VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS AND PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the July
27, 1984 Decision of the Office of the Presidential Assistant For Legal Affairs
dismissing the appeal from the adverse ruling of the Philippine Ports Authority
on the sole ground that the same was filed beyond the reglementary period.

On April 28, 1981, the Iloilo Port Manager of respondent
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA for short) wrote petitioner Victorias Milling
Co., requiring it to have its tugboats and barges undergo harbor formalities
and pay entrance/clear­ance fees as well as berthing fees effective May 1,
1981.  PPA, likewise, required petitioner
to secure a permit for cargo handling operations at its Da-an Banua wharf and
remit 10% of its gross income for said operations as the government’s share.

To these demands,
petitioner sent two (2) letters, both dated June 2, 1981, wherein it maintained
that it is exempt from paying PPA any fee or charge because:  (1) the wharf and all its facilities were
built and installed in its land; (2) repair and maintenance thereof were and
solely paid by it; (3) even the dredging and maintenance of the Malijao River
Channel from Guimaras Strait up to said private wharf are being done by
petitioner’s equipment and personnel; and (4) at no time has the government
ever spent a single centavo for such activities.  Petitioner further added that the wharf was
being used mainly to handle sugar purchased from district planters pursuant to
existing milling agreements.

In reply, on November 3,
1981, PPA Iloilo sent petitioner a
memorandum of PPA’s Executive
Officer, Maximo Dumlao, which justified the PPA’s demands.  Further request for recon­sideration was
denied on January 14, 1982.

On March 29, 1982,
petitioner served notice to PPA that it is appealing the case to the Court of Tax Appeals; and accordingly, on March 31, 1982, petitioner filed a Petition
for Review with the said Court, entitled “Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v.
Philippine Ports Authority,” and docketed therein as CTA Case No. 3466.

On January 10, 1984, the
Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioner’s action on the ground that it has no
jurisdiction.  It recommended that the
appeal be addressed to the Office of the President.

On January 23, 1984, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 66381, but the
same was denied in a Resolution
dated February 29, 1984.

On April 2, 1984, petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of
the President, but in a Decision dated July 27, 1984 (Record, p. 22), the same
was denied on the sole ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary
period.  A Motion for Reconsideration was
filed, but in an Order dated December 16, 1985, the same was denied (Ibid., pp.
3-21).  Hence, the instant petition.

The Second Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated June 2,
1986, resolved to require the respondents to comment (Ibid., p. 45); and in
compliance therewith, the Soli­citor General filed his Comment on June 4, 1986
(Ibid., pp. 50­-59).

In a Resolution
of July 2, 1986, petitioner was required to file a reply (Ibid., p. 61) but
before receipt of said resolution, the latter filed a motion on July 1, 1986
praying that it be granted leave to file a reply to respondents’ Comment, and
an extension of time up to June 30, 1986 within which to file the same.  (Ibid., p. 62).

On July 18, 1986, petitioner filed its reply to respondents’
Comment (Ibid., pp. 68-76).

The Second Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated August
25, 1986, resolved to give due course to
the peti­tion and to require the parties to file their respective simul­taneous
memoranda (Ibid., p. 78).

On October 8, 1986, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
and Rejoinder, stating, among others, that respondents are adopting en toto
their Comment of June 3, 1986 as their memorandum; with the clarification that
the assailed PPA Administrative Order No. 13-77 was duly published in full in the nationwide circulated newspaper,
“The Times Journal”, on November 9, 1977 (Ibid., pp. 79-81).

The sole legal issue raised by the petitioner is –

WHETHER OR NOT THE 30-DAY PERIOD FOR APPEAL UNDER SECTION 131 of
PPA AD­MINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 13-77 WAS TOLLED BY THE PENDENCY OF THE PETITIONS
FILED FIRST WITH THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND THEN WITH THIS HONORABLE
TRIBUNAL.

The instant petition is devoid of merit.

Petitioner, in holding that the recourse first to the Court of
Tax Appeals and then to this Court tolled the period to appeal, submits that it
was guided, in good faith, by considerations which lead to the assumption that
procedural rules of appeal then enforced still hold true.  It contends that when Republic Act No. 1125
(creating the Court of Tax Appeals) was passed in 1955, PPA was not yet in existence; and under the said law,
the Court of Tax Appeals had exclusive appellate jurisdiction over appeals from
decisions of the Commissioner of Customs
regarding, among others, custom duties,
fees and other money charges imposed by the Bureau under the Tariff and Customs Code.  On the other hand, neither in Presidential
Decree No. 505, creating the PPA
on July 11, 1974 nor in
Presidential Decree No. 857, revising its charter (said Decrees, among others,
merely transferred to the PPA the powers
of the Bureau of Customs to impose and collect customs duties, fees and
other money charges concerning the use of
ports and facilities thereat) is there any
provision governing appeals from decisions of the PPA on such matters, so that
it is but reason­able to seek recourse with the Court of Tax Appeals.  Petitioner, likewise, contends that an
analysis of PResidential Decree No. 857, shows that the PPA is vested merely
with cor­porate powers and duties (Sec. 6), which do not and can not include
the power to legislate on procedural matters, much less to effectively take
away from the Court of Tax Appeals the latter’s appellate jurisdiction.

These contentions are untenable for while it is true that neither
Presidential Decree No. 505 nor Presidential Decree No. 857 provides for the
remedy of appeal to the Office of the President, nevertheless, Presidential
Decree No. 857 empowers the PPA to promulgate such rules as would aid it in
accomplish­ing its purpose.  Section 6 of
the said Decree provides –

“Sec. 6.  Corporate
Powers and Duties ?

“a. The corporate duties of the Authority shall be:

“x
x x             x x x                 x x x.

“(III)  To prescribe rules and regulations, procedures,
and guidelines governing the establishment, construction, maintenance, and
operation of all other ports, including private ports in the country.

“x x x             x x x                 x x x”.

Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, PPA
enacted Administrative Order No. 13-77 precisely to govern, among others,
appeals from PPA decisions.  It is now
finally settled that administrative rules and regulations issued in accordance
with law, like PPA Administrative Order No. 13-77, have the force and effect of
law (Valerio vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 7 SCRA 719;
Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco,
et al., 17 SCRA 316; and Macailing vs. Andrada, 31 SCRA 126), and are binding
on all persons dealing with that body.

As to petitioner’s contention that Administrative Order No.
13-77, specifically its Section 131, only provides for appeal when the decision
is adverse to the government, worth mentioning is the observation of the
Solicitor General that petitioner misleads the Court.  Said Section 131 provides –

“Sec. 131.  Supervisory
Authority of General Manager and PPA Board. – If in any case involving
assessment of port charges, the Port Manager/OIC renders a decision adverse to
the government, such decision shall automatically be elevated to, and reviewed
by, the Gene­ral Manager of the authority; and if the Port Manager’s decision
would be affirmed by the General Manager, such decision shall be subject to
further affirmation by the PPA Board before it shall become effective; Provided,
however, that if within thirty (30) days from receipt of the record of the case
by the General Manager, no decision is rendered, the decision under review
shall become final and executory; Pro­vided further, that any party
aggrieved by the decision of the General Manager as affirmed by the PPA Board
may appeal said decision to the Office of the Pre­sident within thirty (30)
days from receipt of a copy thereof.” (Underscoring supplied).

From a cursory reading of the aforequoted
provision, it is evident that the above contention has no basis.

As to petitioner’s allegation that to its recollection there had
been no prior publication of said PPA Administrative Order No. 13-77, the
Solicitor General correctly pointed out that said Administrative Order was duly
published in full in the nationwide newspaper, “The Times Journal”,
on November 9, 1977.

Moreover, it must be
stated that as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the facts of this case show that petitioner’s failure to appeal to the Office of the
President on time stems entirely from its own negligence and not from a
purported ignorance of the proper procedural steps to take.  Petitioner had been aware of the rules
governing PPA procedures.  In fact, as
embodied in the December 16, 1985 Order of the Office of the President,
petitioner even assailed the PPA’s rule making powers at the hearing before the
Court of Tax Appeals.

It is axiomatic that the
right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the provision of law (United CMC Textile Workers Union vs. Clave, 137 SCRA 346, citing the cases of
Bello vs. Fernando, 4 SCRA 138; Aguila vs. Navarro, 55 Phil. 898; and Santiago
vs. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397).

Furthermore, even if
petitioner’s appeal were to be given due course, the result would still be the
same as it does not present a substantially meritorious case against the
PPA.

Petitioner maintains and submits that there is no basis for the PPA to assess and impose the
dues and charges it is collecting, since the wharf is private, constructed and
maintained at no expense to the government, and that it exists primarily so
that its tugboats and barges may ferry the sugar­cane of its Panay planters.

As correctly stated by
the Solicitor General, the fees and charges PPA collects are not for the
use of the wharf that petitioner owns but for the privilege of navigating in
public waters, of entering and leaving public harbors and berthing on public
streams or waters.  (Rollo, pp. 056-057).

Im Compania General
de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Actg.
Commissioner of Customs (23 SCRA 600), this Court laid down the rule
that berthing charges against a vessel are collectible regardless of the fact
that mooring or berthing is made from a
private pier or wharf.  This is because
the government maintains bodies of water in navigable condition and it is to
support its operations in this regard that dues and charges are imposed
for the use of piers and wharves regardless of their ownership.

As to the requirement to
remit 10% of the handling
charges, Section 6b-(ix) of the Presidential Decree No. 857 authorized the PPA
“To levy dues, rates, or charges for the use of the premises, works, appliances, facilities, or for services
provided by or belonging to the
Authority, or any organization concerned with port operations.”
This 10% government share of earnings of arrastre and stevedoring operators is
in the nature of contractual compensation to which a person desiring to operate
arrastre service must agree as a condition to the grant of the permit to
operate.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, and Gancayco,
JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., in the result.