FLERIDA OVENSON, PETITIONER, VS. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, RESPONDENTS.

This is a Petition to Review the decision of the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 2009 dated August 30, 1983, affirming the decision of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), to wit:

Flerida Ovenson,
appellant herein, elevated her case to this Commission for review of the
decision of the respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denying
her claim for benefits under PD 626, as amended, for the death of her husband
due to adenocarcinoma of the rectum.

Records show that the late Serafin Ovenson started working in 1955 as laborer in the Central
Bank of the Philippines
and later on rose to various posts until he was appointed senior trade
analyst.  His duties include: 
assisting the supervising trade examiner in reviewing the
verification, examination and evaluation work made by a group of trade analysts
on reports of foreign sales, export declarations/permits and mark-up
computation reports of embroidery exporters; preparing reports and memoranda on
findings relative to pricing, payment terms and other conditions of sale which
do not conform to export regulations; preparing periodic accomplishment reports
and other duties that may be assigned to him by his superior from time to time.

On March 29, 1981,
Ovenson was confined at the Delos
Santos General Hospital
due to on-and-off LBM which started about one-and-a-half months before.  This symptom was later accompanied by rise of
temperature in the afternoon.  Dr. Violeta Roda, diagnosed his condition as “septicemia, adenocarcinoma, rectum and hypothyroidism.” The
patient was sent home on May 4, 1981 after undergoing proctoscopy
and chemotherapy.  Two days later, on May
6, he succumbed to adenocarcinoma of the rectum at
the age of 49 years.

The claim for death benefits filed by the widow under PD 626, as
amended, was denied by the respondent System based on its medical evaluation
that the fatal ailment, a malignant newgrowth of the
rectum which commences in the mucous membrane and gradually invades the deeper
structure is attributed to genetic influence.

Appellant requested reconsideration of respondent’s adverse
ruling.  However, her request was also
turned down by respondent reiterating its previous stand that the ailment which
resulted in the decedent’s death is not in the least causally related to his
duties and conditions of work.  Hence, this appeal.

We have carefully reviewed the records and we believe that
respondent System did not err in disallowing the instant claim.  From our study of the etiology of the ailment
in question, we failed to find any
basis for attributing the same to the deceased’s employment.

According to medical
authorities, adenocarcinoma of the rectum
and lower sigmoid comprises approximately 7% of all malignant tumors of the
body.  Men are affected more commonly
than women in the ratio of 3:2.  While no
age is exempt, the most common decade for the occurence
of this form of cancer is 50-60, although many cases have been reported under
the age of 30 years.

Though the true etiology of cancer is as yet unknown, certain
lesions may be considered pre-malignant in the rectum.  This is particularly true with multiple or
single polyps.

Malignant lesions of the rectum are spread by direct extension, and
venous and lymphatic channels.

Reference:  Textbook of Surgery, 3rd edition, edited by
Moseley, 1959.

It is evident from the foregoing medical definition that cancer of
the rectum could not be caused by decedent’s employment factors.  We have taken into consideration the
decedent’s duties as senior trade analyst at the Central Bank but we could not
come up with any possible link between his work and his employment (sic).  Even the decedent’s working environment would
not to our mind contribute in any manner to the contraction of his ailment.

As regards the deceased’s other ailments of septicemia and
hyperthyroidism, the contraction of which being not traceable to decedent’s
employment are not compensable under the law.

In view of the foregoing, we have no recourse but to affirm
respondent’s decision denying the instant claim.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from, should be as it
is hereby, AFFIRMED and the instant case dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Manila, Philippines.

The sole issue postulated
on appeal is whether or not cancer of the rectum was contracted by Serafin Ovenson by reason of his
employment.

Petitioner contends that
the decision of the ECC overlooked the nature and conditions of employment of
her late husband Serafin Ovenson.  To convince Us that
the illness causing the death of her husband was work-related, petitioner
argues that cancer diseases may be caused by chemical, physical and parasitic
carcinogens present in a man’s environment. 
That her late husband was exposed to all these is confirmed by an
examination of his employment records, petitioner alleging that during the
early days of her husband’s employment at the Central Bank, he worked as
laborer and janitor.  Petitioner claims
that in those capacities, her late husband was exposed to different chemicals
in his painting jobs and in cleaning comfort rooms of the building with acids
and disinfectants, not to mention possible parasitic infestation because of insanitary working environment.  This exposure to health hazards was
compounded by physical and mental stress in employment, the same stress which
some scientists believe may have a much larger role in helping cancer cells to
grow and that according to some experts, stress such as tension and agitation
weaken the body’s protective immune systems which hold some potential cancers
in check (Times Journal, April 1, 1982).”^[1]

Claimant’s contentions
are palpably meritorious.  Under the law^[2] a “compensable sickness” means (1)
any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the ECC,
or 2) any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that
the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.

A cursory reading of the
law shows that cancer of the rectum is not listed by the ECC as one of the
compensable diseases.  The next question
therefore is whether the working conditions of claimant’s deceased husband
predisposed him to contract cancer of the rectum.

The record reveals that
the husband of the claimant contracted the fatal disease only in 1981 or after
16 years from the time he started to work as laborer in 1955.  Respondent GSIS, relying on its medical
evaluation, found that the fatal illness of the deceased is attributed to
genetic influence.  Respondent ECC ruled
that although the true cause of cancer is yet unknown, certain lesions may be
considered pre-malignant in the rectum and may be aggravated during the course
of employment if there is sufficient proof presented by the claimant.  But as ruled by Us,
this duty to prove exists only when the cause of the disease is known.  In a case like the present one, even medical
experts have not determined its cause, and therefore the duty to prove does not
exist for it is absurd for the law to require an
impossibility.  Thus in the case
of Mercado, Jr. v. Employees Compensation Commission, 139 SCRA 270 citing Cristobal v. ECC, 103 SCRA 329, We
ruled as follows:

“While the presumption of compensability and the theory of
aggravation espoused under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may have abandoned
under the New Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may
still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law in
general still subsists.

“x x x As
agents charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by
both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal
attitude in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some
basis in the facts for inferring a work connection, 103 SCRA 329, 336).

“x x x
Where however, the causes of an ailment are unknown to and or undetermined even
by medical science, the requirement of proof of any casual link between the
ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized so that those who have
less in life will have more in law x x x.

“x x x The
point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award
of compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment – the cause or
origin of which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science – was,
in fact caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his working
conditions.  Plainly, the condition would
be an impossible one, specially considering that said claimant is most probably
not even conversant with the intricacies of medical science and the claimant
invariably bereft of the material resources to employ medical experts to
demonstrate the connection between the cause and the disease.  Considering the liberal character of
employment compensation schemes, the impossible condition should be deemed as
not having been intended and/or imposed. 
(139 SCRA, pp. 275-276).

“x x x As an employee, he had contributed to the funds of
respondent for 34 years until his forced retirement.  In turn respondent should comply with its
duty to give him the fullest protection, relief and compensation benefits as
guaranteed by law.” (Ibid., p. 277).

In the more recent case
of Flaviano Nemaria1, Petitioner versus Employees’ Compensation
Commission and Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of Education and
Culture), Respondents, promulgated October 28, 1987 and following the rule We enunciated in the Mercado case, We stated:

“Thus the requirement that the disease was caused or
aggravated by the employment or work applies only to an illness where the cause
can be determined or proved.  Where cause
is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the link exists.  For certainly, the law cannot demand an impossibility.”

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED.  The decision of the respondent
Employees Compensation Commission is SET ASIDE and another is rendered ordering
the respondents to pay the herein petitioner the full amount of compensation under Presidential Decree No.
626 as amended.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa,
Cruz, and Gancayco,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 11.

^[2]
Art. 1167(I), P.D. 626 as amended).

1 G.R. No. 57889