THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE, VS. GUILLERMO SUMILANG, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT.

FERIA, J.:

The petitioner in this case was convicted by the Court of First Instance of
Laguna of the crime of arson and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of from
5 years 4 months and 21 days of presidio correcional to 10 years and 1 day of
prision mayor. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the
lower court. The petitioner filed on June 14, 1944, a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court for the review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, and the petition was denied on July 5, 1944. A motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the petition for certiorari was
filed by the petitioner on July 17, 1944, and also denied.

From the records it appears that a copy of the resolution of this Court
denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed to the petitioner’s attorney
at his address 307 Palma, Quiapo, Manila, on July 17, 1944. But the attorney for
the petitioner alleges now, in his petition, that he did not receive the notice
because then “he was already hiding in the mountains of Laguna as a guerrilla
officer of the Markings guerrilla,” and “prays this Court that the reading of
the sentence of the accused be suspended and that said accused be permitted or
allowed to file whatever pleading that may be allowed by this Honorable Tribunal
necessary for the protection of the rights of the accused.” And the petition is
based on the resolution of this Court of October 1, 1945, which suspends, until
further notice, section 8 of Rule 53, and provides that judgment shall be
entered, not upon the expiration of fifteen days after the promulgation thereof,
but upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice of such judgment to the
parties in accordance with the Rules of Court.

It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws
are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. As the resolution of October
1, 1945, relates to the mode of procedure, it is applicable to cases pending in
courts at the time of its adoption; but it can not be invoked in and applied to
the present case in which the decision had become final before said resolution
became effective. In this case, the motion for reconsideration filed by the
defendant was denied on July 17, 1944, and a second motion for rehearing or
consideration could not be filed after the expiration of the period of fifteen
days from promulgation of the order or judgment deducting the time in which the
first motion had been pending in this Court (section 1, Rule 54) ; for said
period had already expired before the adoption of the resolution on October 1,
1945. Therefore the Court cannot now permit or allow the petitioner to file any
pleading or motion in the present case.

As to the suspension of the reading of the sentence of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Court of First Instance, prayed for in the petition, we
have noted that, after receiving the record of the case remanded by the clerk of
the appellate court for execution of the latter’s decision in accordance with
section 9, Rule 53, made applicable to criminal cases by section 17 of Rule 120,
it is generally the practice followed by the clerks of Court of First Instance
to require the accused to appear, or his bondsmen to produce the body of the
defendant to the court, for the reading of the sentence. Such a practice is not
in accordance with law. The judgment or sentence which, according to section 6,
Rule 116, must be promulgated in the presence of the defendant, is the sentence
rendered by the Court of First Instance after the trial of the case by said
court; and the right of a defendant to be present at the promulgation of the
judgment granted by section 1, Rule 111, refers also to said sentence or
judgment of the Court of First Instance.

The certified copy of the judgment is sent by the clerk of the appellate
court to the lower court under section 9 of Rule 53, not for the promulgation or
reading thereof to the defendant, but for execution of the judgment against him.
It is not necessary to promulgate or read it to the defendant, because it is to
be presumed that the accused or his attorney had already been notified thereof
in accordance with sections 7 and 8, as amended, of the same Rule 53.

If the accused desires to have the execution of the judgment in this case
temporarily suspended for some justifiable reason, the petition must be filed
with the proper Court of First Instance.

Moran, C. J., Paras, Pablo,
Bengzon, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

DISSENTING

PERFECTO, J.:

Guillermo Sumilang was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Laguna to
imprisonment, ranging from more than 5 years to more than 10 years, for the
crime of arson allegedly committed in Pila, Laguna, on May 23, 1941.

On October 8, 1943, the Court of Appeals, with a strong dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Jose P. Melencio, affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Sumilang filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court on April 20, 1944, impugning the decision of the Court of Appeals. On June
14, 1944, the Supreme Court, without stating any reason, summarily denied the
petition for review on certiorari. On July 5, 1944, the attorney for
appellant filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the said order of
denial. On July 17, 1944, the Supreme Court, also without alleging any reason,
denied the motion.

On July 21, 1944, the cleric of the Supreme Court issued notice of the order
of July 17, addressed to Jose F. Fernandez, attorney of Sumilang, at 307 Palma,
Quiapo, Manila. The notice was never received by said attorney who, at the time,
was already hiding in the mountains of Laguna as an officer of the Markings
Guerrillas.

On August 2, 1946, more than two years later, the bondsmen of the accused
received an order to produce the person of the same in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna on August 16, 1946, for the reading of the sentence. On
August 12, Sumilang filed a petition before us, praying that the reading of the
sentence be suspended and accused permitted to file whatever pleadings necessary
for the proper protection of his rights and that he be granted such other
relief, just and equitable, in the premises, invoking at the same time the
resolution of this Court dated October 1, 1945.

Sumilang did not specify what pleadings he intends to file or what just and
equitable relief he seeks to obtain from this Court in case his petition is
favorably acted upon; but it is evident that he may (a) ask permission to file a
second motion for reconsideration and, if granted, to file thereafter said
motion; or (b) attack the validity, not only of the order of denial of his
petition for a writ of certiorari, but also the decision of the Court
of Appeals, because they were issued and rendered by tribunals set up by the
enemy during Japanese occupation.
The first question we are called upon to
consider concerns the effect of the second order of denial, the one issued on
July 17, 1944, of which neither Sumilang nor his .attorney was ever notified. In
our opinion, unless and until notified of said order of denial, the same, for
all legal purposes, must be considered as nonexistent as regards accused
Sumilang and, therefore, he is entitled to enjoy the legal benefits resulting
from the nonexistence of said order of denial.

At this stage, we are constrained to analyse and refute the majority position
regarding the interpretation of the word “promulgation” as used in section 8 of
Rule 53, which reads as follows:

“SEC. 8. Entry of judgment.—The judgment shall be entered upon the
expiration of fifteen days after promulgation thereof. The entry shall be in the
same for as is provided in section 2 of Rule 35.”

Promulgation means publication, official announcement, to make known
to the public. That is the etymological meaning of the word, which came from the
Latin promulgare, which in turn came from the word provulgare,
composed of the words pro (forth) and vulgus (the people). Promulgate
means “1. To make known by open declaration, as a law, decree, or esp., a dogma;
to proclaim; to publish abroad. 2. Late (a) To make known or public the terms of
(a proposed law), (b) To issue or give out (a law) by way of putting it into
execution.” (Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language, 2d
Ed., 1938.)

“Promulgate. To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important
or obligatory.” (50 C. J., 720.)

“The word ‘promulgate’ is defined as to make known; to publish; to announce
officially; to make public as important or obligatory. Drown vs.
Democratic Parish Committee of St. Bernard Parish, 1(15 So., 167, 168; 183 La.,
967.” (34 W. & P., Perm., 329.)

“In regard to the necessity of a railway company formulating and
11romuigating rules, ‘promulgate’ means to make known; that the rules shall be
brought to the attention of the service affected thereby, or that it be given
such publicity as that the servant, in the proper discharge of his duties, is
bound to lake notice of it” Wooden vs. Western New York & P. R.
Co,, 18 N. Y. S., 768, 769. (34 W. & P., Perm., 329.)

“Since Acts 1915, p. 338, creating a distinct, or area for the eradication of
cattle ticks, etc., prescribes no particular form for the promulgation of
regulations by the board of control of the Agricultural Experiment Station, any
public act of the board promulgating or declaring, in a manner calculated to
convey information to the public generally, the existence of its regulations,
constitute promulgation thereof. Cazort vs. State, 198 S. W., 103, 104;
130 Ark., 453.” (34 W. & P., Perm., 329.)

“In Act Cong. March 3, 1905, c. 1496, sec. 3, 33 Stat. 1265, 21 U. S. C. A.
sec. 125, requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to ‘make and ‘promulgate’ rules
governing the inspection, delivery, and shipment of cattle from a quarantined
state into any other suite, and section 1 requiring publication of notice of
quarantine and the giving of notice to the proper officers of carriers doing
business in any quarantined state, the words ‘make’ and ‘promulgate’ are not
synonymous, and the duty to “make” rules was sufficiently accomplished by
writing them and signing them officially, but to ‘promulgate’ them required the
giving notice thereof to the officers of carriers, etc., and their publication
in the selected newspapers within the affected district. United States
vs. Louisville & N. R. Co., 165 F. 936, 939.” (34 W. & P.,
Perm., 329.)

The majority maintain that when the resolution of October 1, 1945, was
adopted, the decision of the Court of Appeals, sought by the accused to be
revoked, had already become final, this conclusion being premised on the
assumption that the order of July 17, 1944, denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by accused, notwithstanding that it was never notified to
the accused or to his attorney, produced its legal effects against the accused
in the same manner as if the latter had been duly notified of said order on the
very day of its issuance, July 17, 1944, upon the erroneous and absurd theory
that its entry by the clerk constituted its promulgation in accordance with
section 8 of Rule 53, above quoted, which refers to section 2 of Rule 35,
providing that—

“SEC. 2. When and how judgments and orders entered.—If no appeal or
motion for new trial is filed within the time provided in these rules, the
judgment or order shall be entered by the clerk. The notation of the judgment or
order in the book of entries of judgments shall constitute its entry. The
notation shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or order and ishall
be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or order has
become final and executory.”

The theory that by the entry made by the clerk, that is, by the notation of
the order in the book of entries of judgments made by the clerk, the order was
promulgated, as maintained by the majority, is premised on a completely mistaken
concept of the idea of promulgation, which is appulse of logic.

Before proceeding further, the majority must be reminded, in the first place,
that section 8 of Rule 53 does not and can not apply to the order of denial of
July 17, 1944, because said order is not a “judgment,” the word used in said
section, which does not, for any purposes, mention the word “order.” Any law
student knows that there is a world of difference between “judgment” and
“order.”

But, even if we do violence to the rule meaning of the two words and, by
adroit logodaedaly, should accept both as reciprocally interchangeable, it does
not attenuate or minimize the error in giving to the word “promulgation” a
definition which, etymologically and philosophically, is repugnant to reason and
common sense, besides leading to repellent iniquity.

What principle of justice may justify this Court in giving a party litigant,
an accused, a person who is fighting for his honor, property, liberty, or life,
time within which he may ask relief by asking for reconsideration, or otherwise,
of an order or judgment which will jeopardize his fundamental rights, but at the
same time deprives him of the opportunity of availing himself of that time,
because the promulgation of the judgment or order is made, not by notice to him,
but by an official routine undertaken at his back, without his knowledge, the
entry made by the clerk? Conscience revolts against such a mockery in legal
procedure, such farcical, pharisaical, hypocritical gesture within the
administration of justice.

The rules of court, fortunately, do not offer any ground for such a
farfetched and absurd interpretation. Section 7 of Rule 53, which must be taken
into consideration jointly with section 8 thereof, provides:

“SEC. 7. Filing and notice of judgment.—After the judgment and
dissenting opinions, if any, are signed by the justices taking part, they shall
be delivered for filing to the clerk who shall cause true copies thereof to be
served upon the parties or their counsel.”

The above provision determines the true procedure of how promulgation is to
be accomplished. The judgment not only shall be delivered for riling to the
clerk, but must be notified to the parties or their counsel, who will be served
by the clerk-with true copies thereof. A judicial promulgation accomplished
without actual notice to the litigants or their attorneys is mere twaddle which
necessarily will strobilate and proliferate into unending judicial errors,
absurdities and injustices.

In the case at bar, no true copies of the order of denial of July 17, 1944,
having been served by the clerk upon accused Sumilang or his attorney, no
promulgation has been legally accomplished and, therefore, Sumilang is entitled
to take all the legal steps to protect his rights under and within the legal
situation resulting from the fact that with respect to him said order, for all
legal purposes, is nonexistent.

Coming to a different order of ideas, the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated October 8, 1943, having been rendered by a tribunal created and organized
by the enemy during Japanese occupation, whose judicial processes have been
declared null and void and without effect by proclamation of General Douglas
MacArthur, as we have explained in our dissenting opinion in Co Kim Cham
vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113), Sumilang is entitled to
all the legal remedies available to one who is convicted by a decision which is
null and void ab initio.
For all the foregoing, we dissent from the
resolution denying Sumilang’s petition dated August 12, 1946.

HILADO, J.:

I concur in the above dissent of Mr. Justice
Perfecto for the reasons stated in its penultimate paragraph and those expressed
in my own dissents in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon,
supra, as well from the main majority decision as from the majority
resolution on the motion for reconsideration.

DISIDENTE

BRIONES, M.:

No estoy conforme con la resolucion de la mayoria; creo que el apelante,
Guillermo Sumilang, todavia tiene su apelacion pendiente ante esta Corte Suprema
y, por tanto, puede valerse de cualesquier recursos que por ley todavia le
asistan como tal apelante.

Consta en autos, sin valida y eficaz contradiction que la resolucion de esta
Corte de fecha 17 de Julio, 1944, ya no se pudo notificar a Jose F. Fernandez,
abogado del apelante, en su domicilio en 307 calle de Palma, Quiapo, Manila,
porque entonces dicho abogado ya estaba remontado en las espesuras de la
provincia de Laguna coma oficial de guerrilleros bajo el mando del famoso jefe
guerrillero Marking. Sostengo que desde aquel momento la causa, del apelante,
sin culpa suya, quedo desplazada del llamado gobierno de facto y todo
plazo legal contra el quedo suspendido hasta despues de la liberation. A este
efecto,. estimo oportuno roproducir y reafirrriar a continuation las
apreciaciones y conclusiones de mi disidencia en el asunto basico de Co Kim Cham
contra Valdez Tan Keh y Dizon, a saber:

“Al interpretar la proclama del General MacArthur de 23 de Octubre de 1944
que anula todas las actuaciones del gobierno esta-blecido en estas islas bajo la
ocupacion militar japonesa, creo que la inteleccion mas apropiada cs que, como
regla general, esa proclama anula todo, incluso las actuaciones judiciales
(judicial processes), sobre todo aquelias cuya entidad y cuyos efectos rebasan
el periodo de la esclavitud forzosa y trascienden y repercuten en la
postliberacion. En otras palabras, la nulidad, la ineficacia debe ser la regla
general; y la validez, la eficacia, la excepcion, la salvedad.

“La razon de esto es sencilla. El gobierno de ocupacion repre-sentaba en
nuestra vida un parentesis anomalo, de obligada ilegitimidad, y es nada mas que
natural que el gobierno legitimo, de jure, al restaurarse, no
transigiese con los actos y procesos da aquel gobierno, excepto en lo que fuera
absolutamente necesario e iireme-diable. Caerian, por ejemplo, bajo esta
excepcion solamente aquellos actos y procesos resultantes del hecho de que
formabamos una comunidad civilizada con necesidades e intereses individuales y
sociales complejos; y de que por instinto de conservacion y para vivir con
cierto orden y relativa tranquilidad y no precipitarnos en la anarquia y en el
caos habiamos menester la egida de un gobierno, sin hnportar que este no fuese
hechura de nuestra voluntad y que inclusive nos fuera repulsive, Mas alia del
minimum de esta forzosidad, no puede baber transaction con los actos y procesos
de aquel regimen.

“Como corolario de esta inteleccion es obvio que por mucho quo nos tienten y
atraigan ciertas doctrinas y principios conocidos de derecho internacional sobre
gobiernos dc facto, no es conveniente y es hasta p&ligroso sentar reglas
absolutas que a lo mejor no cuadran con las circunstancias peculiares de cada
caso. Lo mas seguro es enjuiciar por SUS propios meritos cada acto o proceso que
se plantee.

“En la determinacion judicial dc esta clase de asuntos nunca se deben perder
de vista, entre otras, las sigmentes circunstancias: (1) que la invasion
japonesa, aun en el apogeo de su fuerza, jamas pudo quebrantar la lealtad
fundamental del pueblo filipmo a su go-hierno y al gobierno de los Estados
Unidos de America; (2) que en casi todas partes de Filipinas esta lealtad hizo
posible la articulacion y organizacion soterranea de ftierzas de resistencia
contra el enemigo; (3) que si bien el control japones era por lo general
efectivo en las ciudades y grandes poblacionps, era, sin embargo, precavio en
muchos pueblos y barrios, sobre todo en aquellos que no tenian valor estratcgico
o eran poco propicios a la confiseacion y rapina, dominando practicamente en
dichos sitios las guerrillas; (4) que en algnnas regiones el gobierno del
Commonwealth Eeguia funcitmando, trasladi’mdose de un sitio a otro para burlar
la persecucion de enemiro acuartelandose en zonas a dondc no nicanzaba la accion
de las guarniciones japonesas; (5) que muchos habitantes de los llanos y
poblados se sustrajeron a la jurisdiccion del gobierno de fuerza pre-dominante
(paramount force), refugiandose en las montanas y lu-garee dominados por las
guerrillas y colocandose bajo la proteccion y salvaguardia de estas, o bien en
sitios donde no habia ni japoneses ni guerrillas; (6) y por ultimo, que despues
del desembarco del General MacArthur y de sus fuerzas libertadoras en Leyte el
20 de Octubre de 1944, la lealtad filipina y el espiritu de rcsistencia ilegaron
a su maxima tension y la ocupacion japonesa se fue desmoronando rapidamente a
pedazos hasta sufrir finalmente un colapso lotal.” (75 Phil., 403,
404.)

Se arguye que bajo las rcglas a la sazon vigentes la citada resolucion de 17
de Julio, 1944, quedo firme, sin necesidad de notificacion a las partes, 15 dias
despues de su promulgation, entendiendose por tal el simple hecho de su
expedition y registro en los autos. Creo que esto es un error. Esa regla ya era
discutible, aun bajo circunstancias normales; pero se podia tolerar en virtud de
la presuncion de que en 15 dias cabia notificar a las partes bajo un sistema
postal eficiente y con servicios de transporte y comunicaciones en normal,
ordenado y expedito funcionamiento. Como pretender, sin embargo, que esa regla
rigiera en una situation de guerra, cuando todos los serquilidad, la seguridad,
la libertad, a lo mejor la vida misma pendia de un hilo? Y, sobre todo icomo
ponerla en vigor contra partes litigantes y abogados que, sin prueba valida en
contra, se sumaron patridticamente al movimiento de resistencia contra el
enemigo?

Por lo expuesto, juzgo que el apelante tiene derecho’a que se conceda su
mocion. Por de pronto, tiene derecho a presentar una segunda mocion de
reconsideracion, desde luego con nuestra venia, que creo debe serle concedida en
justicia y equidad.