G.R. No. 17185. February 28, 1964
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, PETITIONER VS. GSIS EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.
PADILLA, J.:
promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations on 29 June 1959 and 14
March 1960, respectively, in “GSIS Employees’ Association vs.
Government Service Insurance System,” Case No. 896-V, holding that it
has jurisdiction of the case concerning 21 demands of the respondent
association which led to a strike on 17 June 1953 and the case was
certified to by the Acting Secretary of Labor; that the judgment sought
to be clarified already had become final, and denying the motion for
reconsideration on the grant of family allowance to GSIS employees.
On 6 July 1959, the petitioner, then respondent, filed a motion for
clarification and reconsideration of the judgment thus rendered praying
the respondent Court to clarify (1) whether the right of collective
bargaining of the GSIS Employees’ Association (GSISEA) “means that the
GSIS Management is bound to bargain on some matters with the
petitioner-union,” the petitioner contending that the rates of pay and
the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed by
law and may not therefore be the subject of collective bargaining
whether the order allowing employees receiving- salary ranging from
P120.00 to P190.00 a month to receive an increase of P10.00 a month,
and those in the bracket from P200.00 to P245.00 a month to receive
P5.00 raise per month from July 1, 1953, until the implementation of
the job classification made by the WAPCO, applies to all employees
regardless of whether or not they received promotions after 1953; (2)
to reconsider its order granting family allowance to GSIS employees
“who were employed, got married and had children between 1 July 1952
and the date said allowance was absorbed in the basic pay;” and (3) “to
delete the observation on pages 27 & 28 of the decision quoted
herein on the deceptions about the financial conditions of the GSIS.”
(Annex C).
On 13 August 1959, the Court of Industrial Relations entered an
order (Annex D to Supplemental Pleading) holding that the recognition
of the right of a, labor union for the purpose of collective bargaining
does not carry with it the duty to accept by the other party terms and
conditions of employment offered if the same cannot be the subject of a
collective bargaining agreement; that salary increases granted by the
GSIS during the pendency of the case in court are not substitutes for
the increases granted in the judgment since said increases are separate
and independent of each other; and denying the prayer of the GSIS to
delete part of the judgment. The parties were directed to inform the
respondent Court whether their motions for reconsideration would be
withdrawn or submitted to the respondent Court en banc. (Annex D).
On 16 October 1959, petitioner, then respondent, filed a motion to
set for hearing its motion for clarification and reconsideration dated
6 July 1959 before the respondent Court en banc (Annex E). A motion for reconsideration of the judgment was also filed by the GSIS Employees Association.
On 14 March 1960, the respondent Court en banc denied the
petitioner’s motion for clarification and reconsideration (Annex F)
holding that the Court has jurisdiction over the case, and that only
the second point (family allowance) in the motion for reconsideration,
together with the arguments advanced in support thereof, was deemed
submitted to the respondent Court en banc for resolution, the
respondent Court being of the opinion that a motion for clarification
does not suspend the period within which a motion for reconsideration
or an appeal may be filed and taken to the Court en banc or to
the Supreme Court, respectively, and that, as there was already a
judgment, a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the respondent
Court en banc or the Supreme Court should have been filed or taken.
On 22 July 1960, petitioner GSIS filed its notice of appeal from the
respondent Court’s judgment rendered on 29 June 1959 and its resolution
en banc promulgated on 14 March 1960 (Annex A to Petition for Extension of Time to file Supplemental Pleading and supporting papers).
On 26 July 1960, petitioner GSIS filed its petition for review
predicated on three grounds, namely: (1) lack of jurisdiction of the
respondent Court over the subject matter of the case, (2) the filing of
a motion for clarification of the respondent Court’s judgment suspends
the time for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal, and (3)
error of the respondent Court in granting salary increases to the
employees of the GSIS.
On 27 July 1960, respondent GSIS Employees’ Association moved for
the dismissal of the petition for review or the ground that this Court
already had upheld the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations in 98 Phil., 876, entitled “GSIS vs. Hon. Castillo, etc., et
al.,” 27 April 1956 (Annex B to Supplemental Pleading), and that the
respondent Court’s order of clarification entered on 13 August 1959 and
its resolution promulgated on 14 March 1960 (Annexes D and F) already
have become final, since no motion for reconsideration had been filed
with the Court en banc, nor an appeal to the Supreme Court had
been taken by the aggrieved party within (5) days or ten (10) days,
respectively, from receipt of a copy of the order under Sees. 15-17 of
the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, as amended; or, if
filed within the reglementary periods, the petition for review is not
in accordance with Sec. 2, of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, for
questions of law have not ‘been distinctly set forth in the petition.
On 10 August 1960, petitioner filed its “Supplemental Pleading to
the Petition for Review” alleging and claiming (1) that the respondent
Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; (2) that
the respondent Court erred in holding that a motion for clarification
of its judgment does not suspend the time for filing a motion for reconsideration, for a party cannot move for reconsideration of or appeal
from an order or judgment until it is clarified; and (3) that the
respondent Court erred in granting salary increases to GSIS employees.
On 24 August 1960, this Court gave due course to the petition.
On 21 September 1960′, respondent GSIS Employees’ Association filed
its answer and, after refuting petitioner’s three grounds for review,
asked for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the judgment
sought to be re- viewed already had become final and, therefore, the
issue of jurisdiction could no longer be raised. On 10 October 1960,
the respondent Court filed a motion praying that it be allowed to adopt
as its own the answer of its co- respondent, GSIS Employees’
Association.
In its brief, petitioner contends that as the controversy in the
case does not involve the Minimum Wage Law, the Eight Hour Labor Law,
an industry indispensable to the national interest duly certified to
the Court of Industrial Relations by the President, nor is an unfair
labor practice case under R.A. No. 875, the controversy does not come
within the jurisdiction of the respondent Court. It argues that on the
day R.A. No. 875 took effect (17 June 1953), the respondent Court was
deprived of jurisdiction of cases, other than those mentioned above,
because a law passed or approved is deemed to be effective from the
first moment of the date of its approval or passage. Petitioner also
maintains that even if it had made partial payments of the monetary
awards granted in the judgment, such payments do not preclude it from
raising the jurisdictional question, for jurisdiction is conferred only
by law, and that lack of jurisdiction of a Court over the subject
matter involved in a case may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
Petitioner’s contention that the respondent Court has no
jurisdiction because GSIS employees are governed by the Civil Service
Law is untenable. In the case of GSIS vs. Hon. Modesto Castillo, etc.,
et al., supra, this Court held that the Court of Industrial Relations
has jurisdiction over labor disputes affecting government-owned or controlled corporations, and that C. A. No. 103 does not exclude civil
service employees from the court’s jurisdiction. Even under section 11
of Rep. Act. No. 875, which provides that-
“The terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including
any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by
law and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees
therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes or
modification in their terms and conditions of employment. Such
employees may belong to any labor organization which does not impose
the obligation to strike or to join in strike; Provided, however, that
this section shall apply only to employees employed in governmental
functions and not to those employed in proprietary functions of the
Government including but not limited to governmental corporations.” the
jurisdiction of the respondent Court over employees in government-owned
or controlled corporations performing proprietary functions is
provided, admitted and recognized.
It appears from the pleadings and annexes thereto attached that on 6
July.1959 a motion for clarification and reconsideration of the
judgment rendered on 29 June 1959 was filed by the petitioner, then
respondent (Annex C).
On 13 August 1959, this motion was acted upon by the respondent
Court (Annex D). On 16 October 1959, the petitioner moved to have its
motion for clarification and reconsideration set for hearing before
the respondent Court en banc (Annex E). A motion for
reconsideration of the judgment was also filed by the then petitioner,
now respondent association. On 14 March 1960, the respondent Court
promulgated a resolution denying the motion for clarification and
reconsideration and holding that the motion for clarification did not
suspend the period within which a motion for reconsideration with the
respondent Court could be filed or an appeal to the Supreme Court could
be taken, and that only the second point on family allowance together
with the arguments in support thereof was deemed submitted to it en banc.
(Annex F). On 22 July 1960, petitioner filed its notice of appeal from
the judgment rendered on 29 June 1959 and resolution promulgated on 14
March 1960 (Annex A to Petition for Extension of Time to file
Supplemental Pleadings and supporting papers).
On 26 July 1960, the instant petition or appeal by certiorari was
filed in this Court. From 14 March 1960, the date when the resolution
was promulgated denying the motion for clarification and
reconsideration, to 22 July 1960, the date when notice of appeal was
filed by the petitioner, and , 26 July 1960, the date of the filing of
the instant petition, more than four months had elapsed. Therefore, the
appeal was not taken within the period, as provided for in section 1
Rule 44, section 14 Com. Act No. 103, and section 6 of Rep. Act No. 875.
The petition or appeal by certiorari is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Reyes, J.
B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.