G. R. No. L-9646. December 21, 1957

Appellant  ascribes  error to  the  decision  of  the Sulu court granting  Lay Kock’s  petition  for naturalization on three grounds, namely, (a) failure to file with the  Bureau of Justice his  declaration  of  intention one  year before applying for citizenship;  (6) lack of the  requisite moral qualification  and  of sincere disposition to adopt Filipino ways  of  life,   and  (c)  incompetency of  his  character witnesses.

As to the first ground,  the  record shows  presentation of this petition on July 27, 1954.   At the hearing, petitioner swore to having forwarded his declaration of  intention  “sometime in  July  1953.”  The  money  order attached to such  declaration bears the  date July 2, 1953. As against this evidence  the  Solicitor General  points to the receipt issued by his  office (dated August  5,  1953) acknowledging payment of the fees for filing petitioner’s declaration.  We  think  however that this is  not positive proof of the date of filing of the  declaration. It is true, the petitioner  did not specify  the date he forwarded in but such  omission  obviously resulted  from  the absence of objection  on that specific ground in the  trial court; indeed the  fiscal  who  handled  the  opposition,  failed to cross-examine him for  particulars.   Now if “sometime in July” meant  on or before July 27, 1953 the one year condition precedent had been complied with.  On  the other hand, if it meant any day afterwards (July 28-31) there would be a  shortage of  one  to  four days.  Now, would such  small  difference  be  fatal?   We  do  not  deem  it necessary to discuss  this aspect, partly because it was not raised in the lower court—it could have been  raised—and partly  because  although appellee’s  brief asserts  that “factually the declaration was received in  the Office of the Solicitor General on July 11, 1953, as its records  show” we discover no denial of such assertion in  the pleadings or memoranda subsequently submitted to this Court.

On the second ground, appellant quotes appellee’s own admission of having married  his wife simply  because she was his mother’s choice and  of  having  left  the  former in China to take care of the latter.  This goes to show, argues appellant, Lay  Kock’s unwillingness  to  discard Chinese in  favor of local customs; and considering that he has  not brought his wife here, and has stopped sending her support ever since the last war, he may not be  deemed to have observed a proper  and irreproachable conduct.

Yet even  among Filipino there are wives who have been selected by  their respective mothers-in-law and who lived with  and cared for them.  As to appellee’s failure to bring his wife to  this  country or to send her  support,  he explained that

“I went to China in 1947.  My aim was to find out what happened to my mother and my  wife but the town people told me  that my mother  died during the Japanese Occupation in China and afterwards my wife have evacuated but they did not know so  I stayed only for a few months trying to find her but I could not locate her so I leave words to the people of that  place to inform me if they happen to see my wife. * * *.  And now in recent years even with the information I received from friends  in Hongkong not long after that I sent a letter to my friends “but that letter “was never  answered and so I gave up hope  communicating with her.  I wanted to communicate with  her but  I could not.”

It  is urged as a  third ground  of objection that petitioner’s witnesses were incompetent because they  did not know  him  since  1923 when  he  began  residing  in  the Philippines.  One witness, it would seem, became  his acquaintance in 1925 and the others in 1927.

Although the law  requires the  witnesses to  state that they  “personally know the petitioner to  be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time  required  by this Act”  (section 7) we have already interpreted this “period” to mean ten years before the petition, under section 2 or five years under section 3 of the Act.¹   Therefore, the said witnesses were competent on that score.

If the argument however is addressed  not to their competency  to  declare on petitioner’s  residence,  but  on  the latter’s conduct “during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines” under section  2² our  comment  is that one does not need to personally know another  from  the moment of the  latter’s birth or age of  reason, to  qualify as witness to his proper  and law-abiding behaviour.   Existing records,   common  reputation  and mutual  friends and acquaintances are available sources of information.

The appealed decision sets forth in detail the  circumstances disclosed  at  the  hearing  of  this petition  which show petitioner’s  possession of all the qualifications prescribed by the  Naturalization Law.  As  the objections of the appellant appear to be without merit,  the said decision should accordingly be affirmed; and it is  hereby affirmed, without costs.

Paras,  C. J., Padilla, Montemayor,  Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

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¹ Chua Tiong vs.  Republic  of  the  Phil.  93  Phil.,  117; Awad
vs.  Republic  97  Phil., 569,  Padilla  Civil  Law 1956  Ed.  Vol. I
p. 155, 157.
² Supposing this is  to be literally applied—not  the ten or  five year period already mentioned.