G.R. No. L-25643. June 27, 1968
JOSE MANUEL LEZAMA AND PAQUITA LEZAMA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JESUS RODRIGUEZ, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, JOSE DINEROS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS RECEIVER OF THE LA…
CASTRO, J.:
The issue tendered for resolution in this case is whether a wife,
who is a co-defendant of her husband in an action, may be examined as a hostile
witness by the adverse party under section 6 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
without infringing on her marital privilege not to testify against her husband
under section 20(b) of Rule 130. The
trial court, presided by the respondent Judge Jesus Rodriguez, ruled in the
affirmative and required the wife to appear and testify. The petitioners sued for certiorari
but the Court of Appeals dismissed their petition[1]
and denied their motion for reconsideration.[2]
Hence this appeal.[3]
On July 18, 1960 Jose S. Dineros,
acting as receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co. in Iloilo,
together with C.N. Hodges and Ricardo Gurrea, filed
an action in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the annulment of a
judgment rendered against the La Paz Ice Plant by the Court of First Instance
of Manila in Civil Case 39327. Named as
defendants were Mariano C. Roque, in whose favor
judgment was rendered, and the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita
Lezama. The
complaint alleged that, because of mismanagement by the Lezamas,
the La Paz Ice Plant was placed under the receivership of Dineros;
that during the pendency of the receivership, Marciano C. Roque brought an
action against the La Paz Ice Plant in the Court of First Instance of Manila
for the collection of P150,000, which sum he had supposedly lent to it; that
summons was served not on the receiver but on the spouses Jose Manuel and Paquita Lezama; and that, through
the collusion of the Lezamas, Roque
was able to obtain judgment by default against the company. It was claimed that, because the summons was
served on Jose Manuel Lezama instead of on the
receiver, the Court of First Instance of Manila acquired no jurisdiction over
the La Paz Ice Plant and that, therefore, the decision of that court was void.
In their answer, the defendant spouses (the herein petitioners),
while admitting that the company was placed under receivership, maintained
that Jose Manuel Lezama nevertheless remained
president of the La Paz Ice Plant and that as such he had authority to receive
in behalf of the company the court summons in Civil Case 39827. They denied entering into collusion with Roque and averred that they did not contest Roque’s claim because they knew it to be a legitimate
obligation which the La Paz ice
Plant had incurred pursuant to a resolution of its board of directors.
Issues having been joined, the case was thereupon heard. At the hearing Dineros
asked the court to issue a subpoena to Paquita
Lezama to testify as “a witness summoned by the
plaintiffs in accordance with the Rules of Court.” The request was granted
over the objection of the petitioners who invoked the following provision of
the Rules of Court:
“A husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her
consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent, except in a
civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other.”[4]
This provision deals with two different matters which rest on
different grounds of policy: the disqualification
of husband and wife to testify in each other’s behalf, as well as their privilege
not to testify against each other.[5]
The fundamental theory of the common law is said to be that relationship of the
spouses, not their pecuniary interest, is the basis of the disqualification.[6]
Indeed Section 20 of Rule 130 is entitled “Disqualification by reason of
. . . relationship.”
On the other hand, while a welter of emotional reasons has been
offered[7]
for the privilege, the “true explanation [which] is after all the
simplest”[8]
and which constitutes “the real and sole strength of the opposition to
abolishing the privilege,” is the natural repugnance in every fair-minded
person to compelling a wife or husband to be the means of the other’s
condemnation and to subjecting the culprit to the humiliation of being condemned
by the words of his intimate life partner.[9]
Here the request for subpoena indicated that Paquita Lezama was to do no more
than testify as an adverse party in the case and, indeed, in the light of the
allegations both in the complaint and in the answer, the request was apparently
one that could reasonably be expected to be made. Thus, the complaint charged:
“13. – That in obtaining the judgment by default in
Civil Case No. 39827 of the Court of First Instance of Manila against the La
Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. defendants, in gross and evident bad
faith, and, in fraudulent conspiracy, made it appear that the La Paz Ice Plant
& Cold Storage Co., Inc. had obtained a loan of P150,000.00 from defendant Marciano C. Roque thru defendant
Jose Manuel Lezama allegedly upon an authority vested
upon defendant Jose Manuel Lezama by the alleged
Board of Directors of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc.
allegedly evidenced by the minutes of the meetings of the Board of Directors
of the said corporation signed by defendant Jose Manuel Lezama
and attested to by Benjamin Luis Borja and Paquita B. Lezama and that defendants
spouses Jose Manuel Lezama and Paquita
B. Lezama had manipulated the books of the
corporation by making it appear that such fictitious loan was then in
existence.”
On the other hand, the answer claimed
“13. That the herein defendants specifically deny
all the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the complaint; the truth is,
that the herein defendants have not conspired and acted in bad faith with the
plaintiff [Marciano C. Roque]
in Civil Case No. 39827 of the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
rendition of the said judgment referred to therein; for the truth is, that the
herein defendants, in their capacities as President-Manager and Secretary of
the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc., believing as they believe
that the obligation sought to be enforced by said civil action being legitimate
and the allegations of the complaint in said Civil Case No. 39827 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila are true, they did not deem it wise to contest the
same; that the obligation of P150,000.00 of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold
Storage Co., Inc., which the defendant Marciano C. Roque sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. 39827 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila was legitimately contracted in accordance
with law; that said obligation was duly entered in the books of the corporation
and that the said loan is not fictitious; that the amount realized therefrom was spent for the benefit of the said corporation.”
Thus, while the petitioners denied the charge that the loan was
fictitious, they did not deny the allegation that it was Paquita
Lezama who, as secretary of the company, signed the
minutes of the meeting at which Jose Manuel Lezama
was allegedly authorized to negotiate the loan and that it was she who,
likewise as secretary, made the entry in the books of the corporation.
It was obviously to test the truth of the assertion that the loan
transaction was above board that Dineros, the company
receiver, wanted Paquita Lezama
on the witness stand, not as a spouse witness “for or against her
husband,” but rather as an adverse party in the case.
It is postulated that a party can make, as it were, such forays
into his opponent’s position on the strength of section 6 of Rule 132 which
provides:
“Direct examination of unwilling or hostile witnesses. – A party may interrogate any unwilling or
hostile witness by leading questions. A
party may call an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a
public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an
adverse party, and interrogate him by leading questions and contradict and impeach
him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party and the
witness thus called may be contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the
adverse party also, and may be cross-examined by the adverse party only upon
the subject-matter of his examination in chief.”
The basic issue may therefore be restated thus: In this case where the wife is a co-defendant
in a suit charging fraud against the spouses, can the wife be compelled to
testify as an adverse party witness concerning her participation in the alleged
fraud without violating Section 20(b) of Rule 130?
It is argued that the wife may be so compelled but her testimony
would be receivable only against her.[10]
It is even suggested that “each may testify in his or her own behalf,
although the testimony may inure to the benefit of the other spouse, or
against his or her own interest, although the testimony may also militate
against the other spouse.”[11]
Upon the other hand, it is insisted that compelling Paquita
Lezama to testify will transgress Section 20(b) of
Rule 130, especially if her testimony will support the plaintiff’s charge.
The complaint charges “fraudulent conspiracy” on the
part of the spouses and one Marciano C. Roque to make it appear that the La Paz Ice Plant &
Cold Storage Co., Inc. was indebted to Roque. The wife, Paquita Lezama, is called upon to testify as an adverse party
witness on the basis of her following participation in the alleged fraudulent
scheme: “that it was Paquita Lezama who as Secretary
of the company signed the minutes of the meeting during which Manuel Lezama was allegedly authorized to negotiate the loan and
that it was she who, likewise as Secretary, made the entry in the books of the
corporation.”
Evidently, Paquita Lezama
will be asked to testify on what actually transpired during the meeting and
will be asked questions on the matter of the veracity or falsity of the entry
in the books of the corporation. Whether
her testimony will turn out to be adverse or beneficial to her own interest,
the inevitable result would be to pit her against her husband. The interests of husband and wife in this
case are necessarily interrelated.
Testimony adverse to the wife’s own interests would tend to show the
existence of collusive fraud between the spouses and would then work havoc
upon their common defense that the loan was not fictitious. There is the possibility, too, that the wife,
in order to soften her own guilt, if guilty she is, may unwittingly testify in
a manner entirely disparaging to the interests of the husband.
Because of the unexpansive wording of
the rule which provides merely that the wife cannot be examined “for or
against her husband without his consent,” it is further argued that
“when husband and wife are parties to an action, there is no reason why
either may not be examined as a witness for or against himself or herself
alone,” and his or her testimony could operate only against himself or
herself.[12]
Even if such view were generally acceptable as an exception to
the rule, or even as a separate doctrine, it would be inapplicable in this
case where the main charge is collusive fraud between the spouses and a third
person, and the evident purpose of examination of the wife is to prove that
charge.
Indeed, in those jurisdictions which allow one spouse to be
subjected to examination by the adverse party as a hostile witness when both
spouses are parties to the action, either the interests of the spouses are
separate or separable, or the spouse offered as a witness is merely a formal or
nominal party.[13]
The final point urged upon us is that to prevent one spouse from
testifying would encourage alliance of husband and wife as an instrument of
fraud; for then what better way would there be to prevent discovery than to
make a co-conspirator in fraud immune, to the most convenient mode of discovery
available to the opposite party? This
argument overlooks the fact that Section 6 of Rule 132 is a mere concession,
for the sake of discovery, from the rule which precludes the husband or the
wife from becoming the means of the other’s condemnation. The said rule of discovery should therefore
not be expanded in meaning or scope as to allow examination of one’s spouse in
a situation where this natural repugnance obtains.
It may not be amiss to state in passing that the respondent Dineros has not demonstrated that there is no evidence
available to him other than the Lezama’s testimony to
prove the charge recited in the complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions appealed from are reversed,
and this case is ordered remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings in accordance with law. No
costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Sanchez, Angeles, and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., took no part.
[1]
Resolution 52, CA-G.R. 36718-R,
Nov. 24, 1965.
[2]
Resolution 12, CA-G.R. 36718-R,
Jan. 6, 1966.
[3]
While the appeal was pending in this Court, the receivership was dissolved and,
consequently, Jose S. Dineros, who was originally
made a party respondent, was dropped and the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold
Storage Co. substituted in his stead. Resolution,
Oct. 26, 1966.
[4]
Rule 130, sec. 20(b).
[5] See
8 J. Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 2227 at 211, sec. 2223
at 216 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereafter cited as 3 Wigmore].
[6]
J. Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 603 at 737 (3d ed. 1940)
[hereafter cited as 2 Wigmore].
[7]
For instance, in United States
v. Concepcion,
31 Phil. 182 (1915) the basis of the rule is said to be the
“considerations of public policy growing out of the marital
relation.” Said the Court: “To
allow one to testify for or against the other would be to subject him or her to
great temptation to commit perjury and to endanger the harmony and confidence
of the marital relation.” At 187.
On the other hand, in People v. Francisco,
78 Phil. 694 (1947), the Court gave as reasons for the privilege the
following: “First, identity of interest;
second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which
deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even
at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such
evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness;
and fourth, because, where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is
danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.” At
703.
[8] 8
Wigmore, sec. 2227 at 212.
[9] Id.,
sec. 2228 at 217.
[10] See
8 Wigmore 227.
[11]
97 C.J.S. 477.
[12]
See Menzel vs. Tubbs, et al., 53 NW
653, 656 cited in 58 Am. Jur. 129.
[13]
97 C.J.S. 477.