G. JESUS B. RUIZ, PETITIONER, VS. ENCARNACION UCOL AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte dismissing
the plaintiff- appellant’s complaint for damages against defendant-appellee on the ground of res judicata.  The issue
involved being a pure question of law, the appellate
court certified the appeal to us for decision on the merits.

The facts are not disputed. 
Agustina Tagaca, laundrywoman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an administrative charge
against defendant-appellee Encarnacion
Ucol, a midwife in the health center of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte.  In her answer to the charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was
merely used as a tool by Atty. Ruiz who
wanted to get back at the Ucol’s because of a case
filed by Encarnacion Ucol’s
husband against Ruiz.  She was also
alleged to have made remarks that Atty. Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated
the charges.

The administrative case
was dismissed.  Ruiz decided to
file his own criminal complaint for libel against Ucol
based on the alleged libelous portion of Ucol’s
answer.

Upon arraignment, Ucol entered a plea
of not guilty.  During the proceedings in
the libel case, com­plainant Atty. Ruiz entered his appearance and partici­pated
as private prosecutor.  After trial, the
lower court rendered judgment acquitting Ucol on the
ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt.  No pronouncement was made by the trial court
as to the civil liability of the accused.

Instead of appealing the civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a
separate complaint for damages based on the same facts upon which the libel
case was founded.

Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating
that the action had prescribed and that the cause of action was barred by the
decision in the criminal case
for libel.

The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata.  As earlier stated, on appeal, the Court of
Appeals certified the case to us, the only issue being whether or not the civil
action for damages was already barred by the criminal case of libel.

Before going into the merit of this appeal, it is noteworhty
to mention that there are actually two cases now before us involving the contending parties.  Defendant-appellee Ucol filed an “appeal by certiorari”
before this Court questioning the dissenting
opinion of the Court
of Appeals.

Ucol prays for a ruling “that the
respondent Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing
the present case but instead in order­ing the same remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings x x x.”

Any ordinary student in law school should readily know that what
comprises a decision which can
be the subject of an appeal or a special civil
action is the majority opinion of the members of the court, but never
the dissenting opinion.  Moreover, no
decision on appeal has as yet been rendered in this case.  The act of the defendant-appellee’s
counsel in filing such a petition
defies logic or reason.  It is totally in­explicable
how a member of the bar could be so careless or, if the act was deliberate,
could have the courage to come
before this Court asking us to review a dissenting opinion.  Counsel is warned that we do not find his
mistake in the slightest bit amusing.

Turning now to the present appeal, plaintiff­-appellant Ruiz
contends that there can be no res judicata
since nowhere in its decision did the trial court pass upon the civil aspect of
the criminal case nor did it make any express declaration that the fact on
which said case was predicated did not exist. 
He cites the pertinent provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code and Rule
III, Section 3 subsection (c) of the Rules of Court which respectively provide:

“ART. 29.  When the
accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted.  x x.

xxx                                        xxx                                           xxx

RULE III, Sec. 3(c) –

“Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist.  x x x“

We
may also mention Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives an offended party in
cases of defamation, among others, the right to file a civil action separate
and distinct from the criminal proceedings whether or not a reservation was
made to that effect.

The
plaintiff-appellant’s contentions have no merit.  The right of the plaintiff-appellant under
the above provisions to file the civil action for damages based on the same
facts upon which he instituted the libel case is not without limitation.

We
find the appeal of G. Jesus B. Ruiz without merit.  We see no advantage or benefit in adding to
the clogged dockets of our trial courts what plainly appears from the records to be a harassment
suit.

In
acquitting Encarnacion Ucol
of the libel charge, the trial court made these factual findings:

“Clearly then, Atty. Ruiz filed the instant Criminal Case
against Encarnacion Ucol as
retaliation for what he believed was an act of ingratitude to him on the part
of her husband.  The precipitate haste
with which the administrative complaint
was filed shows that he was the one personally interested in the matter.  All that Agustina Tagaca told him was double hearsay.  The incident, if there was, happened between
the accused and Ceferino in the absence of Agustina; so that, all that Ceferina
allegedly told her, and she in turn told Atty. Ruiz, was undoubtedly double
deck hearsay; and Atty. Ruiz should therefore check the facts with Ceferino, but he did not do that, and he did not even
present Ceferino as a witness.  For these
reasons, accused has every reason to believe that Atty. Ruiz was the author who concocted the charges in the administrative
complaint and had his laundrywoman, complainant Agustina
Tagaca, sign it. 
Agustina has very little education and could
hardly speak English, yet the administrative complaint was written in polished
English, and who else but Atty. Ruiz could have authored those phrases in the
complaint:  ‘The retention of Mrs. Ucol in this government service is inimical to the good
intentions of the Department to serve humanity and a disgrace and liability to
present administration.’ As will be shown later on, it appears that it is this complaint signed by Agustina, but
authored by Atty. Ruiz, that is libelous and not the respondent’s answer; and
even, assuming that the administrative complaint may not have been impelled by
actual malice, the charge(s) were certainly reckless in the face of proven
facts and circumstances.  Court actions
are not established for parties to give bent to their prejudice.  The poor and the humble are, as a general
rule, grate­ful to a fault, that intrigues and ingratitude are what they
abhor.” (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 8-10).

The findings in the criminal case, therefore, show a pattern of
harassment.  First, petitioner Ruiz had
something to do with the administrative complaint.  The complaint was dismissed.  Second, he filed a criminal case for libel
based on portions of Mrs. Ucol’s answer in the
administrative case.  Third, he acted as
private prosecutor in the criminal case actively handling as a lawyer the
very case where he was the complainant. 
And fourth, after the accused was acquitted on the basis of the facts
stated above, Atty. Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols
with implacability by filing a civil action for damages.  As stated by the trial judge, “court
actions are not established for
parties to give bent to their prejudice.” This doubly true when the party
incessantly filing cases is a member of the bar.  He should set an example in sobriety and in
trying to prevent false and groundless suits.

In Roa
v. de
la Cruz, et al. (107, Phil. 10)
this Court ruled:

“Under the above provisions (Art. 33
of the Civil Code), independently of a criminal action for defamation, a civil
suit for the recovery of damages arising therefrom
may be brought by the injured party.  It is apparent, however, from the use of
the words ‘may be’, that the institution of such suit is optional.  (An Outline of Philippine
Civil Law by J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Vol.
I, p. 54) In other words, the civil liability arising from the crime charged
may still be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does
not waive to have it adjudged, or does not reserve his right to institute a
separate civil action against the defendant. 
(The case of Reyes v. de la Rosa (52 Off. Gaz., [15] 6548; 99 Phil., 1013) cited by plaintiff in
support of her contention that under Art. 33 of the New Civil Code the injured party is not required to reserve her
right to institute the civil action, is not applicable to the present
case.  There was no showing in that case
that the offended party intervened in the prosecution of the offense, and the
amount of damages sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the
criminal court so that a reservation of the civil action was useless or
unnecessary.) (Dionisio v. Alvendia,
102 Phil., 443; 55 Off. Gaz., [25] 4633.])

“In the instant case, it is not disputed that plaintiff Maria
C. Roa – upon whose initiative the criminal action
for defamation against the defendant Segunda de la
Cruz was filed – did not reserve her
right to institute it, subject, always to the direction and control of the
prosecuting fiscal.  (Section 15 in
connection with section 4 of Rule 106, Rules of Court; Lim Tek
Goan v. Yatco, 94 Phil., 197). 
The reason of the law in not permitting the offended party to intervene
in the prosecution of the offense if he had waived or reserved his right to
institute the civil action is that by such action her interest in the criminal
case has disappeared.  Its prosecution
becomes the sole function of the
public prosecutor.  (Gorospe,
et al. v. Gatmaitan, et al., 98 Phil., 600; 52 Off. Gaz., [15] 2526).  The
rule, therefore, is that the right of intervention reserved to the injured
party is for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the
criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused.  (People v. Orais, 65 Phil., 744;
People v. Velez, 77 Phil., 1026; People
v. Flores, et al., G.R. No.
L-7528, December 18, 1957; see also U.S. v. Malabon, 1 Phil., 731; U.S.
v. Heery, 25 Phil., 600).

“Plaintiff having elected to claim damages arising from the
offense charged in the criminal case through her appearance or intervention as
private prosecutor we hold that
the final judgment rendered therein constitutes a bar to the present civil action for damages based upon the
same cause.  (See Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al.,
91 Phil., 672; 48 Off. Gaz., [7] 2745.).”

We are, therefore, constrained to dismiss the present
appeal.  Atty. Ruiz has more than had his
day in court.  The then court of first
instance acquitted Mrs. Ucol and stated in the dispositive portion of its decision that her guilt was not
established beyond reasonable doubt.  A
review of the court’s findings, however, indicates that the disputed Answer of
Mrs. Ucol in the administrative case contains no
libel.  As stated by the trial court,
“As will be shown later, it appears that it is this complaint signed by Agustina, but
authored by Atty. Ruiz, that is libelous and not the respondent’s
answer.” (Emphasis supplied).  The
court found the charges against Ucol, if not
malicious, at least reckless in the face of proven facts and circumstances.

The trial court stated.

“Analyzing defendant’s answer Exh. ‘5′, even with meticulous
care, the Court did not find any defamatory imputation which causes dishonor or
discredit to the complainant.  She was the
victim of an unprovoked, unjustified and libelous attack against her honor, honesty, character and
reputation; she has a right to self defense, which she did in her answer, to protect
her honesty and integrity and the very job upon which her family depend for
their livelihood.  Every
sentence in her answer (Exh. “5”) is relevant,
and constitutes privileged matter.  She
did not go further than her interest or duties require.  She did
not go beyond explaining what was said of her in the complaint for the
purpose of repairing if not
entirely removing the effects of the charge against her.  She had absolutely no motive to libel Atty.
Ruiz who, by the way, cast the first stone. 
xxx” (Amended Record on Appeal, pp.
10-11).

WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by appellant Jesus B. Ruiz is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.  The petition filed by petitioner Encarnacion Ucol is
likewise DISMISSED for patent lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, and
Cortes, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., on leave.

Gancayco, J., no part having participated in the resolution of the case in CA.