JUAN E. TUASON, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FRANCISCO ARCA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH I) AND JUANA T. DE LA VIÑA, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for a writ of certiorari with preliminary injunction to
set aside certain orders, dated February 3, 1965 and December 17, 1964, of
respondent Judge Francisco Arca of the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Branch I) issued in Civil Case No. 21954 of said court, and
to require the same court to grant petitioner’s motion for demolition of a
lessee’s buildings.

Basic to these proceedings is that by decision of the Court of
First instance of Manila in its Case No. 21954, the private respondent, Juana
T. de la Viña, with other lessees who are not now
involved, were on September 29, 1956 condemned to vacate the lots in Manila
leased by them from herein petitioner, and –

“remove the buildings built thereon, and
return the possession”

of the lots to herein petitioner: for
said respondent de la Viña to pay P2,224.50 annually,
beginning January 1, 1954, with interest at the legal rate, plus real estate
tax of P278.06 per year until the possession of the lot occupied by her is
restored to herein petitioner Tuason.  Appealed to this Supreme Court (Case G.R. No.
L-12020), the aforesaid judgment was affirmed, with costs
against appellants, on August 31, 1960.

The records having been returned to the Court of First Instance
(Branch I) of Manila, petitioner Tuason secured a writ of execution, by virtue of which the
Sheriff levied upon personal property of respondent De la Viña,
and sold the same on March 22, 1961.  Thereafter, the Sheriff also made levy on
three buildings belonging to the execution debtor, standing on the premises to
be vacated.

De la Viña resorted to the Court of
Appeals (Case CA-G.R. No. 29294-R) entreating that Court to set aside the writ
of execution and the City Sheriff’s sale of the personalty
and the levy on the buildings aforementioned; and by decision of December 19,
1961, the Court of Appeals upheld the execution and sale of the personalty, but enjoined the sale of the real properties
until proper notice of the sale had been made.

After new notices had been issued, the Sheriff of Manila sold the
buildings to the herein petitioner Tuason as the
highest bidder and on September 28,
1962 executed the corresponding certificate of sale.  De la Viña moved to
set aside the sale, but apparently upon indication from respondent judge,
withdrew the motion on February 13,
1963 in order to file a separate civil action to annul the
sheriff’s sale.

The suit was actually instituted on September 17, 1963, docketed as Civil Case No. 54997 of
the City Court of first Instance, Branch X, presided by Judge Moya; but the latter rejected de la Viña’s
application for a preliminary writ of injunction to restrain Tuason from consolidating ownership over the buildings and
from taking possession thereof.  Reason
given for denying the writ was that one year had elapsed since the sale; that
the petition showed that the houses were in actual possession of the buyer, and
that whatever prejudice might ensue could be adequately compensated.

Having obtained a final deed of sale from the Sheriff, petitioner
Tuason secured from respondent Judge Arca an alias writ of execution on July 13, 1964 ordering de la Viña and all persons claiming under her to vacate the lot
in question.  On August 1, 1964, de la Viña
once more resorted to the Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition against
the enforcement of the alias writ of execution (CA-G.R. No. 34350-R) but
that appellate court, on August 25,
1964, dismissed the petition.

De la Viña returned to the court of
respondent Arca, with a motion to quash the alias
writ of execution, and on August 29,
1964 respondent judge issued an order authorizing her and her
household help “to stay in her house No. 2, one of the subject matters of
the ejectment“. 
This order was set aside on September 22 by the same judge, after
hearing the parties, and the motion to quash the execution was denied.  Four days later, on September 26, a third alias
writ was issued.

De la Viña asked for reconsideration,
and on September 29 the respondent judge set aside its order of September 22,
and restrained further action on the alias writs of execution.

After various other incidents, Tuason
finally moved on November 28, 1964 for “leave to forthwith demolish and
destroy the buildings in question,” on the ground that his title to the
land had never been disputed, and that regard­less of the validity or
invalidity of the Sheriff’s sale to him of the houses standing thereon, he was
entitled to have the buildings removed, pursuant to the final judgment affirmed
by the Supreme Court.  By order of December
17, the respondent denied the motion for demolition, on the ground that the
houses might have sentimental value for de la Viña
and that she could not be deprived of her property without due process.  And on February
3, 1965, upon ex parte
motion, the respondent directed as follows:

“the sheriff
and the defendant Tuason are hereby ordered to place
the plaintiff de la Viña in possession of one house
of her choice among the three houses in question x x x .”         

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Tucson
came to this Court on certiorari.  We
gave the petition due course and issued a preliminary writ of injunction upon a
P1,000.00 bond.

Through the incredible turnings and twistings
of this lawsuit one circumstance starkly juts out, though apparently ignored by
the respondent judge:  that a final judgement, directing Juana T. de la Viña
to vacate the lot she leased from petitioner, to remove her
buildings thereon and to restore possession to petitioner (a judgment
affirmed by this Supreme Court since 1960) stands to this day unimplemented and
not executed.  Contrary to the terms of
the judgment, the respondent court, which is duty bound to enforce it, has, on
one pretext or another, ordered possession of one building of her choice
restore to the judgment debtor, and refused to order its demolition, although
the creditor has asked for it, and it is directed in the final judgment.  Clearly, such action is in plain abuse of
discretion.

That this situation should not be tolerated any longer is
self-evident.  To allow further evasion
of a judgment that became final years ago does nothing but discredit judicial
processes and cast contempt and disrepute upon the ad­ministration of justice.

Whether or not the respondent De la Viña
is or is not the owner of the buildings is without relevance.  She has been ordered to remove the buildings
and return possession of the land to petitioner Tuason
by a final adjudication that may no longer be altered.  Having failed for years to do so voluntarily,
it is but proper that the sheriff be now allowed to demolish the buildings and
the landlord recover possession of his land (Rule 39, section 14) in order that
the judgment in his favor be not reduced to a mockery.  For the respondent judge to deny the judgment
creditor his remedy on the ground that the tenant-owner of the buildings can
not be deprived thereof without due process is a perversion of the
constitutional provision; for she has had ample opportunity to be heard, and
was heard, before the judgment of eviction against her became final.  Nor does the question of sentimental value of
the property constitute a justification for refusal to execute that
judgment.  As ruled by Judge Moya, any prejudice that may ensue can be adequately
compensated by a damage award.

Respondent De la Viña’s belated
contention that the buildings are not on petitioner’s land is not entitled to
serious consideration.  If this claim had
any truth in it, the said respondent would not have failed to invoke it in the
main case or in the two proceedings initiated by her in the Court of Appeals to
block execution of the judgment.  Not
having done so, the claim, even if true, is now barred by estoppel.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted, and the
orders of February 3, 1965 and December 17, 1964, issued by the respondent
Judge Francisco Arca, directing that, private
respondent De la Viña be placed in possession of one
of the houses in question, and denying the petition for their demolition, are
hereby annulled and set aside 
and the respondent court is hereby ordered to grant the order of
demolition and to cause the writs of execution to be forthwith completely
carried out.  Costs
against respondent De la Viña.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro, and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., did not take
part.