SUSANO AMOR, PETITIONER, VS. JUGO, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, SHIU CHE KONG (ALIAS TIU TIONG IU), RESPONDENTS.

PADILLA, J.:

In a detainer action brought by petitioner against respondent Shiu Che Kong
alias Tiu Tions Iu and Francisco Gonzales, judgment was rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Manila on appeal, the dispositive part of which reads
thus:

“El demandado Shiu Che Kong alias Tiu Tiong Iu y el demandante manifestaron
al Juzgado que entrs ellos dos acababan de tensr un arreglo amistoso, sin
especificarlo; pero para evitar que las partes vuelvan a litigar sobre la misma
question, y sin perjuicio de cualquier arreglo legal que las partes pudiaran
tener, el Juzgado dicta decision, condenando a los demandados a restituir al
demandante la casa en cuestion No. 2248 (piso bajo), Avenida Rizal, Manila; se
demandado Shiu Che Kong alias Tiu Tiong lu a pagar al demanlos aquileres de
dicha casa a razon de CIENTO CUARENTA PESOS (P140.00) al mes el exceso de lo que
habia recibido desde Marzo,a Julio, inclusive, de 1945, mas sus intereses
legales; se condena al demandado Shui Che Kong alias Tiu Tiong Iu a pagar al
demandante los alquileres de dicha casa a razon de CIENTO CUARENTA PESOS
(P140.00) al mes por el tiempo que vaya venciendo despues de Julio de 1945 hasta
la restitution completa de dicha casa al demandante; se ordena al demandando
Francisco Gonzales a no inmiscuirse en la posesion y disposicion de dicha casa;
y se ordena a los dos demandados a pagar las costas en ambas instancias.”
(Exhibit A.)

Only Francisco Gonzales appealed from the judgment. This Court affirmed it
(Exhibit C). On August 2, 1946, a motion for reconsideration was denied by this
Court (Exhibit, C-1). On August 5, petitioner moved for execution of the
judgment which the respondent court granted the following day (Exhibit D). On
August 10, respondent Tiu Tiong Iu moved for a stay of execution of the
judgment, on the ground (1) that there had been a contract of lease on the
premises involved in the action between him and the petitioner; (2) that after
making him believe that he could continue occupying the premises, petitioner was
estopped from asking for execution of the judgment; (3) that the judgment, the
execution of which was prayed for, by its terms could not be executed against
him; (4) that the judgment had already been executed, for the contract of lease
referred to had in effect restored to petitioner the possession of the premises
(Exhibit 5r’) . It clearly appears that the real purpose of the motion was not
to stay execution of the juagment but to quash it. The motion was objected to by
petitioner (Exhibit G) . On August 20, the respondent court denied the writ of
execution prayed for by petitioner (Exhibit E) , which had already been granted
on August 6 {Exhibit D) . The motion submitted, to the respondent court for
decision was to stay execution ox the judgment (should be to quash the writ of
execution), but the order denying the execution was tantamount to granting the
stay of execution of the judgment (should be to quashing the writ of execution),
prayed for by respondent Tiu Tiong Iu, on the ground that there was a
contractual relation of landlord and tenant between petitioner and respondent
Tiu Tiong Ju (Exhibit H) . A motion for reconsideration of the preceding order
(Exhibit I) was denied (Exhibit L).

The petition filed in this special civil action prays for a writ to compel
the respondent court to issue a writ for the execution of the judgment, the
issuance of which it had denied or the quashal or stay of which it had
ordered.

The alleged settlement of the detainer case between respondent Tiu Tiong Iu
and petitioner is disputed by the latter who claims that what was settled or
accepted by him was the payment of rental to him every month instead of its
deposit into court during the pendency of the appeal. Petitioner’s claim is
corroborated by: his refusal to accept the payment of the rental for the month
of August after learning of the denial by this Court of appellant’s motion for
reconsideration on August 2, 1946. If the respondent Tin Tiong In had in fact
entered into a contract of lease with the petitioner, the former should have
bared it to the trial court or should have sat up his defense and presented
evidence in support thereof, when the latter objected to the dismissal of the
case as to said respondent. Be that as it may, the fact remains respondent Tiu
Tiong Iu and his co-defendant Francisco Gonzales were ordered by the Court of
First Instance of Manila, among other things, to vacate the premises then
occupied by the respondent Tiu Tiong lu. Only Francisco Gonzales appealed from
that judgment. This Court affirmed it. The judgment was final and executory as
to the respondent Tiu Tiong lu even before its affirmance by this Court, because
he did not appeal therefrom.

The respondent court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a final
and sice out ory judgment, or Quash it, or order its stay, for, as a general
rule, the parties will not be allowed, after final judgment, to object to the
execution by raising new issues of fact or of law, except when there had been a
change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution Inequitable
(Warner, Barnes & Go, vs. Jaucian, 13 Phil. 4; Behn, Meyer &
Co. vs. Mc Micking, 11 Phil., 276; Molina276; Molina vs. De la
Riva, 8 Phil. 569; Espiritu vs. Crossfield and Guash, 14 Phil, 588;
Flor Mata vs. Lichauco y Salinas, 36 Phil. 809; Chua A. H. Lee
vs. Mapa, 51 Phil, 624]; or when, it appears that the controversy has
never been submitted to the judgment of the court (Yulo vs. Powell, 36
Phil. 732} ; or when it appears that the writ of execution has been
improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is Issuad against
the wrong party, or that judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or
when the writ has been issued without authority (Wolfson vs. Del
Rosario and Fajardo, 76 Phil., 143; Viuda de Mayuga vs. Raymundo and
Nable, 42 Official Gazette 2121) . None of these circumstances is present in the
judgment sought to be executed. The judgment is clear, specific and definitive.
And with more compelling reason the respondent court cannot refuse to issue such
writ, or quash it or order its stay, ‘When the. judgment had been reviewed and
affirmed by an appellate court, for it cannot review or interfere with any
matter decided on appeal, or give ether or further relief, or assume supervisory
jurisdiction to interpret or reverse the judgment of the higher court (Shioji
vs. Harvey, 43 Phil. 333; Cabigao and Izquierdo vs. Del
Rosario and Lira, 44 Phil. 182; Wolfson vs. Del Rosario and Fajardo,
supra; Philippine Trust Co. vs. Santamaria, F.M. Yaptico & Co., 53
Phil. 463)

The phrase “sin perjuicio de oualquier arreglo legal que las partes pudieran
tener”, found la the judgment under consideration, does not warrant an inference
that there had been a contract, understanding or settlement between petitioner
and respondent Tiu Tiong lu which created between them the relationship of
landlord and tenant. It is more of a future than a past or previous
understanding, Respondent Tiu Tiong la insists that it was an understanding had
before the trial of the case in the respondent court. His failure to persist in
his motion to have the case dismissed as to him based on that understanding
deprives him of the right to rely thereon. If the alleged understanding had been
entered into before the trial of the case, the rule laid down in Chua A. H. Lee
vs. Mapa, supra, invoked by respondent Tiu Tiong lu, is inapplicable,
because the understanding is not subsequent to the judgment, the trial court
disregarded it, and the respondent Tiu Tiong lu did not appeal from such finding
to have it reversed.

There being, no legal or equitable ground upon which, a refusal to issue a
writ of execution, or a quashal of the execution, or a stay of execution, of the
judgment rendered in the detainer case against the respondent Tiu Tiong lu may
be predicated, the order of the respondent court denying the issuance of the
writ of execution, or quashing it or directing its stay after it had been
issued, is clearly illegal.

The respondent court is directed to issue the writ of execution as prayed for
by the petitioner, with costs against the respondent Tiu Tiong lu.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon,
Briones, and Tuason, JJ., concur.