G.R. No. 79173. December 01, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROLANDO N. ABADILLA, SUSAN S. ABADILLA, IN HER OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE MINORS JUNE ELIZABETH, ROLANDO, JR., DAPHINE JE…
GANCAYCO, J.:
The validity of the detention of an individual is challenged in
this Petition for habeas corpus.
The petitioners are the spouse and minor children of the detainee while the respondents are ranking
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
The record of the case discloses that on January 27, 1987, a group of officers and
enlisted men of the AFP seized control of the radio-television broadcasting
facilities of the Republic Broadcasting System (GMA-Channel 7) located in Quezon City, ostensibly for the
purpose of toppling the existing constitutional government. While the takeover might have been a prelude
to similar operations throughout the national capital, it did not succeed. On January
29, 1987, the mutineers surrendered to the military authorities and
the possession of the facility was restored to the owners and managers
thereof. Soon thereafter, the military
authorities conducted an investigation of the matter.
On April 18, 1987,
a group of enlisted men staged a mutiny inside the Fort
Bonifacio
military facility in Makati,
Metropolitan Manila. The mutiny, dubbed
as “The Black Saturday Revolt”,[1]
did not succeed either. After the incident, the military authorities
also conducted an investigation.
The first investigation was concluded on March 12, 1987. The
investigation disclosed that Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla
of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) of the AFP was one of the leaders of the unsuccessful takeover of the GMA
radio-television facilities.[2]
The Board of Officers investigating the matter recommended that the case of
Colonel Abadilla be endorsed for pre-trial
investigation and that the appropriate charges be filed against him for
violation of Article of War 67 (Mutiny or Sedition), Article of War 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to
Article 139 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1866, and such other offenses that may be warranted by the evidence. Accordingly, a charge sheet was prepared
against the Colonel.
The investigation conducted on “The Black Saturday
Revolt” ended on May 27, 1987. It was found at said investigation that
Colonel Abadilla was also involved in the mutiny.
The Board of Officers conducting the investigation also recommended that
the case be endorsed for pre-trial
investigation and that the appropriate charges be filed against the Colonel.[3]
The Colonel was likewise charged, accordingly.
Colonel Abadilla was at large when both investigations were
conducted.
On May 4, 1987 or some two weeks before the second investigation
was concluded, herein respondent Major General Renato
De Villa, Commanding General of the PC and Vice-Chief of Staff of the AFP issued an Order for the arrest and
confinement of Colonel Abadilla.[4]
On May 21, 1987,
respondent AFP Chief of Staff General Fidel V. Ramos issued General Orders No.
342 dropping Colonel Abadilla from the rolls of regular
officers of the AFP.[5]
The pertinent portions of the said
General Orders are as follows -?
“DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF REGULAR OFFICERS
“The names of the following officers are dropped from the
rolls of Regular Officers, Armed Forces of the Philippines
for cause effective as of 9 May 1987
pursuant to Article of War 117. (Authority: Letter from the
President, dated 9 May 1987).
“BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSE MARIA CARLOS ZUMEL xxx
“COLONEL ROLANDO N ABADILLA 0-4937 PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY
(GENERAL STAFF CORPS)
“MAJOR REYNALDO C CABAUATAN xxx
“BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE:
“xxx.”
On July 7,
1987, the Assistant
City Fiscal of Quezon City filed an
Information for Slight Physical Injuries with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Metropolitan Manila in Quezon City against Colonel Abadilla.[6] The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 0237558.
On July 27,
1987, a combined
element of the Philippine Army and
Philippine Constabulary arrested Colonel Abadilla.[7] He was detained first in Camp Crame in Quezon City and later, up to the present, in Fort Bonifacio in Makati.
On July 30, 1987, another
Information, this time for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition) was filed by the Assistant City Fiscal
of Quezon City against Colonel Abadilla.[8] The case was assigned to Branch 104 of the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City and was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-53382.
On the same date, July 30, 1987, Mrs. Susan S. Abadilla, the spouse of Colonel Abadilla
together with their minor children June Elizabeth, Rolando, Jr., Daphine Jennifer, Ma. Theresa, Anna Rosanna, Vincent Marcus
and Bart Joseph, went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for habeas
corpus, challenging the validity
of the detention of Colonel Abadilla.[9]
The main arguments in the
Petition are as follows —
(1) When Colonel Abadilla
was dropped from the rolls of officers effective May 9, 1987, he became a
civilian and as such, the order for his arrest and confinement is null and void
because he was no longer subject to military law;
(2) His detention is illegal because he is not
charged with any criminal offense, either before a civil court or a
court-martial;
(3) Even assuming that the order for the arrest
and confinement of Colonel Abadilla was valid at the
initial stage, the said order became functus officio
and/or moot and academic when the Colonel was dropped from the rolls of
officers;
(4) Even assuming that Colonel Abadilla
is subject to military law, his detention remains
illegal because under Article of War 70, a person subject to military law can
be detained only if he is charged with a crime or a serious offense under the
Articles of War.
In the meantime, the
Regional Trial Court, with Judge Maximiano O.
Asuncion presiding therein, granted the Motion to Quash and the Supplement
thereto filed by the counsel of Colonel Abadilla. Accordingly, the
Information in Criminal Case No. Q-53382 was dismissed by the trial
court.[10]
In a resolution dated August 4, 1987, this Court resolved to issue the writ of habeas
corpus. The respondents were required to make a return of the writ on August
10, 1987.[11]
On August
10, 1987, the
respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
submitted the Return of the writ.[12] The main arguments in the Return are as
follows -?
(1)
In the event that proceedings with a view to
military trial are commenced against a person subject to military law before
the termination of military service, military jurisdiction will fully attach on
the said person.;
(2)
The confinement of Colonel Abadilla
as a person subject to military jurisdiction is authorized by Article of War
70; and
(3)
The continued confinement of Colonel Abadilla in Fort Bonifacio is imperative and
justified on account of the criminal case/s filed against him by both the
military and civil authorities.
As instructed by this
Court, the petitioners submitted their Reply to the Return of the writ on September
7, 1987.[13] The main arguments in the Reply are as
follows -?
(1)
The pendency of a case in the civil courts has no relevance to the issue of military
jurisdiction over Colonel Abadilla. This view notwithstanding, Criminal Case No.
Q-53382 filed against Colonel Abadilla has been
dismissed by the trial court. The pendency of Criminal
Case No. 0237558 filed against the Colonel does not warrant his continued
confinement inasmuch as the Colonel has posted bail for his provisional
liberty;
(1) Colonel Abadilla is
not in the active service of the AFP nor is he a person under sentence adjudged
by courts-martial. As such, he does not
fall under the category of a person
subject to military law as defined
by Article of War 2;
(2)
An
officer dropped from the rolls by order of the President is fully separated
from the service and is no longer subject to military law (Citing Gloria,
Philippine Military Law Annotated).;
(3)
Under
Section 10 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, Philippine Army, court-martial
jurisdiction over officers in the military service of the Philippines
ceases on discharge or separation from the service. The case of Colonel Abadilla
does not fall under any of the exceptions to this rule. This observation has been upheld in Martin
v. Ver, 123 SCRA 745 (1983);
(4)
The pronouncement of the United States Supreme
Court in Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11
(1955), cited in Olaguer v. Military
Commission No. 34, G.R. Nos. 54558 and 69882, May 22, 1987, supports the
stand taken by the herein petitioners; and
(5)
Under the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1850, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1952, court-martial jurisdiction
over the person of accused military personnel cannot be exercised if they are
already separated from the active service, provided that jurisdiction has not
attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law.
On September 9, 1987,
the petitioners submitted their Traverse to the Return of the writ.[14]
It is contended therein that, contrary to the view of the Solicitor General,
jurisdiction over a person is acquired not by the mere filing of a charge or
information, or by the commencement of an investigation, but by the arrest of
the defendant. The petitioners stress
that inasmuch as Colonel Abadilla was arrested after
he had become a civilian, the charge sheets prepared
against him by the military authorities are null and void for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the Colonel.
On September
24, 1987, the
petitioners submitted their Additional Traverse together with a Motion to
Decide the Petition.[15] On the issue of military jurisdiction, and
in support of their contentions, they cite the treatise of Colonel William
Winthrop entitled Military Law and Precedents.[16]
Inasmuch as the parties herein had already presented
their respective arguments, the case was, therefore, deemed submitted for
deliberation.
The sole issue in habeas
corpus proceedings is the legality of the detention.[17] Therefore, the issue that must be resolved
by this Court is this: Is the detention
of Colonel Abadilla illegal? The resolution of this issue will of course,
relate to the jurisdiction of the military authorities over the person of
Colonel Abadilla.
I.
We shall first resolve the problem of jurisdiction.
In Olaguer
v. Military Commission No. 34,[18] this Court held that a military commission
or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses
allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and
functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian
is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal
concerned. For the same reasons, the
doctrine announced in Aquino, Jr. v.
Military Commission No. 2[19] and all decided cases affirming the same, in
so far as they are inconsistent with the Olaguer
pronouncement, were deemed abandoned.
There is no doubt, therefore, that military authorities cannot try
civilians.
The petitioners contend
that the Olaguer doctrine applies to Colonel Abadilla on the ground that he had become a civilian since May 9,
1987 when he was
dropped from the rolls of officers of the AFP.
They argue that on account of his civilian status, Colonel Abadilla is no longer subject to military law. In support of their arguments, the
petitioners cite the Articles of War,[20] the Manual for Courts-Martial of the AFP,[21] Presidential Decree No. 1850, as amended, as
well as the dissertations on military law of Colonel William Winthrop[22] and Colonel Claro
Gloria.[23] They likewise invoke the pronouncement of
this Court in Martin v. Ver[24] and
that of the Supreme Court of the United States in Toth
v. Quarles.[25]
On the other hand, the
Solicitor General contends that military jurisdiction had fully attached on
Colonel Abadilla inasmuch as proceedings were
initiated against him before the termination of his service in the military.
We agree.
As early as March, 1987, months before Colonel Abadilla was dropped
from the rolls of officers, the military authorities began the institution of
proceedings against him. As of
that time, he was certainly subject to military law. He was under investigation for his alleged
participation in the unsuccessful mutinies when he was an officer of the
AFP. As a military officer, it was
incumbent upon him to appear before his superior officers conducting the
investigation even for the purpose of clearing his name. He did not do so. His superiors could not confine him during
the period of investigation because, as stated earlier, he was at large. This disregard for military duty and
responsibility may have prompted his superiors to cause him to be dropped from
the rolls of officers.
It is clear that from the very start of this controversy, the
military authorities intended to try Colonel Abadilla
as a person subject to military law.
This can be gleaned from the charge sheets prepared against him.
The fact that Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers cannot and
should not lead to the conclusion that he is now beyond the jurisdiction of the
military authorities. If such a
conclusion were to prevail, his very own refusal to clear his name and protect
his honor before his superior officers in the manner prescribed for and
expected from a ranking military
officer would be his shield against prosecution in the first place. His refusal to report for duty or to
surrender when ordered arrested, which led to his name being dropped from the
roll of regular officers of the military, cannot thereby render him beyond the
jurisdiction of the military courts for offenses he committed while still in
the military service. This Court cannot
countenance such an absurd situation.
Established principles in remedial law call for application.
The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of
Colonel Abadilla at the time of the alleged
offenses. This jurisdiction having been
vested in the military authorities, it is retained up to the end of the
proceedings against Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction
once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until
the case is terminated.[26]
The petitioners stress that jurisdiction over a person is
acquired not by the mere filing of a charge or an information, or by the
commencement of an investigation, but by the arrest of the defendant. They maintain that the Colonel was arrested
when he was already a civilian.
The argument is untenable.
The rule that jurisdiction over a person is acquired by his
arrest applies only to criminal proceedings instituted before the regular
courts. It does not apply to proceedings
under military law. At the time the
military investigations were commenced, Colonel Abadilla
was an officer of the AFP subject to military law. As such, the military authorities had
jurisdiction over his person pursuant to Article of War 2 and Section 8 of the
Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP, which provide as follows-?
“Art. 2. Persons
Subject to Military Law. — The
following persons are subject to these articles and shall be understood as
included in the term ‘any person
subject to military law’ or ‘persons subject to military law,’ whenever used in
these articles:
“(a) All officers and
soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary; xxx;
”
xxx. ” and
8. COURTS-MARTIAL — Jurisdiction in general —
Persons. — The following persons are
subject to military law:
“(a) All officers and
soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippine
Constabulary; xxx;
”
xxx. “
As mentioned
earlier, his earlier arrest could not be effected
because he was at large. The initial
stages of the investigations had against him before his arrest were, therefore,
not improper.
As a whole, the
authorities cited and relied upon by the petitioners do not satisfactorily
support their contentions.
Article of War 2
enumerates who are subject to military law. In March, 1987, Colonel Abadilla
was a military officer. Under this
Article, he was subject to military law.
Section 10 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP, which
discusses court-martial jurisdiction in general, states the general rule to be:
“The general rule is that court-martial jurisdiction over
officers, cadets, soldiers, and others in the military service of the
Philippines ceases on discharge or other separation from such service, and that
jurisdiction as to an offense committed during a period of service thus terminated is not revived
by a reentry into the military service.”
Attention
is called to the exception mentioned in the last sentence of the Section, to
wit -?
“So also, where a dishonorably discharged general prisoner is
tried for an offense committed while a soldier and prior to his dishonorable
discharge, such discharge does not
terminate his amenability to trial for the offense.”
This exception applies to
the case of Colonel Abadilla inasmuch as he is at present confined in Fort Bonifacio upon the orders of his superior officers,
and his having been dropped from the rolls of officers amounts to a
dishonorable discharge.
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1850, as amended, even
acknowledges instances where military jurisdiction fully attaches on an
individual even after he shall have been separated from active service, to wit
-?
“SECTION 1. Court martial jurisdiction
over Integrated National Police and Members
of the Armed Forces. xxx;
“(b) all persons subject to military law under
Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who
commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or
their case disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, that in either
of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the
proper civil or judicial authorities
when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under
Article 38 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, or court-martial
jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated National
Police can no longer be exercised by
virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction
having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise
provided by law; xxx.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The dissertations of
Colonels Winthrop and Gloria are, at most, persuasive authorities. Indeed, this Court has cited the treatise of
Colonel Winthrop in at least three cases[27] on account of the scholarly discussions
contained therein. Works of this nature
provide insight and information which have been of tremendous help to this
Court in many judicial controversies.
Regardless of their great value, they cannot prevail over opposing but
nonetheless settled doctrines in Philippine jurisprudence.
These observations
notwithstanding, We have gone through the treatise of
Colonel Winthrop and We find the following passage which goes against the
contention of the petitioners, viz
—
“3. Offenders in general -? Attaching
of jurisdiction. It has further been
held, and is now settled law, in regard to military offenders in general, that
if the military jurisdiction has once duly attached to them previous to
the date of the termination of their legal period of service, they may be
brought to trial by court-martial after that date, their discharge being
meanwhile withheld. This principle has mostly been applied to
cases where the offence was committed just prior to the end of the term. In such cases the interests of discipline
clearly forbid that the offender should go unpunished. It is held therefore that if before the day
on which his service legally terminates and his right to a discharge is
complete, proceedings with a view to trial
are commenced against him, — as by arrest
or the service of charges, — the military
jurisdiction will fully attach, and once
attached may be continued by a trial by court-martial ordered and held after
the end of the term of the enlistment
of the accused. xxx.”[28]
The case of Martin v. Ver[29]
cited by the petitioners is not in point.
In Martin, this Court took the opportunity to discuss the general
rule that “court-martial jurisdiction over persons in the military service
of the Philippines
ceases upon discharge or separation from such service” and an exception to the general rule
recited in Article of War 95 regarding frauds against the Government.
The case of Toth v. Quarles[30] decided by the Supreme Court of the United States is also inapplicable.
Toth involves a former
serviceman named Audrey M. Toth who five months after
his honorable discharge from the U.S. Air Force, was arrested by military
authorities on a charge of murder allegedly committed in Korea
when he was still an airman. A divided
Supreme Court[31]
held that Congress has no power to subject a discharged serviceman to trial by court-martial for offenses committed
by him while in the military service and so to deprive him of the
constitutional safeguards protecting persons accused of crime in a federal
court.
The Toth
ruling is inapplicable to the instant case for two reasons.
First —
Toth was honorably discharged from the military
service. The arrangement was voluntary
on the part of the serviceman. There was
an ostensible intention on his part to
live the life of a civilian again.
Colonel Abadilla was not honorably
discharged. On the contrary, he was
dropped from the rolls of regular officers of the AFP. This arrangement did not have his express
consent. In fact, he was at large at
that time.
Second
— The proceedings against Toth began
after his honorable discharge from the service.
The proceedings against Colonel Abadilla were
commenced when he was still a regular officer of the AFP.
Moreover, the doctrine in Toth
is not a unanimous pronouncement as there were some persuasive dissenting
views.
Although Toth was cited in Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34,[32]
the citation should not be construed as a sweeping endorsement of the entire
doctrine therein. Toth
was cited in Olaguer only for the purpose of
emphasizing that military commissions or tribunals cannot try civilians. In Olaguer,
this Court relied on the doctrine announced in Ex-parte
Milligan,[33]
and not the one in Toth, in arriving at the
Decision of the Court.
Another point should be
mentioned regarding the matter of jurisdiction.
We agree with the respondents in their assertion that the pendency of a case in the civil courts has no relevance to
the problem of military jurisdiction over Colonel Abadilla. The argument is well-taken.
II.
The matter of jurisdiction having been settled, We now proceed to discuss the remaining contentions of the
petitioners.
The petitioners argue that even if it were to be assumed that
Colonel Abadilla is subject to military law, his
confinement remains illegal because under Article of War 70, a person subject
to military law can be detained only if he is charged with a crime or a serious
offense under the Articles of War.
The record of the case discloses that Colonel Abadilla
has been charged by the military authorities for violation of Article of War 67
(Mutiny or Sedition) which is a serious offense, and the corresponding charge
sheets have been prepared against him.
The important issue in this Petition has been resolved — the
detention of Colonel Abadilla under the circumstances
obtaining in this case is not illegal.
For this reason, the instant Petition for habeas corpus
should be dismissed for lack of merit.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, the motion of
petitioners to hold respondent General Ramos in contempt of court for approving
the filing of court martial proceedings against Colonel Abadilla
during the pendency of this case should be and is
hereby denied. The Court has not issued
a restraining order enjoining such proceedings.
In fact We now find that the court martial
proceedings may proceed inasmuch as the military authorities have jurisdiction
over Colonel Abadilla in the above-stated cases.
One last word. The man in uniform belongs to the elite in
public service. His eminent credential
is his absolute loyalty to the Constitution, the flag, his country and his people.
He is the guardian against external and internal
aggression.
He is a man of
honor and courage. He is a
gentleman. He is given arms to insure his capability as an instrument of
peace. When he is drafted in the
Philippine Constabulary he becomes a peace officer, a law enforcer, a law
man. Respect for the law is his article
of faith.
However, when he wavers and fails to live up to the highest
standard of fidelity to his country and people, when he defies authority and
discipline, when he commits offenses or when he turns against the very people
and government he is sworn to
protect, he becomes an outlaw and a disgrace to his uniform. The state has a right to hold him to account
for his transgressions and to see to it that he can not use the awesome powers
of his status to jeopardize the security and peace of the citizenry.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition
for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.
[1]
Page 16, Rollo.
[2]
Pages 22 to 26, Rollo.
[3]
Pages 27 to 33, Rollo.
[4]
Annex “B”, Petition; page 12, Rollo.
[5]
Annex “A”, Petition; page 11, Rollo.
[6]
Page 43, Rollo.
[7]
Page 3, Petition.
[8]
Pages 41 to 42, Rollo.
[9]
The herein petitioners were represented by Dean Antonio Coronel
and Former Justice Vicente G. Ericta.
[10]
Annex “C”, First Supplemental Expediente.
[11]
Page 15, Rollo.
[12]
Pages 16 to 21, Rollo.
[13]
Pages 1 to 16, First Supplemental Expediente.
[14]
Pages 1 to 9, Second Supplemental Expediente. A Traverse signifies a denial. Thus, where a defendant denies any material
allegation of fact in the plaintiff’s declaration, he is said to traverse
it, and the plea itself is thence frequently termed a traverse
(Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, page 1345).
[15]
Pages 1 to 3, Third Supplemental Expediente.
[16]
Second Edition, 1920.
[17]
Herrera v. Enrile, L-40181,
62 SCRA 547 (1975).
[18]
G.R. Nos. 54558 and 69882, May 22,
1987.
[19]
63 SCRA 546 (1975).
[20]
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.
[21]
Executive Order no. 178 issued by President Manuel L. Quezon
on December 17, 1938.
[22]
Military Law and Precedents, Vols. 1 and 2, 1920
edition.
[23]
Philippine Military Law Annotated, Revised Edition, 1956.
[24]
123 SCRA 745 (1983).
[25]
350 U.S. 11; 76 S. Ct. 1; 100 L. Ed. 8 (1955).
[26]
Lat v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 69 SCRA
425 (1975); Republic v. Central Surety & Insurance Co., 25 SCRA 641
(1968); Rizal Surety & Insurance Co. v.
Manila Railroad Company, 16 SCRA 908 (1966); Tuvera v.
De Guzman, 13 SCRA 729 (1965).
[27]
Martin v. Ver, supra;
Ruffy v.
Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875
(1946). See also Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2, supra.
[28]
Supra, at page 90. Later emphasis supplied.
[29]
Supra.
[30]
Supra.
[31]
Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black wrote the majority opinion concurred in by five other Justices. Three Justices, Stanley Reed, Harold Burton
and Sherman Minton, dissented.
[32]
Supra.
[33]
4 Wallace (U.S.)
127, 18 L. Ed. 297.