G.R. No. L-6647. September 02, 1954

In the municipal court, City of Cabanatuan, a criminal Complaint was
filed charging Manuel Virola and others with the crime of serious
slander by deed. At the preliminary investigation the defendants moved
to quash,the case because the complaint was signed by the offended
party Eugenio Reyes, but the offense was a public crime to be
prosecuted by the corresponding officials. The judge up4 held the
contention, and dismissed the case by an order dated November 23,1952.
On appeal to the Court of First Instance, the Hon. M. M. Mejia,
reversed the appealed order and “remanded the case to the court of
origin for further proceedings.”

From this reversal, the appellants took exception and brought the
matter to this Supreme Court, contending that the lower court erred:
(1) in not dismissing the case for lack of personality of the private
prosecutor (2) in not declaring the complaint invalid and (3) in
deciding that the Fiscal in effect adopted the complaint when he
appeared in court on the side of the complainant.

We find this appeal to be premature. It is practically appealing an
order of the Court of First Instance that overrules defendant’s motion
to quash the information. We recently held that such appeal is too
early to be entertained here:

“In March 1953 the defendant submitted a motion to
quash both cases, contending that the assistant provincial fiscal had
no authority to formulate the charges, nor to hold the preliminary
investigation.

“Denial of such motion, cause the instant
appeal, which we find to be premature, inasmuch as the order overruling
the motion was not appealable.

‘SECTION 1. Appeal.—From
all final judgments of the Court of First Instance or courts of similar
jurisdiction, and in all cases in which the law now provides for
appeals from said courts, an appeal may be taken to the Court of
Appeals or to the Supreme Court as hereinafter prescribed.’ (Rule 118
sec. 1).

‘Under section 1, in order that a judgment may be
appealed from, it is necessary that it be final in the sense that it
completely disposes of the cause, so that no further question affecting
the merits remain for adjudication. An order overruling a motion to
dismiss presented by the defendant against the information does not
dispose of the cause upon its merits and is thus merely interlocutory
and not a final order within the meaning of the above section. But an
order sustaining a motion to dismiss is appealable for it leaves
nothing to be done in the trial court.’ (Moran Rules of Court [1952
Ed.] Vol. 2 p. 880, citing Fuster v. Johnson, 1 Phil., 670.)

“And
in line with the above view, the Rules specifically direct that if
defendant moves to quash before pleading, and the motion is overruled,
“he shall immediately plead”; (sec. 1 Rule 113) which means, obviously,
that trial shall go on. As stated in Collins vs. Wolfe, 4 Phil., 534,
the appellant Domingo Manuel, after the denial of his motion, “should
have proceeded with the trial of the causes in the court below, and if
final judgment is rendered against him he can then appeal, and upon
such appeal present the question which he is now seeking to have
decided” (1)” (a).

What herein appellants should do is to defend themselves as best
they can, in the courts below, without waiving the point they have
raised and if convicted, they may appeal and then discuss the questions they are now submitting beforehand.

Appeal dismissed, with costs. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Padilla,Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and Reyes, J.B L., JJ., concur.