that defendant
spouses Luzame filed an ejectment case against plaintiff Crisanta Seno for
alleged non-payment of rentals.

On motion of defendant spouses Luzame and Penaflor, the trial
court ordered on October 20, 1975
the inclusion as defendants of Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat on
the ground that they are indispensable parties. 
On December 29, 1971,
plaintiffs filed their amended complaint compliance with the court’s order of
October 20, impleading Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat as
defendants.

The newly impleaded defendants moved for the dismissal of the
case against them on the ground of prescription which motion was granted by the
court in its order of July 3, 1972, the dispositive portion of which reads –

“x x x

“Considering that under Art. 1144 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, an action upon a written contract must be
brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrued, and
considering further the opposition of plaintiffs which we find to be justified
and meritorious, this Court resolves to dismiss as it hereby dismisses the case
only as against defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat.

“x x x.”^[5]

Defendants Luzame and Penaflor in their motion for reconsideration
represented by Atty. Jose Manacop and defendant Marcos Mangubat in his
Supplement to motion for reconsideration or in support of Atty. Manacop’s
motion for reconsideration asked the court a quo to dismiss the
case against all the defendants.  The court
a quo in its order of September 27, 1972 reconsidered its order
of July 3rd and dismissed the case against all the defendants holding that the
court is no longer in a position to grant plaintiffs’ demands, principally the
reformation of subject Deed of Absolute Sale.

The motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs of the
foregoing order was denied by the trial court in its order of January 17, 1973;^[6]
hence, an appeal was brought before the Court of Appeals praying for the
reversal of the orders of the court a quo dated September 27,
1972 and January 17, 1973 and for the remand of the case to the court a quo
for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals certified the instant case to this Court
holding that the assignment of errors made by plaintiffs in their appeal raised
purely legal questions, to wit –

1)    Are defendants Andres Evangelista and
Bienvenido Mangubat indispensable parties in the case without whom no action can be properly taken thereon?

2)    If they are such, has the action prescribed
against them in view of Art. 1144,
Civil Code?

3)    If they are not, was the dismissal of said
defendants a legal ground for dismissal of the complaint as against the other
defendants?  and

4)    Was the dismissal of the case without a
hearing on the merits in accordance with law?^[7]

The first issue We need to resolve is
whether or not defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat are
indispensable parties.  Plaintiffs
contend that said defendants being mere dummies of defendant Marcos Mangubat
and therefore not real parties in interest, there is no room for the
application of Sec. 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

For the determination of this issue, We
find it necessary to consider the distinction between indispensable and proper
parties as clearly stated in Sections 7 and 8, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court which provide:

“Sec. 7.  Compulsory joinder of
indispensable parties.  – Parties
in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall
be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.”

“Sec. 8.  Joinder of proper parties.  – When persons who are not indispensable but
who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded as between those
already parties, have not been made parties and are subject to the jurisdiction
of the court as to both service of process and venue, the court shall order
them summoned to appear in the action. 
But the court may, in its discretion, proceed in the action without
making such persons parties, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without
prejudice to the rights of such persons.”

Under Section 7, indispensable parties must always be joined
either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the court cannot proceed without
them.  Necessary parties^[8]
must be joined, under Section 8, in order to adjudicate the whole controversy
and avoid multiplicity of suits.^[9]

Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the
controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that
the courts cannot proceed without their presence.  Necessary parties are those whose presence is
necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so far
separable that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting
them.^[10]

Defendants cite Alberto vs. Mananghala^[11]
to support their theory that defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido
Mangubat are indispensable parties.  Thus
–

“x x x.

“One of the issues raised by the parties is whether the
transactions carried out by and between Arcadio Ramos and the deceased Vicente
Feliciano is a sale with pacto de retro or simply an equitable mortgage.  If it be held that it is an equitable
mortgage, then their right would be defeated and they would be held liable for
warranty and eviction under the law to Casimiro Mananghala.  This being so, it would seem clear that the
presence of all the heirs of Vicente Feliciano in this case is indispensable in
order that they may protect their interests. 
They are entitled to be heard. 
They may have a valid defense which may have the effect of defeating the
claim of the plaintiffs.  This however,
was not done, for some of the heirs of Vicente Feliciano were not served with
summons and consequently have not entered their appearance.  This is in violation of Section 7, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court.

“x x x.”

We, however, find this case inapplicable to the case at bar.

In the present case, there are no rights of defendants Andres
Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat to be safeguarded if the
sale should be held to be in fact an absolute sale nor if the sale is
held to be an equitable mortgage. 
Defendant Marcos Mangubat became the absolute owner of the subject
property by virtue of the sale to him of the shares of the aforementioned defendants
in the property.  Said defendants no
longer have any interest in the subject property.  However, being parties to the instrument
sought to be reformed, their presence is necessary in order to settle all the
possible issues of the controversy. 
Whether the disputed sale be declared an
absolute sale or an equitable mortgage, the rights of all the defendants will
have been amply protected. 
Defendants-spouses Luzame in any event may enforce their rights against
defendant Marcos Mangubat.

In fact the plaintiffs were not after defendants Andres
Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat as shown by their non-inclusion in the
complaint and their opposition to the motion to include said defendants in the
complaint as indispensable parties.  It
was only because they were ordered by the court a quo that they
included the said defendants in the complaint. 
The lower court erroneously held that the said defendants are
indispensable parties.

Notwithstanding, defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido
Mangubat not being indispensable parties but only proper parties, their joinder
as parties defendants was correctly ordered being in accordance with Sec. 8 of
Rule 3.

We, therefore, need to settle the next issue of whether the
action against them has prescribed in view of Art. 1144, Civil Code, which
provides:

“The following actions must be brought ten years from the time
the right of action accrues:

“1) Upon a written contract;

x x x.”

The complaint clearly alleged that the deed of sale executed on July 17, 1961 did not express the
true intention of the parties and should be reformed into the mortgage it
actually was.  Such allegations are
binding for purposes of determining the motion to dismiss (which hypothetically
admits the allegations in the complaint). 
The prescriptive period for such actions based upon a written contract
and for reformation thereof is ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the
Civil Code.  Such right to reformation is
expressly recognized in Article 1365 of the same Code which provides:

“If two parties agree upon the mortgage or pledge of real or
personal property, but the instrument states that the property is sold
absolutely or with a right of repurchase, reformation of the instrument is
proper.”13

Article 1605 of the Civil Code14 in conjunction with Article 160415
likewise allows the apparent vendor to ask for the reformation of the
instrument.

Plaintiffs argue that:

“A grave and palpable error was committed by the court a
quo in holding that the prescriptive period must be counted from the
date of execution of the deed of sale on July 17, 1961 up to the date of filing of the Amended
Complaint on December 29, 1971.”

“The important reckoning point is the date   of filing of the original complaint on August 29, 1969.  It has been held that amendments in pleadings
do not necessarily expunge those previously filed; That amendments made, more
so when ordered by the court, relate back to the date of the original
complaint, as in the case at bar, the claim asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the same conduct, transaction or occurence, and that amendment
presupposes the existence of something to be amended, and, therefore, the
tolling of the period should relate back to the filing of the pleading sought
to be amended (Philippine Independent Church v. Mateo, et al., L-14793, April
28, 1961.”16

In the case of Pangasinan Transportation Co. vs. Philippine
Farming Co., Ltd.,17 this Court held that where the
original complaint states a cause of action but does it imperfectly and
afterwards an amended complaint is filed correcting the defect, the plea of
prescription will relate to the time of the filing of the original
complaint.  However, in the case of Aetna
Insurance Co. vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation,18 We held that this rule would not
apply to the party impleaded for the first time in the amended complaint.

In Aetna, the defendant Barber
Lines Far East Service was impleaded for the first time in the amended
complaint which was filed after the one-year period for prescription.  The order of the lower court dismissing the
amended complaint against the said defendant was affirmed by this Court.

In the instant case, defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido
Mangubat were only impleaded in the amended complaint of December 29, 1971 or ten (10) years, five (5)
months and twelve (12) days from July
17, 1961 the date of execution of the subject Deed of Absolute
Sale, clearly more than the ten (10) year prescriptive period.

Anent the third and fourth issues, the theory of the plaintiffs
is that the complaint should not have been dismissed as against said defendants
but instead the court a quo should have proceeded with a trial on
the merits because there is an issue of fact appearing on the pleadings, that
is, that defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat were mere
dummies of defendant Marcos Mangubat.

It should be remembered that the court a quo
dismissed the complaint against defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido
Mangubat upon their motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription.

Section 3, Rule 16 relating to motion to dismiss, provides that
“after hearing, the court may deny or grant the motion or allow amendment,
or may defer the hearing and determination of the motion until the trial if the
ground alleged therein does not appear to be indubitable.”

A motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription will be given
due course only if the complaint shows upon its face that the action has
already prescribed.19 If it does not so appear, the
determination of the motion to dismiss must be deferred until trial.20

Under the circumstances of this case, the ground of prscription
alleged by aforementioned defendants was apparent on the face of the
complaint.  As earlier pointed out in
this decision, the action against said defendants has prescribed.  The court a quo properly
ordered its dismissal as what it originally did in its order of July 3, 1972.

The plaintiffs now maintain that assuming the action against
defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat had already prescribed,
this defense was personal to them and could not legally encompass the position
of defendant Marcos Mangubat; that the latter defendant, could be held solely
responsible to plaintiffs, having become absolute owner of the property subject
matter of the July 17, 1961 instrument, or in the least he could be held
accountable for his 1/3 share of the property. 21

One case which the lower court particularly applied to justify
dismissal of the case against the other defendants was Pillado vs. Francisco.22
In said case, plaintiffs filed an action for the annulment of the contract of
sale of a certain real estate executed by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in
favor of the spouses Estela Francisco and Vivencio Lasala.  Defendant PNB submitted an answer while
defendant spouses filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
stated no cause of action and that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to
sue.  Said defendant spouses subsequently
filed an additional motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action of
plaintiff, if any, had prescribed.  The
court ordered the dismissal of the complaint which dismissal became final.  Plaintiffs then asked the court to continue
the case against PNB but the latter moved for the dismissal on the ground that
the court had lost, or had been divested of its jurisdiction over the case
through the release of the defendant spouses, who were indispensable
parties.  The court granted the motion to
dismiss holding that defendant spouses who were the vendees were indispensable
parties in an action for the rescission of the sale.  From this order, the plaintiff appealed to
this Court.  This Court affirmed the
order holding that the indispensable parties having been discharged by the
trial court, the Court is no longer in a position to grant the plaintiff’s
demands, principally the revocation of the Deed of Sale in their favor.

As We have already held that defendants Andres Evangelista and
Bienvenido Mangubat are not indispensable but proper parties, Pillado
cannot therefore, be applied to the case at bar.  In that case, the parties discharged were
indispensable being the purchasers and the present holders of the subject
property.  In the instant case, the
parties discharged were the original vendees who have since transferred their
interest in the subject property to one of the original co-vendees, and the
latter after having been vested with absolute title over the subject property
sold the same to defendants spouses Luzame. 
Whereas in the former case, the court was no longer in a position to grant
the relief sought by the plaintiffs, in the latter, the trial court may still
be able to grant plaintiffs’ demands for reformation of the instrument and
annulment of subsequent sale if after trial on the merits, plaintiffs prove
their allegations that defendants Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat
were in fact mere dummies of Marcos Mangubat and that the sale executed on July
17, 1961 was in reality an equitable mortgage.

By the dismissal of the case against defendants Andres
Evangelista and Bienvenido Mangubat, the court a quo had lost
jurisdiction over them.  We have already
pointed out that the joinder of proper parties is necessary in order to
determine all the possible issues of the controversy; but if for some reason or
another it is not possible to join them, as when they are out of the
jurisdiction of the Court, the court may proceed without them, and the judgment
that may be rendered shall be without prejudice to their rights.23
Hence, notwithstanding the absence of said defendants, the court could still
proceed with the trial of the case as against the remaining defendants in
accordance with Sec. 8 of Rule 3.

Nevertheless, the court is constrained to affirm the dismissal of
the complaint against all the defendants as there is merit in the argument
raised by defendants-appellees that plaintiffs are barred by laches to bring
suit against them.

Laches (or estoppel by laches) is unreasonable delay in the
bringing of a cause of action before the courts of justice.24
As defined by this Court, “laches is failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled thereto either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.25

A perusal of the records shows that from the time of the
execution of the deed of sale on July 17, 1961 to the time of the filing of the
present complaint on August 29, 1969 or a period of 8 years, 1 month and 12
days, plaintiffs never took any step to enforce their rights which they claim
to have despite the several opportunities available to them.

Defendant Marcos Mangubat filed an ejectment suit against
plaintiff Crisanta Seno in 1963 and this fact was admitted by the plaintiffs in
their complaint.  For failure of
plaintiff to appear in the case, a decision was rendered by the trial court
ordering plaintiffs to vacate the subject property26
which decision was duly executed.27

It further appears from the complaint that plaintiffs were well
aware of the transfer of the title from the name of plaintiff Crisanta Seno to
the names of defendants Marcos Mangubat, Andres Evangelista and Bienvenido
Mangubat and subsequently to the name of defendant Marcos Mangubat alone as
early as 1963 when the ejectment case was filed against plaintiffs, and also
they did not do anything about it.

In January 1969, plaintiffs learned of the sale of the subject
property to defendants-spouses Luzame, but it was only on August 29, 1969 when plaintiffs brought this
action and only after an ejectment case was filed by said defendant spouses
against plaintiff Crisanta Seno before the Municipal Court of Paranaque, Rizal
on August 4, 1969.

As defendants-appellees contend, before the nine-year period
lapsed, plaintiffs never raised a voice to protest against all these
proceedings.  They chose to sleep on
their rights and to rely on defendants’ alleged word that their true agreement
would be respected rather than bring their grievances to a court of law.  However, when an ejectment case was filed
against them just when the 10-year prescriptive period for bringing of their
suit was nearly over, they finally decided to stake their claim against the
defendants.

The essence of laches is not merely lapse of time.  It is essential that there be also
acquiescence in the alleged wrong or lack of diligence in seeking a remedy.28
The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based on public
policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale
claims and, unlike the statute of limitations not a mere question of time but
is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right
or claim to be enforced or asserted.29

By the negligence of plaintiffs in asserting their rights for an
unreasonable length of time, they are now forever precluded from enforcing
whatever right they may have against defendants.  Indeed, it is an indicia
of the infirmity of their claim.

Moreover, as against plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant
spouses Luzame are purchasers in bad faith, We hold that the legal presumption
of good faith on the part of said defendant spouses must prevail.

Plaintiffs would have Us believe that
defendant spouses being their erstwhile neighbors and friends had knowledge of
the circumstances surrounding the transaction between plaintiff Crisanta Seno
and defendant Marcos Mangubat which therefore makes them purchasers in bad
faith.

Defendant spouses, however, claim that they came to know of the
existence of the original title of plaintiff Crisanta Seno only when they
verified the title to the land in 1969 when it was being offered to them by
co-defendant Marcos Mangubat.  They deny
that they are neighbors much less friends of plaintiffs.

In order that a purchaser of land with a Torrens title may be
considered as a purchaser in good faith, it is enough that he examines the
latest certificate of title which in this case is that issued in the name of
the immediate transferor.30 The purchaser is not bound by the
original certificate of title but only by the certificate of title of the
person from whom he has purchased the property.31

Good faith, while it is always to be presumed in the absence of
proof to the contrary, requires a well-founded belief that the person from whom title was received was himself the owner of the land,
with the right to convey it.32 In this regard, a buyer of real
estate should exercise ordinary care in purchasing land,33
so that one who purchases real property should make inquiries about the right
of those in possession thereof.34

The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing
with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens
Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except
when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry.35

It is true that by the possession of plaintiffs of the subject
property, defendant spouses Luzame should have been put on their guard and
should have taken precautionary steps in ascertaining the interest of the
possessors of the land.  The defendant
spouses did verify the title to the property with the Register of Deeds and
finding that the latest title was in the name of defendant Marcos Mangubat,
they had every reason to rely on such title. 
Besides, there was the ejectment suit filed by defendant Marcos Mangubat
against plaintiff Crisanta Seno which was decided in favor of the former.  The defendant spouses could not be faulted
for believing that the possession of the plaintiffs was in the concept of
lessee; in fact said defendant spouses also filed an ejectment suit against
plaintiffs.

This Court had occasion to rule that possession by the appellees,
either by themselves or through their predecessors in interest, if there was
such possession at all, would be unavailing against the holder of a Torrens
Certificate of Title covering the parcels of land now in question.36

Thus, where innocent third persons relying on the correctness of
the certificate of title issued, acquire rights over the property, the court
cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the
certificate for that would impair public confidence in the certificate of
title; otherwise everyone dealing with property registered under the torrens
system would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title had been
regularly or irregularly issued by the court. 
Indeed, this is contrary to the evident purpose of the law.  Every person dealing with registered land may
safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefore and
the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the
condition of the property.  Stated
differently, an innocent purchaser for value relying on a torrens
title issued is protected.37

We therefore hold and find that defendants spouses Luzame are
purchasers in good faith and for value of the questioned property.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the order of
dismissal dated September 29, 1972
and the order denying the motion for reconsideration dated January 13, 1973 of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch I, are hereby AFFIRMED. 
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz, and
Paras, JJ., concur.

---

^[1] Certified for review on questions of law per decision dated July 23, 1976.

^[2] Penned by Judge Emilio V. Salas, p. 340, Record on Appeal.

^[3]
Annex “B” of the Complaint.

^[4]
Annex “D” of the Complaint.

^[5] P. 40, Record on Appeal.

^[6] P. 406, Record on Appeal.

^[7]
Decision promulgated July 23, 1976
penned by Associate Justice Godofredo P. Ramos, concurred in by Associate
Justices Andres Reyes and B.S. de la Fuente, p. 163, Rollo.

^[8]
Under the Old Rules of Court, Sec. 8, Rule 3, the term used was “necessary
parties”, while under the present rules, the same section uses the term
“proper parties”.  The present
section is a total reproduction of the old rule except for these two
terms.  It is therefore to be understood
that all references to the term “necessary parties” shall mean
“proper parties.”

^[9]
Palarca v. Baguisi, 38 Phil. 177.

^[10]
Wyoga Gas & Oil Corp. vs. Schrack, 1 Fed. Rules
Service, 292, 27 Fed. Supp. 35.

^[11] G.R. No. L-2715, May 30, 1915, 89 Phil. 188.

13 Spouses Jayme and Solidario V.
Alampay, G.R. No. L-39592, January
28, 1975, 62 SCRA 131 (notes in parenthesis supplied).

14 “Art. 1605.  In the cases referred to in Articles
1602 and 1604, the apparent vendor may ask for the reformation of the
instrument.”

15 “Art. 1604.  The provisions of Article 1602 shall
also apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale.”

16 Page  144, Rollo.  Brief for the
plaintiffs-appellants, pp. 13-14.

17 81 Phil. 273.

18 G.R. No. L-25266, January 15, 1975, 62 SCRA 11.

19 Francisco, et al. v.
Robles, et al., 94 Phil. 1035; Sison v. McQuaid, 94 Phil. 201.

20 Cordova v. Cordova, 102 Phil. 1182.

21 Page 19, Brief for the
plaintiffs-appellants, p. 144, Rollo.

22 G.R. No. L-12006, January 31, 1959 (unreported).

23 Smith v. Lopez, 5 Phil. 78.

24 Civil Case of the Philippines
Annotated Vol. IV, p. 2, 1985 Ed. Paras.

25 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 35; Heirs of Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan, 65 SCRA
605; Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175.

26 Annex “I”, p. 97, Record on Appeal.

27 Annex “K”, p. 102, Record on Appeal.

28 Southern Pacific v. Bogert
by J. Louis Brandeis USSC, 250 U.S.
483, 39 S. Ct. 536, 63 L, Ed. 1099, 1106-1107 cited in Cristobal v.
Melchor, supra.

29 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, supra.

30 Hernandez v. Katigbak Vda.
de Salas, 69 Phil. 744; Flores, et al. v.
Plasina, et al., L-5727, Feb. 12, 1954;
Revilla, et al. v. Galvidez, L-9940, March 30, 1960.

31 Canas, et al. v. Tan Chuang Leong, et al.,
L-14594, Nov. 29, 1960.

32 Santiago v. Cruz, 19 Phil. 148 cited in Duran v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 138 SCRA 489.

33 Caram, Jr. v. Laureta, 103 SCRA 7.

34 Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 102 SCRA 331.

35 Capital Subdivision v. Province of Negros
Occidental, 7 SCRA 60; Fule v. Legare, 7 SCRA 351 cited in PNB v.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 57757, August 31, 1987.

36 Benin
v. Tuason, 57 SCRA 531.

37 Duran v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, supra.