IRINEO FACUNDO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. JOSE M. SANTOS, EX-JUSTICE OF “THE PEACE OF PASAY, RICARDO C. ROELES, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF PASAY, AND VALENTIN R. LIM, RESPONDEN…

BENGZON, J.:

The appealed decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissed
petitioner’s complaint for certiorari, out¬growth of civil case No. 32 of the
justice of the peace court of Pasay, same province, entitled “Valentin R. Lim
vs. Irineo Facundo.”

In the last mentioned case—an ejectment proceeding began January 31,
1946—plaintiff alleged ownership of the house located at 603 Samora street,
occupation thereof by defendant, as lessee, at one hundred pesos a month,
defendant’s failure to pay rents since February, 1945, and a thirty-day notice.
Defendant Irineo Facundo denied the main allegations, and asserted that
“plaintiff’s legal possession and ownership of the house and lot is derived from
a deed of sale, which is null and void.” Before the hear¬ing, Facundo moved for
dismissal on the ground, among others, that the justice of the peace court had
no jurisdic¬tion, ownership of the premises being necessarily involved. The
motion was denied. Thereafter, the parties in¬troduced evidence and judgment was
rendered by the herein respondent Jose M. Santos, justice of the peace, on
February .23, 1946, ordering the occupant Irineo Facundo to surrender the
premises, and to pay the plaintiff the stipulated monthly rental of P100 from
February 18, 1945, until the time he actually leaves.

This special civil action for certiorari was subsequently instituted, the
petitioner insisting on the alleged lack of jurisfiiction of the justice of the
peace court. In denying the remedy prayed for, His Honor, Judge Eulalio Garcia,
pointed out to petitioner’s remedy of appeal from the decision of the justice of
the peace, and the existence of another case pending trial in his court (civil
case No. 7611), between the same parties, wherein petitioner had directly
assailed the validity of Lim’s muniment of title the deed of sale of the realty
to him.

The jurisdiction of a justice of the peace over detainer cases in which
defendants aver ownership, has been the subject of many decisions of this Court,
some of them conflicting. But the conflict has now been settled, the present
theory being that defendant can not defeat in such an action “the jurisdiction
of the magistrate’s court by setting up title in himself. In this connection it
should be borne in mind that the factor which defeats the jurisdiction of the
court of the justice of the peace is the necessity to adjudicate the question of
title. The circumstance that proof of title is introduced at the hearing or that
a claim of ownership is made by either or both of the parties is not material.”
(Moron’s Kuies of Court, Vol. II, p. 120, citing Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37
Phil., 752, 759-760. See also Villaroman vs. Esmundo, SC-G. R. No. 37104; Medei
vs. Militante, 41 Phil., 52G, 529.)
In Supia and Batioco vs. Quintero and
Ayala, (59 Phil., 312, 320, 321), this Court said:

“It will be perceived that the real controversy between the parties in this
case centers around an apparent conflict between two lines of decisions of this
court on the sub:ect of the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace in actions of
forcible entry and detainer. Experience has shown the necessity for laying down
a clear and, as far as possible, definite rule on the question, in order to
avoid further confusion and unnecessary litigation. After a careful
consideration of the whole question in the light of pertinent authorities, we
hive come to the corchtsion that (1) the purchaser under a contract of sale with
right to repurchase, is a vendee within the meaning of section 80 of the Code
fcf Civil Procedure, and (2) in an action of forcible entry and detainer, the
mere filing of an answer, claiming title to the premises involved or raising the
question of ownership, will not divest a justice of the peace of
jurisdiction.

“We believe that the conclusion thus reached is in harmony with sound
principles of law and jurisprudence. As stated by the court in Pettit vs. Black
(13 Neb., 142, 154), ‘the answer is a mere statement of the facts which the
party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. If, however, on the
trial it should appear that the action is not in fact for the reccvery of the
possession of the prem¬ises, but to determine a question of title, the court
will have no authority to proceed, and the case must be dismissed. In other
words, where the question to be determined is one of title, it will oust the
court of jurisdiction. But the court has authority to proceed with the hearing
of the case until this fact is clearly established,’ ” (See also Sevilla vs.
Tolentino, 51 Phil., 333.)

From the papers before us it may be gathered that the justice of the peace
court could lawfully decide the litigation without solving the question of
ownership inasmuch as the defendant admitted having sold the property in
February, 1944 (although he claims that the sale was void), and impliedly
admitted having paid rentals thenceforth until February, 1945, when he began
defaulting in the monthly payments. It is obvious that the lessor-lessee ties
having been established or admitted, the true ownership became immaterial, the
lessee being estopped to question his lessor’s title. In other words, the
authority of the respondent justice of the peace to proceed and decide the
controversy arose from the fact that, as submitted, it did not call upon him to
make an adjudication as to the title. (See lloran’s Rules of Court, supra.)

At this juncture, appellant’s view may be remarked that he “does not contend
to be the owner of the property” but “his query is, who is the real owner of the
said house and lot * * *?” The answer is aptly stated in the brief of the
appellees, who maintain that such position “would leave petitioner-appellant
without any leg to stand on” and argue:

“* * * For what interest wculd petitioner-appellant have if he is merely
concerned with finding out who the real owner of the property is. Does not the
law debar him as a tenant from disputing the title of his landlord? And is that
not a conclusive presumption? And if he does not claim to be the owner and as a
tenant he could not raise the question of the title of his landlord, is he not
then wasting the time of the Court * * *?”

All of which confirm the view, already expressed, that the justice of the
peace was not actually required to pass on the question of ownership of the
premises.

The foregoing considerations dispose of the main issue ¦in this review of the
litigation. Other minor issues may now be taken up.

Appellant’s contention that the lower court erred in re¬quiring him to file a
bond for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the
execution of the ouster judgment appears to be unmeritorious. The writ does not
issue as a matter of course at the commencement of certiorari or prohibition
cases. It may be prayed for as an auxiliary remedy and may be issued in the
court’s discretion, which certainly is not abused when it requires compliance
with the conditions for its issuance in other instances, one of which is the
filing of a bond. (Rule 60, section 4.)

Neither did the lower court err in allegedly overlooking the evidence on the
landlord’s failure to give notice and make demand, because any error of the
justice of the peace in that regard did not go to the jurisdiction, which was in
general, the only controversy in the certiorari proceeding. Such error, if any,
could or should be corrected by appeal.

There being no reversible error in the appealed decision, it is hereby
affirmed with costs against the appellant.

Moran, C, J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Briones,
and Tuason, JJ., concur.