JOSE C. VILLANUEVA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, vs. JUAN CANLAS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

PERFECTO, J.:

Defendant is occupying the house of 596 Isabel, Sampaloc, Manila, at a
monthly rental of P100, payabale in advance during the first five days of each
calendar month. Plaintiff, in a complaint filed in the Municipal Court of Manila
on August 15, 1945, seeking the restitution of the property, alleged that
defendant failed to pay the rents for the months of July and August 1945, that
plaintiff needs the premises for his personal use, that defendant had been
requested several times to vacate the premises, the last request having been
made in writing on August 8, 1945, and the defendant even threatened to do
bodily harm to plaintiff if he is forced to vacate the property.

On August 22, 1945, the municipal court rendered decision ordering the
defendant to vacate the premises and to pay rents from July 1, 1945, at the rate
of P100 a month and costs. On November 29, 1945, Judge Buenaventura Ocampo, of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, on appeal, rendered decision affirming
the deaision of the municipal court.

Defendant alleges that the reason of plaintiff in ousting him from the
premises in question is plaintiff’s desire to charge an unlawful and
unconscionable rent; that defendant’s ouster, in view of the present grave
shortage of housing facilities, will be tantamount to casting him and his family
to the streets; and that the contract of lease has not yet expired.

Upon the evidence, the lower court has found that plaintiff and defendant
entered into a verbal contract of lease concerning the premises in question on
the basis of a monthly rental of P100, payable within the first five days of
each calendar month, and that in July, 1945, plaintiff requested defendant to
vacate the property because plaintiff needed it for him and his family, as they
are occupying temporarily a room in the house of plaintiff’s mother at Legarda
Street. By reason of defendant’s refusal to vacate the property, plaintiff
approached his attorney who, on August 8, 1945, wrote to defendant the letter
Exhibit A, asking him to vacate the house within five days.

No period of time having been agreed upon in the verbal contract of lease as
the facts of the case show, the duration of the contract must, according to the
Civil Code, be on a month to month basis, that is, terminating at the end of
each month, but being renewed the next month by tacit agreement, and so
successively until one of the parties refuses to oontinue the tacit renewals.
This is the case when plaintiff required defendant to vacate the premises in
July, 1945.

In his brief, appellant maintains that the lower court erred in not applying
Commonwealth Act No. 689, in finding him delinquent in the payment of rentals,
in holding that there was a demand made upon him to vacate the premises, and in
finding that plaintiff needs the premises.

Commonwealth Act No. 689 was enacted on October 15, 1945, about two months
after plaintiff’s cause of action had arisen. Since said act is not retroactive,
as defendant’s, counsel himself admitted, it is not applicable in this case.

The question whether or not demand was made upon defendant to vacate the
premises is immaterial, although the evidence shows that plaintiff did really
make such a demand. “A lease ceases upon the expiration of its term without the
necessity of any notice to the tenant who thenceforth becomes a deforciant.” (Co
Tiamc vs. Diaz, 75 Phil., 672.) “The lease shall terminate without
necessity of a special notice, upon the expiration of the term.” (Domingo Vda.
de Buhay vs. Cobarrubias, 76 Phil., 213.)

Whether or not defendant had been delinquent in the payment of rentals and
plaintiff needs the premises, although the record appears to support plaintiff’s
contention, are of no consequence after we have arrived at the conclusion that
the duration of the verbal lease contract between plaintiff and defendant was
monthly, according to article 1581 of the Civil Code. There could be no implied
renewal of the lease contract after July, 1945, under article 1566 of said Code,
because in that month the lessor gave the lessee notice to vacate.

We are not unmindful of defendant’s plea that the City of Manila is faced by
an acute shortage of housing facilities and that his ouster will be tantamount
to casting him and his family into the streets. We can not close our eyes to the
stark realities of the prevailing situation, deplorable aftereffects of the last
war. But defendant’s plea does not raise a legal question within the proper
cognizance of tribunals. It rather raises a political question or points out a
social” evil that may be exposed, borrowing an image from Rizal, at the steps of
the temple, and whose solution or remedy can and should be afforded by the
political departments of government. The burden of such solution or remedy lies
primarily on the shoulders of Congress, the policy-making agency of the state.
Congress enacted in 1945 Commonwealth Act No. 689, and it seems satisfied with
that legislation for the time being. If defendant feels that, under the existing
legislation, which this Court has no other alternative but to apply and enforce,
he is a victim of a political or social injustice, the Constitution opens the
doors for him to petition Congress for proper legislative remedy.

The lower court’s decision is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Paras, Pablo, Hilado, and Padilla, JJ., concur.