G.R. No. L-1266. August 29, 1947
CO CHIONG AND LIM CHIU GUAN, PETITIONERS, VS. RAFAEL DINGLASAN ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
FERIA, J.:
petitioners on January 7, 1947, against the respondent judge who issued an order
dissolving a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the same judge, which
enjoined the other respondents to refrain from ejecting the petitioners from the
market stalls, the petitioners ask this Court to annul the said order and
command the respondent judge to forthwith reissue such writ, and that, pending
final judgment in the instant proceedings, this Court issue ex-parte a
writ of preliminary injunction ordering the respondent to refrain from ejecting
the petitioners from the said market stalls.
This Court denied the petition ex-parte for a preliminary injunction
during the pendency of this proceeding in this Court, and ordered the
respondents to file their answer to the petition or complaint. On January 18,
1947, respondents filed their answer, and after the answer was filed the hearing
of the petition was set for January 24, 1947. At the hearing both parties were
granted permission to file their respective memoranda, and on February 10 the
petitioners submitted their reply to the respondents’ memorandum. Since that
date February 10, 1947, this case was considered submitted to this Court for
decision.
The respondent Secretary of Finance suspended motu proprio the
operation of the Department of Finance Order No. 32, and for that reason the
other respondents refrained from ejecting the petitioners from the market
stalls, notwithstanding the above stated dissolution of the injunction by order
of the respondent judge who had issued it and the denial by this Court of the
petitioners’ petition that this Court issue ex-parte a preliminary
injunction during the pendency of this case in this Court.
On April 24, 1947 the petitioners filed with this Court a petition called
Manifestation, which reads in part as follows:
“That the above-entitled special civil action was instituted by the
petitioners for the purpose of annulling the order of the respondent judge of
the Court of First Instance dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction
granted in Civil Case No. 1436 of the Court of First Instance of Manila entitled
‘Co Chiong et al. vs. Miguel Cuaderno et al.’; and* * * * *
* *“Rule 39, section 4 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
* * * * *
* *“If a petition for prohibition to restrain the enforcement of a law and/or
administrative order can be considered as an action for injunction within the
foregoing provision of the Rules of Court, then there is no longer any need to
review and annul the interlocutory order of the respondent judge dissolving the
preliminary injunction, the same having been revoked and superseded by the said
respondent judge’s subsequent judgment. * * *”
From a reading of the facts alleged in the petition filed with this Court, as
well as in the complaint in the court below, it appears that the principal
action of which the present is an incident is not a special civil action of
prohibition, although it is so entitled, for the simple reason that the
defendants or respondents do not exercise any judicial or ministerial functions,
and there is no allegation in the complaint that they acted without or in excess
of their jurisdiction for they have no specific jurisdiction granted by law, or
with grave abuse of discretion since the law docs not give them any discretion
in the performance of the acts complained of. It is, in reality, an action of
injunction filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants to restrain the latter
from enforcing the provisions of the Republic Act No. 37 and Department of
Finance Order No. 32, on the alleged ground that they are unconstitutional, and
their enforcement will injuriously affect the enjoyment of their right to
continue occupying the market stalls leased to them.
“The usual ground for asking injunctive relief against the enforcement of
statutes is their invalidity, but that, of itself, is not sufficient to warrant
the exercise by equity of its extraordinary injunctive power. In other words,
the mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid will
not entitle a party to have its enforcement enjoined. Further circumstances must
appear bringing the case under some recognized head of equity jurisdiction, and
presenting some actual or threatened and irreparable injury to complainant’s
rights for which there is no adequate legal remedy. If it is apparent that the
law can furnish all the relief to which the complainant is entitled, the
injunction will be refused. It is recognized, however, that an injunction will
lie to restrain the threatened enforcement of an invalid law where the lawful
use and enjoyment of private property will be injuriously affected by its
enforcement, or where the right of a person to conduct a lawful business or
calling will be injuriously affected thereby * * *.” (28 American Jurisprudence,
pp. 369-371.)
In view of the foregoing, the question raised by the petitioners in this case
has become a moot question, since it is no longer necessary for us to decide
whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the relief demanded, and if they
are to order the respondent judge to set aside the order dissolving the
preliminary injunction and to reissue or revive the latter, in order to prevent
the defendants from doing the acts complained of during the pendency of the
suit. Because, aside from the fact that, as above stated, the Secretary of
Finance has suspended the operation of the Department’s Order No. 32, which the
respondents were about to enforce, the principal action being an ordinary action
of injunction, and the respondent judge having rendered since April 19, 1947 a
judgment granting the injunction (called Prohibition), said judgment or order is
effective and its operation was not stayed after the rendition and during the
pendency of the appeal taken by the defendants to this Court, for the lower
court did not order otherwise, in accordance with the provisions of section 4,
Rule 39, which reads as follows:
“SEC. 4. Injunction, receivership and patent accounting, not
stayed.—Unless otherwise ordered by the court a judgment in an action for
injunction or in a receivership action, or a, judgment or order directing an
accounting in an action for infringement of letters patent, shall not be stayed
after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an
appeal. The trial court, however, in its discretion, when an appeal is taken
from a judgment granting, dissolving or denying an injunction, may make an order
suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting such injunction during the
pendency of the appeal, upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it may
consider proper for the security of the rights of the adverse
party.”
As to the necessity for this Court to decide as soon as possible the question
as to the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 37, and Department of Finance
Order No. 32, the proper time for deciding that question is when we decide on
the merits the appeal pending before us. We cannot decide it now, because it is
not necessary for this Court to do so in order to dispose of the present case.
It is a well settled rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional
question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid unless such question
is raised by the parties, and that when it is raised, if the record also
presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that
course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be
unavoidable (Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, p. 231).
In view of all the foregoing, petitioners’ petition for certiorari and
mandamus, is dismissed without costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J.,
Paras, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ.,
concur.
DISSENTING
PERFECTO, J.:
By the petition filed with this Court on January 7, 1947, petitioners sought
the issuance ex parte of a writ of preliminary injunction to refrain
respondents from ejecting the petitioners from the stalls they are occupying in
several public markets and that, after hearing, judgment be rendered annulling
the order of the respondent judge dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction
in case No. 1436, Co Chiong et al. vs. Cuaderno et al., and commanding
him to forthwith re-issue such writ, praying further for such other remedy as
the Court may deem just and equitable in the premises. Exhibits A to E, attached
to the petition, are copies of proceedings and orders in the Manila case.
The main issue in the lower court centers on the validity of Republic Act No.
37 and of Department of Finance Order No. 32, petitioners contending that both
are unconstitutional and void.
The question of the unconstitutionally of said act and department order is
also necessarily the main issue raised by the petition, so much so that
petitioners had reproduced in their petition all the ten grounds, alleged in
their complaint below, upon which they rely in support of their attack against
the validity of said act and department order.
Such was clearly understood by this Court when it denied the prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction but gave due course to the petition, by requiring
respondents to answer it within five days from notice, by resolution we adopted
on January 10, 1947. Everybody understood that we were ready to decide whether
said act and department order are constitutional or not.
No other interpretation can be given to our resolution, adopted on January
10, 1947, as more explicitly expressed in the concurring and dissenting opinions
accompanying the resolution which reads as follows:
“Considering the petition in L-1266, Co Chiong et als. vs. Judge
Rafael Dinglasan et als., it is ordered that the prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction be denied, and that respondents answer the petition
within 5 days from notice and receipt of copy thereof. Mr. Justice Paras
concurs, notwithstanding the pendency of a case in the Court of First Instance
of Manila, so as to expedite a decision on the merits. Mr. Justice Perfecto
expressed his opinion as follows: ‘We vote to dismiss the petition. The question
whether stalls in public markets should be reserved to citizens is not new to
us. More than one-fourth of a century ago, as Representative of Manila, we
initiated the movement and campaign to nationalize said stalls, and before doing
it we had to assure ourselves that it can be legally done. That conviction was
strengthened by the embodying of nationalistic policy in the Constitution, being
in fact one of its most striking essential characteristics. There is no doubt to
our mind that Republic Act No. 37 and Department Order No. 32 issued by the
Secretary of Finance in pursuance thereto are constitutionally valid and
binding. Public markets form part of the means employed by the government to
safeguard public health by a more effective supervision of the sale of
perishable food, and, in that sense, sale in public markets partakes of a
semi-official function. All official or semi-official functions, as a matter of
universal public policy, should exclusively be reserved to citizens. As there
are several hundreds of public markets in the country, at least one in each city
and municipality, it is necessary that we should decide without any delay the
question of the validity of Republic Act No. 37 and Department Order No. 32 to
stop further litigations which may unnecessarily crop out in the
provinces’.”
On January 18, 1947, respondents filed their answer and, meeting squarely,
the main issues raised by petitioners, employed more than six pages to state
concisely their reasons in support of the validity and constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 37 and Department Order No. 32.
On January 21, 1947, we ordered the case to be set for hearing on January 24,
at 9.30 a.m. At the hearing both parties were granted a few days’ time within
which to file their memoranda.
On January 29, petitioners filed an 18-page memorandum and respondents a
44-page memorandum, urging that Republic Act No. 37 and Department Order No. 32
be declared valid and constitutional.
On February 5, we granted petitioners an extension until February 10, to
submit their rebuttal memorandum. On February 3, respondents filed their reply
to petitioners’ memorandum, reiterating their prayer that Republic Act No. 37
and Department Order No. 32 be declared valid and constitutional.
On February 10, petitioners filed a 115-page rebuttal memorandum, wherein
petitioners objected to respondents’ prayer for a final resolution on the
constitutionality of Republic. Act No. 37 and of Department Order No. 32,
although almost three-fourths of the long memorandum, that is, 84 pages, are
employed in an almost exhaustive discussion in support of their stand against
the constitutionality of both act and department order.
Since the filing of said memorandum on February 10, 1947, the case has been
submitted to us, ready for final decision.
More than two months later, that is, on April 25, 1947, petitioners filed a
pleading entitled “Manifestation” wherein, among other things, they alleged that
on April 19, 1947, the respondent judge rendered judgment, in civil case No.
1436, the allegation being in support of their opposition to the final
resolution of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 37 and Department Order
No. 32.
On April 26, respondents answered to petitioners’ manifestation, insisting
that “it is to the public interest that the case be decided on the merits, the
respondents in their memorandum discussing the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 37 and Department Order No. 32” and counsel for petitioners “in their
rebuttal memorandum answered point by point the constitutional questions raised
in respondents’ memorandum.” Respondents averred further that “it is expedient
and imperative that this pressing national question be now decided ‘so as to
expedite a decision on the merit’ as desired by Mr. Justice Paras in his
concurring opinion to the resolution of this Honorable Court of January 10,
1947, since, according to Mr. Justice Perfecto, in his concurring opinion to the
same resolution ‘there are several hundreds of public markets in the country, at
least one in each city and municipality, it is necessary that we should decide
without any delay the question of the validity of Republic Act No. 37 and
Department Order No. 32 to stop further litigations which may unnecessarily crop
out in the provinces.’ “
On April 30, this Court adopted a resolution denying petitioners’
manifestation, filed on April 25, and our denial was an explicit reiteration of
our desire of deciding this case on the merit and of passing upon the final
question of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 37 and Department Order
No. 32, a desire clearly manifested when we adopted the resolution of January
10, 1947.
It must be remembered that in said resolution we denied petitioners’ prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction. Although said denial had practically
disposed of the petitioners’ main purpose in filing the petition in this case,
this Court decided to order respondents to answer the petition with the
unmistakable purpose of deciding once and for all the constitutional questions
raised by petitioners.
Not only the parties in this case, but the public at large, were aware of the
avowed purpose of this Court to pass upon said questions, and everybody had been
waiting for our decision on said questions.
The belated and sudden reversal of that attitude cannot but produce a bitter
disappointment to those who are directly interested in the case and to the
people at large, and it will lead to irretrievable misunderstanding, nothing
helpful to enhance the prestige and dignity of the highest tribunal of the
land.
The reversal places this Court in a bad light. The reasons in support of the
majority resolution have absolutely no weight. The allegation that the operation
of Department Order No. 32 was suspended,—and it was suspended “until the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 37 has been determined by this
Court,”—shows precisely the contrary of what is intended to be proved. It shows
the necessity of deciding as soon as possible the question of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 37, rather than indulgence in any delay or
procrastination in rendering our decision on questions of urgent and pressing
national importance.
The fact that the argument has been advanced by the majority upon their own
initiative without any party mentioning the alleged suspension of the operation
of Department Order No. 32, makes the resolution officious. This officiousness
is emphasized by the fact that the resolution constitutes a reconsideration and
reversal of our resolution of April 30, 1947, without any party moving for the
reconsideration. The fact that petitioners themselves allowed to pass about
three months since said resolution of April 30, 1947, was promulgated, shows
that petitioners themselves were willing to abide by our resolution of deciding
finally on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 37 and Department Order No.
32.
Ever since January 10, 1947, when we stated the reasons for our dissent to
the resolution giving due course to the petition and ordering respondents to
answer it, we made known our opinion that Republic Act No. 37 and Department
Order No. 32 do not violate, contrary to petitioners’ claim, any provision of
the Constitution.
Furthermore, we believe that both act and order are in perfect harmony with
avowed main purposes of the government established by our fundamental law.
According to the preamble, said government shall embody the ideals of the
Filipino people, promote the general welfare, and secure to our people and their
posterity, the blessings of independence. According to section 5 of Article II
of the Constitution, “the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the state,” and
there should not be any question that nationalization of public markets is one
of the imperative measures for attaining the purpose. The operation of public
utilities is reserved to citizens of the Philippines by section 8 of Article XIV
of the fundamental law, and it is our opinion that public markets partake of the
nature of a public utility, perhaps in greater measure than power and
transportation services. Public markets are feeding the nation. Food is one of
the elemental and indispensable necessities of human beings.
Considering the fact that petitioners belong to one of the most powerful,
rich and influential social groups, well provided with means to attain their
social and economic ends, while those who are supposed to be benefited by
Republic Act No. 37 and Department Order No. 32 constitute a much weaker class,
It is evident that nationalization of the public markets is one of the proper
means to establish the economic equilibrium demanded by social justice.
Official duty, public policy, judicial statesmanship, proper administration
of justice, all concur in demanding from us an unequivocal decision of the main
legal issues, the real issues raised by the pleadings in this case. It is not
enough that individual members of this Court, like us, should have expressed in
unmistakable terms, their opinion in the controversy. It is not enough that a
majority should have manifested their leanings in support of the same opinion,
as they did in the preliminary deliberations we had before adopting the
resolution promulgated on January 10, 1947. It is necessary that a formal
decision should be rendered.
This is so extremely simple that it may seem unbelievable and paradoxical.
Sometimes it is hard to demonstrate what is evident. The elementals are easily
forgotten. The most familiar things are not minded. The simplest ideas and
feelings challenge expression. The modern mind is overburdened by complexities
of its own making, by the weight of undiscerned authorities, by unanalyzed
background and precedents, by overlapping technicalities, by information
accumulated without method or logic, that its power of seeing and reasoning
appears sometimes to be incapable of grasping what is self-evident in the same
way that the hand cannot hold what is already in its palm because it is bent on
catching what is far away. That is the tragedy of the gourmet who had lost taste
for natural foods, of the futurists and cubists who pretend to be painters, of
jazz and primitive syncopation devotees who can not enjoy the divine fugues of
Bach.
Thousands all over the country are awaiting the result of the controversy.
Many agencies of the government,—the Department of Finance, municipal councils,
provincial boards, other officers in charge of public markets,—are awaiting the
final settlement that could come only from the highest tribunal of the land. We
can put an end to the worry in many minds. We must not fail them. Let us speak
out our minds without hesitancy, without fear or favor to anyone. The
administration of justice must be performed with the unconcern and aloofness of
the decrees of destiny.
This Court is failing in its official duty by
abstaining from deciding on the merits a case which has been awaiting decision
more than six months ago. We cannot even remain silent at the peril that our
silence be interpreted as consent or complicity, although there is imminent
danger that this our attitude may not escape the blackout under the policy of
concealment prevailing in this Court, and we will not be exempted, in the eyes
of the people who will be kept ignorant of the true facts, of the blame for this
Tribunal’s refusal to administer justice in this case.