G.R. No. L-20490. June 29, 1968
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF RAMON CU KING NAN, ALIAS CHUA TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. RAMON CU KING NAN, ALIAS CHUA, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF…
ZALDIVAR, J.
On September 5, 1960
Ramon Cu King Nan, alias Chua, filed with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija a petition for
naturalization. In his petition Ramon Cu
King Nan alleges that he was horn in Kwi-Aw, Fokien, China on January 21, 1919; that he came to the
Philippines aboard the “SS Anking on April 18,
1935; that as of the time when he filed his petition he was a resident of San
Jose, Nueva Ecija, and that
his former place of residence was Muñoz, Nueva Ecija; that he is married
to Ines Arellano Chua, and have eight children by her
— the first child having been born on January 8, 1944, and the eighth child,
on January 25, 1960; that he had been engaged in the lumber business since
1946, and that his average annual income is from P8,000 to P9,000; that he had
continuously resided in the Philippines for a period of at least 26 years prior
to the date of the filing of the petition; that he speaks and writes the Tagalog and English languages; that he had enrolled his
child Ramon Jr. at the University of Santo Tomas, Manila; his son, Romeo at
the San Sebastian College, Manila; and his other children, Albert, Alexander,
Ana Marie and Henry, at the Grace Christian School in Manila; while the other
children Daisy and Cesar are not yet of school age; that he filed his
declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen; that he believes in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution and had conducted himself in
a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his stay in the
Philippines in his relation with the government and the community in which be
lives, and that he had not made an application for citizenship in any court.
The petition was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Eulogio Santa Maria and Simplicio
Andres, who declared that they have known Ramon Cu King Han since April 1934
and that said petitioner has resided in the Philippines continuously since 1934
and that they have personal knowledge that during the period of petitioner’s
stay in the Philippines he is a person of good repute and morally
irreproachable; that petitioner believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution; and that in their opinion petitioner has all the
qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines.
After due publication of the order of the court on the hearing of
the petition, as required by law, the petition was heard. After hearing, the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, on July 31, 1962, rendered a decision
declaring that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen, and forthwith declared him
entitled to be naturalized as a Filipino citizen.
From the above-mentioned decision of the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija the
Solicitor General appealed to this Court, and contends that the lower court
erred: (1) in not finding that
petitioner’s character witnesses are not credible persons; (2) in not finding
that petitioner’s children were not given the required education in the
prescribed schools; and (3) in not finding that petitioner failed to establish
his marriage with Ines Arellano Chua.
We have examined the testimonies of the two character witnesses, Eulogio Santa Maria and Simplicio
Andres, and we find that their testimonies fall short of what may be considered
satisfactory for the purpose of establishing that the petitioner has conducted
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his
residence in the Philippines. Witness Eulogio Santa Maria testified that in 1934 when the
petitioner arrived in Muñoz, Nueva
Ecija, he was working as chief clerk in the municipal
treasurer’s office of Peñarada and he only cane to Muñoz on week ends, such that his meeting with the
petitioner was merely casual; that petitioner transfered
his residence from Muñoz to San Jose in 1935, and it
was not until 1939 when he met the petitioner again when he was assigned as
chief clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer of San Jose, but in 1940
he left San Jose to work as municipal treasurer of Pantabañgan;
that from Pantabañgan he was assigned to Caranglan, Cabiao, Peñaranda, Quezon, and Muñoz, and it was not until 1950 when he was assigned as
municipal treasurer of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, and it was from that time when he again had a chance
to observe the petitioner. This witness,
however, says that his association with the petitioner was only occasional,
that is, on occasions when petitioner would go to the office of the municipal
treasurer to transact business, and meeting him during baptismal parties,
funeral, and wedding parties. This
witness said that he did not know if petitioner had been convicted of any crime
or charged with violation of any law.
The testimony of this witness about the character of petitioner is so
general that it cannot be said that he is a person who can reliably certify to
the irreproachable moral character and good conduct of the petitioner during
the entire period of his residence in the Philippines.
Likewise, the other witness, Simplicio
Andres, while claiming that he had known the petitioner since 1935 when the
latter came to reside in San Jose, Nueva Ecija, his association with him was only occasional, and
his testimony regarding the character and conduct of the petitioner was also
general. This witness simply based his
belief that petitioner has social dealings with the members of the community
where he lives because he is friendly with the authorities.
We agree with the Solicitor General that these two character
witnesses of petitioner did not satisfy the requirements regarding credible
character witnesses.[1]
We also agree with the Solicitor General that the requirement of
the law, that the applicant for Philippine citizenship should enroll his
children of school age in schools recognized by the government where Philippine
history, government and civics are prescribed in their curriculum and are
taught, has not been complied with. The
evidence of the petitioner simply shows that his eldest son Ramon, Jr. was a
College student at the University of Santo Tomas. There is no evidence as to where he studied
his primary and high school courses.
Similarly, the record shows only that the second son, Romeo, was a
student at the San Sebastian College but there is no showing as to where he
studied his elementary school course. As
regards the other four children Albert, Alexander, Ana Marie and Henry, the
record simply shows that they are certified to be studying at the Grace
Christian High School,
but there is no evidence that the Grace
Christian High School
teaches the courses in Philippine history, government and civics as required in
the Naturalization Law.[2]
We likewise agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioner
has not satisfactorily proved his marriage with Ines
Arellano Chua. The marriage certificate
evidencing the marriage of petitioner with Ines
Arellano Chua was not presented in evidence, and neither is there any evidence
which establishes the fact that their marriage certificate was lost or
destroyed, or that the record of the said marriage in the civil registrar’s
office of Baguio City, where they were allegedly
married, had been lost or destroyed. The
only evidence regarding the marriage of petitioner with Ines
Arellano Chua is his own testimony, and no record, other than petitioner’s
alien certificate of registration where it appears that the petitioner is
married to Ines Arellano Chua, was presented as
evidence. The testimony of the
petitioner that he was married to Ines Arellano Chua,
and what appears in his alien certificate of registration are
not sufficient evidence to establish the fact of their legal marriage. In a petition for naturalization the
petitioner must establish the fact of his marriage by clear and competent
evidence, because the grant of Philippine citizenship to the petitioner would
carry with it the grant of citizenship to his legitimate minor children and
enable his legitimate wife to ask to be declared a Filipino citizen if she
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a
Filipino citizen.[3]
In appeals to this Court from decisions of the trial court in
naturalization cases the entire record of the case is open for review. In examining the record of this case We find that there is a defect in the publication of the
notice of the hearing of the petition for naturalization. We have noted that while in his petition for
naturalization petitioner stases that his former place of residence was Muñoz, Nueva Ecija,
in the notice of hearing contained in the order of the Court which was
published in the newspaper of general circulation and in the Official Gazette
there is no statement regarding the former place of residence of the
petitioner. This omission of the
statement of the former place of residence of the petitioner in the notice of
hearing is a fatal defect in the proceedings.
The notice of hearing that is published must contain the present and
former residences of the petitioner because the publication of the notice of
hearing is precisely intended to invite comment, if any, from all those who
know the petitioner, about the conduct of the petitioner in all the places
where he had resided during his stay in the Philippines.
We have also noted that in his petition for naturalization
petitioner states that his average annual income is from P8,000
to P9,000. The financial capability of
an applicant for Philippine citizenship must be determined as of the time when
he files his petition. If, as petitioner
himself declared under oath, on September 24, 1960 when his petition was filed,
his average annual income was only from P8,000 to
P9,000, and at that time he had a wife and eight children to support, then that
annual income of from P8,000 to P9,000 cannot be considered sufficient to
qualify him for admission to Philippine citizenship, considering the persons that were dependent on him.[4] While it is true that in the income tax
returns of petitioner for the years 1958, 1959 and 1960 (Exhs.
E, E-1 and E-2) it appears that the annual net income of the petitioner was
P19,334.59, P19,784.46 and P20,882.47, respectively, we note that those figures
are not reliable as a basis for determining the steadiness of the financial
capability of the petitioner. Thus, in
his income tax return for 1958 it appears that his gross income consisted of
salary amounting to P4,200 from the Nueva Ecija North Central Lumber Co. and P16,134.59 as earnings
derived from the Nueva Ecija
North Central Luzon Lumber Co.; in his income tax return for 1959 (Exh. E-1) it appears that his gross income consisted of
salaries from the Gabriel Dysico & Co.
(P1,750.00) and from Central Luzon Enterprise (P2,450.00) amounting to
P4,200.00, and P16,584.46 coming from the Gabriel Dysico
& Co. (P11,387.13) and Central Luzon Enterprise (P5,197.33); in his income
tax return for 1960 (Exh. E-2) it appears that the
gross income of petitioner is P20,882.47, consisting of his salary of P5,400
from the Central Luzon Enterprise and earnings from the Central Luzon
Enterprise amounting to P16,482.47. It
appears, therefore, that the greater part of the income of the petitioner is
derived from the proceeds of the earnings of a business enterprise. We believe that income coming from a business
enterprise not owned by petitioner — specially when
it is not clearly shown how much interest he has in said enterprise and what
participation he has in its management — is so unstable that it cannot be a
safe basis for determining the financial qualification of a person who applies
for Philippine citizenship.
But we have noted one vital circumstance appearing on the
residence certificate, Class B, of the petitioner for the year 1961 (Exhibit
G-1). In this residence certificate it
is not stated that in the preceding year 1960 petitioner had gross receipts or
earnings derived from business in the Philippines. It is simply stated on this residence
certificate that in the year 1960 petitioner received a salary or earnings
derived from occupation the sum of P5,400. Whereas, in petitioner’s income tax return
for 1960 (Exhibit E-2) it is entered therein that he received a salary of P5,400 plus income from the Central Luzon Enterprise in the
sum of P16,482.47. We consider this
discrepancy, between the entry in the income tax return for 1960 and the
statement in the residence certificate, class B, for 1961 of the petitioner, as
an anomaly that reflects on the integrity of petitioner, and makes Us suspect
that the entries in his income tax returns were inflated, just for the purpose
of presenting them as evidence during the hearing of the petition for
naturalization. If the income of petitioner
for 1960 Consisted of his salary of P5,400 and his
share in the earnings of the enterprise known as Central Luzon Enterprise
amounted to P16,482.47, why did he not have that sum of P16,482.47 reflected in
his residence certificate class B for 1961?
We know that before a residence certificate class B is issued to a
taxpayer, the taxpayer has first to accomplish a form, under oath, where he
states his earnings and gross receipts during the preceding year. If petitioner really had that income of P16,482.47 in 1960, aside from his salary, he should have
caused that amount to be stated in his class B residence certificate for 1961,
and paid the corresponding tax for that sum.
If he did not have that amount stated in his residence certificate class
B, it is either because it was not true that he received that income in 1960,
or he was trying to evade the payment of the full residence tax for 1961– in
which case petitioner had shown that he is not a person of irreproachable moral
character, and, as such, he is not fit to be admitted to Philippine
citizenship. We note that petitioner did
not present as evidence his residence certificates, class B, for 1959 and 1960, if only to show that the statement of his income
appearing in his income tax returns for 1958 and 1959 are also reflected in his
residence certificates, class B, for 1959 and 1960, respectively. This Court is not unaware of the practice of
some applicants for Philippine citizenship of inflating the entries in their
Income tax returns for the purpose of utilizing those inflated income tax
returns as evidence to prove their pretended financial capabilities.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court, appealed from,
is reversed; and the petition for naturalization of Ramon Cu King Nan, alias
Chua, is denied, with costs against said petitioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
[1] Uy vs. Republic, L-17622, May 20, 1962; Ho Yuen Tsi vs. Republic, L-17137, June 29, 1962; Yu Kul Tian vs. Republic,
L-15554, November 30, 1962; Uy vs. Republic,
L-19578, October 27, 1964; To vs. Republic, L-20156, December 29, 1967.
[2] Section 2, paragraph (6), Com. Act 473 (Naturalization Law); Lim Cho Kuan vs. Republic,
L-21198, January
22, 1966.
[3] Yap vs. Republic, L-19832, August 23, 1966.
[4]
Lim Sih Beng vs.
Republic, L- 23387,
August 24, 1967.