G.R. No. 77008. December 29, 1987

ANGELITA LOPEZ, REPRESENTED BY PRISCILLA L. TY AS HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY (BRANCH 103) AND ANTONIO MURILLO, R…

Decisions / Signed Resolutions December 29, 1987 FIRST DIVISION GANCAYCO, J.:


GANCAYCO, J.:


In this petition for review of the decision of the Special 5th
Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated September 30, 1986[1]
the issue posed is whether a special
power of attorney executed in a foreign country is admissible in evidence as a
public document in our courts.

On June 5, 1984 petitioner Angelita
Lopez who is a Filipino citizen residing in Norway, represented by her alleged
attorney-in-fact Priscilla L. Ty filed an action for ejectment against private respondent in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of the Metropolitan Manila in Quezon City
docketed as Civil Case No. 0045993.  Mrs.
Ty presented to the inferior court a special power of
attorney authorizing her to prosecute
the case in behalf of
petitioner which appears to have been executed by
petitioner before a city judge-notary public of Oslo,
Norway.  It was duly admitted by the Court.

On November 25, 1984
said Court rendered a judgment in favor of petitioner finding the ejectment of private respondent from the subject premises as
warranted.[2]

Private respondent appealed to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City assailing
among others the authority of Mrs. Ty to bring the
action on the ground that the special power of attorney she submitted is
inadmissible in evidence unless its due execution and its authenticity is first
proved, which was docketed as Q-44813. 
In its decision of November 15, 1985, said court reversed the judgment
of the inferior court holding that the questioned special power of attorney is
inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as it is due execution and authenticity was
not proved.  Thus the court concluded
that the suit was not instituted by the real party-in-interest nor by his duly
authorized representative.[3]
A motion for reconsideration of the
decision filed by petitioner was denied in an order of
June 10,
1986
.[4]

Petitioner elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari but
which was treated as a petition for review which was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
SP-09452.  In a decision of
September
30, 1986
, the
appellate court denied the petition for lack of merit,
[5] a pertinent portion of which reads as
follows:

“What militates more against the posture of the petitioner is
that the action was not filed by the proper party.

“The real party in-interest here is Angelita
Lopez who turned out to be the registered owner.  The action was filed by an attorney-in-fact
under a supposed special
power of attorney.  The due
execution of (the) said special power of
attorney was not established.  An action can be filed only by the real party
in-interest.  An attorney-in-fact has no
interest in the litigation (Arroyo vs. Graneda, 18
Phil. 484).

“xxx.”
(Emphasis supplied)

In
a dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Bienvenido Ejercito he espoused the view that the special power of
attorney being a public document duly executed before a notary public, its
authenticity need not be proved.
[6]

Hence this petition.

On February
9, 1987
, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing
the decision and the order of the Regional Trial Court dated
November
15, 1985
and June 10,
1986
respectively.[7]

In a resolution of April 8,
1987
, the Court gave
due course to the petition.
[8] Thereafter the parties submitted their
respective memorandum.

Mrs. Priscilla L. Ty, the supposed attorney-in-fact, contends that inasmuch
as the special power of attorney in question is notarized, it is
a public document which should be admitted in evidence without need of
authentication and/or proof of due execution. 
On the other hand, the private respondent argues that the same cannot be
considered as a public document because its authenticity has not been proved by
Mrs. Ty in accordance with the procedure prescribed
under the Rules of court.

Is the special power of attorney
relied upon by Mrs. Ty a public document?  We find that it is.  It has been notarized by a notary public or
by a competent public official with all the solemnities required by law of a
public document.
[9] When executed and acknowledged in the Philippines, such a public document or a certified true
copy thereof is admissible in evidence.
[10] Its due execution and authentication need
not be proven unlike a private writing.
[11]

Section 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides –

Sec. 25.  Proof of
public or official record.  — An official record or an entry therein,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody.  If the office in which the record is kept is
in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office.”

From the foregoing provision, when the special power of attorney
is executed and acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official
in a foreign country, it cannot
be admitted in evidence unless it is certified as such in accordance with the
foregoing provision of the rules by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept of said public document and authenticated by the seal of his
office.  A city judge-notary who
notarized the document, as in this case, cannot issue such certification.

Considering that the record of the case does not disclose any
compliance with the provisions of Section 25, Rule 132 of the Rules on the part
of the petitioner, the special power of attorney in question is not admissible
in evidence.  As such, Mrs. Priscilla L. Ty cannot lawfully prosecute the case against the private
respondents in the name of her principal as her authority through a special power of attorney had not been duly
established in
evidence.  The
litigation was not commenced by the real party-in-interest or by one duly
authorized by the said party.

This being so, the
Metropolitan Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals never
acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the real party-in-interest — Angelita Lopez.  For
lack of the requisite jurisdiction, all the proceedings in the said courts are
null and void ab initio.[12]
All proceedings therein should be and are hereby set aside.

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a
special power of attorney executed before a city judge-public notary in a
foreign country, without the certification or authentication required under
Section 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, is not admissible in evidence in
Philippine courts.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the entire
proceedings in the Metropolitan Trial Court (Civil Case No. 00459930), the
Regional Trial Court (Civil Case No. Q-44813) and the Court of Appeals (Case
No. CA-G.R.SP No. 09452) are hereby declared null and void and the case is
DISMISSED without costs.  The temporary
restraining order issued on February 9,
1987 is hereby lifted.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa,
Cruz, and Paras,
JJ., concur.


[1]
At the time of the promulgation of the Decision, the Special Fifth Division of
the Court of Appeals was composed of Justice Jorge R. Coquia
as Chairman and Justices Carolina Grino-Aquino, Jose
A. R. Melo, Bienvenido C. Ejercito and Antonio M. Martinez as members.  Justice Coquia
wrote the Decision.  Justice Ejercito submitted a dissenting opinion.

[2]
Pages 39 to 41, Rollo.

[3]
Pages 42 to 47, Rollo.

[4]
Page 52, Rollo.

[5]
Pages 34 to 39, Rollo.

[6]
Pages 21 to 28, Rollo.

[7]
Page 73, Rollo.

[8]
Page 118, Rollo.

[9]
Cacnio v. Baens, 5
Phil. 742 (1906).

[10]
Anlillon v. Barcelona,
37 SCRA 148; Section 25, Rule 132, Rules of Court; U.S.
vs. Enriquez, 1 Phil. 241.

[11]
Section 21, Rule 132, Rules of Court.

[12]
People v. Navarro, 63 SCRA 264, 274 (1975).