MANUEL C. RAMOS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARDANT TRADING CORPORATION, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal by defendant, Ardant Trading
Corporation, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Davao denying a motion to dismiss.

On November 28, 1962,
plaintiff, Manuel C. Ramos, commenced Civil
Case No. 3890 of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, to recover, from said defendant,
P225 a month, as salary from June 29, 1962 up to his reinstatement as
defendant’s truck driver, as well as
P5,500 as damages and P1,000 as Attorney’s fees, for
having allegedly dismissed him, on said
date, as such truck driver, summarily, arbitrarily, without justifiable reason
or prior notice, in addition to interest on the sums allegedly due to
him.

Defendant moved to
dismiss the complaint upon the
ground that the same is seemingly
based on Republic Act No. 1052, pursuant to which – defendant maintained – the
aggrieved party must take up his claim with
the Department of Labor “for investigation and mediation, before the Court can
acquire jurisdiction”, and that, although plaintiff had “brought this
matter x x before
Regional Office 4, Depart­ment of Labor, Manila”, the latter has not, as
yet, heard it.  The motion, having been
denied, defendant sought a reconsideration, with the
same result.  Thereupon, defend­ant
interposed the present appeal, invoking the same
reasons relied upon in the lower court.

Manifestly, the present
appeal is premature and cannot be entertained. 
The orders denying defendant’s motion for dismissal and its subsequent
motion for reconsideration are interlocutory in nature, and hence, not appealable until after the rendition of judgment on the merits.  Defendant’s appeal contravenes the explicit
provisions of Rule 41, Sec­tion 2, of the Rules of Court, to the effect
that:

“Only final judgments or orders shall be subject to
appeal.  No interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the
progress of an action, nor shall it be the subject of ap­peal until final
judgment or order is rendered for one party or the other.

x  x  x            x  x  x               x  x  x  x

which, moreover,
incorporates a well-established rule of practice and procedure, constituting
one of the main tenets of our remedial law.^[1]

WHEREFORE, this appeal is hereby dismissed, with treble costs against defendant-appellant, Ardant Trading Corpora­tion, jointly and severally, with its counsel, Atty. Sergio S. Sison.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro and Angeles, JJ.,
concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

^[1]
Sec. 123, Act No. 190; Go-Quico v. Municipal
Board, 1 Phil. 502, 508; Diokno v. Reyes, 7
Phil. 385; Olsen v. Olsen, 48 Phil. 238, 240; Manila Electric Co. v.
Artiaga, 50 Phil. 147; Sitchon
v. Sheriff of Occ. Negros,
80 Phil. 397; Restauro v. Fabrica,
80 Phil. 762; Lopez v. Dinglasan, 84
Phil. 292; San Jose v. Castillo, 84 Phil. 839; De la Fuente, et al. v. Geron, et al., L-14138,
July 30, 1960; Moreno, etc., et al. v. Hon. Macadaeg, etc., et al., L-17908, April 23, 1963; Harrison Foundry & Machinery,
et al. v. Harrison Foundry Workers’
Association, et al., L-18432,
June 29, 1963; Bautista v.
De La Cruz, L-21107, Dec. 24,
1963; Perez, et al. v. Monetary Board, et al., L-23307, June 30, 1967.