PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO HORA Y LUNGAY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The records disclose that on January 30, 1978, at or about six o’clock in the
evening, Ricardo Clemen, Anito Arcay, and Alejandro Dumangcas were on their way
to Barangay Duljo, in Panglao,
Bohol, for a drinking spree.  They
stopped at a store where they consumed two “pocket size” bottles of
rhum.  Ricardo Clemen got drunk.  Thereafter, they repaired home.

While on their way, Ricardo Clemen mumbled, “you run because
I’m stabbed.”^[4]
Thereupon, Dumangcas ran back toward the store. 
According to him, he saw Clemen clutching at his wounds in the body and
arm.  Overcome by shock, he (Dumangcas)
allegedly passed out.  But before that,
he had a glimpse of the assailant grappling with Clemen, whom he subsequently
named as the herein accused-appellant. 
While the night was dark, he allegedly recognized the accused-appellant
from a light coming from the
house of Olimpia Cloma nearby.^[5]
He averred that the accused-appellant attacked Clemen with a bolo.  When he regained consciousness, Clemen was
being loaded onto a vehicle.  He was brought
to Tagbilaran City for medical treatment. 
On February 2, 1978, however, Clemen died.

From the medical records, Clemen sustained the following wounds:

xxx    xxx       xxx

1.     
Peritonitis, generalized secondary
to stab wd, abdomen, penetrating, perforating colon, mid transverse and splenic
flexure

2.     
lacerated wd. (L) forearm, mid 3rd
medial, 6 cm

3.     
lacerated wd. (L) mid finger,
proximal phalange, 2 cm. dorsum^[6]

xxx    xxx       xxx

Anito Arcay, on the other hand, testified that he was together
with Dumangcas and the deceased on the evening of the tragedy.  According to him, the deceased invited them
for a drink.  They finished two bottles of
rhum at a nearby store after which they prepared to go home.  About 15 meters from the store, the deceased
uttered; “Bay, I’m stabbed.”^[7]
Like Dumangcas, he allegedly had a look at Clemen’s attacker from the light of
Olimpia Cloma’s lamp about 15 meters from the scene of the incident.  At that time, the victim and the assailant
were allegedy locked in struggle.

The victim then instructed him to “get a light.”^[8]
Arcay summoned Hilario Flores, a policeman who owned a pressure lamp.  Flores soon arrived with his wife, who
carried the lamp.  They then rushed
Clemen to the provincial hospital located at Tagbilaran City.

Arcay further claims that while at the hospital, Clemen pointed
to the accused-appellant as the assailant but cautioned him not to “tell
anybody … even my parents because if I will be already well, I will liquidate
the man.”^[9]

Dumangcas was summoned by the
police as early as February
1, 1978.  He was “interviewed”
separately by two police officers but he did not identify the assailant.  On February 6, 1978, another policeman went
to his house and again he did not implicate the accused-appellant.  It was, however only on March 2, 1978, or
more than a month after the unfortunate incident, that he “divulged”
to the authorities the identity of Clemen’s killer.  He adds, however, that he “was afraid
… because I’m working and I might be, the same thing might happen to me, the
same thing that happened to the deceased.”^[10]
Arcay himself told the same tale to the
police authorities on March 2, 1978.

We reverse the judgment of the trial court.  We have reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused-appellant.

We cannot accept the veracity of the testimonies of Alejandro
Dumangcas and Anito Arcay, two supposed key witnesses for the prosecution.  We are hard put to believe, in the first
place, that the deceased Clemen did not inform the authorities, not even his
relatives, as to who attacked him (assuming he knew who it was),
notwithstanding enough opportunities for him to do so.  The records will show that he had at least
two chances to do so, first, before Patrolman Flores, the responding policeman,
during and at the scene of the incident itself, and second, before his
relatives, who saw and visited him at the hospital.^[11]
It would have been the first impulse of one supposedly on the threshold of
death.

But what is even more unusual
is the fact that he had to confide in, of all people, Arcay, if the latter is
indeed to be believed.  While it might
have been that the deceased did inform Arcay of the identity of the attacker, what
is strange is that he — so Arcay avers — informed him (Arcay) alone, when he
(the victim) could have alerted his very relatives and the police as well.

Neither can we accept
Arcay’s allegation that Clemen, after pointing to the accused-appellant as the
murderer, urged him not to inform the authorities as he planned to get
even when he recovered.  The fact should
be underscored that Clemen was a dying man — a fact he must have known,
judging from the extent of his injuries — and for one near death, it is odd
that he should imagine surviving his wounds in the hope of getting even.  What we are saying is that while it is not
abnormal for Clemen to have harbored revenge, what disturbs us is Arcay’s claim
that he (Clemen) took pains to instruct him (Arcay) not to inform the
authorities when the natural urge would be to have the assassin brought to the
bar of justice where he (Clemen) could have the vindication he sought.

Under the circumstances,
we seriously doubt whether Clemen in fact knew who assaulted him.  It should be noted that as Arcay himself
testified, Clemen, at the time of the incident wished for some light.^[12]
This suggests that Clemen did not see who attacked him.  On top of that, he had imbibed alcohol.  We do not trust his faculties for observation in such an inebriated state.  When he therefore declared to Patrolman
Flores, “I do not know the assail­ant,”^[13] we believe that he was telling the
truth.  This is part of the res gestae.  And between this and his alleged confession to
Arcay, we are more prone to accept the
former.

All told, we do not
accept Clemen’s supposed ante mortem declaration to Arcay.  Clemen, we reiterate, was on the point of death, and for this reason alone he could not have
divulged to Arcay the identity of the murderer and at the same time deny
knowing him before the authorities.  What
this indicates is that he was lying to the police.  We do not believe that he would have been inclined
to misrepresent in so solemn a moment. 
It has indeed been said over and over, “truth sits on the lips of
dying men.”

Yet both Dumangcas and
Arcay insist that they saw the accused-appellant attack the victim.  According to them, they recognized the
accused-appellant from a lighted area nearby Olimpia Cloma’s house.

Again, we reject these
alleged eyewitness accounts.

The evidence will show
that it was a moonless night when the tragedy occurred.^[14] The
streets of Barangay Duljo had no
lights.^[15] Moreover, that portion of Barangay Duljo
where the stabbing took place was a coconut grove.  Except for a faint illumination emanating
from an improvised kerosene lamp (a “[b]eer bottle with a wick and with the use of kerosene”)^[16] inside the house of Cloma, 15 meters away
from the killing field, the place was enveloped in darkness.  Thus, according to Dumangcas, he could not
have identified the assailant (assuming that he saw him) without some light.

To our mind, there was
insufficient lighting to have enabled Dumangcas and Arcay to recognize the
deceased’s attacker, much less, to ascertain the assassin to be the
accused-appellant.  As stated earlier,
the appellant was about 15 meters from Cloma’s house when he allegedly sighted
him.  But Cloma’s improvised kerosene lamp
furnished a dim light,^[17] and from such a distance, we doubt whether he could have in fact recognized the assailant.  In addition, the lamp was situated inside the house. 
It is true that Arcay testified that it was “in the window,“^[18] but
according to Dumangcas it was “inside.”^[19] Cloma herself declared that she “took a
lamp and placed it on our window,”^[20] at which point she saw Clemen staggering
below.^[21] This means that the lamp was inside the
house when the stabbing actually occurred.

The dark of night is
compounded by the fact that both Dumangcas and Arcay (and the deceased himself)
were under the influence of spirits. 
Their intoxication could have dulled their senses.

But if Dumangcas and
Arcay truly saw the accused-appellant, it bothers us that it took them more
than a month to reveal to the authorities, or to anybody for
that matter, the identity of the alleged killer.  According to the records, it was only on
March 2, 1978 that they made their “disclosures” to the police.  We do not accept Dumangcas’ excuse that he
dreaded reprisals from the accused-appellant to justify
his month-long silence.^[22] For if this were the case, he would not have
made his revelation to the police on March 2, 1978 since at that time, the
accused-appellant was still roaming free.^[23]

As for Arcay, he claimed
that he was requested by the deceased not to say anything to the police.  Yet, on the same date, March 2, 1978, he
pointed to the accused-appellant as the
perpetrator of the killing.

What further appears on record is the fact that the twosome of
Dumangcas and Arcay were themselves suspects to the crime in question.  It was for this reason that the Philippine
Constabulary picked them up for questioning on March 2, 1978, and it was only
then that they made their “revelations.” This Court believes that
they had every reason to point to another person as the author of the offense
— exculpating themselves in the process. 
They simply played the old, familiar game of “passing the
buck.”

In addition, we note fatal inconsistencies in the
statements of Dumangcas and Arcay.  In
their sworn declarations before the Philippine Constabulary,^[24]
they both stated that the accused-appellant had an axe to grind against the
deceased.  It is claimed that days
before, the deceased allegedly threatened to retaliate for the alleged mauling
of a certain Nonie Arboleras by the accused-appellant and the latter allegedly
resented this.  When questioned, however,
on the witness stand, both denied knowing the accused-appellant’s motives.^[25]

The accused-appellant
interposes the defense of alibi. 
According to him, he was at home, sleeping at the time of the
incident.  He admitted having struck
Nonie Alboleras on January 30, 1978 but that was because “he boxed me so I
retaliated”^[26] He categorically denied having mauled him.^[27]

While the rule of
long-standing is that alibi is a weak defense,^[28] it is an equally enduring rule that the
prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence rather than on the
weakness of that of the defense.^[29] In this case, we are not convinced that the
prosecution has demonstrated the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable
doubt.

According to Section 2 of
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, “the defendant is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond a reasonable doubt.” This is
so because an accused person, under the Constitution,^[30] is presumed innocent.  In the case at bar, we are not morally
convinced that the guilt of the accused-appellant has been shown true to this
standard.  The Constitutional presumption
has not been overcome.  On account of
reasonable doubt alone, we acquit the accused-appellant.

WHEREFORE, the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED on the
ground of reasonable doubt.  His release
from confinement is hereby ordered unless he is held for another legal
cause.  Costs de oficio.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

^[1]
The Honorable Regino Hermosisima, Jr., presiding Judge.

^[2]
Record, 172.

^[3]
Id., 40.

^[4]
T.s.n., session of July 17, 1978, 4.

^[5]
Id.

^[6]
Record, 184.

^[7]
T.s.n., id., 18.

^[8]
Id., 19.

^[9]
Id., 22.

^[10]
Id., 7.

^[11]
Id., 24.

^[12]
Id., 19.

^[13]
Id., 23.

^[14]
Id., 8, 26.

^[15]
Id., 27.

^[16]
Id., 9.

^[17]
Id., 18.

^[18]
Id.

^[19]
Id., 26.

^[20]
Id., session of August 15, 1979, 8.

^[21]
Id.

^[22]
Id., 7.

^[23]
See People v. Villar, No.
L-34092, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 512 (1974).

^[24]
Record, id., 6-9; 13-16.

^[25]
T.s.n., id., 5. 28.

^[26]
T.s.n., session of August 15,
1979, 14.

^[27]
Id.

^[28]
People v. Pecato, G.R. No.
41008, June 18, 1987; People v. Ferrera, G.R. No. 66965, June 18, 1987;
People v. Tuando, G.R. No. 47720, May 20, 1987.

^[29]
People v. Saavedra, G.R.
No. 48738, May 18, 1987; People v. Ramirez, No. L-39007, August 21,
1982, 116 SCRA 48 (1982); People v. Tabayoyong, No. L-31084, May 29,
1981, 104 SCRA 724 (1981); Duran v. Court of Appeals, No. L-39758, May
7, 1976, 71 SCRA 68 (1976).

^[30]
CONST., art. III, sec. 14(2).