AGUSTINA PARANETE, PERINO VILLAR, PEDRO HERNANDEZ, COMEDES DALLATON, VALERIANO MILLANO, FELISIANA NAVARRO, AND EDUARDO B. OCAMPO, PETITONERS, VS. BIENVENIDO A. TAN, JUDGE, COURT…

This is a petition for a writ of prohibition wherein petitioner
seeks to enjoin the respondent judge from enforcing his order of March
4, 1950, on the ground that the same was issued in excess of his
jurisdiction.

On January 16, 1950, Felix Alcaras, Fructuosa Vasquez, Maxima
Vasquez and Norberta Vasquez filed a case in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal for the recovery of five parcels of land against
Agustina Paranete and six other co-defendants. (Civil Case No. 1020). On
January 28, 1950, plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of preliminary
injunction for the purpose of ousting the defendants from the lands in
litigation and of having themselves placed in possession thereof. The
petition was heard ex parte, and as a result the respondent
judge issued the writ of injunction requested. On February 28, 1950,
the defendants moved for the reconsideration of the order granting the
writ, to which plaintiffs objected, and after due hearing, at which
both parties appeared with their respective counsel, the respondent
judge reconsidered his order, but required the defendants to render an
accounting of the harvest for the year 1949, as well as all future
harvests, and if the harvest had already been sold, to deposit the
proceeds of the sale with the clerk of court, allowing the plaintiffs
or their representative to be present during each harvest. This order
was issued on March 4, 1950. Defendants again filed a motion for the
reconsideration of this order, but it was denied, hence the petition
under consideration.

The question to be determined is whether or not the respondent
judge exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing his order of March 4, 1950,
under the terms and conditions set forth above.

We hold that the respondent judge has acted in excess of his
jurisdiction when he issued the order above adverted to. That order, in
effect, made the Clerk of Court a sort of a receiver charged with the
duty of receiving the proceeds of sale and the harvest of every year
during the pendency of the case with the disadvantage that the Clerk of
Court has not filed any bond to guarantee the faithful discharge of
his duties as depositary; and considering that in actions involving
title to real property, the appointment of a receiver cannot be
entertained because its effect would be to take the property out of the
possession of the defendant, except in extreme cases when there is
clear proof of its necessity to save the plaintiff from grave and
irremediable loss or damage, it is evident that the action of the
respondent judge is unwarranted and unfair to the defendants. (Mendoza vs. Arellano, 36 Phil. 59; Agonoy vs. Ruiz, 11 Phil. 204; Aquino vs. Angeles David, 77 Phil., 1087; Ylarde vs. Enriquez, 78 Phil., 527; Arcega vs. Pecson, 44 Off. Gaz. (No. 12) 4884; Carmen Vda. de De la Cruz vs.
Guinto, 45 Off. Gaz. pp. 1309, 1311; 79 Phil., 304.) Moreover, we find
that Agustina Paranete, one of the defendants, has been in possession
of the lands since 1943, in the exercise of .her rights as owner, with
her co-defendants working for her exclusively as tenants,, and that
during all these years said Agustina Paranete had made improvements
thereon at her own expense. These improvements were made without any
contribution on the part of the plaintiffs. The question of ownership
is herein involved and both parties seem to have documentary evidence
in support of their respective claims, and to order the defendants to
render an accounting of the harvest and to deposit the proceeds in case
of sale thereof during the pendency of the case would be to deprive
them of their means of livelihood before the case is decided on the
merits. The situation obtaining is such that it does not warrant the
placing of the lands in the hands of a neutral person as is required
when a receiver is appointed. To do so would be unfair and would
unnecessarily prejudice the defendants.

While the respondent judge claims in his order of March 25, 1950,
that he acted as he did because of a verbal agreement entered into
between the lawyers of both parties, we do not consider it necessary to
pass on this point because the alleged agreement is controverted and
nothing about it has been mentioned by the respondent judge in his
order under consideration.

Wherefore, petition is hereby granted. The Court declares the order
of the respondent judge of March 4, 1950 null and void and enjoins him
from enforcing it as prayed for in the petition.

Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, and Jugo, JJ., concur.