G.R. No. L-45647. August 21, 1987
MANUEL Q. CABALLERO AND LELITA A. CABALLERO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. FEDERICO B. ALFONSO, JR., AS JUDGE, BRANCH III, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, HON. CONRADO ESTR…
PADILLA, J.:
Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
with preliminary injunction, to annul and set aside the Order issued by the
respondent judge on 10 January 1977 in Special Civil Case No. 386-M of the
Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, insofar
as it ordered the suspension of the proceedings in said case, pending the
comment and/or certification thereon by the respondent Secretary of Agrarian
Reform in accordance with PD 1038.
The facts of the case which led to the filing of the instant
petition are as follows:
On 19 November 1976, petitioners, spouses Manuel and Lelita Caballero, claiming to be the absolute owners of several contiguous parcels of land
planted with coconut trees, situated in Salubsub, San
Isidro, Gingoog City, filed a petition for injunction
with restraining order and damages against the herein private respondents Fernando
Esconde, Cesar Navarro, Gregorio Bakerel,
and Francisco (Frank) Rodriguez, together with William Abatayo,
Elmer Almonte, Teodorico Amoncio, and Pedro Amper, with
the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental,
docketed therein as Special Civil Case No. 386-M, for having allegedly entered
the aforementioned parcels of land and illegally harvested the fruits of the
coconut trees planted therein without petitioners’ knowledge and consent, to
the prejudice of said petitioners, for which they claimed damages in the sum of
P7,000.00[1].
Answering, the private respondents admitted that the petitioners
are the lawful owners of the parcels of land described in the petition. They claimed, however, that the respondents
Fernando Esconde, Cesar Navarro, and Gregorio Bakerel are the tenants on the land, while the rest, except
Francisco (Frank) Rodriguez who is allegedly an investigator designated by the
Land Reform Farmers’ Association to organize the tenants into an association
to put up a solid
front in a program
to help the New Society and to secure the success of the land reform program, are the harvesters of the coconut
lands. They also contended that the
court has no jurisdiction
over the case, which is purely
agrarian in nature and cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations. As counterclaim, said respondents alleged
that they suffered moral damages for mental anguish, mental torture, wounded
feelings, moral shock, serious anxiety and other inconveniences as a result of
the filing of the case, for which they asked to be paid
the sum of P172,000.00[2].
After hearing, or on 13
December 1976, the
respondent judge found that the issuance of a temporary
restraining order would be proper in the interest of justice and, consequently,
ordered the respondents to cease and desist from gathering fruits from the
coconut trees in the land until the petition for injunction shall have been
heard and resolved[3].
The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of said order[4], and on 10 January 1977, the respondent judge issued the
controversial order suspending hearings on the case pending the comment
and/or certification thereon by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, in accordance with PD 1038[5]. The
petitioners moved for reconsideration of this order, but their motion was denied[6].
Hence, the present
recourse.
Pertinent provisions of
the Decree (PD 1038) requiring referral of cases involving landlord and tenant
to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform read as follows:
“SEC. 2. No judge of
the courts of agrarian relations, courts of first instance, city or municipal
courts, or any other tribunal or fiscal shall take cognizance of any ejectment case or any other case designed to harass or
remove a tenant of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and/or corn,
unless certified by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform as a proper case for trial or hearing by a court or judge or other
officer of competent jurisdiction and, if any such case is filed, the case
shall first be referred to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized
representative in the locality for a preliminary determination of the
relationship between the contending parties.
If the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative in
the locality finds that the case is a proper
case to hear, he shall so certify and such court, judge or other hearing
officer may assume jurisdiction over the dispute or controversy.
“The preliminary determination of the relationship between the
contending parties by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative,
is not binding upon the court, judge or hearing officer to whom the case is
certified as a proper case for trial.
Said court, judge or hearing officer may, after due hearing, confirm,
reverse or modify said preliminary determination as the evidence and substantial
merits of the case may warrant.
“SEC. 3. All cases
still pending before any court, fiscal or other investigating body which are
not yet submitted for decision or resolution shall likewise be referred to the
Department of Agrarian Reform for certification as provided in the preceding
section.”
As may be noted, the law
requires that an ejectment case or any case designed
to harass or remove a tenant should first be referred to the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the
parties. The Solicitor General, in his
Memorandum for the public respondents[7], explains that the referral of ejectment cases against a tenant to the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform is intended to prevent the filing of suits designed to harass
the tenant who can ill afford to engage in such suits. He says:
“The requirement of preliminary determination by the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform is intended
to protect tenants in agricultural lands from vexatious and oppressive
litigations and save them the expense and the anxiety of such trials.
Courts can be trusted to protect tenants from malicious and oppressive lawsuits, but because
of the nature of the adversary system they cannot act at the beginning so as to
save tenants the expense and trouble of having to defend themselves against
such cases. Under the adversary system
tenants will have to defend themselves, which means that they have to hire
counsel, pay for transportation of witnesses, and incur other expenses incident
to trial before they may finally get vindication. The system thus compels them to go to trial and thereby go into expense.”
Petitioners claim,
however, that the decree, ordering the referral of cases to the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, is unconstitutional as it is an undue
encroachment on the independence of the judiciary and places courts of justice
under the “control and supervision” of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform.
The contention is devoid
of merit. It proceeds from an erroneous assumption
that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform is the final arbiter on the question of
whether or not an ejectment case (or a case designed
to harass or remove a tenant) filed against a tenant, may be tried by the
courts. A close look at the law in question
will show that no such power has been granted the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform. In the first paragraph of
Section 2 of the law in question, it is stated that a case which seeks the ejectment, harassment or ouster of a tenant from the landholding should
be referred to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform “for a preliminary determination
of the relationship between the contending parties.” However, the second
paragraph of the same section provides that “the preliminary determination
of the relationship between the contending parties by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized
representative, is not binding upon the court, judge or hearing officer to whom
the case is certified”, and that “said court, judge or hearing
officer may, after due hearing, confirm, reverse or modify said preliminary
determination as the evidence
and substantial merits of the case may warrant.” Since the referral of ejectment and other cases against a tenant to the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform is only for the preliminary determination of the relationship
between the contending parties and the findings of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform are not binding on the courts, there is no diminution of judicial power
involved in the operation of the law nor an encroachment on the independence
of the judiciary by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
But, suppose, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, after such
preliminary determination of the relationship of the parties, refuses to
certify the case to the court as proper for hearing? Then, resort to the courts may still be
made. This Court has categorically
declared that there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts
of agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative powers on questions of
law and jurisdiction even though no right of judicial review is expressly given
by statute.[8]
Petitioners contend that
the law in question is not a valid exercise of police power by the state,
mainly because it is not directed to produce the greatest benefit to all the
members of society. They contend further
that the actual operation of the challenged decree has caused hardship and
injustice to many, hampered instead of hastened the social and economic
progress of the community and wrought havoc and chaos in the orderly administration
of justice[9], because it ties the hands of the courts,
while a case is pending before the Department of
Agrarian Reform for certification.
To underscore their claim, petitioners cite the “run-around” they have experienced in pursuing their
cause. They state:
“. . . they have exhausted all the legal remedies available in
the inferior courts such as the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental, City Court
of Gingoog
City, including the Office of the
City Fiscal of Gingoog City and the Civil Affairs
Office of the Philippine Constabulary of Misamis
Oriental as well as the Court of Agrarian Relations. All the parties herein have been at a
“dead-end,” occasioned by the “referral provisions” in some
of the agrarian laws, more specifically the pertinent
Presidential Decrees. The first legal
action taken by petitioners in the government offices below were the criminal
charges of thefts against herein private respondents directly filed with
the Office of the City Fiscal of Gingoog City but which the City Fiscal had to refer to the
Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform at Cagayan
de Oro City as required by Presidential Decrees and
which criminal cases up to now have not been “preliminarily
determined” by the said Regional Office.
“Another case – a special civil action – was instituted by
petitioners against private respondents herein in the Court of First Instance
of Misamis Oriental, Branch III, at Medina Misamis Oriental, but which Court of First Instance, after
having taken cognizance of the case, had to “refer” the same to the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Quezon City, “for
his comment and/or certification.’
Later on private respondents filed a civil case against one of petitioners
herein before the Court of Agrarian Relations at Cagayan
de Oro City, but the Agrarian Court held in abeyance the hearing of the case due to the pendency
of that prior case in the Court of First Instance as well as the pendency of the present action before this Honorable
Supreme Court. Even the Civil Affairs
Office of the Provincial Command of the Philippines Constabulary in Misamis Oriental could not entertain the complaints and
counter-complaints of the parties herein, because the PC authorities have to
abide with the “referral provisions” which empower the Department of
Agrarian Reform to exercise the authority of “certifying” to the
“propriety” or “impropriety” of the subject-matter”[10].
The above allegations,
however, eloquently show that the “run-around” which petitioners have
gone through is more a product of their own doing rather than a flaw
in the operation of the questioned law.
Instead of moving from one forum to another, while their cases were
pending before the Department of Agrarian Reform for certification, petitioners
could have seasonably instituted an action to compel the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform to issue said certification, one way or the other, after an unreasonable
period of inaction.
Petitioners assert that
the operation of the challenged law violates the constitutional provision on
the right to a “speedy disposition of cases”. Corollary to this, they submit that the
challenged law complicates the prescriptive period of offenses and the criminal
and civil liabilities provided in the Revised Penal Code and other penal
laws. To nourish their argument,
petitioners call attention to the fact that even prior to 30 November
1976, they had filed directly
with the Office of the City Fiscal of Gingoog City,
two (2) criminal complaints, one, for theft of bamboo poles and the other, for
theft of coconuts, against private respondents.
And as mandated by the challenged law, the City Fiscal forwarded both
case, on 1 February 1977
and 1 July 1977,
respectively, to the Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform in Misamis Oriental, for referral purposes. As a result, months have passed, and yet, no
advice or resolution has been received by the City Fiscal from the Department
of Agrarian Reform. Petitioners then conclude: “As to why as of July 1, 1977 no action has been taken by the
Regional DAR on the referral cases (and this is so until now) is beyond
comprehension. This obtaining actual
situation is this not a violation of Sec. 16 of the Bill of Rights (sic)?
Justice delayed is justice denied”[11]
The guarantee of the
right to “a speedy disposition of cases”, which the Constitution
expressly provides[12], recognizes the truism that justice delayed
can mean justice denied. Likewise, the
broad sweep that the guarantee comprehends, when it provides that the right is
available before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies,
confirms that the application of the immunity from arbitrary and oppressive
delays is not limited to an accused in a criminal proceeding but extends to
all parties and in all cases. Hence,
under the constitutional provision, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on the part of all who are officially
tasked with the proper administration of justice.
However, “speedy
disposition of cases” is a relative term.
Just like the constitutional guarantee of “speedy trial”[13] accorded an accused in all criminal
proceedings, “speedy disposition of cases” is a flexible concept[14]. It
is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.
In the determination of
whether or not the right to a “speedy trial” has been violated,
certain factors may be considered and balanced against each other. These are length or delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the
right or failure to assert it,
and prejudice caused by the delay[15]. The
same factors may also be considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or
not a person officially charged with the
administration of justice has violated the “speedy disposition of
cases” guarantee.
To strike down a law on
the ground that it violates the guarantee of “speedy disposition of
cases” requires more than a
citation of what may be a misfeasance or malfeasance of a public
officer whose duty and responsibility it is to apply and administer the
law. The challenge must be based on a
clear showing that it is the law, or its operation, and not merely its
administration, which invades and impairs constitutionally protected personal
or property rights. In the case at bar,
it is true that the referral of cases to the Department of Agrarian Reform
opens the door to more
bureaucratic red tape and, perhaps, more opportunities for corrupt
practices. The defects in the
bureaucratic system do not, however, constitute valid arguments against the
merits of legislative policy intended
to protect the legitimate tenant-tiller.
Besides, it is not for this Court to determine the wisdom of PD
1038. This is a matter left for Congress
to re-examine in the exercise of its legislative authority.
Contrary to the
petitioners’ argument, the challenged law does not complicate the prescriptive
periods of offenses and criminal and civil liabilities as provided in the Revised Penal Code and other penal
laws. Under Art. 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, a period of prescription which has run
before it is interrupted, commences to run again only in two instances:
(1) when a proceeding based upon a complaint or an information
terminates without the accused being convicted or acquitted or (2) when such a proceeding is unjustifiably stopped
for any reason not imputable to an accused.
Applying these rules,
once a complaint is filed with the fiscal and the
latter refers the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his
representative in the locality for preliminary determination, as a consequence
of an allegation by the respondent of a tenant-landlord relationship between
him and the complainant, and harassment by the latter, such a referral does not
operate to resume the running of prescription. This is so because, under the challenged law,
the referral of a case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not
“terminate”, but merely suspends, a proceeding. To “terminate” means to put an end
to, to make to cease or to end[16]. It connotes finality. On the other hand, the referral of a case to
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely discontinues temporarily a proceeding,
or stops it with an expectation of resumption.
Likewise, when a proceeding before a fiscal is temporarily stopped by
virtue of a faithful compliance
with the challenged law, neither can the suspension be considered
unjustifiable, and thus it is not a legal ground for the resumption of the
running of the period of prescription.
Considering, therefore,
that the referral of a case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not permit
the resumption of the running of the period of prescription, the argument
that the challenged Decree provide a means by which offenses may prescribe
during the pendency of cases involving such offenses
before the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or his representative for preliminary
determination, cannot be accepted seriously.
However, while we hold that the assailed Decree is
constitutional, it is nonetheless clear that the order directing referral of
the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform was issued on 10 January
1977. Ten (10) years have elapsed since
then and the Secretary of Agrarian Reform has had more than sufficient time to
conduct the required preliminary determination of the relationship of the
parties, but he has evidently not done so.
It is now time for said court to settle and decide the issues between
the contending parties in this case, without waiting for the certification of
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. That portion of the Order issued on 10
January 1977 in Special Civil Case No. 386-M of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, entitled: “Manuel Q. Caballero, et al, petitioners
versus Fernando Esconde, et al, respondents”,
which directed the suspension of the
proceedings in said case, pending the comment and/or certification thereon by
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, is hereby set aside. The respondent judge is directed to hear and
decide said case as expeditiously as possible. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., (Chairman), Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Bidin, Sarmiento, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., on leave.
[1]
Rollo, p. 16
[2]
Id., p. 21
[3]
Id., p. 24
[4]
Id., p. 29
[5]
Id., p. 36
[6]
Id., pp. 4-5, Pars. VI & VII of Petition
[7]
Id., pp. 79, 84
[8]
Dabuet vs. Roche Pharmaceuticals, Inc., G.R.
No. L-45402, April 30, 1987, and cases cited therein.
[9]
Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 23
[10]
Id., pp. 2-3
[11]
Id., p. 42
[12]
Cons. (1973), Art. IV, Sec. 16; Cons.
(1987) Art. III, Sec. 16
[13]
Cons. (1973),
Art IV, Sec. 19; Cons. (1987) Art. III, Sec. 14, Par. 2
[14]
On the aspect of “speedy
trial,” the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 US
514 [1972], candidly said thus:
“Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, the right to
speedy trial is a more vague concept than other procedural rights. It is, for example, impossible to determine with
precision when the right has been denied.
We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where justice
is supposed to be swift and
deliberate.”
[15]
Barker v. Wingo,
supra
[16]
Towne v. Towne, 117 Mont.
453, 159 P.2d 352, 357