HERMINIA GODUCO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA B. CASTRO, RESPONDENTS.

On April 14, 1955, Herminia Goduco instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, a complaint for the recovery of various sums of
money allegedly due her, against Maria B. Castro. In the complaint,
among others, petitioner claimed that it was thru her that respondent
Castro came to know of a piece of land in San Dionisio, Parañaque,
Rizal, with an area of about 100 hectares, and which Castro later
bought for P150,000.00; that when respondent paid the purchase price of
the land, she supposedly deducted therefrom the amount of P7,500.00,
which was appellant’s commission; that the information regarding this
deduction was communicated to her (Goduco) by Dr. Francisco, son of the
owner of the property; that although the deed of sale was in the name
of Sostenes Campillo, the true buyer was respondent Castro, Campillo
being a mere dummy; that for the refusal of respondent Castro
to give her the commission and with the treatment dispensed her by said
respondent when she tried to collect said amount, Goduco claims to have
been embarrassed, for which she asked the sums of P5,000.00 for moral
damages; and P2,000.00 for counsel’s fees.

Respondent Maria B. Castro, answering, alleged that petitioner, for
a number of times, tried to convince her to buy the property, but she
(appellant) was repeatedly informed by respondent that she was not
buying anything, just then, since her properties were under levy. The
rest of the allegations in the complaint were specifically denied for
being false or for lack of knowledge. As special defenses, respondent
Castro averred that (1) the complaint states no cause of action; (2)
assuming that petitioner was authorized to sell the property, the claim
should be directed against the person who authorized the sale and who
promised the commission, not the respondent with whom plaintiff had no
privity of contract, express or implied; (3) the supposed authority to
sell given to petitioner was a nullity, having been given by a mere
son-in-law of the owner, not the owner herself; and (4) the claim on
which the action is founded is unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds. A counter claim of P100,000.00 for moral damages, P50,000.00
for exemplary damages and P5,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees was
prayed for by respondent.

After hearing, with petitioner Goduco as the only witness, wherein
she tried to prove her allegations in the complaint, the trial court
rendered judgment dismissing the complaint, without costs. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals, on August 26, 1960, handed down a confirmatory J
decision, the relevant portions of which read:

“The evidence for the plaintiff shows that the deed
of sale on which she seeks to recover her commission was executed by
the owner of the property Mauricia Antonio, not in favor of the
defendant, but in favor of one Sostones Campillo, and that the
defendant signed the same merely as one of two witnesses to its
execution (Exh, ‘E’) It also appears from the same evidence that the
plaintiff’s commission of 5% on the selling price was to be paid by
the seller, as shown by the authority given by the latter’s son-in-law
and attorney-in-fact, Donato Ciriaco (Exh. ‘D’). The plaintiff claims,
however. that it was to the defendant that she offered the property;
that the two of them in fact when there one day to inspect it; that in
the course of their negotiations the plaintiff unintentionally
disclosed the identity and residence of the owner to the defendant,
together with the fact that the latter’s son-in-law was acting in her
behalf; that the defendant then went to’ see a Donato Ciriaco
personally and concluded the understanding directly with him; that in
order to hWe the fact that she was the real buyer she caused the deed
of sale to be made out to and signed by Sostcnes Campillo, an employee
of hers in the Shollborne Hotel; and that she deducted from the
purchase price the sum of P7,500.00, equivalent to 5% thereof, alleging
that no agent had intervened in the transaction,

The
defendant denied categorically the truth of the foregoing claim of the
plaintiff and on her part testified that while indeed the former tried
to interest her in the property sometime in the year 1954, importuning
her by means of telephone calls for that purpose, she invariably
answered that she was not interestei, particularly because her
properties were being distrained by the government resulting in the
paralyzation of her business; that Sostenes Campillo was not her
employee but was the lessee of the Shellborne Hotel building of which
she was the owner, for which he was paying her a rental of P8,000.00 a
month; and that Campillo was , not her dummy at all and was financially
capable of making the purchase of the property in question for himself.

The deed of sale itself, Exhibit E’, is a strong evidence
against the plaintiff’s claim. Her testimony that the defendant, after
preliminary negotiations between them, went directly to the owner of
the property, Mauricia Antonio, and to her son-in-law and
attorney-in-fact, Donato Ciriaco, to conclude the transaction with
them, is entirely hearsay in nature, since it is based on information
which the plaintiff said was given to her by a Dr. Francisco, a son of
the said owner. Likewise hearsay, and for the same reason, is the
testimony of the plaintiff that after the deed of sale was executed,
the defendant deducted from the purchase price the sum of P7,500.00
corresponding to the broker’s commission. The plaintiff did not testify
on these points from her own personal knowledge, and did not present
Dr. Francisco as witness, nor Mauricia Antonio and Donato Ciriaco, who
are the only persons in a position to know the truth about the matter
other than the defendant herself.* * *.

After going over
the evidence as a whole, we agree with the trial court that the
evidence is insufficient to show that the defendant was the real
purchaser of the property described in the deed of sale Exh. ‘E’. The
plaintiff’s case rests largely on a surmise and conjectures, and cannot
prevail against the plain import of the deed of sale itself and the
categorical declarations of the defendant.

***

**

***

The above judgment is now before Us on appeal by certiorari on a singular assignment of error, to wit:

“The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not
properly appreciating the evidence presented, together with the
accompanying circumstances, thereby departing from its usual course of
judicial proceeding, which is contrary to law * * .”

We gather from the discussions on the assigned error that the
“accompanying circumstances” which appellant Goduco wanted the Court of
Appeals to appreciate, is the case of Marvel Bldg. Corporation, et al.
vs. Saturnine David, C. I. Revenue, 94 Phil. 376, wherein this Court
found that appellee Maria B. Castro was the sole and exclusive owner of
the shares in said corporation and that the other subscribers were
merely dummies. Predicated upon this pronouncement, herein petitioner
now urges a conclusion that Sostenes Campillo was Castro’s dummy in
connection with the purchase of the, land in Parañaque. The contention
necessarily involves the examination of the evidence and its subsequent
re-evaluation. Only questions of law are subject to review by this
Court, and a question of law has been declared as one which does not
call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties. The Court of Appeals in its decision had made
findings of facts which We are not authorized to alter. When the Court
of Appeals found that the purchaser of the property in question was
Sostenes Campillo who was financially capable of making the purchase,
and not the appellee Maria B. Castro, We are bound by such conclusion,
more so when the evidence on record, as elicited by the Court of
Appeals unmistakably show the fact. There is no parallelism between the
facts obtaining in the Marvel case and those of the one at bar. In the
Marvel case, there must have been evidence show- ing that the other
stockholders were mere dummies, but which the trial court therein had
failed to consider. In the case at bar, both the CFI of Manila and the
Court of Appeals found that the evidence on record does not sustain the
cause of action of appellant Goduco, much less her assertion of
Campillo being a dummy. Appellant’s cause of action is based on
the alleged transaction she had with appellee, which transaction
supposedly consisted in having offered a certain parcel of land for
sale and which appellee bought but placed the property in the name of
another. Appellant claims further that for the sale of the property,
she should be entitled to a commission, which, according to her, as
related by one Dr. Francisco, was taken by appellee Castro, by
deducting the amount from the purchase price. All these matters were
testified to by plaintiff-appellant but finds no corroboration at all
from any other evidence, testimonial or documentary. On the contrary,
the documents submitted were against the assertions of appellant, for
they categorically disclose that appellee was not the purchaser. The
written authority (Exh. B), allegedly given by the son-in-law of the
property owner, Mauricia Antonio, did not make mention of the appellant
whatsoever. In other words, granting that appellant had the authority
to sell the property, the same did not make the buyer liable for the
commission she claimed. At most, the owner of the property and the one
who promised to give her a commission should be the one liable to pay
the same and to whom, the claim should have been directed. And even if
We concede, for purposes of argument, that appellee was, in fact, the
buyer and that she deducted the supposed commission from the purchase
price, the claim accrued against the person who promised to pay the
commission, but who gave it to another, instead.

The Court of Appeals was correct when it concluded that “plaintiff’s
case rests largely on surmise and conjectures * * * “. There is not an iota
of evidence to prove plaintiff’s claim, even only to the minimal
measure of preponderance. Of course, appellant tried to impress the
Court by presenting some evidence of her patriotic achievements as a
musical composer. We find, however, that these matters have no
relevancy to the merits of her case.

The record reveals that the heirs of Maria B. Castro, who died in
January, 1963, have registered an adverse claim on the property in
question. Such adverse claim, however, does not affect our conclusion
in the appealed case, since the same is not germane thereto and it is
not one of the issues ventilated in this action.

Conformably with all the foregoing, the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs against plaintiff-appellant Herminia Goduco.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Reyes J. B. L., Barrera, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.

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[G.R. L-17647. June 16, 1965]

R E S O L U T I O N

PAREDES, J.:

On February 28, 1964, this Court rendered judgment in the above
entitled case affirming the findings and conclusions of the Court of
First Instance of Manila and the Court of Appeals. The Motion for
Reconsideration and or New Trial filed by appellant thru counsel on
March 20, 1964 was denied in a Resolution dated March 30, 1964.

Thereafter a Second Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial was
presented and other pleadings by appellant herself. Because of the
nature of the allegations contained in the second motion for
reconsideration, respondents were required to answer the same on April
15, 1964. This resolution of the Court evinced a manifestation from
Atty. Rosendo Tansinsin, former counsel of Maria B. Castro (now
deceased) to the effect that he was not the counsel of the
administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Maria B. Castro, but Senator
Ambrosio Padilla; that Atty, Padilla had already instituted a Complaint
for Reconveyance against Scstenes Campillo, involving the land, the
sale of which was the cause of appellant’s claim for commission,
subject of the present controversy; and that he (Tansinsin) was of the
opinion that the claim of appellant should be presented in the CFI of
Manila where the Intestate Proceedings of fie estate of Maria B. Castro
is pending (Sp. Proc. No. 52975).

The manifestation of Atty. Rosendo Tansinsin was referred to the
Padilla Law Offices for comment. In their comment, they stated, among
others, that they have no objection to the suggestion of Atty.
Tansinsin, but prayed that the motion for reconsideration should not be
denied, but should be held in abeyance to await the result of the claim.

Both the first and second motion for reconsideration and/or New
Trial are based on “newly discovered evidence,” consisting of a receipt
purportedly thumb-marked by Mauricia Dionisio, owner of the lot in
question, stating that she received from the late Maria B. Castro the
sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS, in full payment of said land.

The Second Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial and the
prayer of counsel for the Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of
Maria B. Castro, should be, as they are hereby DENIED, for being
predicated on allegedly newly discovered evidence which this Court is not now authorized to entertain.

“The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive
as to the facts, and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Accordingly, in an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the
latter has no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, for only questions of fact are
involved therein.” (Vol. II, Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., p. 413, citing eases in support thereof, Italics supplied.)

In the decision sought to be reconsidered, We AFFIRMED the findings
of fact and conclusions of both the CFI and the Court of Appeals.

Moreover, in a manifestation submitted by Atty. Tansinsin, former
counsel of private-party respondent Maria B. Castro, dated December 10,
1964, it was shown that petitioner herein Herminia Goduco has already
presented a motion in said Sp. Proc. No. 52975, for the recognition of
her money claim against the estate of Maria B. Castro, which claim has
been admitted by the probate court and for which claim, the
administratrix therein was required to file her answer. On April 28,
1965, the claimant herself, made a similar manifestation assisted by
her new lawyer Mrs. Agustina Rosete Navarro. Counsel for the
administration does not deny the assertion of Atty. Tansinsin, that a
reconveyance case has been presented by the estate against Sostenes
Campillo, which renders the issues raised in the motion for
reconsideration and/or new trial, also moot or academic. Motion denied.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepción, Reyes, J. B. L., Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J. P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.