G.R. No. L-7594 and 7596. September 08, 1954

These two cases concern two petitions for review of the decision
rendered by the Court of Industrial Relations on December 8, 1953
declaring the strike staged by the members of the Insurefco Papers Pulp
& Project Workers’ Union hereinafter referred to as Union, on June
14, 1952″ unreasonable and illegal and leaving to the discretion of the
management of the Insular Sugar Refining Corporation, hereinafter
referred to as Company, the dismissal of those responsible therefor as
listed in Exhibit “T” appearing on page 554-558 of the record of Case
No. 283-V of said court.

The Union interposed the present petition upon the plea that the
court committed serious errors in declaring the strike illegal and in
authorizing the management of the Company to dismiss the alleged
leaders of the Union at its discretion, whereas the Company has
likewise appealed because the authority did not include other persons
who allegedly had had a direct part in the strike; or are deemed also
leaders of the movement.

On June 12, 1952, petitioning Union through its leaders submitted to
the Company two sets of economic demands, one for increase in wages,
elimination of the rotation system, and enforcement of check-off, and
the other containing proposals with respect to profit-sharing, union
representation in the management of the Company and ail option to
purchase the refinery. In the morning of June 14, 1952, a third demand
was submitted by the Union in which it requested for the immediate
cessation of the threats, intimidation, and violence being committed by
certain thugs, goons, and gangsters inside the refinery and asking at
the same time that gratuities be granted to the laborers incident to
the purchase of the refinery.

When said demands were submitted to the Chief of the Finance and
Legal Division of the Company, the union delegation was advised that
the Acting General Manager of the Company was then absent from Manila
and for that reason no action could be taken on these demands until
after his return.

On June 14, 1952, at about 11:30 p.m., the members of the Union,
without notice or warning, struck causing the stoppage and paralization
of the operations of the refinery, said members going even to the
extent of picketing the approaches of its compound. Because of this
walkout, the Company filed on June 18, 1952 an urgent petition in the
Court of Industrial Relations praying that the strike thus staged be
declared unjustified and illegal and that the Company be authorized to
dismiss those responsible for the strike, which petition was docketed
as Case No. 707-V.

The Union having failed to file its answer as required by the
regulation, the trial of the case proceeded and the Company was allowed
to present its evidence in support of the petition. When the time of
the Union came to present its rebuttal evidence, its counsel asked that
it be allowed to set up and prove certain special defenses, which
request was granted. These defenses are: (1) the maulings and acts of
violence committed on members of the Union inside the refinery; (2) the
threats, intimidation and violence committed on members of the Union by
persons supported, encouraged, and abetted by company officials; and
(3) the existence of a company union in the refinery.

After due trial, and the parties had submitted their memoranda, the
Court of Industrial Relations rendered decision declaring the strike
unjustified and illegal and giving discretion to the management of the
Company to dismiss from the service the leaders responsible therefor
whose names are listed in Exhibit “T” appearing on pages 554-558 of the
record of Case No. 283-V. Both parties, being dissatisfied with the
decision, interposed the present petition for review.

Inasmuch as the cases before us concern two petitions for review of
a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations which, by their very
nature, merely involve questions of law, the facts of this case as
found in the decision are deemed undisputed and, for the purposes of
the issues herein raised, resort to said facts is sufficient. We would,
therefore, quote hereunder the pertinent portion of the decision
wherein said facts are outlined:

“It is clear that Mr. Andres B. Callanta and several
others presented exhibits ‘B’ and ‘C, the alleged set of demands, to
Mr. Manuel B. Villano, the secretary and treasurer and chief of the
Finance and Legal Department of the PHILSUGIN between 3:00 and 4:00 in
the afternoon of June 12, 1952 at the office of the PHILSUGIN at 306
Samanillo Building. Mr. Callanta after asking him when the Acting
General Manager of the PHILSUGIN could be contacted was told that said
Acting General Manager together with the chairman of the Board, (the
Board being composed of five members) and two others, were at the time
in Bacolod, Negros Occidental, attending a convention of sugar men Mr.
Callanta was advised that the Acting General Manager was expected to
arrive before June 17 because the usual meetings of the board was every
Wednesday and the following Wednesday would be June 18. Mr. Callanta
was advised that Exhibits ‘B’ and ‘C, would be submitted to Mr.
Oliveros, the Acting General Manager, the moment he arrived from
Bacolod. Mr. Villano noticed upon receipt of exhibits ‘B’ and ‘C’ that
the same were dated March 31, 1952. On Monday morning June 15, 1952,
Mr. Villano received from Mr. Santiago, the cashier of the PHILSUGIN,
another paper signed by one Mr. Lampino and marked as exhibits ‘S’ or
exhibit ‘5’ and was submitted to Mr. Santiago about 11:00 or 12:00
o’clock, Saturday morning, June 14, 1952. This exhibit prayed for the
stopping of the alleged mauling, requested the payment of gratuities to
the workers and the information about petty thefts committed by
“extras”. It can readily be seen that there was no possibility for the
General Manager nor the board of directors to consider the so-called
demanda between the time they were presented and the declaration of the
strike—the strike having been declared about 11:30 p.m. on June 14,
1952. The first official knowledge of the would be strike on that day
was when Messrs. Lampino, Robles, Carrera and De Jesus, officers of the
union went to the house of one of the key officials of the company, Mr.
Dominador Salvador, about 10:30 p.m. urging the latter not to report
during his shift that night because there was going to be a strike.

“Exhibit
‘S’ of petitioner or ‘5’ for respondent which was received as mentioned
by the cashier of the company between 11:00 or 12:00 o’clock Saturday
on the morning of June 14, 1952, the day that the strike was declared
and which respondent considered the same as an ultimatum, mentioned no
time or warning of the declaration of strike. The strike was
particularly the act of the heads of the barangays whose names appear
in exhibit ‘T’ in Case No. 283-V.

“There was no time to
consider the alleged demands because the General Manager, the chairman
of the Board, and two others were in Bacolod, and even when the manager
was advised by the Superintendent of the corporation at 5:03 a.m. thru
a telegram on June 15 of the declaration of the strike, efforts to
locate the General Manager in Bacolod proved futile, perhaps it was
because it was Sunday, (Exhibit ‘U’). Mr. Callanta, the virtual head of
the union, being the president of the U.I.O. mother union of the
respondent union, and the person who advised the emissary of the union
to serve an ultimatum, knew very well that when he for the very first
time on. June 12, 1952, presented demands contained in exhibits ‘B’ and
‘C’ the company officials were not in Manila but elsewhere and would be
in Manila on June 17, and that the board would meet on June 18. There,
was, therefore, no time, for the company thru its duly constituted
authority to consider the alleged demands whether to grant or not the
contents of the three sets of demands presented. Mr. Callanta the man
who, presented exhibits ‘B’ and ‘C’ a very intelligent young man, know
that petitioner is a corporation and its activities are supervised
and/or controlled by its board. And while it is true that during the
progress of the hearing in court propositions and counter propositions
were presented to settle the case amicably in and out of court, and
while it is equally true that the corporation eventually turned down
every effort of amicable settlement, the same could not be taken as the
yard stick to conclude, as respondent claimed, that even if the demands
presented were studied and scrutinized by the management within a
reasonable time still the same, would be rejected, as in fact they
were. Certainly, it is different when a strike is declared before the
demands are studied and presented to the authority that has the final
say on the matter, from a strike called after the demands have been
denied upon their consideration., As in this case, the strike has
already, been declared, and the case presented in court. The
corporation has, every right to stand by on its prayer that the strike
fee declared illegal. For, these reasons, the court considers the
strike unreasonable.”

The question now to be determined is: Has the Court of Industrial
Relations gravely abused its discretion, as claimed, in declaring the
strike staged by the members of the; Union unreasonable, unjustified,
and illegal?

It appears that the Union, through its leaders and officials
submitted to the management of the Company a set of demands urging
immediate action. These demands were handed over to the
Secretary-Treasurer and Chief of the Finance and Legal Division of the
Company on June 12, 1952. At that time the Acting General Manager,
together with the Chairman and two members of the Board of Directors,
were absent, having gone to Bacolod City, Negros Occidental, to attend
a conference of sugar men. The leaders of the Union were advised of
this fact and were informed that they; would probably be back on June
17, because the usual meeting of the Board was held every Wednesday and
the following Wednesday would be June 18. And in the morning of June
14, 1952, the Union5, also through its leaders, ‘submitted another
demand regarding certain maulings and acts of violence being committed
inside the refinery and requesting that they be stopped. And as no
immediate action was taken thereon, but despite the advice given to
them that their demands would be submitted to the Acting General
Manager immediately upon his arrival from Bacolod City,—the leaders, of
the Union caused its members to declare a strike at about midnight of
June 14, 1952 thereby causing the stoppage and paralization of the
operations of the refinery.

It can readily be seen that the walkout was premature as it was
declared without giving to the General Manager, or the Board of
Directors of the Company, reasonable time within which to consider and
act on the demands submitted by the Union. The nature of the demands
was such that no possible action could be taken thereon by the
officials to whom they were submitted. They could have only been acted
upon by the General Manager, or by the Board of Directors. The former
was then in Bacolod, and the latter could not be convened because the
chairman and two of its members were also absent. And this fact was
well known to the leaders of the Union. In the circumstances,, the only
conclusion that can be drawn is that, as found by the lower court, the
strike staged by the Union was un- fortunate, as it is ill-considered,
considering the great damage caused to the business of the refinery
resulting from the complete paralization of its operations. The Court
of Industrial Relations, therefore, acted rightly in declaring said
strike unjustified and illegal.

One circumstance that should be noted is the fact that a portion of
the demands herein involved is but a reaffirmation of the demands that
had been submitted by the Union and which were the subject of a
previous case between the same parties (Case No. 283-V). This case also
gave rise to a similar strike which was resolved by a partial agreement
concluded by the parties and wherein, among other things, they included
a form of settlement of their labor disputes of the following tenor:

“VI. That all labor-management disputes shall be
taken up in a Grievance Committee consisting of 6 members, 3 from the
Insurefco and Paper Pulp Project Workers’ Union and 3 from the
management. This committee shall take charge of investigating any
dispute arising between labor and management, after which it shall make
its recommendation to the management which shall have the final say on
the’ matter under consideration. Any matter submitted to the Grievance
Committee shall be decided within four days and the management to take
action within three days from the receipt of the recommendation of the
Grievance Committee except when the matter necessitates the action of
the Board, in which case the management should decide the matter within
one week from the receipt of the recommendation of the Grievance
Committee.” (Exhibits ‘D’, ‘D-1’ and ‘E’).

Note that the above form of settlement covers all disputes that
might arise between labor and management and was adopted precisely to
pave the way for their amicable solution and avert a possible strike on
the part of the Union. This agreement received the sanction of the
court. But, far from abiding by this form of arbitration, the Union
declared the instant strike as already pointed out. This infringement
constitutes a further justification for the decision reached by the
court a quo: As this court has aptly said: “Strikes held in
violation of the terms contained in a collective bargaining agreement
are illegal especially when they provide for conclusive arbitration
clauses. These agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if
their ends have to be achieved.” (Liberal Labor Union vs. Philippine Can Company, 92 Phil., 72.)

It is true that the Union submitted a third demand complaining about
certain mauling, threats, or intimidation being committed by certain
malefactors inside the refinery, and apparently action on this matter
could be taken without awaiting the return of the General Manager or
the convening to a session of the Board of Directors, but it should be
noted that said demand was submitted at noon of June 14, 1952 and at
about midnight of the same day the Union struck. Even granting that
such mauling or intimidation really existed, still we believe that the
action taken by the Union was unjustified it appearing that it has been
so sudden that it did not give time to the management to make an
investigation of the complaint. But the truth is, as found by the Court
of Industrial Relations, “there is no proof that the company had any
hand in any of the treats, intimidation or mauling incidents as
pictured before this court. * * * They ensued out of petty jealousies
existing between the two unions in the company— jealousies which were
aimed solely at one objective, control by one union.” These incidents
even reached the local courts and at the time the claim was being
considered, they were still pending determination. The court found that
this claim is without merit.

The same thing may be said with regard to the claim that the
declaration of the strike has become moot in view of the order of the
Court of Industrial Relations issued on March 27, 1953 authorizing the
partial resumption of the operation of the refinery readmitting to the
service all those who took part in the strike, for the simple reason
that said order was issued to enable merely the refinery to carry out
its commitment to refine a huge quantity of centrifugal sugar. It
appears that the order was issued subject to one express condition,
that is, that the question of whether the strikers should be allowed to
return permanently to work or not should be made subject to the outcome
of that case. It is obvious that that order of March 27, 1953 cannot
have the effect of declaring moot the question of the legality of the
strike which took place on June 14, 1952.

As regards the contention of the Company that the Court of
Industrial Relations has failed to include among the leaders whose
dismissal was left to the discretion of the management other persons
who, as contended, likewise had a direct part in the declaration of the
strike, we don’t believe necessary to pass upon it it appearing that it
involves a question of fact which cannot be taken up in a petition for
review. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that “as long as
there is some evidence to support a decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations, this court should not interfere, nor modify or reverse it,
just because it is not based on overwhelming or preponderant evidence.
Its only province is to resolve or pass upon questions of law.’
[Philippine Newspaper Guild vs. Evening News, Inc. a R. No. L-2604, April 29, 1950, 47 Off. Gaz., 86 Phil. 303 Bardwill Bros. vs. Philippine Labor Union and Court of Industrial Relations (1940), 70 Phil., 672; Antamok Goldfields Mining vs. Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc. (1940) 70 Phil., 340.]

The petitions are dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.