JOSE GUINTO, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE P. VELUZ, SALVADOR ABAD SANTOS, AND EUSEBIO M. LOPEZ, JUDGES OF THE PEOPLE’S COURT, RESPONDENT.

The original information filed on March 6, 1946, against the petitioner in
the People’s Court charged him with the crime of treason in that he being a
Filipino citizen, and owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth
of the Philippines, in violation of said duty of allegiance during the period
comprised between November 1, 1944, and February 3, 1946, in the City of Manila,
the petitioner for the purpose and with the intent of giving aid and comfort to
the enemy, did willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and traitorously join and
accept, hold and perform the functions and duties, of a spy or informer for the
Japanese Military Police, helping them in the apprehension of guerrillas and
other pro-American elements; and more particularly on or about December 15,
1944, arrested one Ernesto Simpao, a guerrilla, tied his hands behind his back
and forced him to jump into the water in the Manila North Harbor, and while said
Ernesto Simpao was in such helpless, condition he was shot to death.

Before the defendant has pleaded, the Office of the Official Prosecutors
filed on May 25, 1945, an “Amended information by way of a Bill of particulars
on the original information,” in which, besides the overt act alleged in the
original, other overt acts are alleged or specified, to wit: That in the City of
Manila the petitioner, in his capacity as spy or informer of the Japanese
Military Police, for the purpose and with the intent of giving aid and comfort
to the enemy, on or about October 29, 1944, did willfully guide and help five
(5) armed” Japanese spies and informers in the arrest of one Albino Rutao, a
guerrilla suspect, who was taken by them to places unknown, and since then he
has never been seen again or heard from; that on or about January 24, 1945, the
petitioner did lead, accompany and help six (6) armed Filipino spies and
informers in the arrest of one Ariston Tamon and another guerrilla companion of
said Tamon (name unknown), because of their guerrilla activities, and after
punishing said Tamon and companion severely, they were taken to places unknown,
and since then they have never been again seen or heard from; and that on or
about the afternoon of January 24, 1945, the petitioner did lead, guide, and
help three (3) armed Japanese spies and informers in the arrest of one Felix de
Leon, a guerrilla belonging to Ramsey unit, and took him to the Japanese
Military garrison at the Air Port Studio, Azcarraga, Manila, and since then said
De Leon has never been seen again or heard from.

The attorneys for the petitioner filed a motion to quash the allegation of
three additional overt acts in the amended information, on the ground that the
amendment constitutes a new information filed after the period of six months
fixed by law from the passage of Commonwealth Act No., 682, has elapsed. The
People’s Court denied the motion to quash, as well as the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioner on September 4, 1946.

This case is now before us because the petitioner has filed a petition for
certiorari on the ground that the respondents acted in excess of the
People’s Court’s jurisdiction in admitting said amended information.
Section
2 of Act No. G82 provides:

“SEC. 2. The People’s Court shall have jurisdiction to try and decide all
cases of crimes against national security committed between December eight,
nineteen hundred forty-one and September two, nineteen hundred forty-five, and
filed within six (6) months from the passage of this Act: Provided,
however, That any such cases not so instituted within said period of six
(6) months shall be filed with, tried and determined by the proper Court of
First Instance; * * *.”

The only question to be determined in the “present case is, whether or not
after an information charging a person with the crime of treason has been filed
within the period of six months from the passage of Act No. 682, said
information may be amended, before the defendant has pleaded, by alleging in the
amended information additional overt acts committed by the defendant in aid of
the enemy within the period of time alleged in the information.

After a careful consideration of the matter, we are of the opinion, and
therefore so hold, that the amended information is not a new information, and
the presentation thereof is not the filing of a new case of treason, because it
does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the
original one. It merely amends the original information by more particularly
specifying the charge or laying what is termed “to adhere to the enemies, giving
them aid and comfort”; and consequently, in accordance with elementary rules of
procedure, the amended information relates back to the date at which said
original information was filed, that is, within the prescribed period of six
months. The crime of treason such as charged against the petitioner may be
committed by executing, either a single, or several intentional overt acts,
different or similar but distinct, and for that reason it may be called or
considered a continuous offense. A person who commits treason is not criminally
responsible for as many crimes of treason as overt acts ho has intentionally
committed to aid the enemy. All overt acts he has done or might have done for
that purpose constitute but a single offense.
The overt acts alleged in the
amended information are but a specification of the crime charged in the original
It is necessary to make such specification, because it is a well known rule that
treason can only be established by proof of overt acts; and those overt acts
only which are charged in the indictment or information can be given in
evidence. It is perfectly clear that it would not be sufficient to allege
generally that the accused had adhered to the enemy giving her aid and comfort,
as alleged in the second paragraph of the original and amended information. The
charge must be more particularly specified by laying what is termed an overt act
of giving aid and comfort to the enemy. A person charged with treason can only
be convicted of the overt act or acts laid in the information, because,
according to section 1 (b), Rule 111, of the Rules of Court, a defendant has the
right to be informed, not only of the nature of the accusation or the offense
charged, but also of the cause thereof, that is, the acts committed by the
defendant constituting that offense.

As a matter of procedure, the amendment was properly admitted, because
section 22 of Act No. 682 provides that “The prosecution, trial, and disposal of
cases before the People’s Court shall be governed by existing laws and Rules of
Court unless otherwise provided for herein.” And section 13, Rule 106, of the
Rules of Court prescribes that “the information or complaint may be amended, in
substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the defendant
pleads.” There is nothing in Act No. 682 which provides otherwise. To uphold the
contention of the petitioner would be tantamount to authorize the Government
to file in the proper Court of First Instance another information against the
petitioner for treason constituted by the overt acts alleged in the amended
information, splitting thereby the single crime of treason committed by the
petitioner into two, and put him in danger of being convicted twice for the same
offense.

In view of all the foregoing, the respondents or the People’s Court acted
within its jurisdiction in admitting the amended information in this case, and
therefore the petitioner’s petition is dismissed with costs against him. So
ordered.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, and
Tuason, JJ., concur.

CUNCURRING

HILADO, J.:

I concur in the foregoing majority opinion. The filing of the so-called
amended information dated May 25, 1946, within the very same case wherein the
original information had been presented against the self-same accused, did not
bring the case within the purview of the proviso of section 2 of Commonwealth
Act No. 682. The reason is that said proviso, in express terms, refers to cases
not instituted before the People’s Court within six months from the passage of
said Act, which took place on September 25, 1945 and the original information
having been lodged within the said six-month period, namely, on March 6, 1946
and the filing of the so-called amended information thereafter not constituting
the institution of a new case, it is clear that we are not dealing here with a
case not instituted within said six-month period.