CRISPULO, F. ARNALDO AND JULITA SARAYBA DE ARNALDO, PETITIONERS, VS. JOSE BERNABE, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, BENIGNO T. SARAYBA, AMPARO SARAYBA, MIGUEL F. …

This is a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary
injunction filed by Crispulo F. Arnaldo and his wife, Julita Sarayba de
Arnaldo, against the Court of First Instance of Cavite and others.

In 1936, respondent, Benigno T. Sarayba, filed an action against
petitioner, Julita T. Sarayba, de Arnaldo, for collection of a monetary
obligation, this being one of the obligations which the latter assumed
upon accepting a donation of paraphernal property made in her favor.
After trial, judgment was rendered against the defendant on July 19,
1944. A motion for reconsideration which was subsequently filed, was
destroyed together with the record of the case during the war of
liberation. Such motion, however, was reconstituted and it appears to
be predicated on the following grounds:

“1.That the findings of facts in the said decision
is against the evidence presented in this case as explained in detail
in the memoranda filed by the defendants in this case, to which the
attention of this Honorable Court is respectfully referred,
particularly to pages (here the corresponding numbers of pages follow)
thereof;

“2. That, accordingly, the said decision is against the law.

“The above grounds will be amplified at the hear ing of this motion.”

On October 23, 1947, petitioners filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings because of the moratorium law, and at the same time
respondent Benigno T. Sarayba asked for the execution of the judgment
alleging that the motion for reconsideration was pro forma
and could not stay the running of the period to perfect an appeal, and,
consequently, the judgment has become final and executory. No action
has been taken on these motions and after almost one year, respondent
Benigno T. Sarayba renewed his petition for the issuance of a writ of
execution not only upon the ground that the motion for reconsideration
was pro forma but also.because the moratorium law had been
lifted. It appears, however, that Republic Act No.342 lifting the
moratorium makes an exception of debtors who contracted their
obligations before December 8, 1941 and who are war sufferers having is
claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission. Defendant Julita T.
Sarayba contracted her obligation before December 8, 1941, and alleges
having a claim pending with the Philippine War Damage Commission.
Respondent court, however, granted the petition for a writ of
execution, holding that the motion for reconsideration was pro forma,
that the moratorium law had been lifted, and that claim was shown to
have been filed by defendant Julita T. Sarayba with the Philippine War
Damage Commission. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

We agree that the motion for reconsideration is pro forma
for it does not specify the findings qr conclusions in the judgment
which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law
but merely makes reference to the contents of a memorandum that had
already been considered by the respondent court before rendering its
.judgment. We believe and so hold that the judgment thus rendered has
become final, and that it may be executed were it not for the
moratorium law. Republic Act No. 342, Section 2 reads as follows:

“Sec.2. All debts and other monetary obligations
payable by private parties within the Philippines originally incurred
or contracted before December 8, 1941, and still remaining unpaid, any
provision or provisions in the contract creating the same or in any
subsequent agreement affecting such obligation to the contrary
notwithstanding, shall not be due and demandable for a period of eight
(8) years from and after settlement of the war damage claim of the
debtor by the United States Philippine War Damage Commission, without
prejudice, however, to any voluntary agreement which the interested
parties may enter into after the approval of this Act for the
settlement of said obligations.”

The monetary obligation which is the subject of the judgment
rendered had been incurred or contracted before December 8, 1941. And
the judgment debtor, Julita T. Saraybay is a war sufferer and co-owner
of the damages claimed by her husband, Crispulo F. Arnaldo, with the
Philippine War Damage Commission, Exhibit 1, admitted without
objection, is a certification of the Secretary of the Philippine War
Damage Commission to the effect that private property claim No,1072272
had been filed with said Commission under the name of Crispulo F.
Arnaldo and that private property claim No.1071519 had been filed with
the same Commission under the name of Abucay Plantation of Delgado,
Arnaldo, Tañada and Dizon. Crispulo F, Arnaldo testified that the
private property claims above mentioned are covered by Exhibits 2-A and
3-A.

To establish that these claims had been filed with the Philippine
War Damage Commission, certified copies there- of are not necessary,
there being the certification, Exhibit nlM, issued by the Secretary of
said Commission which is in accord with the testimony of Crispulo F.
Arnaldo. The latter testified also that the damages he had claimed were
damages caused to property belonging to him and his wife. And damages
that may thus be recovered “belong to the husband and wife share and
share alike” according to law (art. 1392 Civ. Code).

It may, therefore, be rightly stated that the wife, being a
co-owner of the damages claimed by her husband, may be regarded as a
co-claimant irrespective of whether her claim may or may not answer
legally for the liabilities burdening her paraphernal property. What is
important, for the purposes of the moratorium lav;, is that she be a
debtor having a war damage claim, regardless of whether or not there is
any relation between her debt and her claim, the soured or nature of
the claim being immaterial. The purpose of the law is to give the
debtor a chance for rehabilitation, and there is no doubt that the
rehabilitation of the conjugal partnership may, directly or indirectly,
help the spouses ease their individual burdens.

From all the foregoing, the petition is granted and the writ of
execution issued by the respondent court is hereby set aside with costs
against the respondents. It is so ordered.

Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.