FAUSTINO CUNETA, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. MANUEL CASTAÑEDA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

After the government had purchased the Baclaran Estate for resale to
bona fide tenants or occupants, it subdivided it into small lots
observing as close as possible the boundary line of the portions
occupied by their tenants or occupants who, under the law, are given
preference to purchase the portions occupied by them. The lots herein
involved are two, namely, Lot 7 and Lot 8, both of Block No. 24, each
containing 198 square meters. The Rural Progress Administration which
was then in charge of the subdivision of the estate and its
apportionment among its tenants, decided to award Lot S to Juan O. de
Leon by executing in his favor an agreement to sell on January 22,
1948. Lot 7 was, on the other hand, awarded to Faustino Cuneta by
executing in his favor an agreement to sell on February 19, 1948.

Having been notified by the Rural Progress Administration of the
sale of Lot 8 to de Leon, Cuneta was requested to vacate the same, but
on July 26, 1955, Cuneta protested against such award by lodging a
complaint with the same office asserting that he is the bona fide
tenant thereof and should have been given the preference to purchase
the same. After hearing was held on this complaint, the Land Tenure
Administration, which succeeded the Rural Progress Administration,
rendered decision dismissing Cuneta’s complaint for lack of merit, and
ordering that a final deed of sale be executed in favor of De Leon
covering Lot 8. Cuneta filed a motion for reconsideration, and when the
same was denied, instead of appealing to the office of the President
pursuant to Land Tenure Administration’s Administrative Order No. 1, he
riled a complaint with the PCAC denouncing the alleged injustice
committed against him. Pending, however, action on this complaint,
Cuneta instituted on February 26, 1959 the present petition for
certiorari before the Court of First Instance of Rizal contending that
the Land Tenure Administration committed a grave abuse of discretion in
awarding to De Leon Lot 8 of the Badaran Estate. In due course, Juan O.
De Leon, the awardee of the lot, was allowed to intervene.

The respondents filed a motion to dismiss contending, among others,
that the cause of action of petitioner, if any, has already prescribed,
and in any event, the court a quo has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case because petitioner has not exhausted all his
administrative remedies before filing the petition. After the parties
had agreed on the material facts of the case, the court a quo
dismissed the petition mainly on the ground that the decision which
petitioner seeks to set aside has already become final and executory in
view of petitioner’s failure to appeal to the Office of the President
as required by the Land Tenure Administration’s Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1956.

Petitioner interposed the present appeal.

The pertinent provisions of Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the Land Tenure Administration are quoted hereunder:

“The decision or order of the Chairman of the Land
Tenure Administration concerning any adverse claim or conflict between
two or more applications shall become final after thirty (30) days from
the date a copy thereof is received by the interested party unless
appeal therefrom in the manner prescribed in Section 2 hereof, is taken
to, the Office of the President.” (Section 8)

“An appeal
shall lie from a decision or order of the Chairman of the Land Tenure
Administration to the Office of the President within a period of thirty
(30) days to be counted from the date the interested party received
notice thereof unless a motion for reconsideration is filed within the
same period, in which case, the running of the period for appeal shall
be interrupted. * * * ” (Section 2)

The record shows that petitioner received copy of the decision of
the Land Tenure Administration in the complaint filed by him against
respondent relative to the award of the lot in question, on November
19, 1956. He filed a motion for reconsideration on December 15, 1956.
This was denied by an order issued on May 4, 1957, copy of which was
received by petitioner on June 13, 1957. However, instead of appealing
from said decision to the Office of the President within a period of 30
days from receipt by him of the copy of the decision, he commenced the
present action on February 26, 1959. The trial court, therefore,
correctly held that the decision of the Land Tenure Administration has
already become final as of June 19, 1957 in view of petitioner’s
failure to appeal on time.

The Land Tenure Administration, being an office created by law with
a personality separate and distinct from the government, is invested
with the power- to promulgate rules and regulations that may be
necessary to accomplish its objectives and decide cases involving
conflicting claims in the apportionment of lots under its
administration.^[1] As an
entity authorized by law to approve and promulgate said rules and
regulations, and pass upon said claims, it has quasi-judicial powers to
decide such conflicting claims, and as such its decisions have the
force and effect of law. In the same manner, its rules and regulations
adopted pursuant to law have the same effect and are binding upon the
claimants.^[2]

But it is contended that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as a condition precedent to the filing of a
judicial action only applies to cases which involve the disposition of
public lands, and not to those which involve private lands, as those
acquired by the government for resale to bona fide tenants. It appears
however, that the issue herein raised is not merely one of lack of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, but one of prescription, for the
failure of petitioner to appeal on time to the Office of the President
as required by the administrative order already adverted to. This
failure is fatal to petitioner because it bars him from filing the
present action under the principle of res judicata. It should
be noted that the present action is one of certiorari which requires as
a condition precedent that petitioner should not have any other
“adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law”, before he can aver
sufficient cause of action, and as we have already stated, the course
which petitioner should have pursued was to appeal to the Office of the
President, which he failed to do. We, therefore, consider of no
consequence the petitioner.

Wherefore, the decision appealed form is affirmed. Costs against petitioner-appellant.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal JJ., concur.

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^[1] Section 6, paragraph 4, Republic Act 1400.

^[2] Victorias Milling Company, Inc. vs. Social Security Commission.