G.R. No. L-21776. February 28, 1964
NICANOR G. JORGE, PETITIONER VS. JOVENCIO Q. MAYOR, RESPONDENT.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
this Court to have petitioner declared as the sole legally appointed
and qualified Director of Lands, and to require respondent to return
over said office to the petitioner as well as to desist from holding
himself out as “Acting Director, Bureau of Lands”.
It is undisputed that petitioner, Nicanor G. Jorge, is a career
official in the Bureau of Lands. He started working there as a Junior
Computer in the course of 38 years service, from February 1, 1922 to
October 31, 1960, and attained the position of Acting Director, through
regular and successive promotions, in accordance with civil service
rules. On June 17, 1961, he was designated Acting Director of the same
Bureau, and on December 13, 1961 was appointed by President Carlos
Garcia ad interim Director. He qualified by taking the oath of
office on the 23rd December of 1961. This appointment was on December
26, 1961, transmitted to the Commission on Appointments, and on May 14,
1962, petitioner’s ad-interim appointment as Director of Lands was confirmed by the Commission.
Petitioner discharged the duties as Director until on November 14,
1962 he received a letter from Benjamin Gozon, then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources of the Macapagal Administration,
informing him that pursuant to a letter from the Assistant Executive
Secretary Bernal, served on petitioner on November 13, his appointment
was among those revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 of President
Diosdado Macapagal; that the position of Director of Lands was
considered vacant; and that petitioner Jorge was designated Acting
Director of Lands, effective November 13, 1962. Upon learning that
respondent Mayor, an outsider, had been designated by the President to
be Acting Director of Lands, Jorge protested (in a letter of November
16, 1962) to the Secretary of Agriculture informing the latter that he
would stand on his rights, and issued office circulars claiming to be
the legally appointed Director of Lands. Finally, on September 2, 1963,
he instituted the present proceedings.
The answer of respondent pleads that the ad interim appointment
of petitioner and its confirmation were invalid, having been duly
revoked by President Macapagal by Administrative Order No. 2 dated
December 31, 1961; that petitioner voluntarily relinquished his
position and accepted his designation as Acting Director, issuing press
statements to said effect, and voluntarily accompanying and introducing
respondent to most officials of the Bureau as the newly acting Director
of Lands.
The fundamental issue is whether Administrative Order No. 2 of
President Macapagal operated as a valid revocation of petitioner’s ad interim appointment. We think it has not done so.
The official text of said Administrative Order, as published in the Official Gazette (Vol. 58, page 3, No. 1) is as follows:
“WHEREAS, ad interim appointments were
extended and released by President Carlos P. Garcia after the joint
session of Congress that ended on December 13, 1961;NOW,
THEREFORE, I, DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, President of the Philippines,
pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, do hereby withdraw and
recall and declare without any further effect, all the said
appointments and all communications relative thereto, including those
to the defunct Commission on Appointments.Done in the City
of Manila, this 31st day of December, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and sixty-one and of the Independence of the Philippines, the
sixteenth.
By the President:
Petitioner Jorge’s ad interim appointment is dated December 13, 1961, but there is no evidence on record that it was made and released after
the joint session of Congress that ended on the same day. It is a
matter of contemporary history, of which this Court may take judicial
cognizance, that the session, ended late in the night of December 13,
1961, and, therefore, after regular office hours. In, the absence of
competent evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the
appointment of Jorge was made before the close of office hours, that
being the regular course of business. The appointment, therefore, was
not included in, nor intended to be covered by, Administrative Order
No. 2, and the same stands unrevoked. Consequently, it was validly
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, and thereafter, the office
never became vacant.
It is an error to consider petitioner’s case as within the purview
of our ruling in the Aytona vs. Castillo case (L-19313, Jan. 20, 1962).
If in that case this Court refused to interfere with the application of
the Chief Executive’s Administrative Order No. 2, it was because the
circumstances of the appointments therein involved rendered it doubtful
whether the appointees’ equitable rights could be invoked,
“considering the rush conditional appointments,
hurried maneuvers and other happenings detracting from that degree of
good faith, morality and propriety which form the basic foundation of
claims to equitable relief.”
There is certainly no parity between the appointment of petitioner
in December 13, 1961 and the confused scramble for appointments in and
during the days immediately preceding the inauguration of the present
administration. For aught that appears on the record before us, the
appointment of petitioner Jorge was the only one made in that day, and
there is nothing to show that it was not—”so spaced as to afford some
assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need
for the appointment and the appointee’s qualifications”
that could be validly made even by an outgoing President under the
Aytona ruling (Castillo vs. Aytona, L-19313, Jan. 20, 1962: Merrera vs.
Liwag, L-20079, Sept. 30, 1963; Gillera vs. Fernandez, L-20741, Jan.
31, 1964).
If anyone is entitled to the protection of the civil service
provisions of the Constitution, particularly those against removals
without lawful cause, it must be the officers who, like herein
petitioner, entered the Civil Service in their youth, bent on making a
career out of it, gave it the best years of their lives and grew gray
therein in the hope and expectation that they would eventually attain
the upper reaches and levels of the official hierarchy, not through
political patronage, but through loyalty, merit, and faithful and
unremitting toil. In Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil. 740, this Court had
occasion to voice its concern for these civil servants:
“* * *. To hold that civil service officials hold
their office at the will of the appointing power subject to removal or
forced transfer at any time, would demoralize and undermine and
eventually destroy the whole Civil Service System and structure. The
country would then go back to the days of the old Jacksonian Spoils
System under which a victorious Chief Executive, after the elections
could, if so minded, sweep out of office, civil service employees
differing in political color or affiliation from him, and swoop in his
political followers and adherents, especially those who have given him
help, political or otherwise. A Chief Executive running for reelection
may even do this before election time not only to embarrass and
eliminate his political enemies from office but also to put his
followers in power so that with their official influence they could the
better help him and his party in the elections. As may be gathered from
the report of the Committee of the Constitutional Convention which we
have reproduced at the beginning of this opinion, the framers of our
Constitution, at least the Civil Service Committee thereof, condemned
said spoils system and purposely and deliberately inserted the
constitutional prohibition against removal except for cause, which now
forms the basis of this decision.”
In common with the Gillera appointment sustained by this Court less
than a month ago, Jorge’s appointment is featured by a recognition of
his tenure by the Macapagal administration itself, since he was allowed
to hold and discharge undisturbed his duties as de jure
Director of Lands for nearly eleven months; it was only in mid November
of 1962 that the attempt was actually .made to demote Him and appoint a
rank outsider in his place in the person of respondent Mayor.
As to the alleged voluntary acquiescence and relinquishment by
petitioner of his position as de jure Director of Lands, the evidence
is that he did protest against his demotion in letters to the Secretary
of Agriculture and in office circulars. That he did not immediately
adopt a hostile attitude towards the authorities, and the respondent
herein, was merely evidence of that courtesy, and “delicadeza” to be
expected of a man in a high position, who does not wish to obstruct the
functions of the office, and is in no way incompatible with his
determination to protect his rights. It must also be remembered that
the precedent case of the former Chairman of the National Science
Board, suspended indefinitely on charges that were subsequently found
to be false, did not encourage precipitate action, and was a reminder
of the unpleasant consequences of defying the administration. At any
rate, “abandonment of an office by reason of acceptance of another, in
order to be effective and binding, should spring from and be
accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice, either to keep the
old office or renounce it for another” (Teves vs. Sindiong, 81 Phil.
658, and the record is unconvincing that the alleged acts of
acquiescence, mostly equivocal in character, were freely and
voluntarily accomplished.
Wherefore, the writs applied for are granted, and the petitioner
Nicanor G. Jorge is declared to be the duly appointed, confirmed, and
qualified Director of Lands, and the respondent, Jovencio Q. Mayor, is
required to turn over said office to the petitioner and to desist from
holding himself out as “Acting Director of Lands”. Respondent shall pay
the costs.
Bengzon, C. J., Labrador, Concepción, Barrera, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Paredes, J.: In the result.
Bautista Angelo, J.: I concur in part and dissenting in part for reasons stated in my concurring opinion in the Aytona case.
CONCURRING, IN PART, AND DISSENTING, IN PART
DIZON, J.:
I concur with the majority opinion in so far as it holds that the
appointment of herein petitioner-involved in this case—does not fall
within the purview of our ruling in the Aytona case. Said appointment
was made under the same extraordinary and unusual circumstances which
surrounded the making and release of the appointments voided as a
result of the aforesaid ruling.
However, I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion in view,
of the reasons given in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Padilla
in the Aytona case, with which I concurred.
DISSENTING
PADILLA, J.:
For the reasons stated in my concurring opinion in Aytona vs.
Castillo, G. R. No. L-19313, 19 January 1962, and dissenting opinion in
Gillera vs. Fernandez, et al., G. R. No. L-20741, 31 January 1964,
which I re-incorporate and reiterate herein, the ad interim appointment
of the petitioner as Director of Lands made on 13 December 1961 by the
then President of the Republic ended or expired on 30 December 1961. As
the petitioner was not appointed to the same office after the 30th day
of December 1961, the confirmation of his ad interim appointment as
Director of Lands by the Commission on Appointments on 14 May 1962 was
of no legal validity and effect. The respondent was lawfully appointed
to the office and the petitioner is not entitled to hold it. The
petition for writ of quo warranto should be dismissed.