G.R. No. L-2233. April 25, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. TIMOTEO TAMAYO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
TUASON, J.:
Instance of Ilocos Norte with illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition, upon an information of the following tenors
“That on or about August 17, 1946, at the
municipality of Solsona, province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and criminally
have in his possession and under his custody and control one US carbine
Cal. 30 Serial No. 1561754 and five magazines with 116 rounds of
ammunitions without permission to hold same.”
On July 16, 1947, the accused, assisted by counsels pleaded guilty,
whereupon the court, taking into consideration said plea of guilty and
the recommendation of the fiscal, sentenced him to pay a fine of P100
and costs. Upon petition of his attorney, the accused was given one
month within which to pay the fine.
On July 24, 1947, the Provincial Fiscal moved the court to
reconsider its decision on the ground that the imposable penalty was
that provided in Republic Act No. 4, which became effective on July 19,
1946. Evidently when.the ease was tried and decision rendered, neither
the court, the fiscal nor the defendant was aware of the enactment of
the new law, which considerably increased the penalty for the
possession, etc., of firearms and ammunition.
The defendant’s counsel objected to the motion for reconsideration.
Nevertheless, the court, on February 14, 1948, amended its decision and
sentenced the accused to five years of imprisonment, accessories of the
law, and Costs.
The question for decision is whether the court below had
jurisdiction to modify its decision after the lapse of nearly seven
months from the date of its promulgation, although the fiscal’s motion
for reconsideration was filed within fifteen days. The appellant says
no, and the Solicitor General agrees with him, recommending that the
amended decision “be declared null and void.”
Section 7 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Sec. 7. Modification of .judgment.—A
judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside by the court
rendering it before the judgment has become final or appeal has been
perfected. A judgment in criminal case becomes final after the lapse of
the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has
expressly waived in writing his right to appeal.”
Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 118 provide:
“Section 1. Appeal.— From all final
judgments of the Court of First Instance or courts of similar
jurisdiction, and in all cases in which the law now provides for
appeals from said courts, an appeal may be taken to the Court of
Appeals or to the Supreme Court as hereinafter prescribed.“Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken.—An
appeal must be taken within fifteen days from the rendition of the
judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal
shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed
until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served
upon the defendant or his attorney.”
In U.S. vs. Vayson, (27 Phil. 447), this Court went to
great length in a discussion of the authority of the court to modify
its judgment and concluded that before a judgment becomes final? the
trial court has plenary power to alter or revise the same as law and
justice require. The decision cited, among numerous cases, Ex parte
Lange (85 U. S. 163, 21. Law. ed., 872), in which the Federal Supreme
Court states the general rules “The general power of the court over its
own judgments, orders and decrees, in both civil and criminal eases,
during the existence of the term to which they are first made, is
undeniable.”
But the period at the end of which a judgment becomes final, which
is fifteen days, is never, under any circumstances, suspended except by
the filing of a motion for new trial by the defendant under Section 1
of Rule 117.[1] Before the
adoption of the Rules of Court not even such motion by the accused
could produce the effect of interrupting the period to appeal. Section
1 of Rule 117 is new; it has no counterpart in the Code of Criminal
Procedure which the Rules of Court have superseded.
In the case of U. S. vs. Flemister, (1 Phil. 317), Mr, Justice Willard, speaking for the Court, said:
“Our conclusions are (1) that within the fifteen
days allowed for an appeal the trial court may reopen the case on
either of two grounds; (2) that if the defendant does not appeal he can
make no motion in this court on either ground, (3) that if he does
appeal he can move In this court on either ground. If the defendant
makes a motion in the lower court and that is denied, he can still
appeal if the fifteen days allowed therefor have not expired. If the
defendant fails to appeal and limits himself to a motion in the trial
court to reopen the case, this motion fails if it is not decided within
the nonextendable period of fifteen days.”
The same question was extensively discussed in U. S. vs. Court of First Instance, (24 Phil. 321), wherein the Flemister case was cited among many others.
If a motion for new trial or reconsideration by the accused himself
could not stop the running of the period to appeal, save for Section 1
of Rule 117, how much less could the prosecution by a motion or
otherwise do so in the absence of a similar provision?
Both the appellant and the Solicitor General concede that under
Section 7 of Rule 116 a Judgment may be amended within fifteen days
from the date of its promulgation; their objection is that the
amendment in this case was made outside that period. However some
members of the Court believe that without the consent of the defendant
a judgment may not at any time be altered beyond the correction of
clerical or inadvertent errors. They rely on section 1 of Rule 117 for
this view.
Others, including the writer of this decision, maintain that
Section 1 of Rule 117 does not control. They are of the opinion that
this rule has no bearing on the case at bar; that the applicable rule
is Section 7 of Rule 116, and that this rule and Rule 117, Section 1,
relate to different subjects and do not conflict or interfere with each
other. Section 7 of Rule 116 refers to modification of judgment, as its
title shows, while section 1 of Rule 117 refers to new trial.
What is a new trial? While “new trial” is a term of broad
signification, we think that Section 5 of Rule 117 furnishes a clue to
its meaning as the term is employed in Rule 117. Said Section 5 is as
follows:
“Sec. 5. Effect of granting a new trial.— The effects of granting a new trial are the following:
“(a)
When a new trial is granted, on the ground, of errors of law or
irregularities committed during the trial, all the proceedings and
evidence not affected by the commission of such errors and.
irregularities shall stand, but those affected thereby shall be set
aside and taken anew. The court may, in the interest of justice, allow
the introduction of additional evidence.“(b) When
a new trial is granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the
evidence already taken shall stand, and the newly discovered and such
other evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to
be introduced, shall be taken and considered together with the evidence
already in the record.“(c) In all cases, the
original judgment shall-be set aside and a new judgment rendered, and
the former shall not be used or referred to in evidence or argument on
the new trial.”
These directions portray a proceeding whereby errors of law or
irregularities are expunged from the record, or new evidence is
introduced, or both steps are taken. In a new trial, by the very nature
of its purpose and of what is. to be done, both .parties have to
intervene. On the other hand, Section 7 of Rule 116 contemplates no new
hearing or proceeding of any kind or change in the record or evidence.
To modify a judgment, the court alone, of its own motion and without
any notice to either party, may and does generally act. This is so
because a simple modification of a judgment is accomplished on. the
basis of what is already in the record. No irregularities or omissions
are involved and absolutely nothing is added to or taken from what is
before the court. Only wrong conclusions from or wrong appreciation of
the proofs already at hand are corrected in the decision.
Again, whereas, when a motion for new trial is granted, “the
original judgment shall be set aside and a new judgment rendered, and
the former shall not be used or referred to in evidence or argument on
the new trial” (Section 5 of Rule 117), as though no judgment had been
rendered, yet under Section 7 of Rule 116 the integrity of the decision
already handed down is unaffected, except for the proposed change,
change which may consist of alteration, insertion, or elimination of a
word, phrase, sentence or paragraph, although there is nothing to
prevent the entire decision from being rewritten as was done in this
case.
One other objection to a modification at any time of a judgment
prejudicial to the accused is—so it is contended—that the accused would
be put twice in jeopardy. Our answer is that the doctrine of double
jeopardy does not enter Into the case for the reason that jeopardy does
not attach until the period for appeal has expired. The principle of
double jeopardy in this respect has not been changed by law or the
Constitution. The rule is the same now as when the Vayson case was
decided; the same rule that prevails under the Constitution of the
United States and the constitutions of the various States on which the
decisions cited in the Vayson ease are predicated. The matter relative
to the time when jeopardy attaches is largely statutory, and Section 7
of Rule 116, in express and plain language, fixes such time at the
expiration of fifteen days. Section 1 of Rule 117 for the reason
already explained does not affect in any manner Section 7 of Rule 116.
It is submitted that to interpret the latter provision in the light of
Section 1 of Rule 11? would be virtually to annul it and violate the
rule of statutory construction that different provisions of a law must
be reconciled so far as it is possible to do so.
To summarizes judgment in a criminal case may be revised or
modified only within the period to appeal, or fifteen days from the
date of its promulgation. We see no reason why the Government may not
make a motion for reconsideration as distinct from a motion for new
trial, before the judgment becomes executory, but such motion can not
operate to suspend or extend the above period; the court must act
before that period terminates if the revision, alteration, or
modification is to be valid. Only a motion by the defendant can
interrupt the running of the period at the expiration of which the
judgment becomes final.
The allegations in the information do not constitute cause of
action. Republic Act No. h became effective on July 19, 1946, but the
President, in Proclamation No. 1, by virtue of the power conferred upon
him by that Act, fixed August 31, 1946, up to which possessors of
unlicensed firearms might surrender them to lawful authorities without
incurring any criminal liability. The clear inference from the terms of
the proclamation is that from the date of the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 4 to August 31, 1946. the penalty for mere possession of
firearms, ammunition, etc., was suspended. The only instances ±u which
such possession was punishable before August 3i, 19k6t were making use
of the firearms, except in self-defense, or carrying them for purposes
other than surrendering them to the proper authorities. (See People vs. Aquino, G. R. No. L-1429 [1])
However, this ease is not before us on appeal on the merit. We are
requested not to review the original judgment but to declare It
subsisting and to set aside the modified judgment.
The modified judgment of the lower court dated August 7, 1947, will
be set aside and the original judgment declared final. This decision
will be without prejudice to whatever recourse the accused may deem
available to annul the original judgment. Without costs.
Ozaeta, Pablo, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.
Moran, C. J., concurs in the result but not in the reasoning of the decision.
Bengzon and Reyes, JJ., concur in the result.
[1] New Trial.—At any time
before the final entry of a judgment of conviction, the court may on
motion of the defendant, or on its own motion with the consent of the
defendant, grant a new trial.
[1] 83 Phil., p. 614.
TUASON, J.:
I certify that Mr. Justice Padilla took part in the deliberation and concurred in this decision.