G.R. No. 78461. August 12, 1987
AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.
PER CURIAM:
In G.R. No. 78461, candidate Augusto
S. Sanchez (Sanchez) filed his petition on May 28, 1987 praying that respondent
Commission on Elections (Comelec) after due hearing,
be directed to conduct a recount of the votes cast three months ago in the May
11, 1987 senatorial elections to determine the true number of votes to be
credited to him and prayed further for a restraining order directing the Comelec to withhold the proclamation of the last four (4)
winning candidates on the ground that that votes intended for him were declared
as astray votes because of the sameness of his surname with that of disqualified
candidate Gil Sanchez, whose name had not been crossed out from the Comelec election returns and other election forms.
Sanchez further alleged that on May 12, 1987, he filed an “Urgent Petition to Recount
and/or Re-appreciate Ballots” with the Comelec;
acting on the petition, the Comelec ordered Sanchez
to submit a Bill of Particulars where votes for “Sanchez” were not
counted in his favor. Sanchezā
compliance asserted that the invalidation of “Sanchez” votes occurred
in all regions where the assailed Comelec forms were
distributed and cited specific precincts in Quezon City, Batangas,
Pampanga, Cebu,
Caloocan,
Manila and Iloilo
as examples, without any particulars as to the number of votes.
The Court in its Resolutions of June 25, 1987 and July 10, 1987
sustained Comelec’s position that it be allowed to
complete the canvass of the returns of the senatorial elections (estimated at
about 240,000 votes as of June 25, 1987) which would be subject thereafter to
its resolution of Sanchez’ therein pending petition for recount on the basis of
the merits and relevant facts thereof, and therefore found no basis to issue
the restraining order prayed for by Sanchez.
In the interval, it appears that on June 26, 1987, candidate Santanina T. Rasul (Rasul) filed her motion for intervention and opposition to
Sanchez’ petition for recount pending before respondent Comelec. On July
2, 1987, Rasul also filed her
Supplemental Opposition raising additional grounds against the recount. On July 2 and 3, 1987, Rasul
and candidate Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile),
then ranked 24th and 23rd, respectively, filed a petition with respondent Comelec praying for their immediate proclamation as
duly-elected senators. The Comelec deferred action on these two petitions per its
resolution dated July 4, 1987,
until after the remaining uncanvassed returns shall have been completely
canvassed. On July 11, 1987, Enrile
also filed his motion for intervention and a motion to dismiss the Sanchez
petition for recount. On July 13, 1987, the Comelec granted the motions for intervention filed by
candidates Rasul and Enrile.
On July 16, 1987,
the Comelec, by a vote of four to three, promulgated
its decision dismissing petitioner Sanchez’ petition for recount. On July
20, 1987, petitioner Sanchez filed a motion for reconsideration of
the decision of July 16, 1987,
which was opposed by intervenors Rasul
and Enrile.
On July 25, 1987,
the Comelec proclaimed Rasul
as the 23rd senator-elect. At that time,
the lead of Rasul over Enrile
was 1,910 votes only while the lead of Enrile over
Sanchez was 73,034 votes with 31,000 votes still to be canvassed in three (3)
municipalities of Sulu, namely, Parang,
Maimbung and Patikul, and
in 15 precincts in Lanao del Sur. In proclaiming Rasul
as the 23rd senator-elect, the Comelec, while
admitting that it was mathematically possible for Enrile
to overtake Rasul, justified its action by
rationalizing that “this is improbable, if not highly improbable”
considering that the untabulated returns come from
Muslim areas or towns “which are all bailiwicks of candidate Rasul,” and “between a Muslim candidate and a
non-Muslim one, in all probability the Muslim candidate will obtain a higher
percentage of the votes cast.”
On July 28, 1987, Enrile filed with
this Court his petition [G.R. No. 79146 – Juan Ponce Enrile
v. Comelec and Santanina Rasul] (1) to compel the Comelec
to complete the canvass of votes cast for senators in the May 11, 1987
elections to determine the 23rd and 24th placers in the senatorial race and (2)
to annul the proclamation of respondent Rasul or to
suspend the effects of such proclamation pending the determination of the 23rd
and 24th placers, on the ground of mathematical possibility that the
uncanvassed votes would materially affect the 23rd and 24th rankings in the
senatorial race, while the Comelec’s proclamation of
the first 20 elected senators was predicated upon a finding that the first 20
placers would no longer be affected by the certificates of canvass still to be
submitted to the Comelec; and that Comelec gave the same reason when it proclaimed
subsequently the 21st placer (Ernesto Herera) and
22nd placer (Mamintal Tamano).
On July 24, 1987,
however, respondent Comelec, by a vote of five to two, announced its second decision
reversing its earlier decision of July
16, 1987 of dismissal of Sanchez’ petition and that it was instead
granting Sanchez’ petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots. Comelec actually
released this second decision on July
30, 1987.
On August 3, 1987, Enrile filed with this
Court his second petition [G.R. No. 79121 – Juan Ponce Enrile
v. Comelec and Augusto S.
Sanchez] to (1) annul the Comelec decision
granting Sanchez’ petition for recount; and (2) to compel it to proclaim Enrile as duly-elected senator, with prayer for issuance of
a temporary restraining order. Enrile alleged that the Comelec
exceeded its jurisdiction in granting Sanchez’ petition for recount and abused
its discretion in refusing to proclaim him (Enrile)
on the ground that Sanchez’ petition for recount is not a pre-proclamation
controversy which involves issues affecting extrinsic validity, and not
intrinsic validity, of the said election returns and that as of July 25, 1987
up to now, Rasul’s lead over him was only 1,916 votes
while his lead over Sanchez was 73,034 votes, with only 31,000 votes remaining
to be canvassed in the three (3) towns of Sulu and
fifteen (15) precincts in Lanao del Sur could not offset his lead over Sanchez.
In its resolution of August
4, 1987, the Court, inter alia,
required respondents to comment on Enrile’s petition
against the Comelec’s recount decision, and directed
the maintenance of the status quo. The parties were heard in oral argument at
the joint hearing held on August 6,
1987, and the cases were thereafter submitted for resolution.
The basic issue at bar — which Sanchez himself avers in his
petition is “a case of first impression” — is whether his petition
for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots filed with the Comelec may be considered a summary pre-proclamation
controversy falling within the Comelec’s exclusive
jurisdiction (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code) or properly pertains to the
realm of election protest falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal as “the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualification of the [Senate’s] members.” (Art.
VI, Sec. 17, Constitution)
Without prejudice to the issuance of an extended opinion and
after taking into consideration the applicable legal provisions and the contentions
of the contending candidates as well as the two conflicting decisions of the Comelec, the Court rules that Sanchez’ petition for recount
and/or re-appreciation of the ballots cast in the senatorial elections does not
present a proper issue for a summary pre-proclamation controversy. Considerations of definition, usage,
doctrinal jurisprudence and public policy demand such a ruling.
1. Sanchez anchors his
petition for recount and/or re-appreciation on Section 243, paragraph (b) of
the Omnibus Election Code[1]
in relation to Section 234 thereof[2]
with regard to material defects in canvassed election returns. He contends that the canvassed returns
discarding “Sanchez” votes as stray were “incomplete” and
therefore warrant a recount or re-appreciation of the ballots under Section
234. A simple reading of the basic
provisions of the cited Section shows readily its inapplicability. By legal definition and by the very
instructions of the Comelec (Res. No. 1865, Sec. 6,
promulgated on March 11, 1987), an election return is incomplete if
there is “omission in the election returns of the name of any candidate
and/or his corresponding votes” (Sec. 234) or “in case the number of
votes for a candidate has been omitted.” (Sec. 6, Res. No. 1865)
Here, the election returns are complete and indicate the
name of Sanchez as well as the total number of votes that were counted
and appreciated as votes in his favor by the boards of inspectors. The fact that some votes written solely as
“Sanchez” were declared stray votes because of the inspectors’
erroneous belief that Gil Sanchez had not been disqualified as a candidate,
involves an erroneous appreciation of the ballots. It is established by the law as well as
jurisprudence (the cited section being a substantial reproduction of Section
172 of the 1978 Election Code and previous election laws) that errors in the
appreciation of ballots by the board of inspectors are proper subject for
election protest and not for recount or re-appreciation of the ballots.
2. The appreciation of the
ballots cast in the precincts is not a “proceeding of the board of
canvassers” for purposes of pre-proclamation proceedings under section
241, Omnibus Election Code, but of the boards of election inspectors who are
called upon to count and appreciate the votes in accordance with the rules of
appreciation provided in section 211, Omnibus Election Code. Otherwise stated, the appreciation of ballots
is not part of the proceedings of the board of canvassers. The function of ballots appreciation is performed
by the boards of election inspectors at the precinct level.
3. The scope of
pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under sec. 243
of the Omnibus Election Code. The
enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation
controversy, is restrictive and exclusive.
In the absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns
canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects (sec. 234), appear to have
been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (sec. 235) and/or
contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of
which affects the result of the election (sec. 236), which are the only
instances where a pre-proclamation recount may be resorted to, granted the preservation
of the integrity of the ballot box and its contents, Sanchez’ petition must
fail. The complete election returns
whose authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie considered valid for
the purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates.
4. To expand the issues
beyond those enumerated under sec. 243 and allow a recount/reappreciation
of votes in every instance where a claim of misdeclaration
of stray votes is made would open the floodgates to such claims and paralyze
canvass and proclamation proceedings, given the propensity of the loser to
demand a recount. The law and public
policy mandate that all pre-proclamation controversies shall be heard summarily
by the Commission after due notice and hearing and just as summarily
decided. (Sec. 246, Omnibus Election
Code)
5. The Court has always
stressed as in Alonto vs
Comelec[3]
that “the policy of the election law is that pre-proclamation
controversies should be summarily decided, consistent with the law’s desire that
the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible. As declared in Abes,
et al. vs. Commission on Elections, L-28348, December 15, 1967, the powers of
the Comelec are essentially executive and
administrative in nature, and the question of whether or not there had been
terrorism, vote buying and other irregularities in the election should be
ventilated in a regular election protest, and the Commission on Elections is
not the proper forum for deciding such matters,” and that the Comelec and the courts should guard “both against
proclamation grabbing through tampered returns” and “the equally
pernicious effects of excessive delay of proclamations” and “attempts
to paralyze canvassing and proclamation.” To allow the recount here
notwithstanding the multifarious administrative and financial problems of
conducting such a recount, as enumerated by the Comelec
in its two decisions – when now three months after the elections the question
of who is entitled to the 24th seat of the Senate would remain unresolved for
how long no one can tell – is unthinkable and certainly contrary to public
policy and the mandate of the law that the results of the election be canvassed
and reported immediately on the basis of the authentic returns which must be
accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the votes cast for and
obtained by the candidates.[4]
6. Election cases involve
not only the adjudication of the private interest of rival candidates but also
the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice
of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the
offices within their gift. They are
imbued with public interest (Vda. de Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533, 538).
7. The ground for recount
relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among the issues that may be raised in a
pre-proclamation controversy. His
allegation of invalidation of “Sanchez” votes intended for him bear
no relation to the correctness and authenticity of the election returns
canvassed. Neither the Constitution nor
statute has granted the Comelec or the board of
canvassers the power in the canvass of election returns to look beyond the face
thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity (Abes
v. Comelec 21 SCRA 1252, 1256).
8. In Grand Alliance for
Democracy v. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 78302,
promulgated May 27, 1987,
the Court restated certain principles governing canvass proceedings, which are
fully applicable here, mutatis mutandis, to wit:
“The Court has restated the settled doctrine in senatorial
elections in Ilarde v. Commission on Elections, 31
SCRA 72, thus: ‘Canvass proceedĀings are administrative and summary in nature,
and a strong prima facie case backed up by a specific offer of
evidence and indication of its nature and importance has to be made out to
warrant the reception of evidence aliunde and
the presentation of witnesses and the delays necessarily entailed thereby. Otherwise, the paralyzation
of canvassing and proclamation proceedings leading to a vacuum in so important
and sensitive an office as that of Senator of the Republic could easily be
brought about – this time involving the eight place and next time involving
perhaps all the eight places, when it is considered that the position of
senator is voted for, nationwide by all the voters of the 66 provinces and 57
cities comprising the Philippines.’
“And in Anni v. Izquierdo,
57 SCRA 692, the Court declared that: ‘The decisive factor is that where it has
been duly determined by Comelec after investigation
and examination of the voting and registration records that actual voting and
elecĀtion by the registered voters had taken place in the questioned precincts,
the election returns cannot be disregarded and excluded with the resulting
disenfranchisement of the voters but must be accorded prima facie status
as bona fide reports of the result of the voting for canvassing
and proclamation purposes.”‘
“As the Court stated in Anni v. Rasul, 46 SCRA 758.
āThe rule has been time-tested.
To allow a respondent in the Comelec to raise
belated questions concerning returns at any time during the pendency
of the case on review before the Comelec
notwithstanding that he has not originally raised such questions before the
canvassing board and only when he finds his position endangered would mean undue
delays in pre-proclamation proceedings before the Comelec,
x x x . The Court has stressed that Comelec
and the courts should guard both against the proclamation grabbing through
tampered and spurious returns as well as attempts and machiĀnations to paralyze
canvassing and proclamation x x x
x .ā
“It should be added that the other alleged irregularities,
such as the omissions of the Commission on Elections in the distribution and
protection of the election forms and paraphernaĀlia, involve the discharge of
its administrative duties and so do not come under the jurisdiction of this
Court, which can review the decisions, orders and rulings of the body only in
cases of grave abuse of discretion committed by it in the discharge of its
quasi-judicial powers (Aratuc v. Commission on
Elections, 88 SCRA 251; Guevara v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-12596, July 31, 1958; Filipinas Engineering
Co. v. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25).”
9. As of July 25, 1987, and
as the canvassing results stand, Rasul as of her
proclamation as the 23rd Senator-elect, had a lead over Enrile
of 1,910 votes, while Enrile had a lead over Sanchez
of 73,034 with only 31,000 votes still to be canvassed (in three municipalities
of Sulu and in 15 precincts of Lanao
del Sur.) Said
uncanvassed votes (31,000) are clearly not sufficient in number to offset the
73,034 votes lead of Enrile over Sanchez even if
awarded to the latter. There is no need
to wait for the canvass of the votes from the 3 municipalities of Sulu and the 15 precincts in Lanao
del Sur, which still remains up to this late day a
big question mark of when and how they will finally get canvassed, assuming
their integrity has been preserved.
Candidate Juan Ponce Enrile is therefore
entitled to proclamation as the 24th senator-elect in the May 11, 1987 elections. Enrile’s petition
against Rasul has been rendered moot.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition in G.R. No. 79212 (Juan Ponce Enrile v. Commission on Election and Augusto
Sanchez) is hereby GRANTED and the decision of respondent Commission on Elections
promulgated on July 30, 1987
granting Sanchezā petition for recount is hereby SET ASIDE. The respondent Comelec
is hereby ordered to proclaim petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile
as a duly elected senator in the May
11, 1987 elections. The
petitions in G.R. No. 78461 (Augusto S. Sanchez v.
Commission on Election) and G.R. No. 79146 (Juan Ponce Enrile
v. Commission on Elections and Santanina T. Rasul) are both DISMISSED.
This decision shall be IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY upon its promulgation.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, and
Cortes, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., dissent in a separate opinion.
Melencio-Herrera, J., on leave.
[1]
Sec. 243. xxx
(b) The canvassed
election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be
tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in
other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236
of this Code;
x x
x x
x x x x x
[2]
Sec. 234. Materials defects in the
election returns. – If it should clearly appear that some requisites in
form or data had been omitted in the election returns, the board of canvassers
shall call for all the members of the board of election inspectors concerned by
the most expeditious means, for the same board to effect the correction: Provided, That in case of the omission
in the election returns of the name of any candidate and/or his corresponding
votes, the board of canvassers shall require the board of election inspectors
concerned to complete the necessary data in the election returns and affix
therein their initials: Provided,
further, That if the votes omitted
in the returns cannot be ascertained by other means except by recounting the
ballots, the Commission, after satisfying itself that the identity and
integrity of the ballot box have not been violated, shall order the board of
election inspectors to open the ballot box, and, also after satisfying itself
that the integrity of the ballots therein has been duly preserved, order the
board of election inspectors to count the votes for the candidate whose
votes have been omitted with notice thereof to all candidates for the position
involved and thereafter complete the returns.
The right of a candidate to avail
of this provision shall not be lost or affected by the fact that an election
protest is subsequently filed by any of the candidates. (Sec. 172, 1978 EC)
[3]
22 SCRA 878, 884, per Reyes, J.B.L.
[4] Bashier vs. Comelec, 43
SCRA 238 Anni vs. lzquierdo,
57 SCRA 692.
Dissenting Opinion
Clean
6 pt
6 pt
0
3
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DISSENTING OPINION
SARMIENTO, J.:
I vote to dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 79212, and
consequently, to sustain the recount of ballots ordered by the respondent
Commission on Elections.
I hold that paragraph (b),
Section 243, of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines is the basis enough for the challenged
recount order. Thus:
SEC. 243. Issues that may
be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. – The following shall be proper issues that
may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material
defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or certain discrepancies in
the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections
233, 234 and 236 of this Code;
xxx xxx xxx
I agree with the respondent Commission that the erroneous
invalidation of votes cast in favor of “Sanchez” on account of the
inclusion of “Gil Sanchez” in the election forms distributed nationwide
on election day, although Gil Sanchez, a nuisance candidate, had been earlier
disqualified, makes the election return either “incomplete” or
“materially defective” within the meaning of Section 234 of the Code,
thus:
SEC. 234. Material
defects in the election returns. –
if it should clearly appear that some requisites in form or data had been
omitted in the election returns, the board of canvassers shall call or all
members of the board of election inspectors concerned by the most expeditious means, for the same board to effect
the correction: Provided, That in case of the omission in the election
returns of the name of any candidate and/or his corresponding votes, the board
of canvassers shall require the board of election inspectors concerned to complete
the necessary data in the election
returns and affix therein their initials: Provided, further, That of the votes omitted in the returns
cannot be ascertained by other means except by recounting the ballots, the Commission,
after satisfying itself that the
identity and integrity of the ballot box have not been violated, shall order
the board of election inspectors to open the ballot box, and, also after
satisfying itself that the integrity of the ballots therein has been duly
preserved, order the board of election inspectors to count the votes for the
candidate whose votes have been omitted with notice thereof to all candidates
for the position involved and thereafter complete the returns.
The right of a candidate to
avail of this provision shall not be lost or affected by the fact that
an election protest is subsequently filed by any of the candidates.
I am satisfied with this holding of the respondent Commission:
xxx xxx xxx
x x x In order to be regarded as a true expression of the
people’s will, an election return must reflect all the votes cast in favor of a
candidate, or at least such number of
votes as would be enough to declared him elected. Otherwise, to the extent that this will is
not made manifest, the election return is incomplete and materially defective.[1]
In any event, I do not believe that Section 243 of the Code makes
an exclusive enumeration of the grounds that may be raised in a
pre-proclamation controversy. What I
believe is more significant is the fact that the Commission on Elections is the
office charged by our very Constitution, among other things, to “[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall.”[2]
While the same Constitution has made the House Electoral Tribunal the
“sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications”[3]
of the members of Congress, that
to me does not lessen the significance of the Commission’s chief mission as the watchdog of elections and all
other political exercises. In Olfato v. Commission on Elections,[4]
we therefore said:
xxx xxx xxx
To give a strict interpretation of Section 175 (second sentence) of
the 1978 Election Code would be to limit the grounds in pre-proclamation
controversies to matters purely affecting election returns. WE believe that to revert to the old doctrine
prohibiting the Comelec from looking behind the
election returns as to the existence of election irregularities is not
consistent with the very purpose of the
law. Clearly, Sections 172, 173 and 174
only speak of irregularities committed in the preparation of election returns themselves. WE cannot see any difference however if the Comelec be allowed to suspend a canvass or suspend or annul
a proclamation of a candidate-elect on the ground that irregularities or mistakes in the preparation of the returns such as
tampering, altering, falsifying of returns, material defects or discrepancies
of election returns exist and deny said authority to the Comelec
if based on grounds not apparent on the face of the election returns but
indirectly affecting their integrity.
CerĀtainly, it would be ridiculous to deny the Comelec
the authority to suspend a canvass or suspend or annul a proclamation if based
on grounds of election irregularities committed during the election which would
necessarily also vitiate or affect the integrity of the election returns such
as fake voters whose votes cast and included during the canvass would
inevitably be reflected in the election returns themselves, although not
apparent upon the face. Seemingly
genuine returns based on fake votes are equally spurious as tampered election
returns. To sustain the validity of election
returns despite a prima facie showing of the commission prior to the
voting of election irregularities independent of the subsequent act of
preparing the election returns is to stamp our approval on making said election
returns as an impenetrable shield in the perpetuation of anomalies.[5]
I am of the opinion that what we said in Olfato
applies with equal force here. I have no
doubt that the disregard of certain “Sanchez” votes diminishes the
integrity of the returns as much as a tampered or falsified return that would
justify a Comelec action by way of a pre-proclamation
disposition.
In this connection, I
find Commissioner Haydee Yorac’s
dissent in the first Comelec decision persuasive:[6]
xxx xxx xxx
x x x
I take the legal position that where events take place and acts are
committed in the course of canvassing and before proclamation which event and acts are seasonably brought to the
attention of the Commission, and which the Commission can
xxx xxx xxx
expeditiously act upon or address adminisĀtratively,
the Commission must take jurisdiction.
The grounds must be analogous to those which are grounds for
pre–proclamation controversy and must not be identified by any provision of
law as grounds for election protest. A
gap in the law does not warrant an
abnegation of duty. Art. 9. Civil Code.[7]
It is not for me to point that there is no showing, as candidate Enrile alleges, that a recount would land candidate Sanchez
in the winning column (at the expense of the former, who is holding on at the
24th slot). What to me is essential is
the fact that by a recount, we may be assured of the true will of the
people. If such a recount will mean the
inclusion of Sanchez in the winning ticket, then so be it. That is the mandate of the people. But if not, it means that the electorate
prefer candidate Enrile.
For I do not believe that
the technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in the election laws should be
an impediment to the determination of the popular will. I am not saying that a recount is by itself a
departure from the provisions of the election laws — as I said, Section 243 of
the Election Code furnishes sufficient basis for the Comelec
action in question. But if we do so, it
is not the first time that we would have assumed such an activist posture. In his concurrence in our benchmark ruling in
Pimentel v. Comelec,[8] retired Chief Justice Enrique Fernando wrote:
xxx xxx xxx
“x x x While the approach followed by the Court may appear to be
a departure from what has long been considered traditional, I have no hesitancy
in joining my brethren. For me, what is paramount is that through this mode of
resolving a dispute where urgency is of the essence, the basic right of
suffrage is safeguarded and vitalized.
That is the controlling consideration.
I shall explain why, to my mind, it is so.
“1. Let me start with this authoriĀtative doctrine coming from
the pen of Justice Laurel in the
leading case of Moya v. del Fierro: ‘As long as popular government is an end to
be achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form
devised, must contrive to be the means by which the great reservoir of power
must be emptied into the receptacular agencies
wrought by the people through their ConstiĀtution in the interest of good
government and the common meal.
Republicanism, or so for as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the
enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate
source of the established authority. He
has a voice in his Government and whenever possible it is the solemn duty of the
judiciary, when called upon to act in justiciable
cases, to give it efficacy and not stifle or frustrate it.’ It is such a
cardinal principle that led this Court in Badelles
v. Cabili to
state: ‘A republic then to be true to
its name requires that the government rests on the consent of the people,
consent freely given, intelligently arrived at, honestly recorded, and
thereafter counted.’[9]
These petitions, reduced to their barest essentials, are the aftermath
of a mad scramble for the last Senatorial slots, but I am more inclined to view
the same, Augusto Sanchez’s petition in particular,
as welcome opportunities to ascertain the genuine mandate of the people. At the same time, we would have animated the
right of suffrage.
In fine, I reject candidate Enrile’s
objections based on rigid application of the Omnibus Election Code.
It seems to me unfair, if unfounded, for candidate Enrile to suspect efforts on the part of the respondent Comelec “to keep petitioner Enrile
from sitting in the Senate.”[10]
I cannot pin specific blame on any party for this fiasco, although I would be
lacking in candor if I hold the respondent Comelec
entirely free from responĀsibility either.
But I believe that it is largely by accident that it is candidate Enrile who now finds himself in the middle of the
controversy. But then, so is candidate
Sanchez.
Notwithstanding the former Defense Minister’s doubts on the
veracity of the records of the respondent Commission pointing to a case of
mistake in appreciating the “Sanchez” votes, I am strongly of the
opinion that there was indeed such misappreciation of
the votes cast for the name “Sanchez”.
The inclusion of “Gil Sanchez” in the election forms is
not disputed, and neither is the damage caused to legitimate candidate Augusto Sanchez arising from the erroneous nullification of
“Sanchez” votes. There is then
no question that an error has been committed, an error neither the Comelec nor candidate Sanchez is prepared to assume
responsibility for. But nevertheless,
there was such an error. The extent
thereof is a matter of evidence and it is on candidate Sanchez that the burden
of proof lies. In all cases, the
error must be corrected.
A recount, while admittedly a tedious process, is not, however,
”interminable.”[11] We must
entrust to the Comelec such faith and confidence that it will
perform its solemn duties under
the Constitution. It should know when to
stop. It is not without power to limit
the number of ballot boxes to reopen for the purpose only of counting the
“Sanchez” stray votes.
Let me state in closing
that a recount is proper whenever there has been a patent failure to properly credit votes in favor of a candidate. This is particularly true in the case of Augusto
Sanchez who obviously was the victim of
a nuisance candidacy. Under the
Constitution:
Sec. 10. Bona fide
candidates for any
public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination.[12]
There is nothing in the Omnibus Election Code that penalizes nuisance
candidacies, yet there must be some way
of vindicating victims of nuisance candidates. It is no argument that this would “open
the floodgates to recount”[13]
since it is a matter of right on the part of legitimate aspirants to protect
their candidacies. Otherwise, Gil
Sanchez — his true identity is a mystery to this day — and many more of his
ilk would have served their unscrupulous purposes.
[1]
In the Matter of the Petition for a Recount, SPC No. 87-179, July 30, 1987, 10.
[2] CONST., art. XI (C), sec. 2 (1).
[3] Supra, art. VI, sec. 17.
[4] No. L-52749, March 31, 1981, 103 SCRA 741 (1981).
[5] Supra, 780-781; emphases in original.
[6] In the Matter of the Petition for a Recount,
SPC No. 87-179, July 16, 1987, Yorac, Comm.,
dissenting.
[7] Supra, 2.
[8]
No. L-68113, October 31, 1984,
134 SCRA 571 (1984).
[9] Supra, 572-573.
[10]
Petition, G.R. No. 79212, 28.
[11] Id.,
29.
[12] CONST., art. IX (C), sec. 10.
[13] Petition, id., 25.