JUSTINA DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. CARMEN QUEVEDO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

This controversy over a five-hectare land in Ilocos Norte between
the Cruz and the Quevedo families, started in 1932. Despite three
litigations won by the latter, it still occupies the courts’ attention.
It should have ended in June 1942 when this Tribunal decided G. R. No.
L-48790 between the same parties; but the shrewdness of counsel
exploiting a clerical error, managed to prolong the dispute.

In October 1932, Teodora de la Cruz, the predecessor of the
present plaintiffs, filed (with others) an application for registration
of a parcel of land of more than 90 hectares (Registration Case No.
241). Among the oppositors were Santos Quevedo, (ascendant of present
defendants) who asserted ownership over a 5-hectare portion. Cruz
prevailed in the court of first instance. The Court of Appeals, upon
review, approved the registration, but modified it by sustaining the
opposition and claim of Quevedo in these lines, immediately following a
complete description of the 5-hectare not claimed by him:

“por la proponderancia de las pruebas, dicha porcion debe
excluirse de la solicitud y adjudicarse a Santos Quevedo x x x”

x x x

“Por las consideraciones expuestas, modificamos la sentencia
apelada, estimando las oposiones de Felix Ponce, de los herederos de
David Flor y de Santos Quevedo, desestimando todas las demas, y adjudicando
a ellos las porciones reclamadas por los referidos opositores
Ponce, Flor y Quevado, sujeto a los contratos exhibitos O, P y Q
otorgados entre aquellos y los opositores llamados zanjeros. x x x Los
solicitantes deben presentar un plano enmendado de acuerdo con esta
decision, y dentro del pplazo que el Juzgado inferior designe. x x x.”

(Note: the words underlined in the above quotation are pivotal in
the case at bar.)

The Court of Appeals decision became final. Thus, upon the return
of the expediente (Registration Case No. 241) the Ilocos Norte Court of
First Instance required Cruz to submit an amended plan of the real
property by excluding the portions adjudicated [sic] to Santos
Quevedo, (Felix Ponce and Herederos de David Flor … other successful
oppositors). Unwilling to submit such amended plan and maintaining that
the portion adjudged to Santos Quevedo was not included in the plan
originally submitted by her, Teodora Cruz came to this Court with a
certiorari petition challenging the order. Her petition, however, was
dismissed in January 1940 by a resolution that ended with these words: x
x x el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Ilocos Norte no solamente obro
dentro de su jurisdiccion sino que obro precisamente en cumplimiento
de la decision dictada por el Tribunal de Apelaciones.”

This 1940 decision, however, in quoting the dispositive part of
the Court of Appeals’ decision omitted or rephrased through clerical
mistake or erroneous transcription the portion which reads “y
adjudicando a ellos las porciones reclamadas por los referidos
opositores Ponce, Flor y Quevado.”^[1]
We say it was a mistake because the official copy of the decision
attached to Registration Case No. 241 contains the omitted portion; and
the very 1940 decision makes an acknowledgement that certain parcels had
been adjudicated to the oppositors Santos Quevedo, Felix Ponce and
Herederos de David Flor.

After 1940, Quevedo took steps to carry out the Court of Appeals
decision in his favor; but Cruz presented again a petition to review, on
the ground of fraud, the award in favor of Quevedo, which fraud was
made to consist in the manifestation of Quevedo that “the land applied
for by Cruz included parcels belonging to him”, when in fact it did not.
The petition was denied — naturally, because the alleged fraud being
intrinsic could not justify reopening.^[2] And when she appealed the denial, the court disallowed
the appeal. She took the matter to this Court by petition for mandamus
(G. R. No. L-48790). However, such petition was here dismissed in June
1942, because as this Court found, “the motion for revision can have
evidently no other purpose than malicious delay, and the appeal taken
from the order denying such motion is frivolous.” This decision again
expressly referred to the parcel that “had been adjudged” to Quevedo.

These rebuffs notwithstanding, Cruz continued to refuse to submit
an amended plan, as directed by the Court of Appeals, showing the area
claimed by and adjudicated to Quevedo. So, the latter obtained a court
decree permitting a government surveyor to prepare the technical plan
thereof. Upon submission of the surveyor’s plan, the court ordered, in
December 1946, the Sheriff to put Quevedo in possession of the land
therein described. This order was accordingly complied with.

Four years later, i. e. in September 1950, the heirs of Cruz
initiated the present lawsuit of reivindicacion, alleging they
had been illegally deprived of the land given to the Quevedos by the
Sheriff.

There is no doubt that the land was identically the same parcel
described in the opposition and claim submitted by Quevedo in the
original Registration Case No. 241. Nevertheless, plaintiffs contend it
was not adjudicated to Quevedo in that Case No. 241; and they rely
principally on the mistaken quotation in our decision of 1940 in
the certiorari case. Fortunately, however, the court of first instance
took cognizance of its own records, and following the tenor of the
official copy of the Court of Appeals decision attached to Registration
Case No. 241, correctly held that the parcel had been adjudicated to
Quevedo. Indeed, our very decision of 1940 explicitly approved the lower
court’s order to segregate from the original plan “las porciones adjudicadas
a los opositores Quevedo, x x x.” Therein, we thought the court “obro
precisamente en cumplimiento de la decision dictada por el Tribunal de
Apelaciones.”

In fact, up to 1950 when this case was instituted, the court of
first instance in several directives, ad this Court, have regarded the
lot as awarded to Santos Quevedo.

It is now too late to aver, as appellants do, that such piece of
land was not included in Registration Case No. 241, or was different
from the lot he claimed in said registration proceeding or that he had
no title to it. The Court of Appeals’ decision constitutes res
judicata^[3] on the point
of Quevedo’s ownership.

Consequently, the lower court’s dismissal of the instant
attempt to recover the land from his successors must be, and is hereby
affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Paras, C. J., Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

Padilla and Endencia, JJ., took no part.

---

^[1] “y adjudicando a los
solicitantes los terrenos solicitados con excepcion de las porciones
reclamadas por los referidos opositores Ponce, Flor y Quevado.”

^[2] Only extrinsic or
collateral fraud gives rise to reopening. Perjury is not extrinsic
fraud. Labayen v. Talisay-Silay, 68 Phil. 376; Domingo v. David, 68
Phil. 134; Melgar v. Delgado, 54 Phil. 668.

^[3] The cases cited by
appellant holding that one who lost in a registration case may
thereafter relitigate and sue the oppositors in a “reivindicacion”, were
cases wherein the land was not adjudged in favor of the latter in the
registration proceeding.