ALIPIO N. CASILAN AND PURITA GANGCAYCO, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. RAYMUND TOMASSI, SANTIAGO GANCAYCO AND MANUEL GANGCAYCO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

This case originated in the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiuan, Samar. A
complaint was filed there by the present appellants on April 12, 1950, alleging
that the defendants, appellees here, were unlawfully detaining two (2) qounset
huts owned by appellants and leased by them to appellees under a verbal contract
entered into on November 1, 1949. It was further alleged that the rental agreed
upon was P400.00 a month, but that appellees had failed to pay the same from the
time the lease agreement started, notwithstanding repeated demands for such
payment.

A motion to dismiss was filed by appellees on the ground that the complaint
did not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The motion was
denied by the Justice of the Peace Court. The hearing of the case was postponed
several times upon motion of appellees. The last motion for postponement,
however, was denied upon appellants’ objection, and the trial proceeded in the
absence of the adverse parties, after which, judgment was rendered, ordering
them to vacate the premises described in the complaint and to pay the sum of
P500.00 as rentals from November 1, 1949 to March 31, 1950.

The case was appealed to the Court of First Instance of Samar, where
appellees filed their answer to the complaint. In the answer of Santiago
Gangcayco he alleged as special defense that the quonset huts in question had
been sold to Raymond Tomassi. In his separate answer Tomassi raised, among his
special defenses, the question of jurisdiction on the part of the Justice of the
Peace Court.

On December 27, 1950 the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order
dismissing the case on the ground that the Justice of the Peace Court had lost
its jurisdiction by reason of the several postponements granted by it and
therefore the Court of First Instance did not acquire appellate jurisdiction at
all. An appeal from that order was taken to us (G. R. No. 9320), and this Court
rendered judgment on January 31, 1956, stating that the case should have been
tried on the merits by the Court of First Instance and remanding the record for
that purpose.

On May 15, 1956 the Court of First Instance again issued an order dismissing
the appeal of appellees and remanding the case in turn to the Justice of the
Peace Court for execution of its judgment. From that order appellees elevated
the matter to this Court by certiorari (G. R. No. L-11335 and G. R. No.
L-11450); and on October 30,1958, we rendered judgment ordering the Court of
First Instance to proceed with the trial on the merits. On June 23, 1959, the
Court of First Instance, after conducting the trial as ordered, rendered its
decision again dismissing the complaint, this time on the ground that the
Justice of the Peace Court did not acquire original jurisdiction in view of the
absence of any allegation in the complaint that the plaintiffs, appellants here,
had made demand upon the defendants to vacate the two huts in question.
Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration, and upon denial thereof,
perfected the present appeal. Their prayer is that the dismissal be set aside
and the court ordered to render judgment in accordance with the oral and
documentary evidence adduced during the trial.

The issue here, is whether or not original jurisdiction was acquired by the
Justice of the Peace Court, considering the allegations in the complaint. If
it did acquire such jurisdiction, then the Court of First Instance, acting as
appellate court, should consider the evidence presented. On the other hand, if
the Justice of the Peace Court did not acquire jurisdiction, the only recourse
for the Court of First Instance was to issue the order of dismissal, as it
did.

We have gone over the allegations of the complaint and found nothing there to
the effect that a demand had been made upon the defendants to vacate the
premises in question. What allegation there was refers to a demand for payment
of the rentals agreed upon. Such allegation, according to the consistent ruling
of this Court, is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Justice of the
Peace Court. in an action of unlawful detainer. Thus in Canaynay vs. Sarmiento,
79 Phil. p. 36, it was held:

“The fact that it is alleged in the complaint that defendants failed to pay
the rents since after August 25, 1923, does not make unlawful defendant’s
withholding of possession of the property. Mere failure to pay rents does not
ipso facto make unlawful tenant’s possession of the premises. It is the owner’s
demand for tenant to vacate the premises, when the tenant has failed to pay the
rents on time, and tenant’s refusal or failure to vacate, which make unlawful
withholding of possession. There is no legal obstacle for the owner to allow a
defaulting tenant to remain in the rented property one month, one year, several
years, or even decades. That consent, no matter how long it may last, makes
lawful tenant’s possession. Only when that consent Is withdrawn and the owner
demands tenant to leave the property is the owner’s right of possession asserted
and the tenant’s refusal or failure to move out makes his possession unlawful,
because it is violative of the owner’s preferential right of possession.” (See
also Robles vs. San Jose, 99 Phil., 658; 52 Off. Gaz., 6193; Rickards vs.
Gonzales, 109 Phil., 423).

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs,

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Reyes, J. B.L., Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, and Regala, JJ., concur.