NATIVIDAD DOLIENTE, PETITIONER, VS. MANUEL BLANCO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOILO, JACINTO DOLIENTE, AND FEDERICO DOLIENTE, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari with mandatory
injunction to restrain the respondent Judge from enforcing his orders
of October 27, 1949, and November 18, 1949, and to have them declared
null and void on the ground that they were issued in excess of his
Jurisdiction.

Natividad Doliente filed a case in the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo to quiet title over two parcels of land and to recover damages
against Jacinto Doliente and Federico Doliente (case No. 715). After
trial, the court, presided over by Hon. Manuel Blanco, respondent
herein, decided the case absolving the defendants from the complaint,
without pronouncement as to costs. On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
the decision was affirmed with costs against the appellant. On
September 27, 1949, after the case was returned to the lower court, the
defendants filed a motion for the execution of the decision, and on
September 28, 1949, they also filed another motion to require the
plaintiff to render an accounting of the products gathered by her from
one of the lots in litigation during the period she had been in
possession since January 1946. On October 27, 1949, the respondent
judge issued two separate orders, one ordering the plaintiff to
surrender possession of the lots in question to the defendants and pay
the costs of action, and another to render an accounting of the
products gathered by her from February 20, 1948. Plaintiff filed a
motion to reconsider the last order, which was readily denied, and when
plaintiff refused to render an accounting, respondent judge allowed the
defendants to present evidence as to the damages allegedly suffered by
them. Thereafter, or on November 18, 1949, the respondent judge issued
an order directing the plaintiff to deliver to the defendants
fifty-seven and one-half (57-1/2) bultos of palay, or in lieu
thereof, pay their value in the sum of P1,497,50, with legal interest
from the date of the order until fully paid. Plaintiff again filed a
motion for the reconsideration of the order issued on November 18,
1949, and when the motion was denied, plaintiff filed the petition
under consideration.

The record also shows that on February 3, 1948, when Civil Case No.
715 was pending in the Court of Appeals, defendants filed a motion with
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo praying for the appointment of a
receiver who may take possession of the two (2) lots in litigation
under section 9, Rule hi, of the Rules of Court. This motion was denied
by the respondent judge, but the latter required the plaintiff to file
a bond for the damages that may be suffered by the defendants resulting
from the possession by the plaintiff of one of the lots in litigation,
and in compliance therewith plaintiff caused the Philippine Guaranty
Company to put up a bond in the amount of five hundred pesos P500 upon
the express condition that said amount would be to answer for the
damages that may be awarded to the defendants by the appellate court.

The question now to be determined is whether the respondent judge
acted legally and within his jurisdiction in issuing the orders of
October 27, 1949, and November 18, 1949, requiring the plaintiff to
render an accounting of the products gathered by her from one of the
lots in question, and to pay to the defendants fifty-seven and one-half
(57-1/2) bultos of palay, or their value in the sum of P1,497,50, as damages.

It appears that the two orders above adverted to were-issued by the
respondent judge after the decision of the Court of Appeals had become
final and executory. This decision affirmed that of the lower court,
which absolved the defendants from the complaint without costs. Neither
in the decision of the lower court, nor in that of the Court of
Appeals, was there any award of damages in favor of the defendants,
notwithstanding the fact that this matter was put in issue in the
pleadings and the parties had presented evidence in relation thereto.
When no award as to damages was made in the decision both of the lower
court and the Court of Appeals, the claim of the defendants for damages
must have been devoid of merit. Otherwise, the defendants would have
filed a motion for reconsideration. When, therefore, the lower court in
issuing the writ of execution of the judgment ordered not only to
execute it according to its terms but to add thereto a new relief, such
as the rendition of accounts, or the payment of the sum of P1,497,50 as
damages, it is evident that it acted in excess of its jurisdiction, if
not with abuse of authority, for it is a well-known doctrine that when a
judgment of a higher court is returned to a lower court, the only
function of the latter “is the ministerial one of issuing the order of
execution.” The lower court cannot amend it, nor add a new or further
relief. Thus, in the leading case of Shioji., vs. Harvey, (43 Phil. 337), this Court said:

“Lengthy elucidation of the proposition that the
only function of a lower court, when the judgment of a higher court is
returned to it, is the ministerial one of issuing the order of
execution, and that a lower court is without supervisory jurisdiction
to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher court, would seem
to be superfluous. A judge of a lower court cannot enforce different
decrees than those rendered by the superior court. If each and every
Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling
decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation,
and judicial chaos would result. Appellate jurisdiction would be a
farce if the Supreme Court did not have the power of preventing
inferior courts from meddling with decisions when sent to them for
compliance. Where a cause has been appealed from a Court of First
Instance to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, and a judgment
rendered by the latter, no interference therewith by the lower court
can be tolerated through any proceedings other than such as are
directed by the appellate court. Until revoked by the Supreme Court of
the United States, the decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands must stand and be enforced.

“The inferior court is
bound by the decree as the law of the case, and must carry it into
execution according to the mandate. They cannot vary it, or examine It
for any other purpose than execution, or give any other or further
relief, or review it upon any matter decided on appeal for error-
apparent, or inter meddle with it, further than to settle so much as has
been remanded.’ These are the words of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the early case of Sibtoald vs. United States ([1838], 12 Pet., 488).” (See also Cabigao and Izquierdo vs. Del Rosario and Lira, 44 Phil. 182; Chua A.H. Lee vs. Mapa, 51 Phil. 624; Patricio Contreras et al. vs. Alfonso Felix et al, Vol. 44 Off. Gaz. 4306, June 30, 1947).

Counsel for the respondent claims, however, that plaintiff may still
be held answerable for damages in this state of the case because, while
the original case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the defendants
prayed that a receiver be appointed to take possession of one of the
lots in litigation pending appeal, and that in lieu thereof, the
court required the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for the damages
that the defendants might suffer resulting from the possession of said
lot by the plaintiff, and for that purpose plaintiff has caused the
Philippine Guaranty Company to put up a bond in the amount of P500.

We do not find merit in this claim. While plaintiff put up the
aforesaid bond, it does not necessarily mean that she bound herself,
together with her bondsman, to pay damages even if they have not been
proven. As the terms of the bond clearly indicate, the bondsman will
only answer for damages if and when they are awarded by the appellate
court. The bond, being contractual, can only be enforced in accordance
with its terms. Indeed, it was the duty of the defendants to establish
their claim for damages when the case was tried in the lower court or
in the Court of Appeals, and having failed to do so, as evidenced by
the decision rendered by both Courts, no damages can be claimed from
the plaintiff. To prove these damages now is too late. The decision of
the court has already become final.(sec 9, Rule61).

Wherefore, petition is hereby granted. The Court declares the
orders of the respondent dated October 27, 1949, and November 18, 1949,
null and void, and enjoins him from enforcing them as prayed for in the
petition.

Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, and Jugo, JJ., concur.