CLEMENTE FORTUS, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. ROSARIO NOVERO AND JULIA T. FORTUS, RESPONDENTS.

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in
G.R. L-22378, affirming the one rendered by the Court of First Instance of Lipa City in its Special Proceedings No. 610.

The proceedings for the summary settlement of the intestate
estate of the late Ciriaca Angelo, who died sometime
in the year 1930 in the municipality of Rosario, province of Batangas, were commenced by Rosario Novero
who claimed to be an illegitimate child of the deceased Victo­rino
Fortus (Ciriaca’s
grandson), born on April 4, 1922 out of Victorino’s
alleged illicit relations with Patricia Novero.  Her claim was opposed, on the one hand, by
Julie T. Fortus, the surviving widow of Victorino, and on the other, by Clemente,
Zoilo, Faustina, Catalino, Pio, De­metria, Francisca and Roman, all surnamed Fortus, here­inafter referred to as the Fortuses,
who claimed to behalf brothers and sisters of said deceased.  After the required notice by publication and
subsequent trial the aforesaid Court of First Instance rendered judgment as
follows:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the claims
of petitioner and the Fortus brothers and sisters to
succeed to the estate left by Victorino Fortus, and declaring Julia T. Fortus
as the sole heir and the abso­lute owner of all the properties left by Vic­torino Fortus.  Julia T. Fortus is
hereby or­dered to reimburse Felicidad Peña Gonzales the amount of P1,303.04.  No pronouncement as to cost is hereby
made.”

Rosario Novero and the Fortuses appealed to the Court of Appeals who in due time
rendered the appealed decision.  As the
first did not appeal, said decision must now be deemed final, as far as she is
concerned.  The Fortuses,
however, interposed the present appeal by certiorari and urge Us to reverse the appealed decision claiming that the Court
of Appeals committed the following errors:

“The trial court erred in finding that petitioners’ parents, Fermin Fortus and Ja­coba Aguil, were not legally
married:

(1) By holding that the legal presump­tion of marriage was overcome
by Exhibit 5 and by the testimony of Clemente Barbosa;

(2) By construing the certification Exhibit 5 without reference to
Act No. 3022 and the explanatory testimony of David de Jesus, Jr. of the Bureau
of Public Libraries;

(3) By holding that Exhibits 2, 4, 9-B and 9-C did not constitute a
proof of marriage between Fermin Fortus
and Jacoba Aguil, much less
a proof of the legitimacy of the oppo­sitors Fortuses; and

(4) By not applying the law and applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court to the undisputed facts of the case.”

The above assignment of errors make it
obvious that the only issue involved in this appeal is one of fact: whether or
not Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil were legally
married.  Indeed, at page 8 (last
paragraph) of their brief the Fortuses openly admit
that “the sole question in this case”
is “whether petitioners’ mother, Jacoba Aguil, was legally married to Fermin
Fortus“. 
The Court of Appeals’ (1) holding that the legal presumption of marriage
was overcome by Exhibit 5 and by the testimony of Clemente
Barbosa“; (2) said court’s “construing the
certification Ex­hibit 5 without reference to Act No. 3022 and the explanatory
testimony of David de Jesus, Jr., of the Bureau of Public Libraries”; (3)
its “Holding that Exhibits 2, 4, 9-B and 9-C did not constitute a proof of
marriage between Fermin Fortus
and Jacoba Aguil, much less
a proof of the legitimacy of the oppositors Fortuses” involve nothing more than evaluation of
evidence and are but the reasons that led said court to declare as a fact
that Fermin and Jacoba were
never married.  The evaluation made by
the Court of all or part of the evidence of record; its finding of fact – that
the persons just named were never legally married -, even if wrong, may not now
be reviewed by Us, the present being an appeal by certiorari.  We have held in a long line of cases that in
appeals of this nature We pass upon and decide only
questions of law (Cabrera vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 834-5; Pacheco vs. Arro, 85 Phil. 505-15; Celesto
vs. People, G.R. L-3935, Dec. 21, 1951; Traders etc. vs. Golangco,
G.R. L-6442, Sept. 21, 1954).  In the recent case of Jesusa Lacson Vda. de Arroyo vs. Beaterio etc.  We held:

“According to the decision of the Court of Appeals, the lone
assignment of error submitted by the appellants in their brief argued ‘for the
suffi­ciency of plaintiffs-appellants’ evidence as a fair and reasonable basis for resting a finding
that the do­nation in question is inofficious’.  It is clear, therefore, that the only issue
submitted to said court, and by it decided, was purely
one of fact.

“In this connection it is a matter re­moved from dispute that We can review deci­sions of the Court of Appeals only on
errors of law, its findings of fact being conclusive.

“A question of law has been declared as one not calling for
the examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties
(Goduco vs. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. L-17647, February 28, 1964; Air France etc. vs. Carrascoso et al. G. R. No.
L-21438, September 28, 1966).  Moran’s Com­ments on the subject (Rules of
Court, Volume II, 1963 Edition, p. 412) are to the effect that ‘For a question
to be one of law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the li­tigants or any of them’.

“In a case similar to the one at bar (Lim
vs. Calaguas, G. R. No. L-2031, May 3, 1949, 40 O.G., 11 Supp. 247, 83
Phil. 796) We held:

‘Our review should be confined to the facts and circumstances found
by the Court of Appeals.  And we agree
that such facts and circumstances in this case do not sustain the theory of the appellant. 
Indeed it is serious­ly to be doubted whether we could reverse the
conclusion of the appellate court to the effect that those facts and circumstances
are not ‘enough evidence’ to show clearly and beyond doubt that the parties
intended the contract to be a mortgage instead of a conditional con­veyance.  That conclusion is obviously ONE OF FACT, not
a bit different from the verdict of a jury in a murder trial that the
circumstantial evidence pre­sented by the prosecution has proved, or has not
proved that the accused had killed the deceased.

‘In disputes of this nature, the pivotal inquiry is: Do the
circumstan­ces show beyond doubt that the parties made a contract different
from the express terms of the document they signed? Is the evidence clear, con­vincing
and satisfactory that the deal was a mortgage instead of a sale with pacto de retro? (Cuyugan v. Santos 34 Phil. 100; Tolentino v. Gonzales, 50
Phil. 558).  That query
necessarily invites calibration of the whole ‘evidence’, considering mainly the
credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole and the
probabilities of the situation.  Consequently
the question must be deemed factual for the Appeals’ Court to solve.’

‘In the United States where ques­tions of law are for the jury, it
is held that if the question whether a given transaction amounts to a
conditional sale or mere mortgage depends upon written instruments alone, it is
a question for the court; but if extra­neous
evidence is required or received for the purpose of ascertaining the real
intention of the parties, the question is for the jury (41 C.J. 361 citing many
cases, particularly Bogk v. Gasset,
149 U.S. 17, Howard v. Kopperl, 74 Tex. 194; 5 SW 627
and Kinnert v. Strong, 103 Wis. 70; 79 N.W. 32) and
‘an issue involving determination of the xxx xxx
intent of a person or persons with respect to 
acts done by them is a question of fact for the jury. (64
C.J. 365).’ underlining ours.

“In Rapatan vs.
Chicano, G.R. No. L-­13828, February
25, 1960, We likewise said:

‘But the trial court did not merely dismiss the complaint,
proceeded to re­ceive evidence on the counterclaim of defendants.   In this respect the trial court said ‘With
respect to the counter­claim alleged in the amended answer of the said
defendants, the preponderance of
evidence discloses that the imputations contained in the complaint that the
late EscoIastico G. Chicano, husband of Coleta de Chicano and father of Elpidio
Chicano had acquired the land in question from the plaintiffs through fraud and
that the said defendants ‘taking advantage of the igno­rance of the plaintiffs
herein managed fraudulently to transfer the tax declara­tion of the land in
question in the name of the plaintiffs to the name of defendants, are false,
malicious and defamatory to the memory of the late Escolastico
Chicano and the reputation of his heirs, Elpidio Chi­cano
and Coleta de Chicano, thus causing the latter mental
anguish, besmirched re­putation, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar
injuries,’ and accordingly, ordered plaintiffs to pay the sum of P5,000.00 as
moral damages.

‘Considering that the foregoing finding is a question of fact
which involves an evaluation of the evidence and the same is now assigned
as error, we are of the opinion that this case comes within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.'”

We have also held, however, that, in extreme cases calling for
the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction, We may disturb or reverse any
particular finding of fact of the Court of Appeals should We find it to be
arbitrary or whimsical or entirely outside the issues raised by the parties in
their respective pleadings.

In De Luna vs. Linatoc 74 Phil. 15,
answering our own question: “When may the Supreme Court review such
deduction of fact based on uncontroverted or plain
evidence?“, We said:

“x x x Only when reasonable men readily
agree that the inference is mani­festly mistaken, absurd or impossible.  If however, fair-minded men may differ on
whether or not the main conclusion of fact is rightly drawn from the undisputed evidence, the Supreme Court
should not, as a rule, in­quire into the discretion exercised by the Court of
Appeals.  The instant case is of the
latter category, because the findings of the Court of Appeals that there has
been no deceit may or may not be persuasive, according to one’s own reasoning
after reading the decision and resolution of that Court.  It cannot be said that fairminded
men will not differ in this case on the existence of fraud.”

Then, in Evangelista vs. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.,
speaking through the present Chief Justice, We said:

“Considering, therefore, that neither the pleadings, nor the briefs
in the Court of Appeals, raised an issue on whether or not copies of the writ
of attachment and notice of attachment had been served upon Rivera; that the
defendants had impliedly admitted – in said pleadings and briefs, as well as by
their conduct during the entire proceedings, prior to the rendition of the
decision of the Court of Appeals – that Rivera had received copies of said
documents; and that, for this reason, evidently, no proof was introduced there­on,
we are of the opinion, and so hold that the finding of the Court of Appeals to
the effect that said copies had not been served upon Rivera is based upon a
misapprehension of the specific issues involved therein and goes beyond the
range of such issues, apart from being contrary to the aforementioned admission
by the parties, and that, accord­ingly, a grave abuse of discretion was com­mitted
in making said finding, which is, furthermore, inaccurate.”

In connection with all the foregoing, the following facts are
either undisputed or fully borne by the evidence.

Ciriaca Angelo was the owner of the
parcel of land located in barrio Alpaye, Rosario, Batangas, with an area of approximately 20,102 sq.m.,
subject of the petition for summary settlement mentioned at the beginning of
this decision.  It was registered in her
name under Original Certificate of Title No. 370.  She had only one child, a daughter by the
name of Crisanta Ilagan,
married to Fermin Fortus.  This couple had an only son, the deceased Victorino Fortus.  As Crisanta Ilagan predeceased her mother, Ciriaca
Angelo, who died intestate sometime in the year 1930, the property aforesaid
passed on to Victorino Fortus
as the lone surviving heir of his grandmother. 
It is a fact, however, that he never caused the original certificate of
title covering the property to be cancelled and to have another issued in his
name.

It is not disputed that Victorino Fortus and Julia T. Fortus were
husband and wife and that up to Victorino’s death on January 8, 1954 they were
childless.  It is simi­larly admitted that
at the time of his death, Victorino had been
estranged from his wife for a number of years and had been living maritally with another woman named Feli­cidad
Gonzales Peña. 
Out of this illicit relation, how­ever, no issue was begotten.

That the property is now covered by transfer cer­tificate of
title No. 6831 issued by the Registrar of Deeds of Batangas
is due to the fact that upon Victorino’s death, his
widow, Julia T. Fortus, executed the required
affidavit of extra-judicial summary settlement and had it registered in
accordance with law.  By reason thereof,
original certificate of title No. 370 was cancelled and the transfer
certificate of title already referred to was issued in Julia’s name.  In this connection, the Fortuses
(page 7 of the their brief) make the claim that in her
affidavit in connection with the extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Ciriaca Angelo, Julia had “falsely re­presented the
original owner Ciriaca Angelo to be her
grandmother.” While this alleged falsehood is unsubstan­tial, We venture the observation that Julia’s statement contained
no real falsehood, for, indeed, Ciriaca was the
grandmother of her husband and therefore her own grand-mother-in-law.

As Rosario Novero did not appeal from
the decision of the Court of Appeals, it is now proper to say something only
about the claim of the Fortuses – that they are Vic­torino’s legitimate half-brothers and sisters, being
the legitimate children of Fermin Fortus
(father of Victorino) and Jacoba
Aguil who were allegedly married sometime between
1902 and 1905 before Isabelo Bolaños,
at that time justice of the peace of the municipality of Rosario, Batangas.

As correctly held by the court of origin (Court of First Instance
of Lipa City) it was incumbent upon the Fortuses to prove their affirmative allegations that Fermin and Jacoba were legally
married and that they, the Fortuses, are their
legitimate children.

According to the record, the presentation of the evidence of the
parties began before Judge Conrado Vasquez; was later
continued before Judge Luis B. Reyes; and when both were transferred to other
judicial districts the hearings were continued before Judge Damaso
S. Tengco, who penned the decision of the court.  These circumstances are here stated to show
that Judge Tengco cannot be said to have rendered his
decision relying only upon the transcript of the testimonial evidence.

In connection with the vital question of fact involved, His
Honor’s decision says:

“Are the Fortuses legitimate
half-brothers and sisters of Victorino Fortus? The property involved in this proceeding came from Ciriaca Angelo, and passed to Victorino
Fortus through his mother Crisanta
Ilagan, daughter of the former.  The Fortuses
brothers and sisters are children of Fermin Fortus, father of Victorino Fortus, and a certain woman by the name of Ja­coba Aguil.  The Fortuses
maintained that the petitioner not being an illegitimate daughter of Victorino Fortus, they are
entitled to inherit the one-half portion of the property left by their deceased
brother, Victorino Fortus.  Their right is based upon their assertion
that their father Fermin Fortus
and Jacoba Aguil were legal­ly
married.

“The Fortuses brothers and sisters
failed to present a valid document of marriage between Fermin
Fortus and Jacoba Aguil.  They maintained
that it was lost during the last global war. 
In many cases it has been observed by this Court that a party who is
claiming a right by virtue of a document usually finds it convenient to allege
that the said document was lost during the last global war, when in fact and in
truth there was no such document.  The instant case is one of the many cases
wherein a party allege to have lost a document which
never existed.

“Attempts were made by the Fortuses
brothers to lay the basis for the intro­duction of a
secondary evidence as to the existence of a marriage contract and/or
celebration thereof, but said evidence did not satisfy the requisites required
by law.  Section 51, Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court, provides that when the original writing has been lost or
destroyed, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, its contents
may be proved by a copy or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by collection of witnesses. 
The question at issue now is, were the oppositors
Fortuses able to prove the due execution of the
alleged marriage contract between Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil or to present satisfactory secondary evidence to that
effect.

“The testimony of David de Jesus, Jr., of the Division of
Archives, National Library, Manila, who identified Exhibit ‘5’ clearly
established that there existed no records of such marriage.  This statement was corroborated by Clemente Barbosa, a clerk in the
Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Rosario, Batan­gas,
that there were no records of such marriage from 1902 to 1922 of the Municipality
of Rosario, Batangas.  So that the conclusion is
now inevitable that when the pre-war records were burned as per Exhibit ‘7’,
the imaginary record of marriage of Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil could not have been included, as it never existed at
all.

“The testimony of Jacoba Aguil which is purely self-serving and which was
contradicted by a sincere witness, Felicidad Blay, cannot serve as a basis to establish the celebration
of the marriage in question.  Neither
could said marriage be established by the contradict­ing statements of Clemente Fortus and Pio Fortus.  Both claimed to have seen the marriage
contract.  Clemente
Fortus said that it was written in Tagalog while Pio said it was
written in Spanish.

“The Court was at a loss to understand who of them was really
sincere.  Considering that both Clemente and Pio were presented
as material witness to prove the existence of the alleged marriage contract and
the fact that they materially contradicted each other on the substantial
contents of the said con­tract, the conclusion is imperative that neither one
of them should be believed.  Viewed from
these findings, the Court could not sustain the fact that secondary evidence
has been established by the Fortuses brothers and
therefore there can be no basis for their claim of legitimacy.

“Disregarding the principle of primary or best and secondary
evidence, still the Court believes that the other testimonial evidence as well
as documentary evidence adduced do not establish their
claim.  Jacoba Aguil’s testimony was replete with inconsistencies and
impossibilities.  She could not remember
on what part of the page of the marriage contract she placed her thumbmark; that she placed her thumbmark
only once, which is rather contrary to the practice that it should be more than
one; that she could not state whether the alleged marriage contract was not in
longhand or typewritten or printed; that she never went to Batangas,
Batangas, and knew nobody there, contrary to the statement
given by Felicidad Blay who
has no false motive to tell a lie and also found to be a sincere witness; that
she never saw again the marriage contract she allegedly thumbmarked
since they were married, (Cle­mente and Pio declared though that they saw it in the aparador and also saw that the aparador
together with the controversial marriage contract were burned during the
Japanese occupation) and that it was lost only during the Japanese time.  By all these testimonies Jacoba
Aguil has failed to make this Court believe in the existence of her marriage.

“The deposition of Victoriana Guerro
was presented.  Victoriana Guerro was a relative of Jacoba Aguil and she could not be expected to be unbiased.  Her des­cription of the celebration of
marriage between Fermin and Jacoba
was contrary to the existing procedure prescribed by the then existing marriage
law.  The marriage law which was then in
existence was general orders No. 68 which took effect on December 24, 1929.  The formalities mentioned by Victoriana Guerro and Jacoba Aguil were the formalities prescribed in the present law,
Act No. 3613, and therefore the conclusion is inevitable that these witnesses
were telling a lie.  In the year 1902 or
1903 when the alleged marriage of Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil was celebrated General Orders No. 68 which was then
the law on marriage did not require the contracting parties or the so called
witnesses or padrinos to sign the marriage
contract.  What the law then required
only as to the proof of the celebration of marriage was a certificate of the
parish priest or the justice of the peace or judge contain­ing the full names
of the parties, their residence, ages and the consent of the father and mother
or guardian and nothing else.  It was
only the father who signed a form giving consent to his or her child of minor
age to the contract of marriage.  Nothing
more was necessary.  On this score that
Court believes that the witnesses for the Fortuses
brothers and sisters and the Fortuses themselves made
a story which was of their own concoction. 
In the light of these findings and observations the Court was of the
considered opinion that Fermin Fortus
and Jacoba Aguil were not
legally married.  And if they were not
legally married, the Fortuses brothers and sisters
were illegitimate children and have no right to succeed to the properties of
either Ciriaca Angelo or that of Vic­torino
Fortus. 
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides that an illegitimate child
has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relative of his father and mother, nor such
children or relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate children.

Exhibit ‘2’ is not an evidence of legitimacy much less of marriage
between Fermin Fortus And Jacoba Aguil.  It is a baptismal certificate and it does not
serve as proof of relationship of or filiation of the
child baptized.  ‘The record of baptism
as a general rule, in all documents, attest to the fact which give rise to its
issue, and the date thereof, to wit, the fact of the adminis­tration of the
sacrament on the date stated, but not the truth of the statements therein made
as to the parentage of the child bap­tized.” (Basa,
et al., vs. Arquiza, et al., 5 Phil. 187) ‘The
aforementioned canonical certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism
administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest
who baptized the child but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations
and statements contained in the said cer­tificate that concern the relationship
of the person baptized.  Such
declarations and statements, in order that their truth may be admitted, must
indispensably be shown by some of the kinds of proof recognized by law.’  (Adriano vs. de Jesus, 23 Phil. 353)

“Exhibit ‘4’ likewise is not a proof of marriage nor could it
be a prima facie evidence of legitimacy of Roman Fortus,
the eight child of Jacoba Aguil
had with Fermin Fortus.  The authority cited by the Fortuses brothers and sisters to wit: Crisolo
vs. Judge Macadaeg, L-7017, pro­mulgated April 29,
1954, is not square on the point, because while that case was decided under the
authority of Act 3753 which took effect on February 26, 1931, Roman Fortus was born on February 28, 1922, long before the effectivity of the subsequent law.  Even assuming that Act No. 3753 is applicable
to Roman Fortus, it was only a prima facie proof
which oppo­sitor Julia T. Fortus
had overcome by satis­factory evidence to the effect that Fermin
Fortus and Jacoba Aguil were never married and hence all of their children
are not legitimate brothers or half-brothers and therefore have no right to
inherit from Victorino Fortus
under Article No. 992 of the New Civil Code. 
Likewise, Exhibit ‘9-B’ and ‘9-C’ could not support the claim that Fermin Fortus was married to Jacoba Aguil, because even
granting that Fermin Fortus
got married, the name of Jacoba Aguil
was not mentioned as the name of the woman who became his wife.  Of all the children of Jacoba
Aguil, it was only the baptism and/or birth
certificate of Roman Fortus that was presented.  The status of Catalino,
Demetria, Clemente, Zoilo, Pio and Fran­cisco Fortus were left out.”

The brief filed by the Fortuses in the
Court of Appeals makes the following assignment of errors:

“The trial court erred in finding that petitioners’ parents, Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil, were not legally
married:

(1) By holding that the legal pre­sumption of marriage was overcome
by Exhibit 5 and by the testimony of Cle­mente Barbosa;

(2) By construing the certification Exhibit 5 without reference to
Act No. 3022 and the explanatory testimony of David de Jesus, Jr. of the Bureau
of Public Libraries;

(3) By holding that Exhibits 2, 4, 9-B and 9-C did not constitute a
proof of marriage between Fermin Fortus
and Jacoba Aguil, much less
a proof of the legitimacy of the oppositors Fortuses; and

(4) By not applying the law and applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court to the undisputed facts of this case.

The above assignment of errors makes it obvious that the only
issues submitted to the Court of Appeals were factual, namely, whether
or not Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil were ever married,
and whether or not the Fortuses had established their
contention by at least preponderance of evidence.  That the first question is one of fact need
not be demonstrated – the same being obvious. 
It is likewise beyond doubt that the second issue is factual, because it
involves evaluation of the conflicting evidence presented by the contending
parties.

Considering the nature of the issues before it, the Court of
Appeals made a thorough review of the evi­dence in the light of the respective
contentions of the parties, and thereafter said the following:

“The Fortuses brothers and sisters,
who are one of the oppositors in this case, claimed
that they were all the legitimate half-brothers and sisters of the deceased Victorino Fortus as they were the
legitimate children of Fermin Fortus
– who is also the father of Victorino Fortus – and Jacoba Aguil who were legally married between 1902 and 1905 before
Isabelo Beleños, then the
Justice of the Peace in the poblacion of Rosario, Batangas, in the house of Victoriana Guerro;
that after the solem­nization of the marriage the couple was issued marriage
contract but the same was burned dur­ing the Japanese occupation.  For this purpose, to prove the existence of
marriage between Fermin Fortus
and Jacoba Aguil as well as
the unavailability of the record of births of their children – the Fortuses – a certi­fication to the effect that all pre-war
public documents in the municipality of Rosario, Ba­tangas,
were burned (Exhibit 7) was offered as evidence.  Thus, these oppositors
tried to establish by secondary evidence – the weight and credence of which we
shall discuss later on – the existence of the marriage between Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil whom they alleged
lived together as husband and wife for almost 30 years and were never separated
during their marital union.”

“We now come to the Fortuses
brothers and sisters who all claim to be the half-brothers and sisters of Victorino Fortus.  There seam to be no dispute on the evidence
on record that the Fortuses were the children of Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil.  The only question to be passed upon in this
instance is whether or not the spouses Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil were legally married to entitle their children to successional rights and inherit from their alleged brother Vic­torino Fortus.  This is so because Article 992 of the New
Civil Code provides that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relative of his father and mother nor such children
or relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate children.  The Fortuses
maintained that their parents were legally married, but that the marriage
certificate issued to said couple was burned during
the second global war.  Thus, they tried
to establish by secondary evidence the existence of said marriage contract or
the solemnization of said marriage.  At
this instance the oppositors Fortuses
invoked that since for the past 30 years their parents had deported themselves
in public as husband and wife and had been living under the same roof, the
legal presumption is that they had entered into a lawful marriage.  This presumption, however, is only applicable
where there is no clear and concrete evidence showing otherwise.  In this case, however, there is a certificate
from the Division of Archives (Exhibit ‘5’) to the effect that ‘no copy of the
marriage record of spouses Fermin Fortus
and Jacoba Aguil supposed
to have been solemnized in the year 1902 and 1905 in the Municipality of
Rosario, Batangas had been received by said office
for file’, and this certifi­cation is further strengthened by the affirmation
of Clemente Barbosa, a
clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer of Rosario, Batangas,
that there was no record of such marriage supposedly contracted between the
spouses Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil from 1902 and 1922
of the Municipality of Rosario, Batangas.  Such being the case, if it were true that the
parents of the Fortuses contracted marriage sometime
in the year 1902 to 1905 said marriage should have been recorded and a copy thereof should
have been filed either in the Civil Registrar’s Office of said municipality or in our Archives Division where public
records are officially kept intact.  It
is true that Jacoba Aguil
on the witness stand categorically stated that they were legally married be­fore
Isabelo Beleños, who was
then the Justice of the Peace of poblacion Rosario, Batangas, in the house of Victoriano
Guerro; that during the solemnization of the
marriage, they were even required to raise their hands after Jacoba Aguil was required to thumbmark only once the marriage contract; and that after
the solemnization of the marriage, a marriage contract was issued in their
favor but which unfortunately was burned during the Japanese occupation.  In corroboration to the testimony of Jacoba Aguil who resolutely
averred her marriage with her husband, a deposition of Victoriana Guerro was presented. 
We find, however, the versions of Jacoba Aguil and Victoriano Guerro to be replete of inconsistencies and improbabili­ties
after painstakingly examining their entire testimonies and/or versions.  It is noteworthy to observe that at the time
when said spouses allegedly contracted marriage, the law which was then in
force to those who would contract marriage was General Orders No.  68. 
Under this law, neither the contracting parties,
witnesses or padrinos were required to sign
the marriage contract.  What the law
required then was only for the father to sign a form giving his con­sent to his
son or his daughter of minor age to the contract of marriage, as to the proof
of the celebration of marriage, no marriage certificate was issued to the
contracting par­ties, but
merely a certification of the Parish Priest or Justice of the Peace or Judge,
containing the full names of the parties, their residence, ages, and the
consent of the father and mother or guardian, attesting to the ce­lebration of
marriage.  Accordingly, there­fore, the
formalities mentioned by Jacoba Aguil
as well as her witness Victoriana Guerra were the formalities required under
the present law.  And for this matter, it
is clear that the pretension of Jacoba Aguil as to the existence of her marriage with Fermin Fortus is highly
improbable and in­credible, which do not deserve even a scant
consideration.  Analyzing further the cre­dibility
of Jacoba Aguil, the lower
court had keenly observed that-

‘She could not even remember on what part of the marriage contract
she placed her thumbmark; that she placed her thumbmark only once which is rather contrary to the
practice that it should be more than one; that she could not state whether the
alleged marriage contract was in long hand or typewritten or printed; that she
never went to Batangas, Batangas,
and knew nobody there contrary to the statement given by Felicidad
Blay who has no false motive to tell a lie and was
found to be a sincere witness; that she never saw the marriage contract she
allegedly thumbmarked since they were married, (Clemente and Pio declared though
that they saw it in the aparador and also saw the aparador together with the controversial marriage contract
were burned during the Japanese occupation).’

Finding this observation of the trial court
to be in accordance with the evidence obtaining in this case, we do not feel
justified to disturb its findings in not giving credence to the versions of Jacoba Aguil, there being no
circumstance of weight or influence that was misinterested
or overlooked upon by the court below in appreciating her credibility.

“Further, in their vain attempt to prove the contractual
marriage between Fermin Fortus
and Jacoba Aguil, the Fortuses adduced secondary evidence consisting of Exhibits
‘2’, 4 9-B and 9-C.  All these exhibits,
however, do not clearly show nor the same constitute
as a proof of marriage between Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil, much less a proof of the legi­timacy of the oppositors Fortuses.  The court below correctly ruled that Exhibit
‘2’ is not an evidence of legitimacy much less of marriage between Fortus and Jacoba Aguil.  For it is merely a true copy of a baptismal certificate of oppositor appellant Roman Fortus.  The rule is settled that the record of baptism
attests to the fact of the administration of the sacra­ment on the date stated
therein, but certainly not the truth of the statements therein made as to the
parentage of the child baptized.  As held
by the Supreme Court: ‘Neither are the bap­tismal certificates (Exhibits C and
D) public documents or public writings, because the pa­rochial records of
baptisms are not public or official records, as they are not kept by public
officers, and are not proof of rela­tionship or filiation
of the child baptized.’ (Adriano vs. de Jesus, 23 Phil. 353; Pareja vs. Paraiso, et al., G.R.
No. L-5624, May 31, 1954).  As
regards Exhibit ‘4’, the court be­low in declaring the same not a proof of mar­riage
nor could it be a prima facie evidence of legitimacy of Roman Fortus, who is the eight child of Jacoba
Aguil which she had with Fermin
Fortus reasoned out, to which we subscribe, that:

‘The authority cited by the For­tuses
brothers and sisters to wit: Cri­solo vs. Judge Macadaeg L-7017, pro­mulgated April 29, 1954, is not square
on the point, because while that case was decided under the authority of Act
3753 which took effect on February 26, 1921, Roman Fortus
was born on February 28, 1922, long before the effectivity
of the subsequent law.  Even assuming
that Act No. 3753 is applicable to Roman Fortus, it
was only a prima facie proof which oppositor Julia T.
Fortus had overcome by satisfactory evidence to the
effect that Fermin Fortus
and Ja­coba Aguil were
never married and hence all of their children are not legi­timate brothers or
half brothers and therefore have no right to inherit from Victorino
Fortus under Article No. 922 of the New Civil Code.’

With respect to Exhibits 9-B and 9-C which
was a ‘Escritura de Compra
y Venta’ executed by Fermin
Fortus; and wherein Fermin Fortus was reflected as a married man, the same does not
clearly establish the claim of the oppo­sitors Fortuses that their parents were legal­ly married, for the
name Jacoba Aguil was not
mentioned therein as the spouse of Fermin For­tus.  On the contrary,
this piece of evidence is obviously the reflection of his actual be­ing married
with his lawful wife Julia Fortus.“

It is obvious from the foregoing quotations that the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, relying upon similar if not identical reasons, found
that Victorino Fortus and Jacoba Aguil were never
married.  We do not believe anyone can
say that “reasonable men (will) readily agree” that such finding of
fact is “manifestly mistaken, absurd or impos­sible” (De Luna vs. Linatoc, supra).  To
the contrary, We are of the opinion that fair minded
men may differ on whether or not such finding of fact is right, or “is
rightly drawn from the undisputed evidence” (idem).  Consequently, the present case is not one calling
for the exercise of either our appellate or supervisory jurisdiction for the
purpose of reversing the finding of fact aforesaid made by the Court of Appeals
and, before it, by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, J., took no part.