BERNARDA COPON AND CECILIO COPON, PETITIONERS, VS. FERNANDO UMALI AND PURIFICACION ORBETA, RESPONDENTS.

Crispulo Armando died shortly before the last war, leaving a piece
of land of his exclusive ownership but no heirs except his widow,
Bernarda Copon, and his brother, Doroteo Armando. On this land the
widow had built a house with money of her own and planted 5 lanzon
trees. Without benefit of judicial proceeding for the administration
and partition of the decedent’s estate, the widow sold the land and its
improvements to her brother, Cecilio Copon, in 1942, while the
aforesaid Doroteo Armando, on his part, sold the same land to the
spouses Fernando Umali and Purificacion Orbeta in 1945. As was to be
expected, a dispute arose over the ownership of the land between the
first and the second vendees. As a means of ending the dispute, the
present action was instituted in the Court of First Instance by
Fernando Umali and his wife against the widow and her brother to quiet
title, and judgment having been rendered in favor of plaintiffs, the
defendants took the case to the Court of Appeals. Partly confirming the
judgment appealed from, the Court of Appeals adjudged the ownership of
the land and the lanzon trees to plaintiffs and the house to Cecilio
Copon. Not satisfied with this decision, defendants brought the case
here for review on the following

“Assignment of Errors

“1. The Court of Appeals erred in sustaining
respondents’ objection to the admission of oral evidence, raised for
the first time in the motion for reconsideration;

“2. The Court of Appeals erred in not considering that the objection not raised in the trial court is waived;

“3. The Court of Appeals erred in applying the statute of frauds to fully executed contract;

“4.
The Court of Appeals erred in applying here the statute of ‘frauds,
when this case is not for performance of or violation of an oral
agreement jover realty;

“5. The Court of Appeals erred in
concluding that there is no proof of the sale or authority when it held
that it “encuentra probados los siguientes hechos: * * * este solar con
sus sembrados y casa fue vendido por la viuda Bernarda Copon a su
hermano Cecilio Copon, * * * segun escritura Exh. 1′ and ‘y cuando lo
vendio a su hermano Cecilio Copon estaba debidamente autorizado por su
cuñado Doroteo Armando;’

“6. The Court of Appeals erred in
giving more weight to negative testimony, inspite of its findings that
the positive testimonies of the witnesses for petitioners are more
candid; and

“7. The Court of Appeals finally erred in not
allowing compensation to Bernarda Copon for the lanzones trees she had
planted, she being a planter in good faith.”

The first four specifications of error are addressed to the
pronouncement contained in the following paragraph of the decision of
the Court of Appeals:

“Doroteo Armando declaro que no autorizo de palabra
ni por escrito en nihguna ocasion a su cuñada Bernarda Copon. Esta
autorizacion debe constar por escrito (Regla 123, sec. 21 [e]),
y el testimonio de Bernarda Copon sobre esta autorizacion carece de
valor probatorio. Por tanto, Bernarda Copon no podia vender el terreno
en disputa porque ella misma admitip que Crispulo Armando era su
verdadero dueno, por haberio heredado de sus padres antes de su
casamiento.”

The transcript of the testimony is not before us, but it would
appear from the briefs that the widow sought to uphold the validity of
the sale to her brother by declaring at the trial that the said sale
had been authorized by Doroteo Armando. Such declaration did not, of
course, constitute competent proof of the alleged authority, since
under the Statute of Frauds the only competent evidence of the agency
in such case “is the authority of the agent in writing subscribed by
such party, or secondary evidence of its contents.” (Rule 123, Sec. 21 [e])
Appellants contend, however, that as the oral evidence was not objected
to at the trial, the appellate court had no right to rule it out on
appeal. Whatever merit there may be in this contention, the point
raised is not decisive, for the said oral evidence is contradicted by
Doroteo Armando’s declaration (as reported in the decision below) that
he had not on any occasion, verbally or in writing, given authority to
the widow, and with this conflict in evidence, the conclusion that the
widow did not have the authority to sell the land in question is a
finding of fact which we have no authority to revise.

Error No. 5 refers to the following portion of the decision below:

“Esta (the widow) admite que su hoy difunto marido
Crispulo ha heredado de sus padres el solar en disputa, y en vida le
habia cedido el mencionado solar; y cuando lo vendio a su hermano
Cecilio Copon estaba debidamente autorizado por su cuñado Doroteo
Armando. No hay prueba sobre la cesion del solar ni sobre la alegada
autoriaccion.”

The appellants contend that by this pronouncement the Court of
Appeals found it as a fact that the sale of the property by the widow
was duly authorized by Doroteo Armando. It is obvious that appellants
have misconstrued the decision due to somewhat loose phraseology
employed by its writer. But it is evident from the context that the
statement that when the widow sold the land to her brother she had the
requisite authority from Doroteo Armando was an admission made by the
widow and not a conclusion of fact made by the appellate court. This is
obvious from the sentence immediately following said statement which
reads: “No hay prueba sobre la cesion del solar ni sobre la alegada
autorizacion.”

Error No. 6 refers to the credibility of witnesses, a matter for
the exclusive determination of the Court of Appeals as sole judges on
question of fact in cases within their appellate jurisdiction.

In her last assignment of error the widow complains that the
decision appealed from takes away from her the lanzon trees planted by
her on the land in question without providing for compensation for
their “planting and rearing,” thus departing from the ruling laid down
in Dominado vs. Derayunan, (49 Phil. 452), that expenses
incurred in making such improvements are conjugal expenses for which
the conjugal partnership must be reimbursed. While the point raised is
correct as a matter of law, there is, however, no showing that any
expenses have been incurred in connection with the planting of the
trees in question, so that no such expenses could be recovered.

The foregoing disposes of the appellants’ assignment of errors. We
note, however, that the land in question would appear to be the only
property left by the deceased Crispulo Armando, who, as already stated,
died without heirs except his widow and one brother. Under the law
(article 837, Civil Code) the widow inherits one-half of the property
in usufruct. Such being the case, the widow is entitled to the usufruct
of one-half of the land in controversy. This right to the usufruct
being alienable (4 Manresa 420), its conveyance to her brother Cecilio
Copon must be recognized. This point was not raised by the widow in
this case, but in order to do full justice to the parties, we hold that
defendants-appellees shall hold the land in question subject to Cecilio
Copon’s right to the said usufruct until this is extinguished as
prescribed by law.

With this only modification, the judgment brought here for review is affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.

Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.