GIL V. MARIBAO AND ENRIQUETA LLANILLO-MARIBAO, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE JUDGE NUMERIANO ESTENZO AND THE CITY OF ORMOC, RESPONDENTS.

This is an original action for certiorari.  Petitioners Gil V. Maribao
and his wife, Enriqueta Llanillo-Maribao
– hereinafter referred to as the Maribaos – pray that
certain orders issued by Hon. Numeriano Estenzo, as Judge of First Instance of Leyte,
in Sp. Civil Case No. 711-0 of said court, be annulled and that he be declared
to be without jurisdiction to try said case, as well as “immediately en­joined
from proceeding further with the case.”

The records show that, on January
25, 1965, the City of Ormoc
instituted said Case No. 711-0 for the expropriation of several tracts of land
located within its territorial boundaries, to be used as “City
Government Center”.  Among the defendants therein – altogether 31
in number – were pe­titioners herein, as owners of some of the lots sought to
be expropriated. In its complaint, the City prayed, inter alia, for an order fixing the sum of P50,000 as the
provisional value of all the properties involved in the case and directing the
defendants to deliver immediately the possession of said properties to the
City, upon the deposit of said sum with its treasurer.  On February 3, 1965, judge Estenzo issued an order fixing said provisional value at
P50,000, and, a certification by said Treasurer, to the effect that this amount
is provided for in the current annual budget of the City and is available for
expenditure, having been forthwith submitted, Judge Estenzo
ordered, on the same date, the issuance of the corresponding writ of
possession.

The defendants other than the Maribaos
filed motions to dismiss, which Judge Estenzo denied
in an order dated February 23, 1965.  Said order, moreover, declared that the City
has the lawful right to expropriate the aforementioned properties, upon payment
of just compensation, and appointed the City and Highway Engineer, the City
assessor and the Assistant City Auditor as Commissioners to ascertain amount of
said compensation and then report thereon. 
By an order dated March 27,
1965, Judge Estenzo appointed a new set
of commissioners, composed of District Supervisor, and two (2) barrio captains.

Soon thereafter, or on March 5, 1965, the Maribaos
filed a motion to set aside said orders of February 3 and 23, 1965, upon the
ground that the same were issued before the court had acquired jurisdiction
over their persons by service of summons, which took place on February 23,
1965, and another motion to dismiss the complaint.  These motions were denied by Judge Estenzo on March
13, 1965.  Subsequently, the Maribaos filed three (3) motions for reconsideration:  one, dated April 15, 1965, as regards the
denial of the motion to set aside the orders of February 3 and 23, 1965;
another, dated April 17, 1965, with respect to the denial of the motion to
dismiss; and still another, dated April 19, 1965, urging the appointment, in
lieu of the commissioners appointed in the order of March 21, 1965, of a
commissioner to represent the plaintiff, another commissioner to represent the
defendants, and a third commissioner to represent the court.  These three (3) motions for reconsideration
were denied by Judge Estenzo on April 30, 1965.

Meanwhile the commissioners had begun to perform their functions
and to receive evidence, after which they submit­ted their report, copy of
which was received by the Maribaos on June 11, 1965, recommending payment
of P0.29 to P0.30 per square meter. 
Under date of June 19, 1965,
the Maribaos filed their opposition to said report,
alleging that they had no chance to present evidence as regards the value of
their property and the commissioners had not duly considered actual sales of
portions of the land sought to be expropriated.

On June 30, 1965,
Judge Estenzo rendered his decision fixing the value
of the properties in litigation at P0.30 a square meter.  Copy of this decision was, on July 8, 1965, served on the Maribaos, who, on July
17, 1965, moved for a reconsideration thereof.  The motion for reconsideration was denied on July 23, 1965.  Four (4) days later, the Maribaos
filed a motion for new trial.

In the meantime, or on July
23, 1965, they had commenced the present original civil action for
certiorari, based, mainly, upon the theory that Judge Estenzo
had acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction:

(1)  In giving due course to the complaint in said
Case No. 711-0, despite the absence of allegation that the President or the
proper department head had approved or authorized the exercise of the right of
eminent domain by the City;

(2)  In issuing the writ of possession and
appointing commissioners to ascertain the value of the properties sought to be
expropriated, before the court had acquired jurisdiction over the person of
said defendants by the service of summons upon them, and before their motion to
dismiss had been denied;

(3)  In not requiring the City to deposit
“money” be­fore the issuance of said writ of possession;

(4)  In denying their motion to set aside the
orders of February 3 and 23, 1965, as well as the motion to reconsider the
order of denial of said motion to set aside;

(5)  In appointing as commissioners city officers
who are, consequently, biased and incompetent, and who gave the Maribaos no chance to present their evidence.

The petition herein is clearly devoid of merit.  The alleged absence of presidential or
departmental approval of the exercise by the City of the power of eminent
domain – assuming such approval to be necessary, on which we need not and do
not express our view – did not affect the jurisdiction of the lower court.  The same unquestionably had jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of the proceedings, over the Maribaos
– who, admittedly, had been duly served with summons – and over the properties
sought to be expropriated, which are within the Province of Leyte.  On the assumption above referred to, the
absence of said approval, at most, affected the cause of action of the
City, not the jurisdiction of the lower court.^[1]

Neither did the other alleged irregularities complained of by the
Maribaos divest said court of its aforementioned
jurisdiction or constitute a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.  Said alleged
irregularities are mere incidents in the exercise of said jurisdiction, on
which the parties are free to disagree with the court.  They may seek a review of its rulings
thereon, but, on appeal, after the rendition of final judgment, not by original
action of certiorari, which may not be availed of except in the absence of
appeal or other plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.^[2]
In the case at bar, the Ma­ribaos could have availed
of said appeal.  In fact, some of, their
co-defendants in Case No. 711-0 have appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The basic flaw in the position taken by the Maribaos
is that it is predicated upon the erroneous premise that the lower court had no
jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide the case, because the City had not
secured the approval thereto of either the President or the proper department
se­cretary.  All of the issues raised by
the Maribaos in the lower court were founded mainly
upon this mistaken notion.  Such was the
basis of their motion to dismiss and their mo­tion for reconsideration of the
order denying said motion to dismiss.

The grounds upon which their other motions were based were
foreign to the matter of jurisdiction of the Court.  This is true even as regards the orders issued
before the Maribaos had been summoned, for, after
service of summons upon them, they had ample opportunity to be heard, and were
actually heard, in connection therewith. 
In short, the irregularities complained of may not be dealt with in this
original action for certiorari.^[3]
The review thereof may be sought only by appeal.^[4]

WHEREFORE, the petition herein should be, as it is hereby
dismissed, with cost against the petitioners.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

^[1]
Republic v. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966.

^[2]
Rule 65, Section 1, Rules of Court; Claudio v. Zandueta,
64 Phil. 812; Haw Pia v. San Jose, 78 Phil.
238; Silvestre v. Torres, 57 Phil. 885, 890; Pachoco
v. Tumangday, L-14500, May 25, 1960.

^[3] Tirona v. Nañawa, L-22107,
Sept. 30, 1967; Layag v. Gerardo, L-19896, April 30, 1964; De la Cruz v.
Sta. Maria, L-17928, April 30, 1963.

^[4] Giron v. Caluag, L-17995, June 27, 1963; Republic v.
Perez, L-16112, June 29, 1963;
De la Rea v. Subido, L-26082, 27246 and 27248, March 1, 1968.