DIONISIA ABUEG ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. BARTOLOME SAN DIEGO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Manila in the above-entitled cases awarding plaintiffs the compensation provided
for in the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

The record of the cases was forwarded to the Court of Appeals for review, but
as there was no question of fact involved in the appeal, said court forwarded
the record to this Court. The appeal “was pending when the Pacific War broke
out, and continued pending until after liberation, because the record of the
cases was destroyed as a result of the battle waged by the forces of liberation
against the enemy. As provided by law, the record was reconstituted and we now
proceed to dispose of the appeal.

Appellant, who was the owner of the motor ships San Diego II and
Bartolome S, states in his brief the following:

There is no dispute as to the facts involved in these cases and they may be
gathered from the pleadings and the decision of the trial Court. In case CA-G.
R. No. 773, Dionisia Abueg is the widow of the deceased, Amado Nunez, who was a
machinist on board the M/S San Diego II belonging to the
defendant-appellant. In case CA-G. R. No. 774, plaintiff-appellee, Marciana S.
de Salvation, is the widow of the deceased, Victoriano Salvacion, who was a
machinist on board the M/S Bartolome S also belonging to the
defendant-appellant. In case CA-G. It. No. 775, the plaintiff-appellee, Rosario
R. Oching is the widow of Francisco Oching who was captain or natron of the
defendant-appellant’s M/S Bartolome S.

The M/S San Diego II and the M/S Bartolome, while engaged
in fishing operations around Mindoro Island on Oct. 1, 1941 were caught by a
typhoon as a consequence of which they were sunk and totally lost. Amado Nunez,
Victoriano Salvacion and Francisco Oching while acting in their capacities
perished in the shipwreck (Appendix A, p. IV).

It is also undisputed that the above-named vessels were not covered by any
insurance. (Appendix A, p. IV.)

Counsel for the appellant cite article 587 of the Code of Commerce which
provides that if the vessel together with all her tackle and freight money
earned during the voyage are abandoned, the agent’s liability to third persons
for tortious acts of the captain in the care of the goods which
the ship
carried is extinguished (Yangco vs. Laserna, 73 Phi]., 330) ; article
837 of the same Code which provides that in cases of collision, the shipowners’
liability is limited to the value of the vessel with all her equipment and
freight earned during the voyage (Philippine Shipping Company vs.
Garcia, 6 Phil., 283) ; and article 643 of the same Code which provides that if
the vessel and freight are totally lost, the agent’s liability for wages of the
crew is extinguished. From these premises counsel draw the conclusion that
appellant’s liability, as owner of the two motor ships lost or sunk- as a result
of the typhoon that lashed the island of Mindoro on October 1, 1941, was
extinguished.

The real and hypothecary nature of the liability of the
shipowner or agent embodied in the provisions of the Maritime Law, Book III,
Code of Commerce, had its origin in the prevailing conditions of the maritime
trade and sea voyages during the medieval ages, attended by innumerable hazards
and perils. To offset against these adverse conditions and to encourage
shipbuilding and maritime commerce, it was deemed necessary to confine the
liability of the owner or agent arising from the operation of a ship to the
vessel, equipment, and freight, or insurance, if any, so that if the shipowner
or agent abandoned the ship, equipment, and freight, his liability was
extinguished.

But the provisions of the Code of Commerce invoked by appellant have no room
in the application of the Workmen’s Compensation Act which seeks to improve, and
aims at the amelioration of, the condition of laborers and employees. It is not
the liability for the damage or loss of the cargo or injury to, or death of, a
passenger by or through the misconduct of the captain or master of the ship; nor
the liability for the loss of the ship as a result of collision; nor the
responsibility for wages of the crew, but a liability created by a statute to
compensate employees and laborers in cases of injury received by or inflicted
upon them, while engaged in the performance of their work or employment, or the
heirs and dependents of such laborers and employees in the event of death caused
by their employment. Such compensation has nothing to do with the provisions of
the Code of Commerce regarding maritime commerce. It is an item in the cost of
production which must be included in the budget of any well-managed
industry.

Appellant’s assertion that in the case of Enciso vs. Dy-Liaco (57
Phil., 446), and Murillo vs. Mendoza (66 Phil, 689), the question of
the extinction of the shipowner’s liability due to abandonment of the ship by
him was not fully discussed, as in the case of Yangco vs. Laserna,
supra, is not entirely correct. In the last mentioned case, the
limitation of the shipowner’s liability to the value of the ship, equipment,
freight, and insurance, if any, was the lis mota. In the case of Enciso
vs. Dy-Liacco, supra, the application of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act to a master or patron who perished as a result of the sinking
of the motorboat of which he was the master, was the controversy submitted to
the court for decision. This Court held in that case that “It lias been
repeatedly stated that the Workmen’s Compensation Act was enacted to abrogate
the common law and our Civil Code upon culpable acts and omissions, and that the
employer need not be guilty of neglect or fault, in order that responsibility
may attach to him” (pp. 449-450) ; and that the shipowner was liable to pay
compensation provided for in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, notwithstanding the
fact that the motorboat was totally lost. In the case of Murillo vs.
Mendoza, supra, this Court held that “The rights and responsibilities
defined in said Act must be governed by its own peculiar provisions in complete
disregard of other similar provisions of the civil as well as the mercantile
law. If an accident is compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, it must
be compensated even when the workman’s right is not recognized by or is in
conflict with other provisions of the Civil Code or of the Code of Commerce. The
reason behind this principle is that the Workmen’s Compensation Act was enacted
by the Legislature in abrogation of the other existing laws.” This quoted part
of the decision is in answer to the contention that it was not the intention of
the Legislature to repeal articles 643 and 837 of the Code of Commerce with the
enactment of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

In the memorandum filed by counsel for the appellant, a new point not relied
upon in the court below is raised. They contend that the motorboats engaged in
fishing could not be deemed to be in the coastwise and inter-island trade, as
contemplated in section 38 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (No. 3428), as
amended by Act No. 3812, inasmuch as, according to counsel, a craft engaged in
the coastwise and inter-island trade is one that carries passengers and/or
merchandise for hire between ports and places in the Philippine Islands.

This new point raised by counsel for the appellant is inconsistent with the
first, for, if the motor ships in question, while engaged in fishing, were to
be considered as not engaged in inter-island and coastwise trade, the provisions
of the Code of Commerce invoked by them regarding limitation of the shipowner’s
liability or extinction thereof when the shipowner abandons the ship, cannot be
applied (Lopez vs. Duruelo, 52 Phil., 229). Granting however, that the
motor ships run and operated by the appellant were not engaged in the coastwise
and inter-island trade, as contemplated in section 38 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, as amended, still the deceased officers of the motor ships in
question were industrial employees within the purview of section 39, paragraph
(d), as amended, for industrial employment “includes all employment or work at a
trade, occupation or profession exercised by an employer for the purpose of
gain.” The only exceptions recognized by the Act are agriculture, charitable
institutions and domestic service. Even employees engaged in agriculture for the
operation of mechanical implements, are entitled to the benefits of the
Workmen’s Facundo vs. Santos Compensation Act (Francisco vs.
Consing, 63 Phil., 354). In Murillo vs. Mendoza, supra, this
Court held that “our Legislature has deemed it advisable to include in the
Workmen’s Compensation Act all accidents that may occur to workmen or employees
in factories, shops and other industrial and agricultural workplaces as well as
in the inter-island seas of the Archipelago.” But we do not believe that the term
“coastwise and inter-island trade” has such a narrow meaning as to confine it to
the carriage for hire of passengers and/or merchandise on vessels between ports
and places in the Philippines, because while fishing is an industry, if the
catch is brought to a port for sale, it is at the same time a trade.

Finding no merit in the appeal filed in these cases, we affirm the judgment
of the lower court, with costs against the appellant.

Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon,
Briones, and Tuazon, JJ., concur.