ABELARDO IBARRA, CELESTE IBARRA, AURORA I. SUBAN, ENRIQUE SUBAN, NORMA I. PE BENITO, MARCIAL PE BENITO, AND FAUSTINO IBARRA, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. FAUSTINO IBARRA, SR., ALFREDO …

Appeal by certiorari from the decision^[1]
of the Court of Appeals, dated 13 June 1979, in CA-G.R. No. 55910-R, entitled
“Abelardo Ibarra, et al., plaintiffs-appellants vs.
Faustino Ibarra, Sr. et al., defendants-appellees“,
which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
XXVIII, in an action for partial annulment of contract, with preliminary injunction.

The antecedent facts are what follows:

Sometime in 1935, spouses Faustino Ibarra, Sr. and Filomena Morales bought on installment basis two (2)
parcels of land, designated as Lot No. 5 (the lot on which they later
erected a house of strong
materials) and Lot. No. 6, from the San Juan Subdivision.

On 19
December 1951, Filomena Morales died.

Thereafter, the
installment payments for the two (2) lots were continued by Faustino Ibarra,
Sr. until the purchase price was fully paid. 
And, as a consequence, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 45070 and 46235, were issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila solely
in the name of Faustino Ibarra, Sr. as widower^[2].

In a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 6 August 1971, Faustino Ibarra, Sr. conveyed the two (2)
lots, including the house on Lot No. 5 which belonged to the dissolved but
undistributed conjugal partnership of Faustino Ibarra, Sr. and Filomena Morales, for the price of P40.000.00 to spouses
Alfredo de la Rosa and Concesa P. de Regla.  As a
consequence, the certificates of title in the name of Faustino Ibarra, Sr. were
cancelled, and, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 105276 and
105277 were issued in the name of spouses Alfredo de la Rosa and Concesa P. de Regla^[3].

On 29 September 1971, petitioners herein, several of them
claiming to be the legitimate children of Faustino Ibarra, Sr. and the deceased
Filomena Morales, filed an action before the Court of
First Instance of Manila, praying, among others, for the nullification of the
Deed of Absolute Sale of 6 August 1971 and the cancellation of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 105276 and 105277^[4].

After trial, said court rendered judgment ordering, among others,
defendant Faustino Ibarra, Sr. to pay plaintiffs their respective shares, as
heirs, in the participation of Filomena Morales in
the properties sold by said defendant to spouses de la Rosa and de Regla.  The sale
executed by defendant Faustino Ibarra, Sr. in favor of spouses de la Rosa and
de Regla, was upheld in toto.  Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Hence,
the present recourse.

In pressing for the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, which in effect denied the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale
of 6 August 1971 and the
cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 105276 and 105277,
petitioners assign the following errors:

“. . . THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SALE IN
QUESTION IS NULL AND VOID INSOFAR AS IT COVERS THAT PORTION OF THE LOTS THAT
BELONG TO THE PETITIONERS, THE LOWER COURT HAVING HELD SAID LOTS IN QUESTION TO
BE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES OF FAUSTINO IBARRA SR. AND THE LATE FILOMENA
IBARRA”^[5], and

“. . . THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT SPOUSES
ALFREDO DELA ROSA AND CONCESA DE REGLA ARE NOT PURCHASERS IN GOOD FAITH AND
THEREFORE CANNOT ACQUIRE TITLE OVER THE SOLD PROPERTIES THAT LEGALLY BELONGED
TO THE PETITIONERS”^[6].

The Court finds
petitioners’ position to be without merit.

In a similar case^[7], where a parcel of land, forming part of the
undistributed properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, was
sold by a widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate
of title thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow, the Court held that
the purchaser acquired a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the deceased spouse.

The rationale for this
rule is that “a person dealing with registered land is not required to go
behind the register to determine
the condition of the property.  He is only
charged with notice of the burdens on
the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of
title. 
To require him to do more
is to defeat one of the primary
objects of the Torrens system”^[8].

In the instant case, the vendees exercised more than the required
degree of care and prudence before they entered into the sale in question.  Aside from demanding the muniments
of title to the lots when the sale of
the same was offered to them by Faustino Ibarra, Sr. the vendees also engaged
the services of a lawyer to detect any flaw in the vendor’s title to the land^[9].

Likewise, it was only
after the assurance of the plaintiffs, that they do not object to the sale of
the lots because the same were the sole property of their father,
that spouses de la Rosa and de Regla entered
into the sale in question.

Moreover, petitioner Aurora Ibarra Suban
even offered to sell to said spouses the house on Lot No. 5, claimed to be
hers, on the representation that she has no more use for it because her father
was already selling the lot on which her alleged house was standing^[10].

The petitioners,
nevertheless, contend that at the time of the execution of the sale, the contracting parties had already been neighbors for six (6) or seven (7) years, and the vendees
knew that the vendor was a widower with children of a first marriage^[11]. 
Possessed with this knowledge,
the vendees should have placed themselves on guard, according to the petitioners, by examining the extent of the title of the vendor, before entering into the sale
in question.  And by choosing to close
their eyes to these facts, the vendees,
spouses de la Rosa and de Regla, cannot be considered as purchasers in good faith.

This contention is without merit. 
The appellate court correctly found that petitioners, including Faustino
Ibarra, Sr., are not exactly neighbors of spouses de la Rosa
and de Regla. 
Aside from the absence of any proof that the contracting parties in the
sale in question have been neighbors and that the vendees knew that the vendor
is a widower with children of a first marriage, an examination of the records
negates the conclusion that petitioners, together with Faustino Ibarra, Sr., on
the one hand, and spouses de la Rosa and de Regla, on
the other hand, were actually neighbors. 
Based on the complaint filed by the petitioners before the trial court, Lot
nos. 5 and 6, on which Faustino Ibarra, Sr. was supposed to have raised his
children with Filomena Morales, are located at 564 Cavite, Gagalangin,
Tondo, Manila^[12];
on the other hand, spouses de la Rosa and de Regla
resided at No. 2334 Bato St.,
Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila^[13].

As a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final, conclusive and cannot be
reviewed on appeal by certiorari before this Court.  There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, as when:  “(1) the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference
made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and
its findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellees [Roque vs. Buan, L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 648]; (6) the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents [Garcia vs. CA, L-26490,
June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 622); and (9) when the finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence
of record [Salazar vs. Gutierrez, L-21727, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 243)”^[14].  In
the case at bar, there is nothing on record that would justify its falling into
any of such exceptions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED.  Costs
against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera,
Paras, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by Justice Mama D. Busran and concurred in by
Justices Simeon M. Gopengco and Isidro C. Borromeo

^[2]
Rollo, p.12

^[3]
Ibid.

^[4]
Record on Appeal, p. 6

^[5]
Rollo, p. 6

^[6]
Id., p. 7

^[7]
Paraiso et al. vs. Camon,
106 Phil. 187

^[8]
Ibid., citing William H. Anderson vs. Garcia, 64 Phil. 506

^[9]
Record on Appeal, p. 88

^[10]
Ibid

^[11]
Rollo, p. 7-8

^[12]
Record on Appeal, p. 3

^[13]
Id., p. 2

^[14]
Tolentino vs. De Jesus, 56 SCRA 167