G.R. No. L-24065. June 29, 1968
MATIAS RANILLO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. PERSHING TAN QUETO, ANTONIO YAP HOCKUN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF OZAMIS OCCIDENTAL, OZAMIS CITY BRANCH, AND THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, RE…
ANGELES, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction,
which seeks to annul the order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Ozamis City
Branch, granting an alias writ of execution on a judgment
allegedly more than five years after its entry.
It appears that on April 29, 1957, a decision was rendered in
Civil Case No. 1828 of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental, entitled Pershing Tan Queto, et al.,
versus Bonifacio Sevilla,
et al., in favor of the plaintiffs, Herein private respondents, dispositive portion of which decision reads:
“CONSEQUENTLY, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing the
defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the amounts of P3,000.00 in concept of actual and moral damages plus P1,000.00
as attorney’s fees which amounts may be made effective on the bond posted by
the defendants in the amount of P40,000.00 to avoid the compliance of the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction, plus the costs of the proceedings.”
From this judgment, the defendants
interposed an appeal but the same was dismissed on July 9, 1958 for failure of the defendants to submit an
amended record on appeal. The defendants
then filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal but which
motion was denied on August 29, 1958. Not satisfied, the defendants filed with this
Court a petition for mandamus to compel the lower court to give due course to
their appeal. Again, the petition had
failed for on October 16, 1958,
it was dismissed for lack of merit.[1]
On November 19, 1958,
the prevailing parties were able to secure a writ of execution of the judgment
but because it was returned unsatisfied, an alias writ of execution was issued
on January 22, 1959, which
was likewise returned unsatisfied.
On June 9, 1959,
the plaintiffs took steps to claim satisfaction of the judgment upon
defendants’ bond and for the issuance of a writ of execution thereof. This motion having been granted, the sureties
or bondsmen filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction which was granted on June 29, 1962, the Court
annulling the order of the lower court which held the counterbond
liable to answer for and satisfy the judgment, on the ground that the sureties
were not parties to he action nor were they notified of the proceedings.[2]
Later, after the plaintiffs had learned upon inquiry from the
City Assessor of Quezon City that Matias
Ranillo, Jr., one of the defendants (herein
petitioner), and his wife have properties in Quezon
City, they filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution of the
April 29, 1957 judgment. This was
granted by the lower court in its order of July 27, 1964.
Against this order, Ranillo filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for writ of certiorari with preliminary mandatory
injunction. Although the said court, at
the beginning, had issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction enjoining
the respondents from proceeding with the execution of the alias writ of
execution and to release whatever property belonging to the herein petitioner
which the sheriff had levied upon, it finally dismissed the petition, on the
ground that the issue raised therein is one of law, in which case it has no
jurisdiction over the case.
Hence, this petition, which is but a reproduction of petitioner’s
case before the Court of Appeals, except for a prayer to review the said
court’s dismissal of his petition.
The first reason advanced for the granting of the writ of
certiorari now applied for is that the respondent Court of First Instance
acted beyond its jurisdiction when on July 27, 1964, it issued the order
granting an alias writ of execution upon a mere motion, after the lapse of five
(5) years from the entry of the judgment in question, contrary to section 6,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
“Execution by motion or by independent
action. – A judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action.”
Dispute has arisen as to from which date
the five-year period should be counted.
The petitioner argues that the period of five years should start from
“the date of its (judgment’s) entry or from the date it becomes final and executory,” while the respondents contend that that
period should begin from October 16, 1965 because that was the date when the
Supreme Court dismissed in a minute resolution the petition for mandamus.
As already stated, the decision in Civil Case 1828, execution of
which is now at issue, was rendered on April
29, 1957. A notice of appeal
was filed, but the appeal was dismissed on July 9, 1958.
Whether the five-year period is counted from July 9, 1957,
allegedly to be the thirtieth day after the defendant had received a copy of
the decision, or from July 9, 1958, when the appeal was dismissed by the
Court of First Instance, more than five years had elapsed when on July 27,
1964, the lower court issued its order granting the alias writ of execution.
It is of no consequence to consider the claim of the respondent
that the five-year period should be reckoned from October 16, 1958, when
petitioner’s action for mandamus to compel the giving due course to his appeal
was dismissed by this Court, since from October 16, 1958 to July 27, 1964 is
also a period of more than five years.
In the light of the foregoing, the remedy of the plaintiffs in
the aforesaid Civil Case 1828 of the court below, is a
new action to revive the judgment. After
the lapse of the five-year period stated in the above quoted section of Rule
39, the judgment is reduced to a mere right of action, which judgment must be
enforced, as all other ordinary actions, by the institution of a complaint in
the regular form.[3]
The above conclusion renders it unnecessary for Us to go into the other issues raised in the petition.
In view hereof, the order dated July 27, 1964 of the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental, in Civil Case No. 1828, is hereby
annulled for having been issued without jurisdiction. The writ is granted, with costs against the
private respondents Pershing Tan Queto and Antonio
Yap Hockun.
Concepcion, C.J, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
[1]
The G.R. number is not indicated.
[2] Emilio Sy, et al. vs. Judge Ceniza, et al., G.R. No. L-16961, June 29, 1962.
[3] Azotes vs. Blanco, 85 Phil. 90; Torrefranca,
et al. vs. Albiso, 102 Phil. 732; Primo vs.
Fernandez, et al., G.R. No. L-18738, June 29, 1962.