ALFREDO CASTRO, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE T. SURTIDA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAMARINES SUR, AND SINFOROSA CASTRO, RESPODENTS.

In two cases Nos. R-57 and R-58 in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, Sinforosa Castro and her brother Alfredo Castro arrived
at an amicable settlement as a result of which, the two submitted to
the trial court a signed agreement entitled “amicable settlement” and
prayed the court to render judgment in accordance with the terms
thereof. Under that agreement, Alfredo ceded all his right, title and
interest in a certain lot on which his house was constructed subject to
the following conditions:

“(a) That Sinforosa Castro hereby allows
Alfredo Castro to have his house remained in the same lot where it is
constructed for a period of two (2) years beginning the date of the
signing of this Agreement, without any rents therefor.

“(b)
That at the end of the said two years, Sinforosa Castro may either pay
to Alfredo Castro the reasonable value of the said house or Alfredo
Castro may pay Sinforosa Castro the reasonable rent of the lot wherein
the house is constructed but in the event the two could not agree on
the reasonable value of the house or the reasonable rent for the lot,
where it stands, then Alfredo Castro should remove the said house.” (p.
2, Annex A)

The agreement was dated April 12, 1947. The lower court approved
the agreement, made it part of the decision, and rendered judgment in
accordance with its terms and conditions, ordering the parties to
observe faithfully and be bound by its stipulations. The decision is
dated May 27, 1947. On May 23, 1949, that is a little more than two
years after the signing of the agreement when according to its terms,
the period of Alfredo’s free enjoyment of the lot expired, Alfredo
filed in court a motion entitled “Motion to Deposit Rentals”, alleging
that his sister, Sinforosa, refused either to pay for the house or fix
a reasonable amount for the rental of the lot, and further claiming the
reasonable rental of said lot based on Republic Act No. 66 which fixes
it at a sum not to exceed 20 per cent of its annual assessment value,
which is P1,230, to be P20.50 a month; and consigning the amount of P41
equivalent to the rentals for two months from April 13, 1949 to June
12, 1949. He asked that the rentals for said two months be declared
paid, and that in the future he be allowed to deposit future rentals
should Sinforosa refuse to accept the same.

In a counter motion dated May 30, 1949, Sinforosa Castro, alleged
that the period of two years within which her brother Alfredo had been
given permission to occupy the lot had already expired, and inasmuch as
ihe wants to occupy said lot, she asked that the motion of Alfredo be
overruled and that in its place an order of execution of the decision
be entered ordering him to remove his house from said lot in accordance
with the agreement of the parties approved by the court and directing
him to deliver the possession of the lot to her.

Acting upon the two motions the trial court in an order dated June
22, 1949, after quoting and making references to that part of the
agreement already reproduced, found that under said agreement Sinforosa
can not be compelled to accept or to receive the rents for t he use of
the land after the expiration of two years because she wants to take
possession of the land, and so ordered Alfredo to remove his house from
the land, in question, giving him 30 days to do so.

Alfredo tried to appeal from said order. The trial court, however,
in another order dated July 26, 1949, declared said order to be
non-appealable, and denied the appeal, inasmuch as, according to the
trial Judge, it merely referred to the manner of interpreting the terms
of the agreement on which the decision was based and not to any issue
raised in the case, and that should the defendant believe that the
interpretation given by the court is wrong then he should institute a
separate case.

In order to compel the trial court to allow him to appeal from the
order of execution and to approve his record on appeal, Alfredo has now
filed with us a petition for mandamus with a request for a writ of
preliminary injunction. By resolution of this Court and upon the filing
of a bond in the sum of P500.00, the corresponding writ of preliminary
injunction was issued.

Ordinarily, an order of execution of a final judgment is not
appealable. Otherwise, as was said by this Court in the case of Molina vs.
De la Riva, (8 Phil. 571), a case could never end, for as often as an
order for execution of judgment was made it could be excepted to and
the case brought here for review.

However, it is obvious that the tenor of the writ of execution may
not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce (Ang Lin Chi vs.
Hon. Castelo, 46 Off. Gaz., 4848; 83 Phil., 263); and an execution must
conform to the judgment on which it is issued in every essential
particular (33 C. J. S. 210). Where such order of execution in the
opinion of the defeated party varies the terms of the judgment and does
not conform to the essence thereof, or when the terms of the judgment
are not entirely clear and there is room for interpretation and the
interpretation given by the trial court as contained in its order of
execution is wrong in the opinion of the defeated party, the latter
should be allowed to appeal from the said order so that this appellate
Tribunal may pass upon the legality and the correctness of the said
order. Of course, as we have already stated, if the terms of the
judgment are so clear that there can be no room for doubt about their
meaning, and the order substantially conforms to said terms of the
judgment and that the special Civil action of mandamus is resorted to
only for delay and to embarrass the winning party, this Court will
summarily dismiss the petition.

In the present case, however, we are not prepared to say that
considering the rental law invoked by the petitioner, he may be
summarily ejected from the lot in question although he is willing to
pay the amount of rental allowed or fixed by the rental law. Neither
are we prepared to say off-hand that Sinforosa, the owner of the lot
may be compelled to allow the petitioner to continue in the occupation
of the lot by his paying the rental, over her claim that she needs the
premises for her own use. The parties should be given an opportunity to
discuss and support their respective claims and their respective
interpretations of their original agreement on which the judgment was
based.

In view of the foregoing, the order denying the appeal is hereby
set aside and the respondent Judge is directed to permit the appeal and
to approve the record on appeal if otherwise in conformity with the
requirements of law. No pronouncement as to costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, and Reyes, JJ., concur.